Manava Dharmashastra 2

2.1.1

prathamo'dhyāyaḥ śāstrapratipādyārthatattvadarśanārtho'nukrāntaḥ | jagatsṛṣṭayādivarṇanaṃ ca taccheṣameva vyākhyātam | idānīṃ śāstramārabhate | tatra pratijñāto'rtho jagatsargādivarṇanena vyavāyādvismṛta ityanusandhānārthaṃ punaḥ śiṣyānprati bodhayati | yo dharmo bhavatāṃ śuśrūṣitastamidānīṃ mayocyamānaṃ nibodhatāvahitā bhūtvā śṛṇuta | prathame'dhyāye pañcaṣāḥ ślokāḥ prayojanādipratipādanārthāḥ | pariśiṣṭamarthavādarūpam | taccennātisamyagavadhāritaṃ na dharmaparijñāne mahatī kṣatiḥ | iha tu sākṣāddharma upadiśyate | tato'vadhānavadbhiravadhāraṇīyo'yamartha iti punarupanyāsaphalam | dharmaśabda uktārtho'ṣṭakādyanuṣṭhānavacanaḥ | bāhyadarśininastu bhasmakapālādidhāraṇamapi dharmaṃ manyante | tannivṛttyarthaṃ vidvadbhirityādīni viśeṣaṇapadāni | vidvāṃsaḥ śāstrasaṃskṛtamatayaḥ pramāṇaprameyasvarūpavijñānakuśalāḥ | te ca vedārthavido vidvāṃso nānye | yato vedādanyatra dharmaṃ prati ye gṛhītaprāmāṇyāste viparītapramāṇaprameyagra haṇādavidvāṃsa eva | etacca mīmāṃsātastattvato niścīyate | santaḥ sādhavaḥ pramāṇaparicchinnārthānuṣṭhāyino hitāhitaprāptiparihārārthāya yatnavantaḥ | hitāhitaṃ ca dṛṣṭaṃ prasiddham | adṛṣṭaṃ ca vidhipratiṣedhalakṣaṇam | tadanuṣṭhānabāhyā asanta ucyante | ata ubhayamatropāttaṃ jñānamanuṣṭhānaṃ ca | vidyamānatāvacanaḥ sacchabdo na sambhavati, ānarthakyāt | yadi yena sevyate tattaṃna vidyamānenaiva | sevā'nuṣṭhānaśīlatā | bhūtapratyayenānādikālapravṛttatāmāha | nāyamaṣṭakādidharmo'dyatve kenacitpravartita itaradharmavat | etadeva nityaśabdena darśayati |

Learn that Dharma, which has been ever followed by, and sanctioned by the heart of, the learned and the good, who are free from love and hate.—(1)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):
The First Discourse was undertaken for the purpose of showing the real character of the subject-matter dealt with by the Treatise; the description of the creation of the World and such other subjects have also been explained as supplementary to the said delineation of the subject-matter of the Treatise. It is now that the Treatise actually begins. As the promised subject of the Discourse, interrupted by the description of world-creation and such other subjects, may have been lost sight of,—the Teacher again addresses his pupils with a view to recall the subject to their minds.

That ‘Dharma,’ which you desired to learn is now being expounded by me,—please now ‘learn,’—i.e., be attentive and listen.

In Discourse I, five or six verses (85—91) were meant to point out the purpose of the Treatise; the rest of it is mere ‘declamatory description’ (Arthavāda). So that, if all that has not been carefully learnt, there is not much harm; in the present Discourse however ‘Dharma’ itself is being directly expounded; hence this subject should be carefully learnt. This is the meaning of the re-iteration (in this verse, of Dharma being the subject-matter of the Treatise).

The term ‘dharma,’ as already explained, denotes the performance of the Aṣṭakā and such other prescribed acts. External philosophers regard as ‘dharma’ also such acts as the wearing of ashes, the carrying of begging-bowls, and so forth;—and it is with a view to exclude these from the category of ‘Dharma’ that the author adds the qualifications—‘followed by the learned,’and so forth.

The ‘learned’ are those whose minds have been cultured by the study of the sciences; those that are capable of discerning the real character of the means of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. The ‘learned’ (meant here) are those who know the real meaning of the Veda, and not others. In fact those persons that admit sources other than the Veda to be the ‘means of knowledge’ in regard to Dharma are ‘unlearned,’ ‘ignorant’; in as much as their notions of the means and objects of knowledge are wrong. That this is so, we learn thoroughly from Mīmāmsā (Sūtra, Adhyāya I).

The ‘Good,’—i.e., righteous men; those who translate into action what is known from authoritative sources, and who always try to obtain what is wholesome and avoid what is not wholesome;—what is ‘wholesome’ and ‘not wholesome’ among visible things is well known; among the ‘Unseen,’ that which forms the subject of ‘Injunction’ is ‘wholesome,’ while that which forms the subject of ‘prohibition’ is ‘not wholesome.’ Those who are outside the said pale of acting in accordance with the said authoritative sources of knowledge are called ‘not good’ (unrighteous). It is for these reasons that both knowledge and acting have been mentioned here (by means of the two epithets, ‘learned’ and ‘good’).

It is not possible for the term ‘saṭ' (in ‘sadbhiḥ’) to be taken in the sense of existing at the present time; because in this sense the epithet would be entirely superfluous: when a certain thing is ‘followed’ by one, it is only when this latter exists at the time [so that existence would be already implied by the other epithet.]

By ‘following’ in the present context is meant capability of acting (in conformity with). The Past-participial affix (in ‘sevitaḥ,’ ‘followed’) indicates the fact of the Dharma having been in force from times without beginning. As a matter of fact, such Dharma as consists of the Aṣṭakā and other rites are not, like ordinary Dharmas or Duties, set up by any person during the present time. This same fact is also indicated by the term ‘ever.’ (The sense is that) this Dharma has continued ever since the world-process has been going on. All other extraneous Dharmas, being set up by ignorant and wicked persons, though they may obtain currency for some time, drop out in course of time; no mere delusion can continue for thousands of ages. True knowledge on the other hand, even though it may for a time be shrouded by ignorance, shines forth in all its brilliance, upon the destruction of that ignorance. Being by its very nature, pure and brilliant, it can never undergo entire destruction.

