Manava Dharmashastra 5.110.2

5.110.2

evaṃ śuddhāvapi-yadupahataṃ dravyaṃ tena yathāvihitaṃ śrutaprakṣālanādikriyeṇa vyavahartavyamiti-śakyate vidhimūlatā pratipattum | na ca śuddhiḥ kartavyeti vidhyarthaḥ | tathā satyakurvanpratyaveyāt | kiṃtu dṛṣṭārthe vyavahāre yenakenacitpātreṇa śucinā'nyena vā kartavye'rthitvātprāpte niyamaḥ śāstrīyaḥ- 'itthaṃbhūtena vyavahartavyaṃ satyarthitve, nānitthaṃbhūtena' | "nanu ca niyamapakṣe'bhyudayārthino'dhikāraḥ | anyasya tu kāmaprasaṃgaḥ | yathā kusādhutvacintāyāṃ vācakatvāviśeṣe'pi niyamaḥ puṇyapāpayoriti" | satyam , yadyaśuddhapātrasya pratiṣedho na syāt | pratiṣedhe tu sati kuto'kṛtaśuddhinā vyavahāraḥ | śuddhividhistu pratiprasavamātram | pratiprasave kuto'bhyudayaḥ | kevalaṃ pratiṣedhātikramo na bhavati | bhavatu vā padārthādhigamaparaiva smṛtiriyam, sādhvasādhuvivekatantralpasmṛtivacca | yattu 'kāryamūlatvaṃ manvādivākyānāmiti' kenaitaduktam | yatra yādṛśaṃ mūlatvena śakyate'vagantuṃ tatra tadevābhyupagamyate | aṣṭakādau kāryarūpe tādṛśameva vākyaṃ mūlam, siddhe tvarthe siddhārthaviṣayameva | padārthavyavasthāyāmidaṃ prathamatā vyavahāramūleti na kadācitkṛtiḥ | iha tu na kathaṃcidrūpavahāramūlaṃ saṃbhavati | vaidikamantrasādhyāyāṃ ca śuddhau kā vyavahāramūlatā śakyā | vidhiścānarthakaḥ syāt | "nanu ca pāṇinerapi vidhirasti sādhubhirbhāṣitavyaṃ nāsādhubhiriti |" naiṣā pāṇineḥ smṛtiḥ | sā hyetāvati paryavasitā-'sādhurayamayaṃ neti' etattu dharmasūtrakāriṇāṃ smaraṇaṃ yadyapyasti | abhidhānasārāccaitannipuṇato'vagantavyam |

“Or again, the Smṛti may be taken as dealing with the explanation of the meanings of words,—resembling the Smṛti that deals with the correct and incorrect forms of words. As for the notion that ‘the works of Manu and others have their basis in such Vedic texts as deal with the subject of what ought to be done’, we ask—who has said that this is so? As a matter of fact, our presumption of the basis for the assertions of Manu and others depends upon the merit of each individual case. For instance, in the case of the Aṣṭakā, which is of the nature of a rite, we presume its basis in the form of a Vedic text enjoining what ought to be done; but in a case where the assertion deals with things as they really exist, the corresponding basic text, also must be of the same kind, dealing with an accomplished entity. As regards the subject of the exact meanings of words, the idea regarding the priority of a particular denotation may always be derived from usage; as in this matter there is no question of anything to be done. In the case in question however (where there is a question of something to be done), it is not possible to derive any knowledge from mere usage. Specially because purification being something that can he brought about only by means of Vedic texts, how could it ever be made dependent upon usage? If it were, then all injunctions on the subject would be absolutely futile.—‘But we have such in junctions as that of Pāṇini, to the effect that one should make use of correct, and not incorrect, forms of words’ (where also there is no act to be done, nothing to be brought into existence).’—This is not Pāṇini’s injunction at all; all that his rule says is ‘this is correct, not that’; though it is true there is a rule like what has been quoted in the works of the authors of the Dharmasūtras all this may be learnt in detail from the Abhidhānāsara ).—‘In this Smṛti itself we find such injunctions as that—(1) claimants to property shall divide it in such and such a manner, or that (2) the eldest brother shall take four shares (9.153), or that (3) the eldest brother shall take &c. &c. (9.105). The proper denotation of the injunction has been declared to extend to directing and other factors also.

“If this is so, then it should be necessary to describe in detail the impurity attaching to things—in some such form as ‘such and such a substance becomes impure when in contact with such and such a substance’.—‘But these are worldly things; and all this would be known from ordinary usage.’—Not so; because from ordinary usage, the thing is known only in a vague general form. Further in ordinary usage what is called ‘impure’ is only what has become disgusting by being contaminated by urine, ordure and blood; while what is meant by ‘impure’ in the present context is that which is unfit for touching &c.; and it is only from the scriptures that it could be learnt whence this unfitness arises. Then again, a man is called pure when he does not fall into a mistake in regard to what belongs to others. From all this it is clear that no useful purpose can be served from what is thus known, from ordinary usage, regarding the signification of the term in question. Though it is generally known that what has been contaminated is impure, yet it cannot be known by what particular thing a certain thing becomes contaminated.—‘But how can the exact signification of a term be ascertained from scriptures, when, ‘as a matter of fact, what the scriptures provide is the knowledge of what should be done, and not the meaning of a certain word, which latter is what is done by the work of Pāṇini; that this is so follows from the fact that the Smṛtis of Manu and others are based upon the Veda (which deals only with the Duties of Man)’.—Our answer to this is as follows:—In the case in question, we do infer an injunction in the form—‘one should not make use of a substance that has become contaminated by such and such a substance’; and there would be nothing incongruous in the notion that the substance by whose contact the thing becomes unfit for use is the cause of contamination. Similarly as regards purification also, we can recognise its basis in some such injunction as—‘when a thing has become contaminated, it may be used after it has gone through the prescribed process of washing &c.’; and yet such an injunction would not mean that ‘purification should be done’. For if it did this, then, he who would not do it would incur sin. What happens is that in the case of ordinary secular acts, it being possible for the man in need to make use of any kind of vessels, pure or otherwise,—the Scripture lays down the restriction that ‘if need arises, one should make use of such vessels, and not of others If it is to be treated as a restriction, then it would be incumbent upon only one who seeks prosperity; and every other man would be free to do as he chose; just as in connection with the question of the correct forms of words, though the correct and incorrect forms are both equally expressive, yet there is the restriction which indicates that the use of the correct form brings merit, while that of the incorrect form is sinful [and this means that only people seeking merit need use the correct form].’—This would be true only if there were no text prohibiting the use of unclean vessels. But when there is such a prohibition, how could anyone make use of the vessel that has not been purified? As for the rules regarding purification, these only represent exceptions (to the prohibition of unclean vessels, the meaning being, that if the unclean vessel has been purified, it may be used). How then could there be any prosperity arising from what is a mere exception? Since all that it means is that if one acts according to the exception, he does not incur the sin of transgressing the prohibition.