Manava Dharmashastra 1.3.2

1.3.2

vedatvaṃ ca tasya darśapūrṇamāsavākyamantravākyābhyāṃ śrutyantarābhyāṃ svasāmarthyenotthāpitatvāditikumārilapakṣaḥ | athavā vidhirvidhānamanuṣṭhānaṃ prayojanasaṃpattiḥ | tasya svayambhuvo nityasyānādiparamparāyātasya, svayambhuvā vedena vā pratipādyasya, sarvasya śrūyamāṇākṣarapratipādyasya pratipannārthasāmarthyagamyasya ca | dvividho hi vaidiko vidhiḥ | kaścitsākṣācchabdapratipādyaḥ | yathā 'sauryaṃ caruṃ nirvapet brahmavarcasakāma' iti sauryacarau brahmavarcasakāmo' dhikriyate | tasya carorbrahmavarcasaṃ sādhayata iyamitikartavyatā āgneyavadityavagamyate | ubhayatrāpi ceyaṃ pratītiḥ śabdāvagamamūlatvāt śabda eva | ubhāvapi śabdādabhidhānataḥ pratīyete, tathā cāmidheyapratipattitaḥ | viśeṣastu vyavadhānādikṛto na śabdatāṃ vihanti | yathā vāpīsthamudakaṃ hastenābhihataṃ pradeśāntaramabhihanti tadapi hastasaṃyogenaivābhihataṃ bhavati, na tu sākṣāt | śarkarāṇāṃ recakakarmaṇyādyaprayatnakṛtā evotplutyotplutya pātāḥ | tādṛśametat | vaikṛte karmaṇi viśiṣṭetikartavyatāsambandhaḥ | evaṃ viśvajitā yajetetyutpattirnādhikāraśūnyā'stīti svargakāma ityadhikārāvagatiḥ pratipannārthasāmarthyagamyā | ato dvairūpye vidhānasya sarvasyetipadam | sarvasya tātparyamevaṃ rūpam—vedamūlāḥ smṛtaya iti jñāpayitum | dvitīye caitaddarśayiṣyāmaḥ | "nanu liṅādipratipādyo'rthaḥ kartavyatārūpo vidhiḥ | sa ca sarvatra pratyakṣaśabdapratipādya eva | tatra kimucyate dvividho hi vaidiko vidhiriti | nirvapediti kartavyatā' vagamyate | itikartavyatā'rthasāmarthyagamyā uktena prakāreṇa” |

Or, the term ‘vidhāna’ may be taken as equivalent to ‘vidki’, meaning actual operation, the accomplishment of purpose; this is called ‘svayambhu’ in the sense that it is eternal, i.e., handed down by beginningless tradition,—or that it is prescribed in the eternal Veda;—‘entire’—i.e., what is prescribed in the directly available verbal texts, and what is only implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the texts. The Vedic injunction is of two kinds:—(a) There is one kind of injunction which is directly expressed by the words; e.g., ‘desirous of Brahmic glory, one should offer the Saurya-Caru’; here what is expressed is that one who desires Brahmic glory is the ñt and proper person to offer the Saurya-Caru; and when one proceeds to secure Brahmic glory by means of the said offering, he learns that the procedure of the offering is analogous to the Āgneya offering (which is the archetype of all Caru-offerings). In both these cases the idea got at, being derived from the words of the texts, is regarded as ‘derived directly from words;’ though the former is derived directly from the words and the latter from what is ‘expressed by the worlds,’ yet, this difference, due to the removal of the latter by one step, does not deprive it of the character of ‘being derived from words.’ For instance, when the water in the pool is struck by the hand, and it in its turn strikes against some other place; and yet this latter place is regarded as being struck by the hand, though not directly; similarly when pieces of rubber are thrown down, they rise and fall, and all the subsequent acts of rising and falling are the indirect effects of 'the first downward impulse imparted to them. Exactly analogous is the case of the injunctions in question: Every ectypal sacrifice is related to a particular form of procedure (borrowed from its archetype). Similarly when we meet with the injunction ‘one should perform the Viśvajit sacrifice,’ we argue that no injunction is possible except in reference to a fit and proper person capable of (and having a motive for) performing it, and hence come to the conclusion that the person so capable is one who desires Heaven; this idea being thus implied by the force of what is directly expressed by the words of the text. It is in view of this two-fold character of injunctions (and enjoined acts) that we have the term ‘entire.’ In fact the purpose of adding the epithet ‘entire’ is to indicate that Smṛtis have their source in the Veda. This we shall explain under Discourse II.

An objection is raised:—

“As a matter of fact, Vidhi is something in the form of what should be done, expressed by the injunctive and such other verbal expressions; and this, in all cases, must be directly expressed by actual words; under the circumstances, what do you mean by saying that there are two kinds of injunction,—that the term ‘one should offer’ denotes something to be done, and the procedure of the offering is indicated by implication in the manner described above?”