Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 3.2

3.2.1

ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgam |

ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe—on contact of the Soul with the senses and their objects; jñānasya—of knowledge; bhāvaḥ—existence, production, appearance; abhāvaḥ—non-existence, non-production, non-appearance; ca—and; manasaḥ—of the Mind; liṅgam—Mark.

1. The appearance and non-appearance of knowledge, on contact of the Soul with the senses and the objects are the marks (of the existence) of the Mind.

[Read sūtra 3.2.1 above]

3.2.2

dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte |

tasya—its, of the mind; dravyatva-nityatve—substance-ness and eternality; vāyunā—by Air; vyākhyāte—explained.

2. The Substance-ness and eternality of Mind are explained by (the explanation of the Snbstance-ness and eternality of) Air.

[Read sūtra 3.2.2 above]

3.2.3

prayatnāyaugapadyāj jñānāyaugapadyāc caikaṃ manaḥ |

prayatnāyaugapadyāt—from the non-simultaneity of volitions; jñānāyaugapadyāt—from the non-simultaneity of cognitions; ca—and; ekam—one.

3. From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from the nonsimultaneity of cognitions, (it follows that there is only) one (Mind) (in each organism).

[Read sūtra 3.2.3 above]

3.2.4

prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni |

prāṇa-apāna-nimeṣa-unmeṣa-jīvana-manogati-indriyāntaravikāraḥ—ascending life-breath, descending life-breath, closing the eyelids, opening the eyelids, life, the movement of the Mind, and affections of the other senses; sukha-duḥkha-icchā-dveṣa-prayatnā—Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Volition; ca—and; ātmanaḥ—of the Soul; liṅgāni—marks.

4. The ascending life-breath, the descending life-breath, the closing of the eye-lids, the opening of the eye-lids, life, the movement of the Mind, and the affections of the other senses, and also Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, and Volition are marks (of the existence) of the Soul.

[Read sūtra 3.2.4 above]

3.2.5

dravyatvanityatve vāyunā vyākhyāte |

tasya—its, of the Soul; dravyatva-nityatve—Substance-ness and eternality; vayunā—by Air; vyākhyāte—explained.

5. Its Substance-ness and eternality are explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.

3.2.6

yajñadatta iti sati sannikarṣe pratyakṣābhāvād dṛṣṭaṃ liṅgaṃ na vidyate |

5. Its Substance-ness and eternality are explained by (the explanation of the Substance-ness and eternality of) Air.

3.2.7

sāmānyatodṛṣṭāc cāviśeṣaḥ |

sāmānyato-dṛṣṭāt—from a commonly-observed or analogous mark; ca—and; aviśeṣaḥ—non-particular; Not a thing in particular or as such.

7. And from a commonly-observed mark (there is) no (inference of anything in) particuiar.

A commonly-observed mark also becomes a mark of inference. But it does not prove the Soul as Soul, nor as a Substance over and above the eight Substances. It would only prove that desire, etc., must be resident somewhere. And this does not suggest the thought of a Soul. This is the meaning. Therefore it is stated, “Not a thing in particular.”—7.

3.2.8

tasmād āgamikam |

tasmāt—therefore, because the Soul cannot be proved by reasoning; āgamikaḥ—scriptural, proved by the revealed texts.

8. Therefore (the Soul is) proved by Revelation.

The Soul is really proved by Revelation only, but not by inference, since visible and commonly-observed marks do not exist. Therefore, mental vision of the principles or essences of things results from the proper hearing of the Upaniṣads, and not from the course of intellection. So that this Regulation (i.e., the Vaiśeṣika system), which teaches intellection, is no regulation. For, it is observed in the case of “ten ghosts, swimming across the river,” etc., that the cognition of the person who has representation of these things in his consciousness, arises only from the very instructions that ten ghosts dwell on this tree, that such and such an object floats across the river, etc.).—8,

3.2.9

aham iti śabdavyatirekān nāgamikam |

aham—I; iti—this; śabdasya—of the word; vyatirekāt—exclusion, non-application, divergence, abhorrence; na—not; āgamikam—Scriptural, Proved by Revelation.

9. (The proof of the existence of the Soul is not solely) from revelation, because of the non-application of the word ‘I’ (to other designates or objects).—144.

