Manava Dharmashastra 2.6.13

2.6.13

yaduktaṃ śyenādayaḥ pratiṣiddhatvādadharma ititatsatyam | tathāpi pratiṣiddheṣvapi teṣu yo'tyantapravṛddhadveṣo na hiṃsyādbhūtānītyatikrāntaniṣedhādhikārastasya te śatruvadhalakṣaṇāṃ prītimanuṣṭhīyamānāṃ nirvartayantītyetāvatā'śena vedasya dharmamūlatvaṃ śyenādivākyeṣvapi na vihanyate | niṣedheṣvapi yo rāgataḥ pravṛtto hanane sa niṣedhe niyujyate | etadeva niṣedhasyānuṣṭhānaṃ yanniṣidhyamānasyāsyānuṣṭhānam | agnīṣomīyādau tu naiva hiṃsāpratiṣedho'sti dveṣalakṣaṇāyā laukikyā hiṃsāyā niṣedhena niṣiddhatvāt | śāstrīyā tu vidhilakṣaṇā na niṣedhena viṣayīkriyate, laukikyāṃ caritārthatvānniṣedhasya | naca sāmānyatodṛṣṭena hiṃsātvānnaukikahiṃsāvadvaidikyāḥ pāpahetutvamāpādayituṃ śakyate | yato na hiṃsātvaṃ pāpahetutve kāraṇam api tu pratiṣedhena viṣayīkaraṇam | na cātra pratiṣedho'stītyuktam | kaiścittu mūlaśabdaḥ kāraṇaparyāyo vyākhyāyate | dharmasya vedo mūlaṃ pratiṣṭhākāraṇaṃ sākṣātpraṇālyā ca | 'svādhyāyamadhīyīta' 'ṛgvedaṃ dhārayanvipra' ityādi codanāsu sākṣāt | agnihotrādikarmasvarūpajñāpakatyā praṇālyā | smṛtiśīle ca tadvidām | anubhūtārthaviṣayaṃ vijñānaṃ smṛtirucyate | tacchabdena vedaḥ pratyavamṛśyate | taṃ vidanti tadvidaḥ| vedārthavidāmidaṃ kartavyamidaṃ na kartavyamiti yatsmaraṇaṃ tadapi pramāṇam | "nanu ca smṛtirna pramāṇamityāhuḥ | sā hi pūrvapramāṇāvagataprameyānuvādinī nādhikamarthaṃ paricchinattīti vadanti" | satyam | ye smaranti teṣāmādyameva tatra śabdādi pramāṇaṃ nātmīyā smṛtiḥ | asmākaṃ tu manvādismṛtireva pramāṇam |

(B) Smṛti
Medhātithi on Manu, 2.6.—‘Smṛti’ is Recollection and ‘Śīla’ denotes freedom from love, hatred and such improper feelings; this latter, according to one explanation, is a means of accomplishing Dharma, and not a means of knowing it; and it has been separately mentioned in the present connection only with a view to emphasise its importance. Not satisfied with this, he has taken the two terras ‘Smṛti’ and ‘Śīla’ in the compound as inter-related; and as together standing for a single means of knowing Dharma, in the shape of ‘Recollection during that state of the mind when it is calm, free from all disturbing influences of love, hatred and so forth’,—i.e., ‘Conscientious Recollection.’ The authority of ‘Smṛti’ thus becomes qualified. Even though a certain writer may be a Ṛṣi versed in Veda, yet if his ‘recollection’ and its compilation come about at a time when his mind was perturbed by discordant feelings, much trust cannot be placed upon such ‘Recollection.’

The upshot of the whole is that when a person is found to be recognised and spoken of by all wise and learned persons as endowed with the said three qualifications—and a certain compilation is also recognised as made by that person,—the word of such a person as found in his recognised work, should be recognised as an authoritative exponent of Dharma. Sc that even at the present day if there were such a person and he were to compose a work, then for all later generations that work would be regarded just as highly as those of Manu and others. This is the reason why Medhātithi is averse to the practice of enumerating the authoritative ‘Smṛtis.’ (Trans., p. 204.)