2.1.2

yāvatsaṃsārameṣa dharmaḥ| bāhyadharmāstu sarve mūrkhaduḥśīlapuruṣapravartitāḥ kiyantaṃ kālaṃ labdhāvasaro api punarantardhīyante | na hi vyāmoho yugasahasrānuvartī bhavati | samyagjñānamavidyayā sañchannamapi tatkṣaye nirmalatāmevaiti | na hi tasya nirmalatayā chedaḥ sambhava iti | ahṛṣṭarāgibhiḥ | idaṃ bāhyadharmānuṣṭhāne dvitīyaṃ kāraṇam | vyāmohaḥ pūrvamuktaḥ | anena lobhādaya ucyante, rāgadveṣagrahaṇasya pradarśanārthatvāt | lobhena mantratantrādiṣu pravarttayanti | athavā rāgadveṣayorlobho'ntarbhūtaḥ | tmanyeva ye bhogopāyāsteṣu raktāḥ upāyāntareṇa jīvitumasamarthā liṅgadhāraṇādinā jīvati | taduktaṃ 'bhasmakapālādidhāraṇaṃ, nagnatā, kāṣāye ca vāsasī-buddhipauruṣahīnānāṃ jīviketi' | dveṣo viparītānuṣṭhānakāraṇam | dveṣapradhānā hi nātīva tattvāvadhāraṇe samarthā bhavantyato 'dharmameva dharmatvenādhyavasyantīti | athavābhāvapi rāgadveṣau tattvāvadhāraṇe pratibandhakau | satyāmapi kasyāñcicchāstravedanamātrāyāṃ labdhe'pi vidvadvyapadeśe rāgadveṣavattayā viparītānuṣṭhānaṃ sambhavati | jānānā api yathāvacchāstraṃ kasyacid dveṣyasyopaghātāya priyasya copakārāya kauṭasākṣyādyadharmaṃ sevante | teṣāṃ vedamūlamevānuṣṭhānamityaśakyaniścayaṃ kāraṇāntarasya rāgadveṣalakṣaṇasya sambhavāt | atastatpratiṣedhaḥ | atra codyate | “sadbhiriti sacchabdaḥ sādhutāvacano varṇitaḥ | kīdṛśī ca sādhutā tasya yadi rāgadveṣābhyāmadharme pravṛttiḥ sambhāvyate | tasmādadveṣarāgibhiriti na vaktavyam |” evaṃ tarhi hetutvenocyate | yato rāgādivarjitā ataḥ santo bhavanti |

‘Who are free from love and hate’—What is referred to here is another cause that leads men to take to heterodox dharmas. ‘Delusion’ having been already described (as leading to the same end), the present phrase serves to indicate greed and the rest; the direct mention of ‘love and hate’ being meant to be only illustrative; e.g., it is by reason of Greed that people have recourse to magical incantations and rites. Or ‘Greed’ may he regarded as included (not merely indicated) by ‘Love and Hate.’ People who are too much addicted to what brings pleasure to themselves, on finding themselves unable to carry on their living by other means, are found to have recourse to such means of livelihood as the assuming of hypocritical guises and so forth. This has been thus described—‘The wearing of ashes and carrying of begging bowls, being naked, wearing of discoloured clothes—these form the means of living for people devoid of intelligence and energy.’

‘Hate,’—leads to the performance of acts contrary to those prescribed. People filled with hate are not quite capable of comprehending the truth; and hence they come to regard the wrong act (adharma) as the right one (dharma).

Or, both ‘Love’ and ‘Hate’ may be regarded as obstacles to the discernment of truth. As a matter of fact, even when some slight knowledge of the scriptures has been acquired, and the man has acquired the name of being ‘learned,’—there is every possibility of his acting otherwise (than in strict accordance with the scriptures), if he happens to be under the influence of love or hate. For instance, people, though fully conversant with the scriptures, do commit such wrong acts as the giving of false evidence, with a view either to do harm to some one whom he hates, or to do good to some one whom he loves, and certainly one cannot be sure that such acting of these people is based upon the Veda; for the simple reason that there are present other forces (controlling his action), in the shape of Love and Hate. It is for this reason that these are prohibited.

The following objection is hero put forward:—“In the word ‘sadbhiḥ,’ the term ‘saṭ’ has been explained as denoting righteousness; but what sort of righteousness could belong to the man for whom it is considered possible to do wrong under the influence of Love and Hate? Consequently, it is not necessary to add the epithet ‘free from love and hate’ (this being already implied by the word ‘good’).”

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—As a matter of fact, the epithet in question (‘free from love and hate’) is mentioned as the reason or ground (of the aforementioned ‘goodness’ or ‘righteousness’); the sense being that ‘it is because they are free from Love and Hate that they are good.’

By ‘following’ in the present context is meant capability of acting (in conformity with). The Past-participial affix (in ‘sevitaḥ,’ ‘followed’) indicates the fact of the Dharma having been in force from times without beginning. As a matter of fact, such Dharma as consists of the Aṣṭakā and other rites are not, like ordinary Dharmas or Duties, set up by any person during the present time. This same fact is also indicated by the term ‘ever.’ (The sense is that) this Dharma has continued ever since the world-process has been going on. All other extraneous Dharmas, being set up by ignorant and wicked persons, though they may obtain currency for some time, drop out in course of time; no mere delusion can continue for thousands of ages. True knowledge on the other hand, even though it may for a time be shrouded by ignorance, shines forth in all its brilliance, upon the destruction of that ignorance. Being by its very nature, pure and brilliant, it can never undergo entire destruction.

2.1.3

rāgadveṣapradhānatvābhāvaścātra pratipādyate | na sarveṇa sarvaṃ tadabhāvayogyāvasthāgatasya hetoranvayamucchidyate | tathā ca śrutiḥ-“na ha vai saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayorapahatirastīti” | rāgo viṣayopabhogagṛdhnutā | tatpratiṣedhavyāpāro dveṣaḥ | lobho mātsaryamasādhāraṇyenaspṛhā, parasya caitanmābhūdvibhavakhyātyādi | cittadharmā ete | athavā cetanāvatsu strīsutasuhṛdbāndhavādiṣu sneho rāgaḥ; lobho'cetaneṣvapi dhanādiṣu spṛhā | hṛdayena | hṛdayaśabdena cittamācaṣṭe | anujñānaṃ ca hṛdayasya prasādaḥ | eṣā hi sthitiḥ | antarhṛdayavarttīni buddhyāditattvāni | yadyapi bāhyahiṃsāmadyabhakṣaṇādiṣu mūḍhā dharmabuddhyā pravarttante, tathā'pi hṛdayākrośanaṃ teṣāṃ bhavati | vaidike tvanuṣṭhāne parituṣyati manaḥ| tadasya sarvasyāyamarthaḥ | na mayā tādṛśo dharma ucyate yatraite doṣāḥ santi | kintu ya evaṃvidhairmahātmabhiranuṣṭhīyate svayaṃ ca yatra cittaṃ pravarttayati vā | ata ādarātiśaya ucyamāneṣu dharmeṣu yuktaḥ | athavā hṛdayaṃ vedaḥ | sa hyadhīto bhāvanārūpeṇa hṛdayasthito 'hṛdayam' | tataśca tritayamatropāttam | yadi tāvadavicārryaiva svāgrahātkācitpravṛttiḥ kasyacittathā'pyatraiva yuktā | etaddhṛdayenābhyanujñāta ityanenocyate | athāpyayaṃ nyāyo 'mahājano yena gataḥ sa panthāḥ' iti, tadapyatraivāsti | vidvāṃso hyatra niṣkāmāḥ pravṛttapūrvā anindyāśca loke | prathāprāmāṇikī pravṛttiḥ, sā'pi vedaprāmāṇyātsiddhaiveti | sarvaprakāraṃ pravṛttyābhimukhyamanena janyate |

What is really meant is the absence of undue predominance of Love and Hate (and not absolute absence); because no man, even though there be forces at work tending to make him free from Love and Hate, can get rid of these entirely, as declared by Śruti (Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 8-12-1)—‘So long as one has a body, there can be no cessation of the agreeable and the disagreeable.’

‘Love’ here stands for hankering after the enjoyment of things; and ‘Hate’ is that which leads one to avoid or escape from a certain thing. ‘Greed’ is the jealous hankering after the sole possession of an object; the feeling being in the form ‘may all this prosperity, fame and the like not belong to any other person.’ All these are functions of the Mind. Or, ‘Love’ may be taken as standing for the affection one feels towards sentient beings, like one’s wife, son, relations and so forth; and ‘greed’ for the longing that one has for riches and such insentient things.

