Manava Dharmashastra 6.89.2

6.89.2

satyam | yadi vacanāntare strīmātre gamanaṃ na niṣiddhaṃ syāt | samāne'pi sarvatra vedādhigame śāstrato gamyāgamyavivekaḥ | ataśca dhīraprakṛtīnāṃ na vivāhamantareṇa svārthasaṃpattiriti yuktaiva vedasya prayoktṛtvāśaṃkā | “yadyevaṃ sarvasya na prayojakāni santi | sarveṣāṃ tasminsatyarthanivṛttau kiṃ tena nirūpitena | yo'sti vivāhaprayojakaḥ so'stu | āśramāntarāṇi pratyakṣavidhāne gārhasthyasya kathamupapadyanta ityetadadhikṛtā vivāhaprayukticintā tu kenāṃśena saṃgacchate |” ucyate | yāvaduktaṃ 'sarveṣāmarthasiddhiriti' | satyam | ekena prayuktāvanyasya prasaṅgādupakārasiddhau na pṛthakprayoktṛtvakalpanā | yathā vrīhayaḥ puruṣārthena jīvanena prayuktāḥ karmasu viniyujyante | na karmaṇi dhanārjanaṃ prayujyate | yathā vā vidyā satyapyavaidhaśyānadhikāre na prayujyate, svādhyāyavidhinaiva tatsiddheḥ | evamiha kāmataḥ pravṛttisiddherna karmaśrutayaḥ prayoktavyāḥ | tenākṛtavivāhyamapi kṛtyakarmavidhaya upapatsyante | ataśca yo brahmacarya eva kathaṃcitparipakvakaṣāyaḥ sa na vivakṣate | tataḥ sa dvitīyatvābhāvānnādhikariṣyate | ataśca śrauteṣvanadhikārāttādṛśasyāśramāntaratā''patsyeta | anye manyante | nāyaṃ dhanatulyo vivāhaḥ | yathā dhanena vinā jīvanamanupapannamiti, sa vai jīvedadhanataḥ, evaṃ na striyamantareṇa jīvanābhāva ityata eva na dṛṣṭaṃ niyamitaḥ prayojanaṃ saṃbhavatīti dharmādhikārārtho'pi prayukto vivāhaḥ | avaśyaṃ caitadevaṃ vijñeyamadhikārotpattyarthe yatnaḥ kartavya iti | itarathā hi kṛtātatsargasyāśucitvādadhikā-

This would be all right, if intercourse with a mere woman in general were not forbidden. Though what the Veda says regarding the fire-laying may apply to any woman in general, yet the scriptures always make a distinction between the woman with whom one may, or she with whom he may not, have inter course. It is for this reason that for men with a steady character, the desired purpose cannot be accomplished without marriage. So that it is only natural that there should be the idea that marriage is prompted by the Veda itself.

“If it be as the text says, then there would be nothing to prompt the other orders. And the purposes of all orders being accomplished by Householdership alone, what would be the need of examining what prompts the others. That which prompts the marriage may serve as the prompter (of Householdership); but if Householdership alone is actually enjoined, how could the other orders come about? Under the circumstances again, how far would any investigation into the prompter of marriage be justified?”

Our answer is as follows:—It has been asserted that the purposes of all the orders are fulfilled (by Householdership). This is quite true; when one order has been duly prompted, and the aid required by the others becomes indirectly accomplished by the same, there can be no heed for the assumption of what would prompt these latter. For instance, the Vrīhi corn, the acquiring of which is prompted by the motive of livelihood, is also used in the performance of rites; and there is no acquiring of property for the purpose of the rites;—or again, even though the unlearned man is not entitled to the performance of sacrifices, yet the acquiring of learning is not prompted by those performances, being, as it is, already accomplished in obedience to the injunction of Vedic study itself. Similarly in the case in question (of marriage), the necessary motive being already supplied by the man’s own desires, the act does, not need the prompting of Vedic texts. Thus the injunction of the acts to be done would be applicable to those also who have not married.

Thus it is that the man who has all his passions deadened during the period of Studentship itself, does not wish to marry at all; and such a person, on account of having no companion (wife), would not be entitled to the second order. Thus not being entitled to the rites prescribed in the Vedic texts, he would naturally take to the next (the third) order (having skipped over Householdership).

Others have offered the following explanation:—Marriage does not stand on the same footing as Property. Without some property living is impossible, as it is on property that man lives; but in the absence of the wife living is not impossible; so that the wife is not as essential as property; and the act of marrying a wife is prompted soley by considerations of religious acts (which cannot be done without a wife); and it is necessary to realise in this connection the necessity of making every effort to become entitled to the performance of religious acts. Otherwise, (if no such effort were necessary), having lost his title to such acts by reason of the impurity brought about by evacuations, if one were to omit the necessary purifying processes, he would not be open to the charge of having omitted an obligatory duty; under the circumstances, why should anyone take the trouble of getting rid of the impurity caused by death and other circumstances?—It might be argued that this latter is also itself enjoined.—Even so, the omission would involve the transgression of this one injunction only, and not of the thousands of injunctions (relating to the acts that the man would perform after due purification).