Revelation alone is not the proof of the existence of Soul ; but the Soul is proved also by the inference that the word ‘ I,’ or the word ‘Soul,’ must have some designate (or objective reality corresponding to it), because it is a word, like the word, water-pot, etc. Lest it might be said that it is Earth, etc., which are its designates, so he says, “Because of non-application,” in other words, because of the non-application or divergence of the word ‘I’ from Earth, etc. For, there never arises any such use of language or intuition as “I am Earth,” “I am Water,” “I am Fire,” “I am Air,” I am Ether,” “I am Time,” I am Space,” “I am Mind.” If you object that such intuition or use arises with respect to the body, we reply that it does not, for it would then entail such intuition or use with respect to the bodies of others; if, that it arises with respect to one’s own body, we reply that it is not so, for ‘one’s own’ or one’s self, as different from the Soul, has no meaning or is not proved by etymology, and because the intuition, “ My body,” proceeds upon a difference of substrata. It cannot be said, (objection) “Well, but this too is an inference by analogy which however does not and with a particular thing, and is therefore defective ; ” for, (answer) in the word ‘I,’ I-ness or Soul-ness itself forms the specification or distinction. So that on the strength of the property of its being an attribute of the subject of the argument (pakṣa), it follows that I-ness is the cause of the inference of Soul, and as it is not common to any other object, therefore the particular object (or the Soul in particular) is proved. Similarly, there is proof of the particular object, from the analogous inference or commonly observed mark accompanied with the exclusion of other possibilities. The objection which has been made, namely, “From ‘hearing’ alone results realization or intuition of the Soul; what is the need of all this proof?”, is not sound. For, without reflection or intellection, the dross of unbelief in wavering minds cannot be purged away; without this purification, there can be no aptitude in them for constant meditation; and without constant meditation, there can be no realization of truth or intuition of the Soul, which is capable of uprooting false knowledge together with desires or appetencies, as it is from habit only that a sad lover suddenly comes to have a mental realization of his beloved lady, and because verbal or inferential knowledge is not capable of uprooting false knowledge, as is seen in the case of delusion in respect of direction in Space, etc. This is the import.

If it be asked, “Still how can a sign or indication (of its existence) be apprehended in the Soul which is imperceptible we reply, “Who has ever said that the Soul is not perceptible? On the contrary, the Soul is apprehended by its proximity through or in the form of conjunction, to the Mind. Otherwise, how can there be such intuitions as ‘I am happy,’ ‘I know,’ ‘I desire,’ ‘I will,’ ‘I feel pain,’ etc? For these intuitions are neither unsubstantial nor of doubtful substantiality, because like that of the perception of blueness, their substantiality is undoubted. Nor are they inferential or derived from marks, for they arise even without any knowledge of marks. Nor again are they derived from verbal information or authority, for they do not follow upon enquiry for that.” If it be urged that they are appearances of perception (and not true perceptions), we reply that they must have then for their object something which is not apparent (i.e, real), for it will be shown in the sequel that that which is not object of certain knowledge, cannot be applied by metaphor to or superimposed upon, another object.—9.

3.2.10

yadi ca dṛṣṭapratyakṣo 'haṃ devadatto 'haṃ yajñadatta iti |

yadi—if; dṛṣṭam—observation; anvakṣam—sensuous; aham—I; devadattaḥ—Devadatta; aham—I; yajñadattaḥ—Yajñadatta; iti—such.

10. If (there are) such sensuous observations (or perceptions) as ‘I am Devadatta,’ ‘I am Yajñadatta,’ (then there is no need of inference).

The word ‘iti’ marks the form of knowledge, In ‘dṛṣṭa,’ the affix ‘kta’ is used in a passive sense. ‘Anvakṣa’ means sensuous or perceptual. Therefore the meaning is: if there is perceptual or sensuous observation in the form of ‘This is Devadatta,’ ‘This is Yajñadatta,’ then what is the use of taking the trouble of making an inference? “For an elephant being in sight or observation, those who infer, do not infer it by its screaming.”—10.