‘By the heart.’—‘Heart’ here stands for the Mind;—‘sanction’ is satisfaction of mind. The real condition of things is this: Buḍḍhi and other principles are located inside the Heart; and even though deluded persons have recourse to such unrighteous acts as the killing of animals apart from sacrifices, the eating of prohibited food and so forth,—thinking them to be right ‘Dharma,’—yet they have compunctions in their hearts; in the case of the performance of actions prescribed in the Veda, on the other hand, the Mind feels satisfied.

The sense of all this is as follows:—‘The Dharma that I am going to expound is not one beset with the said defects;—it is one that is actually followed by high-souled persons and towards which the Mind itself urges us. For these reasons it is only right that great regard should be paid to the Dharmas that are going to be propounded.’

Or, ‘Heart’ may be taken as standing for the Veda; the Veda, duly studied and borne within the heart in the form of ideas and conceptions, is called ‘heart.’

The present statement refers to the following three cases:—(1) when a person, without much thought, undertakes an action, through sheer impulse,—it must be right; this is what is meant by ‘sanctioned by the heart’;—(2) the same expression also includes the case when one acts according to custom, depending upon the dictum ‘that is the right path by which great men have gone’;—(3) when ‘learned’ persons, without any ulterior motives, are found to act in a certain manner they are never blamed for it, and even when people do not find their action authorised (by the Veda), they accept the fact that it must be based upon the Veda. In every way the present verse makes men have recourse to activity.

2.1.4

anye tvetaṃ ślokaṃ sāmānyena dharmalakṣaṇārthaṃ vyācakṣate | evaṃvidhairyaiḥ sevyate sa dharmo'vagantavyaḥ | pratyakṣavedavihitasya smārtasya vā''cārataḥ prāptasya sarvasyaitallakṣaṇaṃ vidyate | atra tu ya etaiḥ sevyate taṃ dharmaṃ nibodhateti pāṭho yuktaḥ | 116) nakṣatramātre paṭhyate, viśeṣe ca vartate | dhāṭyāśabdaḥ sāmidhenīmātre paṭhyate āvāpikīṣu ca vartate | ato'pa evācamyetyarthaḥ | sa evopaspṛśyetyasyāpi | sa ca parastādvidhāyiṣyate | sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ cānayordṛśyate nityakālamupaspṛśedityabhidhāya trirācāmedityāha | ataḥ samānārthaḥ | 56) samāsaḥ| 'anadhyāye yadadhyayanaṃ' tena 'vaṣaṭkṛtam'| yathā yājyānte avicchedo vaṣaṭkāreṇa kriyata evaṃ caturdaśyādyanadhyāyādhyayanaṃ vaṣaṭkārasthānīyam | vaṣaṭśabdena vaiṣaṭśabdo lakṣyate | tena kṛtaṃ yuktaṃ saṃskṛtam | sādhanaṃkṛteti samāsaḥ | 36) nyāyyā | 87) iti bahulagrahaṇāt | ‘‘nanu cānantarameva vakṣyati ‘garīyān brahmadaḥ pitā’ iti, iha cācāryātpiturādhikyamucyate taditaretaravyāhatam’’ | naiṣa doṣaḥ | ihācāryo nairuktadarśane nādhyāpakaḥ, saṃskāramātreṇācāropadeśamātreṇa cābhipretaḥ | ‘ācāryaṃ’ ācāraṃ grāhayatīti | na caiṣa niyamaḥ svaśāstrasiddhābhireva saṃjñābhirvyavahāraḥ | guruśabdo hyatra pitari paribhāṣitaḥ, ācārye ca tatra tatra prayujyate | tena svalpopakārādupanayanamātrakarādācāragrāhakādadhyāpanarahitādidaṃ piturjyāyastvam | asmiṃścakrame vivakṣite samavāye eteṣāṃ mātā prathamaṃ vandyā tataḥ pitā tata ācāryastata upādhyāyaḥ |

Other people explain this verse as serving the purpose of providing a general definition of ‘Dharma’; the sense being—‘that which is done by such persons should be regarded as Dharma’; this definition is applicable to all forms of Dharma,—that which is directly prescribed by the Veda, that which is laid down in the Smṛti and also that which is got at from Right Usage. In accordance with this explanation, however, the right reading would be—‘yaḥ elaih sevyate tam dharmam nibodhata.’

2.1.5

60) | asminsamāse upanayanaṃ brahmajanma | athavā brahmagrahaṇameva janma | tadvipasya śāśvataṃ nityaṃ pretyopakārakamiha copakārakam | 88) iti yagātmanepade | yaḥ sragvyapi | sragasyāstīti sragvī, kṛtakusumadāmā puruṣa ucyate | anena ca brahmacāriniyamatyāgaṃ darśayati | parityajyāpi brahmacāridharmān yadi śaktito yāvacchaknoti svalpamapyanvahaṃ pratyahaṃ vedamadhīte so'pi prakṛṣṭena puruṣārthena yujyate | stutiriyaṃ na punarniyamatyāge'dhyayanaṃmucyate | 6 ) "yaistu dravyaṃ cikīrṣyate" iti ( 2 | 7 ) |" 56), 'viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyeṇeti' (pā0 sū0 2| 57) vā | yadvā yatkiñcidutkṛṣṭaṃ vastu tadratnamucyate tadā viśeṣaṇamiti | atha tu marakatapadmarāgādīnyeva ratnaśabdavācyāni utkarṣasāmānyādanyatra prayogaḥ, tadopamitamiti | yā strī kāntisaṃsthānalāvaṇyātiśayavatī atha dhānyabahudhanasutādiśubhalakṣaṇā sā duṣkulāddhīnakriyāderapyāneyā | 'abrāhmaṇā'dityasya ( 241 ) vidherayamupodghātaḥ | alābhena tu pradarśitaḥ |

Other people explain this verse as serving the purpose of providing a general definition of ‘Dharma’; the sense being—‘that which is done by such persons should be regarded as Dharma’; this definition is applicable to all forms of Dharma,—that which is directly prescribed by the Veda, that which is laid down in the Smṛti and also that which is got at from Right Usage. In accordance with this explanation, however, the right reading would be—‘yaḥ elaih sevyate tam dharmam nibodhata.’

