Manava Dharmashastra 4.5

4.5

uñchaśca śilaśca uñchaśilam | taddvṛttaṃ jñeyam | satyavratatulyam | kṣetrāllūnasya vrīhyādergṛhaṃ khalaṃ vā nīyamānasya yaḥ pulākaḥ patitaḥ svāmino'napekṣitastasyoccayanamuñchaḥ, 'tattvamṛtam' | na tatreyaṃ buddhirādheyā 'parakīyametanna gṛhāmīti' | evaṃ ca khalātpariśraṣṭasya lūnasyālūnasya vā'nekaprarohavato grahaṇaṃ 'śilaḥ' | amṛtaṃ syādayācitam | atyantaprītikaratvāt | mṛtamiva yācitaṃ bhaikṣamivi | 'yācita'mityeva siddhe 'bhaikṣa'śabdena sāmūhikataddhitāntena bahavo yācitavyā ityucyate, naikaḥ kadardhanīyaḥ | taduktam "alpadroheṇeti" | prāyeṇa ca bhaikṣaśabdasya 'bhaikṣyasyātmaviśuddhyartha' mityevamādau siddhānnaviṣaye prayogasiddheḥ, sāmānyaviṣayārthaṃ 'yācita' śabdopādānam | tena nedaṃ siddhānnabhakṣyāmeva, agnisataḥ parānnapakvena vaiśvadevādivirodhāt | na cedaṃ bhojanārthameva bhikṣeṇam, kiṃ tarhi sthityartham | sthitiśca na bhojanamātrasādhyā gṛhasthasya, kiṃ tarhi yāvatkiñcid gṛhopayogi | ata evodakaparidhānādyapi bhikṣitavyam, gṛhopakaraṇaṃ ca sthālyapidhānādi | brahmacāriṇastu bhojanakāle vidhinā pākāsambhavānniyamataḥ siddhānnaviṣayaṃ bhaikṣyaṃ pratīyate | bhikṣāśabdaścāyaṃ bhikṣyamāṇadravyagataṃ parimāṇamapyācaṣṭe | bhikṣāmātraṃ na dadāti yācitaḥ | prasutimātraṃ bhikṣeti | tena gohiraṇyādibhikṣāṃ na prasūtaśabdenābhyanujñāyate | pratigrahārthaṃ yācateti | "nanu bhaikṣagrahaṇamapi pratigraha eva" | naiva grahaṇamātraṃ pratigrahaḥ | viśiṣṭa eva svīkāre pratipūrvo gṛhṇātirvartate | tena na svīkāramātre | "pratigrahasamartho'pi" (a0 4 ślo0 186) "pratigrahaḥ pratyavaraḥ" iti ( a0 10 ślo0 106 ) adṛṣṭabuddhyā dīyamānaṃ mantrapūrvaṃ gṛhṇataḥ 'pratigraho' bhavati | na ca bhaikṣe 'devasya tvādi' mantroccāraṇamasti | na ca prītyādinā dānagrahaṇe | na ca tatra pratigrahavyavahāraḥ | ataḥ pratigrahādarthāntaramevedamamṛtāmṛtaśabdābhidheyam | ataśca nātra yācyamānasya ayācyamānasya vā mahāsattvatayā upakārāntarāpekṣā jāyate | yena vā dadato jātyādyapekṣā yuktimatī | pratigrāhyasyaiva karuṇayā ca pradīyamānaṃ gṛhṇato na pratigrahaḥ | "nanu ca karuṇayā dānamadṛṣṭāyaiva" | neti brūmaḥ | na ca tatra dānadharmaḥ | kiṃ tarhi karuṇābhyāsātparopakārādvā | tatra yathā hitopadeśādāvanugrāhyasya vidhirjātyādi- nāpekṣate tadvatkaruṇayā dāne | tathā ca śiṣṭā naivaṃvidhe dāne ‘vedatattvārthaviduṣe brāhmaṇāye’tyetadanurudhyante | ata evabrāhmaṇā api dainyamāpannāḥ pareṇa dattaṃ gṛhānā na brāhmaṇavṛttiṃ pratigrahamāśritā bhavanti |
sthitametat | pratigrahe yadyapi yācitāyācitapūrvakatvaṃ vidyate tathāpi na tenaiva mṛtāmṛtaśabdārthaḥ | viṣayāntarasya darśitatvāt | yājanādhyāpanayorapyetadrūpamasti | kaścidyācitvā yājakatvaṃ labhate, kaścitprārthyate | evamadhyāpane yojyam |
ato yāvatā kācidvṛttiryācñayā sā dainyāvahatvāt maraṇamiveti mṛtaśabdenābhidhīyate |
karṣaṇaṃ tu maraṇādapi pāpīyaḥ | lāṅgalākarṣaṇaṃ hi bhāravāhitvaṃ tacca khalajanapadakarma |

Gleaning and picking is to be known as “Truth;” and what is obtained unasked, “Nectar”; alms obtained by begging is “Death,” and cultivation is declared to be “Super- death.”—(5)

Medhātithi’s commentary (manubhāṣya):
The corn that is gleaned is to be known as ‘Truth;’ living by this means being regarded as equal to the strict observance of truth. When after harvesting, corn is being carried either home or to the granary, if certain ears of corn fall down on the ground, and are left by the owner’—the picking up of these is what is called “gleaning;” and this is called ‘Truth;’ and in regard to this, one need not entertain any such idea as ‘this belongs to another person, so I shall not take it.’