3.2.11

devadatto gacchati viṣṇumitro gacchatīti copacārāc charīrapratyakṣaḥ |

devadattaḥ—Devadatta; gacchati—goes; yajñadattaḥ—Yajñadatta; gacchati—goes; iti—such; These. upacārāt—by transference; śarīre—in the body; pratyayaḥ—intntition; Belief.

12. ‘Devadatta goes,’ ‘Yajñadatta goes,’—in these cases, the belief (that their respective bodies go) is due to transference.

For there are such intuitions as “I am fair,” “I am stout,” and there is also such differential intuition as “My body.” Now, in “Devadatta goes,” the perception of co-existence with motion, and the use of language to express it, are topical, whereas the intuition “my” is real as carrying its own meaning. Although the property of being Devadatta is a jdti, kind or genus, existing in the body whereby the use of language as Devadatta goes” is in the primary sense and the intuition is true in its own meaning, yet if the term Devadatta be applied to the Soul delimited by it, it is then to be understood as a transferred epithet.

3.2.12

sandigdhas tūpacāraḥ |

sandigdhaḥ—doubtful; tu—however; upacāraḥ—Transference.

13. The transference, however, is doubtful.

The word ‘tu’ points out the opponent’s view. The intuition and the use of the word, ‘I,’ are observed both in respect of the Soul and body. Therefore the doubt arises which intuition and expression be the primary, and which the secondary ones.—13.

3.2.13

aham iti pratyagātmani bhāvāt paratrābhāvād arthāntarapratyakṣaḥ |

aham—I; iti—this; pratyag-ātmani—in the in-going or individual Soul; bhāvāt—because it exists; Paratra, other-

where. Abhāvāt, because it does not exist. Arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ, (Intuition) wherein the individual soul is the object of perception.

14. Because the intuition ‘I’ exists in one’s own soul, and because it does not exist otherwhere, therefore the intuition has the individual Soul as the object of perception.

‘Arthāntara-pratyakṣaḥ’ is that intuition in which ‘arthāntaram,’ i.e., the Soul itself, is the percept. The meaning is as follows: Since tho intuition ‘I’ arises in respect of ‘pratyagātma,’ i.e., one’s own Soul, and since it does not arise ‘paratra’ i.e., in respect of other Souls, therefore it is proper to regard the reference to ‘arthāntaram’ or one’s own Soul as the primary reference. If, on the other hand, the primary reference were to the body, then the intuition would be produced by the external senses, for the body is not an object of mental perception, and the intuition ‘This is I’ is mental being produced even without the operation of the external senses, since the mind takes in as its object the Soul as modified by appropriate particular attributes in the form of ‘I am happy,’ ‘I know,’ ‘I will,’ ‘I desire,’ This intuition is not inferential, as it is produced even without seeking any mark of inference. Nor is it verbally communicated, since it is produced even without the apprehension of any authoritative text. Therefore it is only mental; further because the mind, as it is not an independent agent outside its own sphere, does not apply into the body and other external objects. Moreover, if it be urged that, if it referred to the body, it would refer to the bodies of others, and if it referred to one’s own Soul, it would also refer to the Souls of others, we deny this, for the Soul of one man is beyond the senses of another, since its particular attributes have no fitness for or relation to, them, and since its fitness for or relation to, them arises from the taking on or super-imposition of appropriate particular attributes. Nor is this the nature of the Soul only, but of every Substance. For Substance? becomes perceptible only by the taking on of appropriate particular attributes. If it is said that Ether also should, for the same reason, become perceptible by the accompaniment of Sound, we reply that such would be the case, if the ear were capable of apprehending Substance, or if Ether possessed colour. If it is rejoined that the Soul also is equally devoid of colour, we reply that it is in the case of external Substances only that possession of colour is a requisite with regard to perceptibility. The word ‘pratyag,’ in-going, points out divergence from others.—14.

3.2.14

na tu śarīraviśeṣād yajñadattaviṣṇumitrayor jñānaviśeṣaḥ |

na—not; tu—but; śarīra-viśeṣāt—perceiving the difference of bodies, Yajñadatta-Viṣṇumitrayoḥ, of Yajña-datta and Viṣṇumitra; jñānam—knowledge, thought; Viṣayaḥ, object

17. But the thoughts of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra do not become objects of perception to them, while they perceive the difference of their bodies. (Therefore consciousness is not an attribute of the body).