2.2

phalābhilāṣaḥ karmapravṛtterheturyasya sa kāmātmā tadbhāvaḥ kāmātmatā | tatpradhānatā 'ātma' śabdena pratipādyate | sā na praśastā ninditā |
"ataśca nindayā pratiṣedhānumāne 'na kartavyeti' pratīyate | arthātsauryādīnāṃ sarveṣāṃ kāmyānāṃ niṣedho'yam | athavā kiṃ viśeṣeṇa brūmaḥ sauryādīnāmiti, sarvameva kriyānuṣṭhānaṃ phalasiddhyarthaṃ, na svarūpaniṣpattaye | na ca kācana niṣphalā kriyā | yadapi-'na kurvīta vṛthā ceṣṭāmiti, bhasmani hutaṃ viṣayāntare deśarājavārtādyanveṣaṇaṃ'-tatrāpi kriyāphalaṃ vidyate | kintu pradhānaphalaṃ svargagrāmādi puruṣasya yad dṛṣṭādṛṣṭaye| rupayujyate tadabhāvād vṛthā ceṣṭetyucyate | athocyate-'bhavatu kriyā phalavatī | tadviṣaye'bhilāṣo na kartavyaḥ vastusvābhāvyātphalaṃ bhaviṣyati'-atrāpi sauryādīnāmaphalatvaṃ, kāmyamānaṃ phalaṃ jñātama | nānicchostadbhaviṣyatīti | na ca laukikī pravṛttirdṛśyate phalābhisandhinirapekṣā | na cātra viśeṣaḥ śrutau-vaidikeṣu karmasu phalaṃ nābhisandheyamiti | tatra phalavatsu śruteṣu kāmanāniṣedhādapravṛttau śrutivirodhaḥ | nityeṣu tu prāptireva nāsti | viśeṣādyanupādānācca laukikavyāpāranivṛttau dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ | tadidamāpatitam, na-kiṃcitkenacitkartavyaṃ sarvaistūṣṇīṃbhūtaiḥ sthātavyam" |
ucyate | yattāvaduktaṃ kāmyeṣu sauryādiṣu niṣedhaprasaṅga iti, -tatra vakṣyati 'yathāsaṅkalpitāṃśceha sarvān kāmān samaśnuta' iti | niṣedhe hi kutaḥ saṅkalpaḥ kutaśca kāmāvāptiḥ | yadapi viśeṣādyanupādānāllaukike'pi prasakta iti-tatropātta eva viśeṣaḥ, 'yo dharmastaṃ nibodhateti' dharmasya prakṛtatvāt | yadapyuktaṃ nityeṣu phalāśravaṇātphalābhisandheḥ prāptireva nāsti, kiṃ niṣedheneti, -tatrāpyucyate | phalābhāvātkaścitsamyakśāstrārthamajānāno na pravarteta, sauryādiṣu ca śrutaphaleṣu phalābhisandhipūrvikāṃ pravṛttiṃ dṛṣṭvā sāmānyatodṛṣṭena yatkartavyaṃ tatphalahetoḥ kriyata ityaśrutamapi phalamabhisandadhīta tannivṛttyarthamidamārabhyate | yadyapyayaṃ nyāyoyatphalavacchrutaṃ tattathaiva kartavyam, yadvāpi niṣphalameva kartavyatayā śāstreṇa yāvajjīvādipadairvineva viśvajinyāyena phalakalpanayā'vagamitaṃ tasyānyathānuṣṭhāne prasaṅga eva nāsti, tathāpi ya cetaṃ nyāyaṃ pratipattumasamarthaḥ sa vacanena pratipādyate | nyāyataḥ pratipattau hi gauravam, vacanāttu laghīyasī sukhapratipattiriti suhṛdbhūtvā pramāṇasiddhamarthamupadiśatisma | kāmaśabdo'yaṃ yadyapi tṛcchḷayavacano dṛṣṭastathā'pi tasyehāsambhavātkāma icchā 'bhilāṣa ityanarthāntaram | tatra vakṣyamāṇaparyālocanayā phalābhilāṣeṇa na sarvatra pravartitavyamityayamarthaḥ syāsyati | parastu kāmātmatāmicchāmātrasaṃbadhamātraṃ padārthaṃ manvānaścodayati | "na caivehāstyakāmatāteti | na ceha loke kācidakāminaḥ pravṛttirastītyarthaḥ | āstāṃ tāvatkṛṣivāṇijyādi vyutpannabuddhinā kriyamāṇam, yaḥ svayaṃ vedādhigamo vedādhyayanaṃ bālaḥ kāryate pitrādinā tāḍyamānaḥ so'pi na kāmamantareṇopapadyate | adhyayanaṃ hi śabdoccāraṇarūpam | na coccāraṇamicchayā binā nirghātadhvanivaduttiṣṭhati | icchati cetkimiti tāḍyata iti | saivatayecchopajanyate | abhimata tu viṣaye svayamupajāyata ityetāvānviśeṣaḥ | yaścāyaṃ vaidiko vedavihitaḥ karma yogo darśapūrṇamāsādikarmānuṣṭhāne nityatvenāvagataḥ so'pi na prāpnoti | na hyanicchato devatoddeśena svadravyatyāgopapattiḥ | tasmātkāmātmatāniṣedhe sarvaśrautasmārtakarmaniṣedhaḥ prasakta iti |
1) | devadarśī sampadyate | anenāpi prakāreṇa svargaprāptirevoktā bhavati | athavā'mara iva lokyate loke |
101 ) iti gamerḍaḥ | 'hṛdayasya hṛditi' ( vyā. sū. 6 |
83 ) iti nāmānte pluto vihitaḥ| taṃ ye na vidusteṣvahamityeva vācyam| vyākaraṇaprayojanopanyāsaprasaṅge na caitanmahābhāṣyakāreṇa pradarśitam | "avidvāṃsaḥ pratyabhivāde nāmno ye na plutiṃ viduḥ | kāmaṃ teṣu tu viprogya strīṣvivāyamahaṃ vadet" ||
83) ṭeḥ plutiṃ smarati | ṭiśabdena yo'ntyoc tadādiśabdarūpamucyate |
126 ) iti | kriyā cātra śrutā- guruvanmānamarhati |

It is not right to be absorbed in desires—“But there is in this world, no absolute absence of desire; for the study of the Vedas itself is prompted by desire, as also every act prescribed in the Veda.”—(2)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):
The man for whom desire for reward forms the sole motive to act is said to be ‘absorbed in desires’; and it is this character that is expressed by the abstract noun; the term ‘ātman’ in this compound denoting preponderance.

‘It is not right?,’—i.e., it is deprecated.

[An objection is raised]—“This deprecation leads us to infer that the said absorption in desires is prohibited.—This means that the text contains the prohibition of all such sacrifices as the Saurya and the like, which are performed with a desire for a definite reward. Or, why should we specify the Saurya and other sacrifices? All performance of actions is for the accomplishment of a desirable end; no one acts simply for the accomplishing of the act itself; in fact there is no action without results. As for the assertion (contained in 4.63) that ‘one should not act aimlessly’ [which might be taken to imply that there are aimless actions, such as] pouring libations on extinguished fire, or seeking for information regarding what is happening to kings and places of other countries,—in reality, in these cases also there is some result following from the act; and all that is meant by calling them ‘aimless’ is that they do not bring about any important results, in the shape of attainment of Heaven, acquisition of village-property and so forth, which are useful to men in the invisible and visible spheres. It might be argued that—‘It may be that the action brings about a reward; what is meant is that the man should have no desire for that reward; even though, in the very nature of things, the reward will follow.’ Even so the Saurya and other sacrifices would be without rewards; that alone is regarded as ‘reward’ which is actually desired; so that there could be no ‘reward’ for one who has no desires. In the ordinary world, we do not find any such activity as is absolutely independent of a desire for reward. Nor have we any such Vedic declaration as that ‘in connection with Vedic actions alone there should be no desire for reward.’ On the contrary, all Vedic acts have been prescribed as bringing definite rewards; so that if desire for rewards is interdicted, it would mean that the acts would not be done; and this would militate against the spirit of the Vedas. As regards the compulsory acts (prescribed in the Veda), there is no possibility of rewards in their case. Then again, since the prohibition in the text is a general one (and not restricted to Vedic acts only), it would lead to the cessation of all ordinary activity of the world, and would thus run counter to visible practice also, and it comes to this that no one should do anything, all should sit silent.”

