Siddhitraya p47

p47

ravirodhaśca . viśaṣaguṇaśca kāṭhinya karakadravyavarti akāraṇaguṇapūrvakaṃ dṛśyata ityanekāntaśca . na ca saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ kāṭhinyam ; tasya dviṣṭhatvāt ; asya tu karakadravyaikavartitvāt ; sparśaviśeṣatayā padārthavidbhirabhyupagamācca . dṛśyasya dehasya kathaṃ draṣṭṛtvamiti cet ; ko virodhaḥ? . ayameva yadekasyāṃ kriyāṃyāmekasya karmatvaṃ kartṛtvaṃ ca na ghaṭata iti . yadyevam, vyatirekavāde vā kathamātmani ahamiti pratyayaḥ . rūpabhedāditi cet, samānamidaṃ dehātmavāde%pi . api ca parasamavāyikriyāphalagāmi karma . svasamanetajñānaphalabhāginaḥ śarīrasya karmatvameva nāstīti na paryanuyogāvakāśaḥ . ato deha evātmeti bārhaspatyāḥ . tathāca " pṛthivyāpastejo vāyuriti tattvāni, tebhyaścaitanyaṃ, kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat " iti sūtram .
prathamaṃ tāvadātmatattvamupavarṇayati "tatre"ti . "deha" iti . nirūpaṇīyatayopakṣipteṣu ghaṭakībhūta ātmā dehādito vilakṣaṇaḥ svayaṃprakāśaḥ nityaḥ sūkṣmatayā sarvavyāptikṣamaḥ pratiśarīraṃ bhinnaḥ ānandasvabhāva ityarthaḥ . dhīḥ - viṣayaprakāśakaṃ jñānamātmano dharmabhūtam . tadādhāratvāttadvilakṣaṇatvam . ananyena svena sādhanaṃ siddhiḥ prakāśo yasya so%nanyasādhanaḥ . nityatvamutpattivināśarahitatvam . vyāpītyaneneṇasūkṣmatvaṃ phalitam . svataḥ sukhī - svarūpata evānukūlaprakāśalakṣaṇasukhavān . sukhasvarūpa iti yāvat . yadvā svābhāvikamānanditvamasya; duḥkhitvaṃ tvaupādhikameveti bhāvaḥ .. 3 ..

Moreover, hardness, a specific quality residing in the substance of hail, is seen not to be preceded by the qualities of its causes, so there is an inconclusiveness [in your rule]. Nor is hardness merely a specific conjunction, because conjunction resides in two things, whereas this resides in the substance of hail alone, and because it is accepted by knowers of the categories as a specific kind of touch. If it is asked: How can the body, which is an object of perception, be a perceiver? What is the contradiction? Just this: that in one and the same action, one and the same entity cannot be both the object and the agent. If that is so, then in the view of an independent [self], how is there the cognition of 'I' with respect to the self? If it be replied, 'because of a difference in aspect,' this is the same in the view that the body is the self as well. Furthermore, an object is that which receives the fruit of an action inhering in another; the body, which receives the fruit of knowledge inhering in itself, is not an object [of action] at all, so there is no room for this objection. Therefore, the body itself is the self—so hold the Bārhaspatyas (Cārvākas). And likewise runs the aphorism: 'Earth, water, fire, and wind are the principles; from them consciousness [arises], like the intoxicating power from ferment and other ingredients.'
First, he describes the true nature of the self with 'There,' [in the verse:] 'The body…' Among the entities introduced to be investigated, the self, which is an constituent part [of them], is distinct from the body and the rest, self-illuminating, eternal, capable of pervading everything by its subtlety, distinct in each body, and of the nature of bliss—such is the meaning. 'Intellect'—knowledge that illuminates objects, which is an attribute of the self. Because the self is its substratum, it is distinct from it. That whose establishment, or illumination, is by itself, not by another, is 'established by no other.' Being eternal means being free from origination and destruction. By 'pervading,' its subtlety is implied. 'Naturally happy'—having happiness characterized by agreeable illumination from its very nature; that is to say, having the nature of happiness. Or rather, its being blissful is innate, while its suffering is merely adventitious—this is the purport. (3)