Similarly, when one takes away what has fallen off from the sheaf—either before or after harvesting,—and what forms part of several offshoots,—this is ‘picking.’

‘What is obtained unasked is Nectar’—so called, because it is a source of great pleasure.

‘The alms obtained by begging is Death.’— The term ‘begging’ itself signifying the fact of what is obtained being ‘alms,’ the addition of this latter term—which is formed by the adding of a Nominal Affix denoting a group or collection,—is meant to imply that several persons shall be begged, and no single person shall be constantly troubled, as is shown by what has been said above regarding ‘what involves very little trouble to living beings.’ Then again, as a rule, the term ‘bhaikṣa,’ ‘alms,’ is found to be used in the sense of cooked food; as we find in the case of such passages as—‘for the purpose of cleansing oneself from alms;’ hence the adding of the term ‘begging’ serves to indicate that ‘alms’ stands here for food in general; hence what is meant here is not cooked food only; specially as for one who has set up the Fire, it would be wrong to make the Vaiśvadeva and other offerings with food cooked in any other fire.

The begging of alms here spoken of is not meant to be that only which is got for eating; it stands for what enables the man to maintain himself; and the maintenance of the householder is not accomplished merely by eating; in fact, it requires all such things as are necessary for house-keeping; hence it is that water-vessels and other such articles should also be begged; as also such household-requisites as dishes and covers, etc. So far as the Student is concerned, since for him it is impossible that just at the time of his eating, cooking should be done in the proper manner;—it follows that in his case ‘alms’ must mean cooked food only.

The term ‘bhikṣā,’ ‘alms,’ also indicates the quantity of the article obtained by begging; this quantity being a mere handful. But when a man is begged, he does not give mere alms, a mere handful; so that the begging of the cow, gold and such other things could not be regarded as sanctioned by the mere ‘handful.’ In fact, begging is always done for the purpose of receiving all kinds of gifts.

“The receiving of alms also would be a receiving of gifts.”

No; mere acceptance does not constitute the ‘receiving of gifts;’ the root ‘graha,’ with the preposition ‘prati,’—i.e., the term ‘pratigraha,’ ‘receiving of gifts’—is applied to a particular form of ‘acceptance,’ and not to any and every acceptance. Wherever the term ‘pratigraha,’ ‘gift,’ is used—e. g., under 4.186 and 10.100—it is used in the sense of such gift as is offered with a view to some transcendental result, and is received with due mantras. In the receiving of mere ‘alms,’ however, there is no reciting of any such mantra as ‘devasya tvā, etc.’ Nor again, is the term applied to the accepting of friendly and other presents; in the sense of this latter, the term is never used.

From all this it follows that the terms ‘Truth’ and ‘Nectar’ are used in the sense of things other than ‘gifts.’ Hence, in this case, the man who gives, whether begged or un-begged, is a high-souled person, and, hence, in his mind there does not arise any desire for any form of return (for the gift he makes); so that there would be no grounds for any restriction as to the caste, etc., of the recipient or giver. When a present is made entirely through sympathy for the receiver, it does not become a ‘gift’ (which always connotes the presence of desire for some transcendental result).

“But what is given through sympathy or pity is also conducive to transcendental results.”

We say—no; because it does not fulfil the conditions of ‘dāna,’ ‘giving’ (formal); it being prompted either by pity or by the desire to do good to others. Hence, just as in offering advice, through sympathy, considerations of caste do not come in; so in the case of giving through pity also. It is for this reason that in the case of such giving, cultured people do not observe any such restrictions as ‘gifts should be offered to the Brāhmaṇa who knows the real meaning of the Veda,’ and so forth. It is for this same reason, again, that even non-Brāhmaṇas, on becoming poor, accept gifts offered by others, but are not, on that account, regarded as having ‘received gifts,’ and thus transgressed upon the Brāhmaṇas ‘livelihood.’

The conclusion, therefore, is as follows:—Though in the regular ‘gift,’ considerations of its being asked or unasked do come in, yet it does not, merely on that account, become either ‘Truth’ or ‘Nectar;’ because it has been shown that these terms have a different connotation.

This same connotation is applicable to ‘officiating at sacrifices’ and ‘teaching’ (the other two means of livelihood for the Brāhmaṇa): Some one obtains the post of officiating at a sacrifice after having begged for it from some one. Similarly with the work of Teaching also.

Any such means of living as is obtained by begging, involves humiliation; and hence, resembling death, it is called ‘death.’

Cultivating is worse even than Death; specially as the act of ploughing and carrying of burdens is the work of lower people.—(5)