To the above objection we make the following reply:—

(1) It has been argued that the Text implies the prohibition of the Saurya and such other sacrifices, which are admittedly prompted by desire for rewards; as regards this, the author is himself going to say (in Verso 5) that ‘the man fulfils the desires he may have entertained’; if he had meant to prohibit (by the present verse) such acts, how could there be any ‘entertainment’ or ‘fulfilment’ of desires?

(2) The second point urged is that, since the text does not specify Vedic acts alone, the interdict would apply to ordinary actions also. But the required specification has already been made by the text (in the preceding verse), where it says—‘Learn that Dharma’; which shows that it is Dharma (and not the ordinary activity of the world) that forms the subject-matter of the present discourse.

(3) The third point raised is that—“in as much as no rewards are mentioned in connection with the compulsory acts, there can be no possibility of any desire for rewards in the case of these; so that no useful purpose could be served by the prohibiting of such desires.”—

Now in answer to this we make the following observations:—

(a) By reason of no rewards being spoken of, no one would ever undertake the performance of any compulsory act, unless he were a person thoroughly conversant with the scriptures (and hence realising the importance of compulsory duties):

and (b) in the case of the Saurya and such other acts as have rewards mentioned in connection with them, finding that men are prompted to their performance by desire for those rewards, people might be led to the generalisation that whatever one is to do should be done with the desire for a definite reward; and thus come to undertake the performance of the compulsory acts also only through a desire for reward, oven though no such reward has been spoken of in the scriptures.

And it is with a view to preclude these possibilities that the text lays down the interdict. Though the general rule is that—

(a) an act which is mentioned as leading to a definite result can only be performed with a view to that result,

(b) while that which is laid down in the scriptures as not bringing any reward, and in connection with which one cannot assume a reward according to the principle enunciated in relation to the Viśvajit -sacrifice [Pūrvamīmāmsā-Sūtra, 4.3. 15-16; that where no reward is mentioned, the attainment of heaven should be regarded as the reward], can never be performed otherwise (than in the purely disinterested manner),—yet there may be persons who are conversant with this principle; and it is to these persons that the text addresses the exhortation; specially as it would be rather difficult to carry conviction to such persons by mere reasoning; and the requisite knowledge is conveyed in a simpler and easier manner by means of direct advice.

It is for this reason that the author has, in a friendly spirit, conveyed a teaching which is thoroughly established by proofs.

Though the word ‘Kama’ is generally found to be used in the sense of sexual desire, yet, since in the present context that sense is not applicable, it has to be taken as synonymous with ‘icchā’ (Desire) and ‘abhilāṣa,’ (Longing). So that in view of what follows, the meaning of the text comes to be that ‘one should not undertake the performance of all acts simply with a desire for reward.’

The opponent, taking the ‘absorption in desires’ to mean mere presence of desire in general, urges the following objection:—

“But there is in this world, no absolute absence of desires; that is, as a matter of fact, in this world, there is no activity for one who is entirely without desire. To say nothing of such acts as cultivation of land, trade and the like, which are done by men of experience,—even the ‘study of the Veda,’ the learning of the Veda, which the boy is made to do by his father and others, being even chastised by them, even this is not possible without some desire; reading consists in the uttering of words; and utterance never proceeds, like the sound of thunder, without desire.—‘Well, if the Boy desires to read, why is he beaten?’—It is by beating that his desire is aroused; the only difference is that in connection with things that the person likes, the desire arises of itself (and does not need an incentive in the shape of the beating).—Similarly ‘the acts prescribed in the Veda,’—as compulsory in connection with the Darśapūrṇa nāṣa and other sacrifices are not possible without desire. There is no possibility of a man giving away to Deities things that belong to himself, unless there is a desire in him for doing so. Hence the prohibition of ‘absorption in desires’ becomes an interdict upon all acts prescribed in the Veda and iu the Smṛtis.”—(3)

Or, the compound ‘amaralokatā’ may he explained as one who sees—‘lokayati’—the gods—‘amarān’; the term ‘loka’ being derived from the root ‘loka’ with the passive affix ‘aṇ’ (according to Pāṇini 3.2.1); and then the abstract affix tal added to it; so that the meaning is that ‘he becomes capable of seeing the Gods’; and this also means that he attains heaven.

Or again, the expression may mean that ‘he is looked upon as a God’—‘amara iva lokyate’—among men.

2.3.1

"tataśca yaduktaṃ yāgasya kāmena binā na svarūpaniṣpattiriti, tadanena vispaṣṭaṃ kṛtvā kathayati | saṅkalpo yāgādīnāṃ mūlaṃ, kāmasya ca | yāgādīṃścikīrṣannavaśyaṃ saṅkalpaṃ karoti | saṅkalpe ca kriyamāṇe tatkāraṇena kāmena sannidhātavyamaniṣṭenāpi | yathā pākārthino jvalanaṃ kurvatastatsamānakāraṇo dhūmo'pyaniṣṭo jāyate | tatra na śakyaṃ yajñādayaḥ kariṣyante kāmaśca na bhaviṣyatīti | " 'atha ko'yaṃ saṅkalpo nāma yaḥ sarvakriyāmūlam' ? "ucyate | yaccetaḥsandarśanaṃ nāma yadanantaraṃ prārthanādhyavasāyau krameṇa bhavataḥ | ete hi mānasā vyāpārāḥ sarvakriyāpravṛttiṣu mūlatāṃ pratipadyante | na hi bhautikā vyāpārāstamantareṇa sambhavanti | tathāhi prathamaṃ padārthasvarūpanirūpaṇam 'ayaṃ padārtha imamarthakriyāṃ sādhayatīti yajjñānaṃ sa iha saṅkalpo'bhipretaḥ' | anantaraṃ prārthanā bhavati icchā | saiva kāmaḥ | 'kathamahamidamanena sādhayāmīti' icchāyāṃ satyāmadhyavasyati karomīti niścinoti so'dhyavasāyaḥ | tataḥ sādhanopādāne bāhyavyāpāraviṣaye pravartate | tathāhi bubhukṣita ādau bhujikriyāṃ paśyati, tata icchati bhuñjīyeti, tato'dhyavasyati 'vyāpārāntarebhyo vinivṛttya bhojanaṃ karomīti,' tataḥ karmakāraṇasthānādhikāriṇa āha 'sajjīkuruta, rasavatīṃ sañcārayateti' | "nanvevaṃ sati na yajñādayaḥ saṅkalpamātrādbhavanti api tu saṅkalpaprārthanādhyavasāyebhyaḥ; tatra kimucyate 'yajñāḥ saṅkalpasaṃbhavāḥ' iti |" saṅkalpasyādyakāraṇatvādadoṣaḥ | ata evottaratra 'nākāmasya kriyā kācid dṛśyata' iti vakṣyati | vratāni mānaso'dhyavasāyo vratam |

Desire has its root in Thought; Sacrifices proceed from Thought; Vows and Restraints—all these have been described as originating in Thought.—(3)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):
Thought is the root of sacrifice and other acts, as also of desire; when a man is going to perform a sacrifice, or any act, he must think of it: and when the thinking has been done, there must follow, from the said Thinking, Desire,—however undesirable this latter may be; for instance, when a man, going to cook, lights fire, there arises, from the fire, the undesirable smoke also. Thus it is impossible that sacrifices should be performed and there should be no desire at all.

Question.—“What is this Thought, which is the root of all action?”

Answer.—We explain it as follows:—Thought is that function of the mind which precedes Desire and Resolution; all these three are functions of the mind, and they are at the root of all activity. As a matter of fact, no physical activity is possible without Thought. What happens in the case of all activity is that—(a) first of all we have the Thought or Idea of the exact nature of a thing, and what is meant by ‘Thought,’ in the present context is the cognition that one h as of a certain thing as capable of accomplishing a definite desirable purpose;—(b) after this follows a longing, a wish; and this is ‘desire’;—(c) after the desire has arisen in the form ‘how may I obtain it,’ the man resolves, determines, that he shall act (towards the obtaining of the thing); and this is ‘Resolution.’ It is only after these three mental operations have been gone through that the man proceeds to that external activity which would accomplish the desired end. For instance, when a man is hungry, (a) he thinks of—has the idea of—the action of eating,—(b) then he desires ‘may I eat,’—(c) then comes the resolution ‘I shall desist from all other activity and take to eating,’—(d) then he says to the persons in charge of the place where the act of eating is to be done—‘make ready,’ ‘set the kitchen going.’ [ Objection ]—“If this is so, then Sacrifices and other acts do not proceed from mere Thought, but from Thought, Longing and Resolution; then why is it said that Sacrifices proceed from Thought?”

[ Answer ]—There is no force in this objection, since Thought is the prime cause. It is in view of this that the author is going to assert (in the next verse) that ‘there is no action done by one who is entirely without desires.’

Votes—A ‘vow’ consists in a mental resolve, in the form ‘this shall be done by me as long as I live’; to this class belong the vows of the Snātaka.

Restraints—are negative in their character,—such as desisting from, killing and so forth.

[The meaning of all this is that] without thought there is neither activity towards what ought to be done, nor desisting from what is prohibited and ought not to be done.”—(3)

‘Saṅkalpamūlaḥ kārnaḥ’—Nandana explains this as—‘The desire for rewards is the root of the will to act.’

‘Vratāni’—The term stands for all those duties that one makes up his mind to perform all through life,—according to Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa;—‘the vow of the Religious Student’—according to Nandana.

‘Yamadharmāḥ’—‘The prohibitive rules’ (Medhātithi, Govindarāja and Nārāyaṇa);—‘the rules pertaining to the Recluse and the Renunciate’ (Nandana).

Comparative notes by various authors
Yājñavalkya, 1.7 .—‘ The desire that has its source in proper reflection is the source of Dharma.’

Āpastaṃba, Dharmasūtra, 1.5.—‘They teach that whatever one determines and thinks of with the mind, or speaks of with speech, or sees with the eyes,—he becomes that same.’

Bhagavadgītā—‘Desires have their source in the will,’

2.3.2

'idaṃ mayā yāvajjīvaṃ kartavyamiti' yadvihitam | yathā snātakavratāni | yamadharmāḥ pratiṣedharūpāḥ ahiṃsādayaḥ | kartavyeṣu pravṛttiḥ niṣiddhebhyo nivṛttiḥ nāntareṇa saṅkalpamasti | 1cd ) ityuttarapadasya dīrghaḥ | chāndasatvādvobhayapadavṛddhiḥ | upanayanamiti hi eṣa saṃskāro vedavidāṃ gṛhyasmṛtiṣu prasiddho mauñjībandhanāparaparyāyaḥ | upanīyate samīpaṃ prāpyate yenācāryasya svādhyāyādhyayanārthaṃ na kuḍyaṃ kaṭaṃ vā kartuṃ tadupanayanam | viśiṣṭasya saṃskārakarmaṇo nāmadheyametat | garbhādekādaśe rājñaḥ | garbhātprabhṛti garbhādvā paro ya ekādaśo'bdastatra kṣatriyasya kartavyam | rājaśabdo'yaṃ kṣatriyajātivacano nābhiṣekādiguṇayogamapekṣate anyeṣu tathā prayogadarśanāt, brāhmaṇādijātiśabdasāhacaryācca | guṇavidhiṣu ca kṣatriyaśabdadarśanāt 'kṣatriyasya tu maurvīti' | yastu rājaśabdasya kṣatriyādanyatra janapadeśvare vaiśyādau prayogaḥ sa gauṇa iti vakṣyāmaḥ | mukhye cāsati gauṇasya grahaṇam | tathā ca gṛhyakāraḥ- "aṣṭame varṣe brāhmaṇamupanayedekādaśe kṣatriyaṃ dvādaśe vaiśyamiti" | bhagavānśca pāṇiniḥ evameva pratipanno 'rājñaḥ karma rājyaṃ' iti rājyaśabdasya rājaśabdaṃ prakṛtiṃ bruvanneva janapadaiśvaryeṇa rājaśabdārthaprasiddhimaha | 10) |

2.3.3

50 ) yogavibhāgāddhṛdādeśaḥ | pūyate pavitratāṃ prāpnotyaśucitvaṃ vyāvartate | āpa īṣadūnaculukamātrapramāṇāḥ | kaṇṭhagābhistābhiḥ kaṇṭhamātravyāpinībhiḥ bhūmipaḥ kṣatriyaḥ | bhūmerādhipatyaṃ kṣatriyasya vihitam | tena prasiddhena karmaṇā kṣatriyajātirlakṣyate | ādhipatyavivakṣāyāṃ rājadharmeṣvevāvakṣyat | vaiśyaḥ prāśitābhirantarāsyapraveśitābhiḥ | kaṇṭhamaprāptā api śuddhihetavo vaiśyasya | śūdraḥ spṛṣṭābhirantata anteneti | ādyāditvāttṛtīyārthe tasiḥ | antaśabdo'yaṃ samīpavacano'sti | 'udakāntaṃ gata' udakasamīpamiti gamyate | astyavayavavacanaḥ | 'vastrānto' 'vasanānta' ityubhayatrāpi vartamānaḥ sambandhyantaramapekṣyate, kasya samīpaṃ kasya vā'vayava iti | tatreha yena sthānena varṇāntarāṇāmācamanaṃ vihitam, tīrthairjihvoṣṭhena ca tadanteneti pratīyate | samīpavacanastu na sambhāvyaḥ vidhīyamānasyācamanasya tatsādhyatvāsambhavāt | sparśepi prāśanamasti | jihvauṣṭhena hi spṛśyamānasya rasāsvādanamavaśyambhāvi | tatra vaiśyaparimāṇātkiñcinnyūnatā'tra vivakṣitā | jihvāmūlaṃ yāvadvaiśyasya; jihvāgraṃ śūdrasya | dravatvādudakasyāparihāryo'vadhyatikramaḥ, avadhyaprāptau tvaśuddhiḥ | sarvaścāyaṃ tīrthavibhāge dakṣiṇahastasya upasparśana hastasyaucityāddakṣiṇācāratāyāśca puruṣadharmatayā vihitatvāt | evamarthameva cāsminnavadhāvidamucyate | 2 ) karmaṇi dvitīyeti dvitīyādiśabdaiḥ | ihāpya sāviti | 'svaṃ nāmātideśeneti'yajñasūtre'pi paribhāṣitam | 41 ) | cakryādīnāṃ tvanyonyaṃ vikalpaḥ | sa ca śaktyapekṣaḥ | 23) |

2.3.4

63) iti hrasvaḥ | tṛtīyaṃ jyotiṣṭomādiyajñadīkṣāyām | dīkṣā'pi janmatvena śrūyate- "punarvāraṃ tṛtvijo garbhaṃ kurvanti yaddīkṣayantīti' | trīṇi janmāni dvijasya śrutinoditāni | 122) dīrghatvādīrghatve |

2.4.1

“pūrveṇa śāstrīye pravṛttinivṛttī saṃkalpādhīne vyākhyāte | anena laukikeṣu karmasu tadadhīnatocyata iti viśeṣaḥ | neha loke karhicitkadācidapi jāgradavasthāyāṃ kriyā kācid tuṣṭheyatvenānicchataḥ sambhavati | yatkiñcillaukikaṃ vaidikaṃ vā kurute karma vihitaṃ pratiṣiddhaṃ ca tatsarvaṃ kāmasya ceṣṭitam | hetutvācceṣṭitaṃ kāmasyaivetyuktam | tadidamatisaṅkaṭam-kāmātmatā na praśastā, na cānayā vinā kiñcidanuṣṭhānamasti” | 10) | atra tu yaivaṃ mahāprayojanā śākhā yasyāṃ sarve smārttā gārhyāśca sarvavarṇāśramadharmā āmnātāstasyā rūpekṣaṇamasambhāvyam, sarvādhyetṝṇāṃ cotsāda ityādi bahudṛṣṭaṃ prakalpyam | viprakīrṇānāṃ tvarthavādagahanānāṃ kratvarthapuruṣārthatayā ca durvijñānānāṃ prayogonnayanamabhiyuktānāṃ nyāyato niścitārthānāṃ ghaṭate | asmiṃstu pakṣe virodhadvayasyāpi pratyakṣaśrautatvādvikalpena smṛterbādhaḥ | sa ca viśiṣṭānāṃ nābhipretaḥ | smṛtikārāśca bādhamanumeyaśrutimūlatvaṃ ca pratipannāḥ | evamapyāha gautamaḥ (3|35)-"aikāśramyaṃ tvācāryāḥ pratyakṣavidhānādgārhasthyasyeti" | yadi hi manvādīnāṃ pratyakṣāstāḥ śākhā abhaviṣyaṃkeyaṃ vācoyukti gārhasthyasya pratyakṣavidhānāditi | nanu sarve evāśramāḥ pratyakṣavidhānāḥ | svamatameva caitadgautamenācāryapadeśenopadiṣṭam 'tasyāśramavikalpam' (3|1) ityādyupakramyānenopasaṃhṛtatvāt | mantrārthavādapramāṇābhāvo'pyaviruddhaḥ | yadyapyarthavādā vidhyuddeśastutiparā na svārthasya vidhāyakāstathāpi keṣāñcidanyaparataiva nopapadyate yāvatsvārthaviṣayo vidhirnāvagamitaḥ |

(A) First, as regards Arthavādas, these are not meant to be construed apart from the injunctive passages; it is only if they were so construed that they would fail to help in the knowledge of dharma. As a matter of fact, we find that if the Arthavāda is taken apart by itself, it remains syntactically defective; and this leads us to conclude that they subserve the purposes of the corresponding injunctive passages; being so subservient to these latter, they come to be construed along with them; and hence they have got to be explained in such a manner as to make them fit in with the corresponding injunction. Thus the mention of Prajāpati having cut his fat cannot be taken by itself; it has to be taken as supplementing an injunction; in view of the fact however that the Arthavādas do not denote a substance, a sacrificial accessory, or any such thing as generally forms the direct object of injunction, they are construed differently, as eulogising what is directly enjoined, and thus come to be recognised as supplementing the injunction. This praise of the enjoined thing is also expressed by the Arthavāda; for instance, the sense of the passage in question is this—‘it is so necessary to perform animal-sacrifices that, at a time when no animals were available, and there was no other remedy, Prajāpati constituted himself into the animal and cut out his own fat.’ That such is the construction to be put upon the Arthavāda is shown by the fact that whenever we have Arthavādas, they always accompany injunctive passages. Thus even though the sense of the injunction is comprehended even without the accompanying Arthavāda,—e.g., in the case of the injunction ‘one should offer the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta,’ we comprehend the injunction from the sentence itself,—yet the Arthavādas are not absolutely useless; for when the Arthavāda is there, it is not right to deduce the injunction from the injunctive sentence only. The Veda is not the work of any author; we cannot argue (from the analogy of human speeches) that ‘since in one case the injunction has no Arthavāda to help it, it need not have it in another case also’;—the Arthavādas are there, we have to construe them; and what we have shown above is the only right way in which the particular Arthavāda can be construed. Nor is there anything very extraordinary in this; in ordinary practice also, we find eulogistic words accompanying injunctions; for instance, at the time that the master is paying -wages to his servants, some servant says affectionately (in regard to another)—‘This Devadatta is a good servant, he is always present, knows the occasions of service and is always careful about it.’ Thus we find that Arthavādas also serve the purpose of enjoining, through the eulogising of what is enjoined by the injunction. In fact, in certain cases, details of what is enforced by the injunction are got at from the Arthavāda only; for instance, when the injunction says, ‘wet pebbles are to be put in,’ this injunction stands in need of some wetting substance, such as butter oil, etc.; so that when it is followed by the Arthavāda ‘Butter is glory,’ this praise of Butter leads us to conclude that Butter is the welting substance to be used. Similarly the Arthavāda ‘those who have recourse to these Rātris become respected’serves to point out the qualifying conditions for the performers of the Rātri-satra sacrifice. From all this it is clear that Arthavādas also are ‘the root of Dharma.’

2.4.2

yathā 'steno hiraṇyasya surāṃ pibaṃśce' tyādeḥ pañcāgnividhiśeṣataivametāvattaiva nopapadyate yāvaddhiraṇyasteyādeḥ pratiṣedho nāvagamitaḥ | ya etāṃ vidyāmadhīte sa hiraṇyasteyādyapyācaraṃstaiśca saṃvasanna patati, anyathā tu patatītyavagatiraviruddhā | "atha vidhyuddeśo vidheḥ pratipādako, nārthavāda iti kenaiṣā paribhāṣā kṛtā | 'ete patanti catvāra' ityatrāpyākhyātaśravaṇamasti | 'liṅādayo na santīti' cet 'pratitiṣṭhantīti' rātriṣvapi naiva liṅaśrutirasti | atha 'tatrādhikārākāṅkṣāyāmekavākyatāyāṃ satyāṃ pañcamalakārikalpanayā vidhyavasāyaḥ', evamatrāpi bhaviṣyati | bahavaśca dravyadevatāvidhayo'rthavādāvagamyāḥ santi | tatra yasya vidheḥ śeṣā arthavādāstadvidhinaiva dravyadevatāderapekṣitatvādviśeṣasamarpaṇamātre vyāpārāntargataviśeṣāvagatirarthavādādhīnā na doṣāya | iha tu tadasambaddhasya vidhyantarasyeṣyamāṇatvādvākyabhedāpattirataśca na prakṛtiśeṣatā | tadabhāve ca tanmūlā pratiṣedhāvagatirna syādataśca 'aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti' 'tejo vai ghṛtami'tyanena vaiṣamyamityāhuḥ |" tadasat | satyapyarthāntaratve tadekavākyatāmūlatvādasyāvagaternāsti vākyabhedābhidhodyāpattiḥ | mantrāḥ prayogaprakāśatvena rūpādevāvagatāstasya prayogasyānyato'siddheḥ prakāśakatvanirvahaṇāya prakāśyaṃ kalpayanti | na cā'satohatpatyadhikārayoḥ prakāśanamaṣṭakāyāḥ sambhavatītyutpatyadhikāraviniyogaprayogabodhakā mantrāḥ | evaṃ māntravarṇikāśca vidhayo'pyupagamyante | yathā''ghāre devatāvidhiḥ |

