Vakyapadiya 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

A verb, a collection of words, a universal residing in a collection, / a single partless word-sound, sequence, synthesis in the mind,

2.2

the first word, every word separately, or dependent [words]— / thus the opinion of those who see logic is divided in many ways regarding the sentence.

2.3

What is defined in the treatise for the sake of regulating accent loss and the like / as having mutually expectant parts, not every [sentence] shares that definition.

Having mutually expectant parts when divided, possessing words with no mutual expectancy for others, / having action as primary, possessing subordinate elements, having a single meaning—such is the sentence declared to be.

2.5

And the vocative word is a modifier of the action; / similarly, they say a word ending in a finite verbal suffix modifies a word ending in a finite verbal suffix in that context.

2.6

Just as even multiple words ending in the affix ktvā modify a word ending in a finite verbal suffix, / so they say a word ending in a finite verbal suffix modifies a word ending in a finite verbal suffix in that context.

2.7

Just as the illumination of all objects, though single, is divided / in conformity with the variety of visible objects, so is the comprehension of sentence-meaning.

2.8

Just as a single variegated color is described by designating its distinctions, / such as blue and the like, which possess different characteristics;

2.9

Just so, the explanation of a single sentence, complete in itself from every side, / is arrived at through other words that do possess expectancy.

2.10

Just as bases, affixes, and the like are separated out in a word, / so the analytical abstraction of words is admitted in a sentence.

2.11

Resemblance to other phonemes is seen in the parts of phonemes, / and parts of words stand as though resembling other words.

2.12

Words like vṛṣabha, udaka, and yāvaka are made of meaningless parts; / yet agreement and difference are the basis of linguistic practice.

2.13

There is no division in the word-sound; whence could there be one in the meaning? / The unlearned person conceives difference in the grammatical derivation through divisions.

2.14

Just as there is no meaning of 'brahmin' whatsoever in brāhmaṇakambala, / just so Devadatta and other [words] would be meaningless in a sentence.

2.15

The general meaning disappears and does not remain in the particular; / whence the abandonment of what was taken up? Where could what has ceased remain?

2.16

If the sentence-meaning were not conveyed by word-sound, the word-meaning too would be likewise; / and this being so, the relation of the word-sound with the meaning is lost.

2.17

The specific words of some [theorists], having the appearance of generals, / are manifested in hearers by virtue of their connection with other words.

2.18

For them, however, the entire sentence-meaning is completed in each individual part; / the realization of the meaning in hearers has manifested auxiliary factors.

2.19

That manifested word-sound, possessing sequence, is what is recited in a whisper; / but the sequential-less is that upon which cognition rests, as if extended.

2.20

Just as a difference in action is not grasped even in a specific throwing upward, / [yet] upon repetition a universal is manifested by actions such as whirling;

2.21

so in phonemes, sentences, and words, an utterance having similar manifestations / is perceived as though identical, despite the absolute difference of the reality.

2.22

And in eternal entities, whence could there be an earlier or a later in the ultimate sense? / Rather, it is the power of the one alone that shines forth in this way.

2.23

Just as, in the cognitions 'slowly' and 'quickly', without a difference of time, / [sounds] appear as having different durations, [so] that is the property of short and long [vowels].

2.24

Time, being eternal, cannot undergo division here through sequential morae alone; / in the absence of recurrent morae, what sort of sequence could there be?

2.25

The cognition that arises from both of them is single and devoid of parts; / for, appearing as if divided through its own power, it reflects upon sequence.

2.26

Whatever seed has been deposited in it through connection with the delineation of sequence— / no description of that is possible in terms of oneness or manifoldness.

2.27

At the time of mental realization, however, this sequence-capacity is without sequence, / by which an object whose divisions are excluded is grasped as having divisions.

2.28

If the words in a sentence were the very same, and those phonemes were the very same in a word, / there would be division of phoneme-parts within phonemes, like atoms.

2.29

Since there is no contact among parts, there would be neither phoneme nor word; / and because they are indescribable, what else could be described?

2.30

That internal word-principle which is single, yet illuminated by parts— / others declare that to be the word-sound, and likewise its unity in the sentence.

2.31

Likewise, through meaning-parts, their internal meaning is illuminated; / word-sound and meaning are two divisions of a single self, existing non-separately.

