Manava Dharmashastra 2.12

2.12

nātra kaścidviśeṣaḥ | vedanindāpratiṣedhena smṛtisadācārātmatuṣṭīnāmapi nindakasya bahiṣkāro'nena vihitaḥ | teṣāmapi vedamūladharmābhidhānam | ataḥ smṛtyādinindako vedanindaka eva |
“nanu ślokadvayena nārthaḥ | evaṃ vaktavyam | śrutyādīnātmatuṣṭyantānhetuśāstrāśrayāddvijaḥ yo nindetsa bahiṣkāryaḥ sādhubhirnāstikatvataḥ” |
ucyate | nācāryā granthagauravaṃ manyante | buddhigauravaṃ yatnena pariharanti | tasminhi sati asamyagavabodho dharmasya | sa ca puruṣārthaṃ vihanti |
bhedanirdeśe'pi hiṃ codayeyurvedagrahaṇameva kartavyam sarvasya dharmasya vaidikatvāt | tasmādvispaṣṭārthaṃ bhedenobhayanirdeśaḥ, saṅkṣiptaBlockrucīnāṃ pūrvaślokaḥ | anyeṣāṃ ślokadvayam |
svasya ca priyamātmanaḥ ityanena prāguktā ātmatuṣṭirevoktā | svagrahaṇaṃ vṛttapūraṇārtham| etatsākṣāddharmasya lakṣaṇaṃ nimittaṃ, jñāpakam, na punaḥ pratyakṣam | yathā'nyairuktaṃ ‘sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa’ iti |
vidhāśabdaḥ prakāravacanaḥ | ekameva dharme pramāṇaṃ vedākhyam | tasya tvete bhedāḥ smṛtyādayaḥ |
anye tūpasaṃhārārthamimaṃ ślokaṃ vyācakṣate | samāptaṃ dharmalakṣaṇaprakaraṇamiti punaḥ pāṭhaḥ samāptiṃ sūcayati | yathā dvirabhyāso vedāṅgeṣu ‘saṃsthājapenopatiṣṭhanta upatiṣṭhanta’ iti | tathā ca piṇḍīkṛta iva prāgukto'rtho hṛdi vartate | yathā naiyāyikā ‘anityaḥ’ śabda iti pratijñāya sādhanopanyāsaṃ kṛtvā nigamayanti ‘tasmādanityaḥ śabda iti’ | prāyeṇa caiṣā granthakārāṇāṃ rītiḥ | tathā mahābhāṣyakāro'pi kvacitsūtraṃ vārtikaṃ vā paṭhitvā vyākhyāya punaḥ paṭhati |

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):
There is no difference here. The prohibition of detracting the Veda implies that there should be casting out of also one who detracts the Smṛti, the Practic Men and Self-satisfaction. These also describe only such Dharma as is based upon the Veda; hence the detractor of these is also the ‘detractor of the Veda.’

Objection:—“There is no need for having both the verses; a single verse would have been sufficient, somewhat to the following effect:—‘the twice-born person, who, relying upon the Science of Dialectics, should scorn the sources of Dharma, beginning with Veda and ending with Self-satisfaction, should be cast out by all good men, on account of his being an infidel.”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—Teachers do not mind the burdening (prolexity) of their works; what they make every effort to avoid is the burdening of the intellect (of the learner); as it is the latter which interferes with the right understanding of Dharma; and this misunderstanding obstructs the fulfilment of the ends of man.

Then again, even if the author had mentioned all the four sources of Dharma (as suggested by the objector), some people might still argue thus—“the author should have mentioned the Veda only, all Dharma being based upon the Veda.” Hence it is for the purpose of clearness that the author has stated the matter in both ways: the former verse being intended for those who like brevity, and both the verses for other persons.

‘What is agreeable to oneself’ is the same as the ‘self-satisfaction’ spoken of before. The term ‘oneself’ is added only for filling up the metre.

‘These constitute directly the means of knowing Dharma’—‘Lakṣaṇa’ means cause, indicator; and Sense-Perception is not the means of knowing Dharma, as some people have held, speaking of (the sages as) ‘persons who have directly perceived Dharma.’

In the compound ‘Chaturvidham,’ ‘fourfold,’ the term ‘vidhā’ means kind, form. As a matter of fact, Veda is the only source of knowledge of Dharma, and Smṛti and the rest are only so many forms of the Veda.

Other people have explained this second verse as serving the purpose of recapitulating (all that has been said regarding the sources of Dharma). The description of the means of knowing Dharma having been finished, it is the end of this section that is indicated by the repetition (contained in the present verse). Such is the fashion with treatises on the Vedāṅgas; e.g., ‘saṃsthājapenopatiṣṭhante upatiṣṭhante’ (when; ‘upatiṣṭhante’ is repeated for indicating the end of the section); and when the author sets forth the second verse he has in his mind the sum-total of all that has been said in the present section. It is just as the Naiyāyikas, having propounded the Proposition that ‘Word is non-eternal,’ set forth the reasons in support of it, and then re-iterate the conclusion, saying ‘therefore word is non-eternal.’ In fact such is the way of all writers; e.g., the author of the Mahābhāṣya (Patāñjali) also sometimes states the Sūtra or the Vārtika, and having explained it, repeats it again.—(12)