Manava Dharmashastra 1.3.3

1.3.3

naiṣa doṣaḥ | nirvapedyajeteti na kevala dhātūrthaviṣayatve'vagate paripūrṇā kartavyatā bhavati yāvadaṃśāntarāṇyadhikāratikarttavyatāprayogarūpāṇi nāvagatāni | etairaṃśairvitatarūpo vidhiḥ pratīyate | ato'ṃśarūpāṇyapi vidhiśabdābhilapyatayā na viruddhāni | etadevāha acintyasyeti | apratyakṣasyetyarthaḥ | pratyakṣaṃ hyanubhūta ityucyate, na cintyate iti, na smaryata iti | aprameyasya kalpyasya, prāyaśaḥ smṛtivākyamūlasya | na hi pratyakṣeṇa pramīyate | ato'prameyasyetyucyate | athavā'prameyasyeyattayā parimātumaśakyasyātimahattvāt | anekaśākhābhedabhinne| vedo na śakyate sarvaiḥ pramātum | ata evācintyasya | yadatibahu taddurmahattvādacintyamityucyate | yathā ca loke vaktāro bhavanti, 'anyeṣāṃ kā gatiḥ ? cintayitumapyetanna yujyata' iti | manaḥ kila sarvaviṣayam, ayaṃ cātimahattvāttasyāpi na viṣaya iti | padadvayena bāhyāntaḥkaraṇāviṣayatayā mahattvasya khyāpanenācāryaḥ protsāhyate | tvayaiva kevalenaivaṃvidho veda āgamito'tastasya yaḥ kāryarūpastattvārthastaṃ vetsi jānīṣe | kāryamanuṣṭheyamucyate | yatra puruṣo'nuṣṭhātṛtvena viniyujyate-idaṃ tvayā kartavyamidaṃ tvayā na kartavyamiti-agnihotrādi kartavyam kalañjabhakṣaṇādi na kartavyam | pratiṣedho'pyanuṣṭhānameva | yadbrāhmaṇavadhasyānanuṣṭhānaṃ tadeva pratiṣedhasyānuṣṭhānam | pravṛttiśca kriyānivṛttiśca kriyeti | na hi parispandamānasādhanasādhyamevānuṣṭhānamucyate, kiṃ tarhi prāpte tadrūpe tannivṛttirapi | yathā 'hitasevī cirāyuriti' yaḥ prāpte kāle bhuṅkte'prāpte na bhuṅkte | abhojanamapi hitameva |

There is no force in this objection. As a matter of fact, in the case of the injunctive words ‘nirvapet,’ ‘should offer,’ ‘yajeta,’ ‘should sacrifice’ and the like, even though what is expressed by the verbal root itself may be comprehended, the full conception of what is to he done is not obtained until we have comprehended the other factors,—such as the character of the person fit for the performance, the procedure to be adopted, and the actual details of the act to be performed; it is only as equipped with all these factors that the Injunction becomes comprehended in its complete form. In view of this fact, there is nothing incongruous in regarding the said factors also as denoted by the Injunctive word.

This is what the text means by the epithet ‘achintya,’ ‘inconceivable’—which means ‘not directly perceptible.’ What is directly perceived is said to be ‘apprehended,’ and not ‘conceived,’ or ‘remembred’ [so that if the Veda were something directly perceived, the epithet ‘inconceivable’ would have no force; things like the Veda can only be conceived of, and the Veda isnot even that].

‘Not directly cognisable;’—i.e., that which has got to be assumed or inferred, as forming the source of several assertions made in the Smṛti;as a matter of fact, such Vedic texts are not perceived, hence it is called ‘not directly cognisable.’—Or ‘not directly cognisable’ may he taken in the sense of incapable of having its extent exactly defined, by reason of its being very extensive; the Veda being divided into several rescensions, cannot be exactly defined by all persons; and on this account also it may be called ‘inconceivable;’ even in ordinary parlance, people are found to say—‘what to say of others; this cannot be even conceived of.’ The mind can conceive of all things; but the Veda is so extensive that it cannot be conceived of even by the mind. Thus the two epithets (‘inconceivable’ and ‘not directly cognisable’) serve to indicate that the Veda is beyond the reach of the internal as well as the external organs of perception; i.e., it is very extensive; and this mention of the extensiveness of the Veda serves as an inducement to the Teacher; the meaning being—‘it is you alone who have learnt the Veda which is so extensive, hence you alone are conversant with what ought to be done, which forms the true import of the said Veda.’

The term ‘Kārya,’ ‘what ought to be done,’ stands for the act to be performed; in reference to which the man is prompted to be the performer, (in such terms as)—‘this should be done by you,’ ‘this should not be done by you,’ ‘the Agnihotra should be performed’ ‘the eating of the flesh of an animal killed by a poisoned arrow should not be done.’ Avoidance also is a kind of ‘acting;’ e.g., the ‘non-doing of Brāhmaṇa-murder’ constitutes the ‘performance’ or ‘acting’ of the avoidance (of Brāhmaṇa-murder). Activity is ‘acting;’ so is also ‘desisting from activity;’ and the name ‘acting’ is not restricted to only that which is accomplished by means of instruments and agents set in motion; in fact, when such ‘acting’ is possible, if one desists from it, this desisting also is ‘acting.’ For instance, when it is asserted that ‘the man who takes wholesome food lives long,’ what is meant is that the man who takes his food at the proper time, and who does not eat at the improper time; as desisting from eating is also ‘wholesome.’