2.32

The nature of illuminating and being illuminated, and the nature of effect and cause, / always belong to that word-principle whose essence is the inner measure.

2.33

In that very [word-principle] reside the capacities of existence and non-existence, / without sequence, appearing as sequential, the foundation of worldly usage.

2.34

If the existence of word-meanings is posited on the authority of comprehension, / then upon the accumulation of word-meanings, meaninglessness would follow due to abandonment [of individual meanings].

2.35

By the word rājan, the meaning of 'king' is understood in a different form; / in a complex formation, a different word similar to a verb is employed.

2.36

Just as when aśvakarṇa ('horse-ear') is uttered, without a horse at all / a certain particular meaning is understood, so is the comprehension in all cases.

2.37

When a different meaning is arrived at in sentences, through the assumption of similarity, / the fact that some words are conventional is recognized only in the treatise [of grammar].

2.38

Those which are to be discarded even after being adopted are called means; / and a fixed rule of means does not necessarily hold.

2.39

A person somehow comprehends the meaning; / the divisions, whether conjoined or separated, are based upon the sentence.

2.40

When the connection 'this is that' is undertaken by the intellect, / then even a single phoneme sometimes causes the sentence-meaning to be understood.

2.41

To the extent that a meaning is expressed by an isolated word alone, / to that extent they declare it expressive of the meaning present in the sentence.

2.42

When there is a relation, whatever other excess arises, / they declare that to be the sentence-meaning itself, resting upon multiple words.

2.43

Though resting on multiple words, that [sentence-meaning] is completed in each individual part; / like a universal even in a collection, it is posited by others like a number.

2.44

Others know the universal as conformity to all particulars; / that, through contact with another meaning, assumes the form of a particular.

2.45

Whatever indeterminacy belongs to that which expects particulars, / the relation restricts that, placing it in a specific instance.

2.46

The relation is inferable from its effect; it has no [perceptible] form; / hence they declare it to be completely devoid of substantial reality.

2.47

The to-be-accomplished is restricted to an accomplishing factor; the action has restricted accomplishing factors; / that restriction shines forth merely through proximity.

2.48

There the noun operates with expectancy by way of subordinate status; / the verb expects causes by virtue of its status as to-be-accomplished.

2.49

The particulars that indeed exist unperceived in the word-meanings / are understood in sequence; the sentence is not expressive [of them].

2.50

And in the mere sequence of word-sounds, there is no other expressive word; / for sequence is a property of time, and therefore the sentence does not exist [as a separate entity].

2.51

And the possible particulars that are unperceived in the word-meanings / are manifested upon proximity; but this sequence does not exist among phonemes.

2.52

The designation 'word' and the name 'sentence' rest merely on sequence of phonemes and of words; / wordhood is not admitted for the two of them.

2.53

Even though wordhood is equal, comprehension is seen from the word, / but this does not exist phoneme by phoneme; therefore they recognize the meaning of the word.

2.54

Just as composite phonemes, without any expressed meaning [individually], / are meaningful when combined, the sentence is likewise accepted.

2.55

Whether meaningless because of being fleeting, or meaningful through word-meaning, / [words] uttered in sequence express the sentence-meaning, which has distinct characteristics.

2.56

Whether in the eternality of wholes or in the positing of a universal, / they declare the unvarying oneness of meaning of a single sentence.

2.57

Differences preceded by non-difference are conceptualized by the proponents of the sentence; / while those who look to the word consider non-differences to be preceded by difference.

2.58

And the state of the word being the base is described through a difference in analytical viewpoint: / either the continuous text (saṃhitā) is the source of the words, or the continuous text rests on the words.

2.59

And if the word-recitation (pada-pāṭha) is distinct, serving to indicate the continuous text (saṃhitā), / being eternal in that [view], how could the word be an effect [derived] from the perception of grammatical rules?

2.60

Just as the cognition of word-meaning is not experienced in each individual phoneme, / even so the determination of sentence-meaning is not experienced in [individual] words.

2.61

Sentence-meaning resides in words operating together, / just as word-meaning resides in phonemes operating together.

2.62

Just as a subtle object to be apprehended, when combined with another, is grasped together, / so too a phoneme, connected with another phoneme, becomes expressive.

2.63

Just as from the utterance of a word some meaning is determined, / so too that meaning is recognized from the proximity of phonemes.

