Siddhitraya p48

p48

uktamātmatattvamasahamānaḥ śarīrātmavātī cārvākaḥ pratyavatiṣṭhate "nanu dehameve"ti . pratyakṣaṃ hi mukhyaṃ pramāṇam . na ca tadatilaṅghanena kaścanārthaḥ sādhayituṃ śakyate . pratyakṣaṃ ca sathaulyādiyoginaṃ dehameva jñātāramahamarthamātmānaṃ pratipādayatīti deha evātmeti bhāvaḥ . dehasyaivāhaṃbuddhiviṣayatvamupapādayati "dehaśce"tyādivākyadvayena . "ata" iti . tatsamānādhikaraṇatayā-dehābhinnārthaviṣayakatayā . itthaṃ bhāve tṛtīyā . ayamahaṅkāraḥ - sthūlo%hamityahapratyayaḥ pratyakṣarūpaḥ . śarīrālambanaḥ - śarīraviṣayakaḥ . śiṣṭaṃ spaṣṭam . pratyakṣātikrame doṣamāha "itarathe"ti . pratyakṣamūlā hi vyavahārāḥ samupalabhyante paṇḍitapāmarasādhāraṇā arthakriyākārimo mukhyā eva . tadvirodhaḥ pratyakṣātikrame prasajyata ityarthaḥ . nanu "sthūlo%haṃ jānāmī"ti pratītirbhrāntireva pāmarāṇām . paṇḍitānāṃ tvaritiktātmagocaraivāhaṃ jānāmīti . ahaṃ sthūla iti tu vyavahāraḥ paṇḍitānāṃ lākṣaṇika ityāśaṅkāmanūdya pratikṣipati "na cāya"miti . ayaṃ vyavahāro lakṣaṇika ca netyanvayaḥ . vācyamiti śeṣaḥ .
pratikṣepayuktimāha "mukhye"ti . ahaṃpadaśaktiviṣayasya dehavyatiriktasyānupalambhanirastatvāddeha eva mukhyatvamahampratyayavyavahahārayoriti bhāvaḥ . jānāmyahamiti jñātṛtvapratīterdehagocaratve%nupapattimāśaṅkate "na ce" tyādinā . anvayinā - niyatena . sāvayavārthapratyakṣatvavyāpakaṃ tadavayavādiprakāśakatvamiti niyamo neti bhāvaḥ . sati niyame yatprasaktaṃ tadā "yene"ti . iti sidhyediti śeṣaḥ . tadanvayābhāvāt-śarīrāvayavādiprakāśānvayābhāvāttadaprakāśakatvāccharīrātiriktamevāvagamayedahaṃ jānāmīti . na tu śarīraṃ sāvayavamiti niyamaphalam . jñātṛtvapratyakṣaṃ śarīrāviṣayakam, tadavayavāviṣayakatvāt . yadyadakyaviviṣayaṃ tattadvayavagocaram, yathā ghaṭādi pratyakṣamityatra prayoge niruktaniyamasyopayogaḥ . niruktaniyamasyāsaṃbhave hetumāha

Not tolerating the true nature of the self as stated, the Cārvāka, who holds that the body is the self, objects: 'Well now, [we perceive] the body itself…' Indeed, perception is the primary means of valid cognition. And no object can be established by transgressing it. And perception presents the body itself, which possesses heaviness and so forth, as the knower, the referent of 'I', the self; hence the body itself is the self—this is the purport. He establishes that the body alone is the object of the 'I'-cognition through the two sentences beginning with 'And the body…' 'Therefore'—by being in co-referentiality with that, that is, by having as its object that which is non-different from the body. The instrumental case is used in the sense of 'being such.' 'This ego-sense'—the perceptual cognition of 'I' as in 'I am stout.' 'Resting on the body'—having the body as its object. The rest is clear. He states the fault in transgressing perception: 'Otherwise…' For practical dealings are observed to be rooted in perception, common to scholars and common folk alike, efficacious, and primary. The meaning is that if perception is transgressed, contradiction with them would follow. An objection might be raised: Surely the cognition 'I, being stout, know' is an error of common folk; whereas for scholars, 'I know' has as its object an additional self, while the scholars' usage 'I am stout' is merely metaphorical. Repeating this objection, he rejects it: 'Nor is this…' The construction is: 'Nor should it be said that this usage is metaphorical'; 'should be said' is supplied.
He gives the reasoning for this rejection: 'primary…' Since a referent over and above the body, which could be the denotative capacity of the word 'I', is refuted by non-observation, both the cognition and the linguistic usage of 'I' are primary with respect to the body alone—such is the purport. He raises the difficulty that if the cognition of being a knower as in 'I know' has the body as its object, it would be untenable: 'Nor…' and so forth. 'Invariably accompanied'—constant. The purport is: there is no such rule that illuminating the parts of an object with parts is pervaded by the perceptual cognition of that object with parts. What would result if that rule existed is stated by 'whereby…' 'It would be established' is supplied. 'Because of the absence of that invariable accompaniment'—because there is no accompaniment of the illumination of the parts of the body and so forth, and because it does not illuminate them, the cognition 'I know' would make known something distinct from the body, but not the body which possesses parts—this would be the result of the rule. Perception of being a knower does not have the body as its object, because it does not have the parts of the body as its object; whatever has a whole as its object has the parts of that whole as its object, just as the perception of a pot and the like—in this syllogistic formulation, the aforementioned rule would be employed. He states the reason for the impossibility of the aforementioned rule: