Manava Dharmashastra 2.165.6

2.165.6

"yadcchayā prāmādikāmasyeva vicāro'pi prāpta" iti cet--evaṃ tarhyaniyatatvātpuruṣecchāyāḥ kaścinna vicārayet | yadi vicārayennādhyayanasamanantaram | ato'smāṃśasyāprāmattvādyāvadaprāptaṃ vidherviṣaya ityasti vidhervyāpāraḥ | tasmādadhyayanasyānyataḥ prāptatvāttatsambandhasyāvabodhasyāniścitarūpasya vastusvābhāvyenotpattestādṛśasya na kvacidarthavattvātsatyapi tasminsaṃskārakatvānnirvyūḍhe niścitasyaiva phalavatkarmānuṣṭhānopayogitvānniścayasya vicārasādhyatvāttasya ca niyatakālāvariśyakartavyatāprāptestannivṛttyarthaṃ vicāraparyavasāyī vidhirayamavatiṣṭhate | ato bhavatyākāṅkṣā niyamānām--kiṃ śrutādhyayanaparyavasānāvadhirutā''kṣiptaniścitāvabodhajananārthavicāraparyavasānaḥ | ato'syāmapekṣāyāṃ 'vedamadhītya snāyādi'tyanenāvadhisamarpaṇaṃ kriyate | tatra prakṛtatyāpekṣāyaścāviśeṣādyuktā lakṣaṇā | "nanu kimidamucyate'śruto'vabodhaḥ, yāvatā 'adhigantavya iti' śrūyata eva| vede smṛtiṣu cānyāsu 'vedamadhīte' 'svādhyāyo'dhyetavyaḥ' iti ca paṭhyate | mānavyā api smṛteretatsmṛtimūlatvādabhinnārthataiva |" āptiprāvabodhābhiprāyo'yamadhigamaḥ| yadi vā svarūpagrahaṇamevādhigamaḥ| avabodhaparyantatā tu tenaiva nyāyena labhyate | na ca visamañjasameko'yaṃ vidhiratasya ca viṣayāṃśaḥ kaścidācāryavidhinā prayujyate, kasyacidaṃśasya sa eva prayojaka iti vairūpyam | kimatrānupapannam, arthabhūtasyaivāvagamāt | yatūktaṃ "anekavedādhyayanamadṛṣṭārthaṃ yuktamiti"--tasya 'ṣaṭtriṃśadābdikam' ityatra parihāraṃ vakṣyāmaḥ |

“Then again, it is just because the singular number in ‘vedah’ in this passage is regarded to be significant that the injunction herein contained is not recognised as laying down the study of several Vedas, and hence its scope is going to be extended with a view to include such study by what is going to be said later on, under 3.2.

“If then, there is to be a study of s everal Vedas, where would be the use of significance being attached to the singular number in the present verse?

“It is certainly of use; it serves to indicate that even by the study of a single rescensional text one is to be regarded as having fulfilled the injunction of ‘Vedic study,’ and that the study of several Vedas is purely optional.

“If the study of several Vedas is not actually prescribed by injunction, what lunatic would he there who would torture himself by the tattering of teeth (involved in the learning of several Vedas)?

“But there is the other injunction—‘Having learnt the Vedas, etc.’ (3.2); this learning is for one who desires a particular reward, and this reward is Heaven. Or, if we have some assertions made in continuation of the said injunction, referring to ‘streams of butter’ or some such thing,—then these may be regarded as the reward (of learning several Vedas).

“As for the injunction of the study (of one Veda) by the Religious Student, it pertains to the learning of the meaning, and serves a perceptibly useful purpose; e.g., the knowledge of what the Veda says is found to be of use in the actual performance of religious acts; and in fact it is only the man so learned that is entitled to their performance. The learning of several Vedas, on the other band, serves a purely imperceptible purpose. If this were not so, then, the injunction of ‘Vedic Study’ having been fulfilled by the study of a single Veda, the assertion of ‘having studied the Vedas’ (3.2) would be entirely superfluous,—if it were not an injunction of learning several Vedas for the purpose of acquiring merit (an imperceptible reward).”

Our answer to the above is as follows:—How can the view here put forward be acceptable?—since there is the single injunction—‘the Veda should be learnt’; and if this be regarded as not pertaining to an imperceptible transcendental result,—on the ground (1) that it is an injunction of sanctification, and (2) tbat it is of use only in the performance of perceptible acts—then the same can be said in regard to the study of several Vedas also; for the same conditions are present there also. And further, according to the view in question, there would be a diversity (in regard to the Veda): in one case (that of the single Veda) it would, like the injunction of fire-laying, be related to all compulsory and optional acts, through the comprehension of its meaning; while in the other (that of several Vedas), it would be directly conducive to a desirable result.

It might be argued that “the injunction of the learning of several Vedas is a distinct injunction, and it is not based upon the injunction of ‘becoming a teacher’ (as the injunction of learning one Veda is); so that it is only one who desires a particular reward that is entitled to the former.”

But this is not right; as a matter of fact, it is not a distinct injunction at all; there is only one injunction bearing upon the question,—viz., ‘ The entire Veda should be learnt’; and what the other passage—‘Having learnt the Vedas, etc.’ (3.2)—does is to restrict the number of Vedas learnt to three only, in view of the possibility of the idea being entertained that the singular number (in the injunction ‘the Veda should be learnt’) not being meant to be significant, one might study as many recensional texts as he could,—five, six, even seven. Then again, in the passage under question (3.2) we do not find the injunction in the form ‘one should learn,’ the actual words of the injunction being ‘O should enter the state of the House-holder.’

Then again, what has been said above iu regard to significance being attached to the singular number in ‘Vedaḥ’ is absolutely incoherent. Such significance should be based upon direct injunction, and not merely upon argument and reasoning; and in the case in question what the Injunction lays down is‘learning for the acquiring of the Vedic text,’ and the predominance of this ‘learning of the text,’ indicated by means of the two words ending with the Accusative ending, does not cease merely on the ground of its subserviency to the ‘comprehension of the meaning.’ If such reasoning were accepted, significance would have to be attached to the singular number in ‘graham’ (in the passage ‘graham sammārṣṭi,’ ‘wash the cup,’); for the cup, even though the predominant factor, does become subservient to the ‘washing’; but no such subserviency is directly expressed by word,—as there is in the case of the passage ‘grahair-juhoti,’ where the words directly express the subserviency of the ‘cups’ to the ‘Homa.’ Thus it is clear that the predominance of ‘Vedic Study’ is distinctly indicated by the direct denotation (of the Accusative ending), and also by Injunction; and the predominance being thus expressed, no significance can be attached to the singular number.

“Well, if the purposes of the injunction of ‘Vedic Study’ are accomplished by the getting up of a single Veda, it behoves you to point out the use of learning several Vedas.”

This we shall explain under Chapter III.

“If the Injunction of Vedic Study extends up to the learning of the meaning also, then, even after the text of the Veda has been got up, so long as the meaning has not been learnt, there would be no cessation of the performance of such Restraints and Observances as the avoiding of honey, meat, etc.—‘What harm is there in that?’—It would be contrary to the usage of cultured persons: cultured persons do not avoid the eating of honey, meat, etc., after they have got up the Vedic text, even though they continue to listen to the expounding of its meaning.”

There is no force in this objection. For there is another law which says—‘Having learnt the Veda, one should bathe’; and here ‘having learnt’ refers to the mere reading of the text, and ‘should bathe’ indicates the abandoning of all those Restraints and Observances that constitute the auxiliaries to ‘Vedic Study’; for Bathing is as much prohibited (for the Vedic Student) as Honey and Meat; so that when Bathing is permitted by the said law, it permits the use of Honey and the rest also, by reason of their association, and also on account of the prohibition of all these occurring in the same context. As for intercourse with women (which also is prohibited along with Bathing, etc., for the Vedic Student), this forms the subject of a separate prohibition—‘With his life of continence unperturbed, etc.’, (Manu, 3-2); and the transgression of this during the time that one is learning the meaning of Vedic texts would do no violation to the Injunction of Vedic Study; for during the said time, ‘continence’ does not form a necessary factor of ‘study’; as all Restraints and Observances cease after the getting up of the text. Then again, this prohibition (of intercourse with women) is meant to fulfil some purpose for the man (and hence not compulsory); it is for this reason that in the event of transgression occurring in some way or the other, there is the expiation laid down (in 11.118) for the Vedic Student commiting adultery; and what the prescribing of this special expiation indicates is that the emission of semen being a delinquency on the part of the person who is still keeping the Restraints and Observances (as is clear from 11.120),—this case would not be met by the ordinary expiatory rites of the ‘Cāndrāyaṇa’ and the rest, laid down in connection with ‘minor sins.’

“What are the grounds for taking the expression ‘should bathe’ as figurative (and indicative of the discontinuance of Restraints and Observances)?”

Our answer is as follows:—The ‘bathing’ herein laid down could not consist of the mere washing of the body with water; for if it were so, then what is enjoined would have to be regarded as serving some transcendental purpose; on the other band, the Restraints imposed upon the Vedic Student stand in need of the mention of some time at which they could be discontinued; so that if the Injunction is taken as indicating this limit of time, it comes to supply a much-needed information.

“But these Restraints do not stand in need of any other limit; they are meant to subserve the injunction of Vedic Study; so that the fulfilment of that injunction would be their natural limit; the fulfilment of the injunction consists in the accomplishment of its object; its object is study; and the accomplishment of study is something that is easily perceived. [Hence there can be no point in taking the expression ‘should bathe’ as indicative of the limit of the Restraints and Observances.]”

This would be quite true, if the injunction of Vedic Study rested merely on what is directly expressed by it. As a matter of fact, however, its object embraces things not so expressed; for instance, the comprehension of the meaning of Vedic texts resulting from the said study is also included in the object of the said Injunction; because if it were not so, then the Injunction would fail to be sanctiftcatory in character. In fact, if the Injunction rested entirely in what is directly expressed by it, it would lose its injunctive character itself; for the injunctiveness of the Injunction consists in its urging the agent to accomplish what it denotes; and ‘what it denotes’ consists of (a) the result to be accomplished, (b) the means of accomplishing it and (c) the procedure adopted; and iu as much as all these three are expressed by a single word, none of them can be regarded as beyond what is denoted by the Injunction. Thus then, in the injunctive verb ‘udhīyīta’ ‘should study,’ the thing to be accomplished is what is determined by the verbal root ‘to study,’—and the ‘procedure’ consists of the keeping of Restraints and Observances. As a matter of fact, this injunction, by itself, is not capable of bringing about the fulfilment of what it denotes; because in the case of every Injunction the full accomplishment of what it denotes is obtained through the execution of an object; and the execution of the object of the injunction in question is already accomplished by the force of another Injunction. For instance, for the Teacher, there is the Injunction—