‘Jñānam’ implies sensible pleasure, pain, and other attributes of the Soul. As the bodies of Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra are mutually different, so are also their knowledge, pleasure, pain, and the like, different. Accordingly, as is this body of Yajñadatta, so also, though no knowledge, or pleasure, etc., be produced in Yajñadatta, will the knowledge, etc., “I feel pleasure,” “I know” “I will,” “I desire,” be objects (of perception); because the sensible body being an object of perception, knowledge, etc., which are (ex hypothesi) its properties, like its colour, etc., will have the possibility of being perceptible. But this is impossible. Therefore (such is the import), it should be said that the seat or subject of knowledge, etc., is something really different from the body. ‘Śarīraviśeṣāt’ means from difference of body. The fifth case-ending has been used in the sense of the infinitive. So that the meaning is that knowledge or thought is not an object of perception, while difference of body is being perceived.—17.

3.2.15

sukhaduḥkhajñānaniṣpattyaviśeṣād aikātmyam |

sukha-duḥkha-jñāna-niṣpatti-aviśeṣāt—because there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge; aikātmyam—identity or unity of Soul.

19. Soul is one, since there is no difference in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge.

There is only one Soul, in spite of the difference of the bodies of Caitra, Maitra, and others. Why? Because of the non-distinction in the production of pleasure, pain, and knowledge, i.e., because the origin of pleasure, pain, and knowledge is really undifferentiated in this that it is determined by, or confined to, the body as a whole- If there were another mark to prove the difference of the Soul, the difference of the Soul might be proved, but there is no such mark. As Ether is only one, in spite of the production of Sounds within the limits of particular spaces, since there is no distinction in Sound which is its mark; as Time is only one, since there is no distinction in the intuition of simultaneity, etc., which is its mark; as Space is only one, since there is no distinction in the intuition of East, West, etc., which is its mark; (so the Soul is only one).—19.

The meaning is that, “aviśeṣāt” i.e., becasue the difference of the Jīvātmā (embodied Soul) from tśvara is not proved, “niṣpa[?]yā” i.e., by the certainty or ascertainment, i.e., of pleasure, pain, and knowledge; in other words, they, being proved in the mind by the above Śruti or Vedic text, are thereby disproved in the Soul.

3.2.16

nānā vyavasthātaḥ |

vyavasthātaḥ—from status; nānā—many.

20. Plurality of Souls is proved by status.

Souls are many. Why? Because of status. Status means several conditions, as one is rich, another miserable, one is happy, another unhappy, one is of high, another of low, birth, one is learned, another ignorant. These circumstances being impossible without a diversity of Souls, prove a diversity of Souls. It cannot be maintained that as the states of one and the same Soul is diversified by the difference of birth or by the difference of childhood, youth and old age, so also it will be in the case of the difference of the bodies of Caitra, Maitra, and others, for it is possible to impose contradictory attributes (on one and the same subject) by means of change of Time (i.e., at different times).—20.

He removes the apprehension, “nānā” means non-identity of the Souls, in other words, that the Jivātmā is not identical with Īśvara. Whence? because of the certainty of the existence of pleasure, pain, and knowledge, in the Soul. For pleasure, etc., are not properties of the mind, because the mind not having largeness or large size, pleasure etc., would be imperceptible; and minuteness or atom-ness or subtleness must be affirmed of the mind as determining the non-simultaneity of acts of knowing. The Śruti, “Desire, Resolution, etc.,” however, like “Life is clarified butter,” etc., demonstrates that the mind is the cause of desire, etc., but not that it is their receptacle, nor that it is identical with them.

3.2.17

śāstrasāmarthyāc ca |

śāstra-sāmarthyāt—from the authority (or force or significance) of the śāstras; ca—and.

21. (Plurality of Souls follows) also from the authority or significance of the Śāstras.

‘Śāstra’ means Veda or revelation. Because difference of Soul is proved by it also. For it is heard. “Two Brahmans (i.e., Souls) have to be known,” etc.; and also “Two birds, friends and kindred, embrace the same tree, etc.” (Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad III, i. I.)—21.