(A) First, as regards Arthavādas, these are not meant to be construed apart from the injunctive passages; it is only if they were so construed that they would fail to help in the knowledge of dharma. As a matter of fact, we find that if the Arthavāda is taken apart by itself, it remains syntactically defective; and this leads us to conclude that they subserve the purposes of the corresponding injunctive passages; being so subservient to these latter, they come to be construed along with them; and hence they have got to be explained in such a manner as to make them fit in with the corresponding injunction. Thus the mention of Prajāpati having cut his fat cannot be taken by itself; it has to be taken as supplementing an injunction; in view of the fact however that the Arthavādas do not denote a substance, a sacrificial accessory, or any such thing as generally forms the direct object of injunction, they are construed differently, as eulogising what is directly enjoined, and thus come to be recognised as supplementing the injunction. This praise of the enjoined thing is also expressed by the Arthavāda; for instance, the sense of the passage in question is this—‘it is so necessary to perform animal-sacrifices that, at a time when no animals were available, and there was no other remedy, Prajāpati constituted himself into the animal and cut out his own fat.’ That such is the construction to be put upon the Arthavāda is shown by the fact that whenever we have Arthavādas, they always accompany injunctive passages. Thus even though the sense of the injunction is comprehended even without the accompanying Arthavāda,—e.g., in the case of the injunction ‘one should offer the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta,’ we comprehend the injunction from the sentence itself,—yet the Arthavādas are not absolutely useless; for when the Arthavāda is there, it is not right to deduce the injunction from the injunctive sentence only. The Veda is not the work of any author; we cannot argue (from the analogy of human speeches) that ‘since in one case the injunction has no Arthavāda to help it, it need not have it in another case also’;—the Arthavādas are there, we have to construe them; and what we have shown above is the only right way in which the particular Arthavāda can be construed. Nor is there anything very extraordinary in this; in ordinary practice also, we find eulogistic words accompanying injunctions; for instance, at the time that the master is paying -wages to his servants, some servant says affectionately (in regard to another)—‘This Devadatta is a good servant, he is always present, knows the occasions of service and is always careful about it.’ Thus we find that Arthavādas also serve the purpose of enjoining, through the eulogising of what is enjoined by the injunction. In fact, in certain cases, details of what is enforced by the injunction are got at from the Arthavāda only; for instance, when the injunction says, ‘wet pebbles are to be put in,’ this injunction stands in need of some wetting substance, such as butter oil, etc.; so that when it is followed by the Arthavāda ‘Butter is glory,’ this praise of Butter leads us to conclude that Butter is the welting substance to be used. Similarly the Arthavāda ‘those who have recourse to these Rātris become respected’serves to point out the qualifying conditions for the performers of the Rātri-satra sacrifice. From all this it is clear that Arthavādas also are ‘the root of Dharma.’

(B) Next as regards Mantras, some of them are directly injunctive; e.g., the Mantra ‘Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhate’ (‘offers the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta’);—in connection with the Āghāra-offering, the deity to whom the offering is to be made is pointed out by the mantra ‘Ita Indra urdhvo’ dhvaraḥ, etc.’ In this case the Deity is not mentioned in the passage that enjoins the offering, nor is it mentioned in any other purely injunctive passage; the particular mantra to be used however is directly enjoined as being the one that begins with ‘Ita Indra’; hence it is from the words of this mantra that we learn the name of the requisite Deity. There are thousand, of such instances where the Deity is indicated by the words of the mantra. Then, there are certain mantras that are only descriptive of what is being done; and these also serve the purpose of making known Dharma by reminding (the persons engaged in the act, of what is to be done); and thus these also become ‘root of Dharma’ by indicating what should be done.

2.4.3

catuṣpāddhi dharmo'bhyupagatastatrālapatarāṃśaḥ śrutaḥ, sakaletarāṃśabodhahetustathāvidha eva, vidhau sambandhagrahaṇāditi | sarvathā tāvatsambhavati vedasaṃyogaḥ | 6) | tatra pūrvayorarthayorasambhavāttṛtīyo'rtho gṛhyate | dvāviṃśateḥ pūraṇo dvāviṃśo'bdaḥ taddhitārthaḥ | 46 ) sthā ā āsābhityāṅā praśleṣātkarmatvam | pari upa ā āsīna iti ihāpyāṅā śliṣṭanirdiṣṭo draṣṭavyaḥ | paryupaśabdāvanarthakau | pavitrairdarmaireva pāvitaḥ śucitvamāpāditaḥ | aghamarṣaṇādistu mantro neha pavitraśabdenocyate, brahmacāriṇastadānīmanadhītatvātteṣām | na ca darbhāḥ svasattāmātreṇa kāñcitkriyāmakurvataḥ pāvane karaṇaṃ bhavantīti | avāntaravyāpārāpekṣayā smṛtyantare prāṇopasparśanaṃ pratīyate | āha ca gautamaḥ | ( a. 1 sū. 46|50) “prāṇopasparśanaṃ darbhaiḥ | prākkūleṣvāsanaṃ ca” | prāṇāyāmaistribhiḥ pūtaḥ | mukhanāsikāsañcārī vāyuḥ prāṇaḥ tasyāyāmo nirodhaḥ śarīre dhāraṇaṃ, bahirniṣkramaṇaniṣedhaḥ, tasya smṛtyantare dhāraṇakālasya mānaṃ samāmnātam | mantrānusmaraṇaṃ ca | “pratipraṇavasaṃyuktāṃ gāyatrīṃ śirasā saha | trijapedāyataprāṇaḥ prāṇāyāmaḥ sa ucyate” | vasiṣṭhena bhagavatā mahāvyāhṛtayo'pyuktāḥ | mantrāvasāna eva nirodhāvadhiḥ anyasyānāmnātatvātsarvasmṛtīnāṃ cāsati virodha ekārthatvādikāpyevamevānuṣṭhānam | “nanvevamitaretarāśrayaḥ syāt kṛteṣu prāṇāyāmeṣu oṃṅkāro na kartavyo, na coṅkāreṇa vinā prāṇāyāmo nirvartate |” naiṣa doṣaḥ | trijapediti prāṇāyāmeṣu mānasavyāpāreṇoṅkārasya smaraṇamucyate | na hi niruddhaprāṇasya śabdoccāraṇaṃ sambhavati | yadyapi japaḥ kaścidvāgvyāpārasādhyo bhavati |

(B) Next as regards Mantras, some of them are directly injunctive; e.g., the Mantra ‘Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhate’ (‘offers the Kapiñjala birds to Vasanta’);—in connection with the Āghāra-offering, the deity to whom the offering is to be made is pointed out by the mantra ‘Ita Indra urdhvo’ dhvaraḥ, etc.’ In this case the Deity is not mentioned in the passage that enjoins the offering, nor is it mentioned in any other purely injunctive passage; the particular mantra to be used however is directly enjoined as being the one that begins with ‘Ita Indra’; hence it is from the words of this mantra that we learn the name of the requisite Deity. There are thousand, of such instances where the Deity is indicated by the words of the mantra. Then, there are certain mantras that are only descriptive of what is being done; and these also serve the purpose of making known Dharma by reminding (the persons engaged in the act, of what is to be done); and thus these also become ‘root of Dharma’ by indicating what should be done.