‘Having initiated the pupil, he should teach him the Veda’; and as the work of ‘teaching’ cannot be accomplished without the work of ‘learning,’ the Teacher, with a view to the accomplishing of the injunction of his own duty, urges the boy to the work of ‘learning’; and it is not possible for the boy, without being urged by the Teacher, to accomplish the act, merely on the strength of his own knowledge of the injunction. From all this it follows that the act of ‘learning the Veda’ should be regarded as prompted by the injunction addressed to the Teacher. And when the act is accomplished by being prompted by that injunction, there is no need for any other injunction proscribing the pupil’s act of ‘learning.’ Thus then, being devoid of prompting force, what sort of injunctive character could belong to the Injunction in question (‘the entire Veda should be learnt’)? In face of this possibility of the Injunction losing its character, we have to look out for some such method whereby it would acquire the requisite prompting force. And the only sure way of doing this is to regard it as an injunction of embellishment. Nor would the embellishment in question be entirely useless; for it is only when the learning (of the Vedic text) has been accomplished, that the pupil derives knowledge of some sort of meaning, which latter knowledge becomes useful in the performance of all those acts (that are laid down in the Veda). From this it is clearly perceived that the Injunction in question lays down the necessity of acquiring the knowledge of the meaning of the texts that have been learnt in the course of ‘Vedic Study.’ Though from the very nature of things, the meaning of the texts becomes comprehended as soon as the texts have been heard,—yet such a comprehension is never definite and sure. Hence the prompting done by the Injunction is towards that method by which the said knowledge may become definitively certain. This certainty comes about when one has pondered over the subject and succeeded in setting aside all doubts; and the doing of this pondering is not found to be indicated by any other means of knowledge; it is certainly not prescribed by the injunction of ‘becoming a Teacher,’—as this latter is accomplished by the learning (by the pupil) of the mere verbal text. Nor is it indicated by any visible purpose to be served by it; for what purpose of man is there which could not be fulfilled without the said pondering,—and for the fulfilling of which one would undertake it?

“Just as for one who desires to acquire landed property, the performance of the act conducive to it is likely to be taken up by chance (or whim),—the same might be the case with the pondering in question also.”

But in that case, there being no certainty regarding the whims and desires of men; it is just possible that some one might not do the pondering at all; or even if he did do it, he might not do it immediately after the learning of the Vedic text.

Thus then, this part (of study) not being indicated by any other means, it comes to be regarded as falling within the province of the Injunction in question, in accordance with the principle that that alone forms the subject-matter of an Injunction which is not got at by any other means. Since then, (a) the ‘learning of the text’ is already got at by other means,—(b) since the comprehension of the meaning which follows, by the very nature of things, upon the mere reading is uncertain and indefinite,—(c) since such comprehension serves no useful purpose,—(d) since even after the sanctificatory learning of the text has been accomplished, it is only the definite knowledge of its meaning that serves the useful purpose of helping the performance of acts,—and (e) since the said definite-knowledge is obtained only by means of pondering,—it follows that it is necessary to do this pondering during a well-defined time; and for the due accomplishment of this pondering, the Injunction in question comes to be one pointing to it as its ultimate purpose.

It is for this reason that in regard to the Restraints there arises the doubt as to whether they arc to end with the learning of the words heard from the mouth of the Teacher, or they are to go on with the enquiry into the meaning of these texts, till this is definitely ascertained,—the necessity of learning this meaning being indirectly implied. Such being the doubt, the direction that, ‘One should bathe after having learnt the Veda,’ serves to indicate the limit of the observance if the said Restraints; and since the indirect indication of this direction is equally helpful to the subject-matter in question, and to the settling of the doubtful point, it is only right to accept the said indication.

“Why is it said that the comprehending of the meaning is not directly laid down? As a matter of fact, the words used are that ‘the Veda should be learnt,’ which directly speaks of the said comprehension. In the Veda as well as in other Smṛtis, we find such directions as ‘Learns the Veda,’ and ‘The Veda should be studied.’ And since the rule laid down by Manu also is based upon those directions, its meaning must be the same as that of these directions.”

The ‘learning’ spoken of in the directions (‘tatyaḥ’) refers to that comprehension of meaning which is only indirectly implied. Or, ‘learning’ may stand for the getting up of the verbal text only; and the necessity of learning the meaning would be deduced from the reasoning expounded above. Nor is there any incongruity in the conclusion that, though the Injunction in question is one only, yet one part of it—that pertaining to its subject-matter—is prompted by the Injunction of ‘becoming a teacher,’ and another portion of it is prompted by itself. Though this involves a diversity, there is nothing wrong in this,—representing as it does, what is a mere fact.

It has been urged that “it is only right that several Vedas should be learnt for the purpose of accomplishing a transcendental result.”

We shall answer this under 3.1.