2.64

If a general principle, which has already obtained by capacity, is completely set aside / by that specific rule through a direct Vedic statement (śruti) whose purpose is restriction;

2.65

Then the substance that had obtained by force of capacity from 'one should sacrifice' / would be set aside by the direct statement 'rice-grains' (vrīhi), and thus there could be no substitute.

2.66

Therefore, the word 'rice-grains' posits an additional property, 'rice-grain-ness'; / being meant to secure [the substance], it does not annul 'substance-ness', because there is no contradiction.

2.67

And when the accompanying 'substance-ness' is delimited by that [word], / other specific [substances] are not seen there, because they are impossible [to combine].

2.68

Nor are all specifics indicated by the word for an action, as the general [property] is; / for a word is not the designator of all existing things.

2.69

Just as existing qualities like white are unintended to be expressed there, / likewise there is a lack of intention to express the particular varieties accompanying 'substance-ness'.

2.70

In the absence [of the prescribed material], there would be no substitute for a compulsory rite; / or, it follows that there would be complete cancellation of an optional rite that has already commenced.

2.71

For one who conceives the sentence-meaning as a qualified action alone, / when the substance is absent, in [introducing] a substitute, that [sacrifice] would become a different action.

2.72

And when the meaning of a word that is already well known has been conveyed, / why is it asked: 'What is this unknown [word] like pika (cuckoo) and the like?'

2.73

And when that which has obtained by capacity is linked syntactically (anuṣajyate) to clarify [the sentence], / a direct statement (śruti) alone, through syntactic extension (anuṣaṅga), annuls inferential mark (liṅga) and syntactical connection (vākya).

2.74

Whereas a quality such as white, which has not [already] obtained, is understood through proximity; / having been obtained through effort in the sentence, it is distinct from the character of a direct statement.

2.75

If, however, the sentence is accepted as entirely undivided, having an undivided meaning, / then all of it, having the status of a direct statement, will not be contradicted by direct statement itself.

2.76

And when there is a collection of sentences for the sake of accomplishing a single meaning, / having mutually expectant parts, there is not even a sentence-meaning in that [individual sentence].

2.77

'This is an incidental duty (prāsaṅgika); this is obtained by a single common performance (tantra); / this is [achieved] by repetition and distinction; here there is annulment (bādha) and combination (samuccaya);

2.78

Adaptation (ūha) is proper in this domain; its relation is not annulled; / this is an extension of a general property (sāmānyātideśa); here a specific property is extended (viśeṣātideśa);

2.79

Here, having a desire [for the result] constitutes eligibility (sāmarthya); in this case, the meaning is not split; / this qualification is obtained from scripture; there is its exclusion from another ritual action;

2.80

This acquisition of order is through direct statement; this is from utterance'; / 'this sequence is strong here, but in this case it is not intended to be expressed';

2.81

'This is connected to subsidiary elements of another; it does not instigate the subsidiary elements; / this instigates them; here, this is an inseparable concomitant;

2.82

This is primary (pradhāna); this is secondary (śeṣa); but this is the order of application; / this directly aids it; this [subsidiary] distinguishes it from afar;

2.83

In this there is a difference in the operation of powers; but here the result differs; / this differentiation arises from relation; there, differentiation is not intended to be expressed;

2.84

This is a simple prohibition (prasajyapratiṣedha); but here it is an exclusionary prohibition (paryudāsa); / this is secondary (gauṇa); this is primary (mukhya); this is pervasive; this is heavy; this is light;

2.85

Its relation of principal and subsidiary varies in multiple ways through division; / this is restricted; here, fitness arises for this;

2.86

From an inferential mark seen in another sentence, a difference in this is inferred; / having abstracted it through words, this word-meaning is analyzed'—

2.87

In this manner, all those properties in sentences which depend on word-meanings / would be [merely] assumed by that [theorist], if the word were non-expressive.

2.88

Even when sentence-meaning is undivided, when abstracted through differences in powers / by means of division into other sentences, what has been stated is not contradicted.

2.89

Just as of a single fragrance a conceptual division is made / with respect to flowers and the like, so too a division of meaning is expressed in a sentence.

2.90

Just as in the case of a wild ox (gavaya) or a man-lion, covered by a single cognition, / one apprehends a part as similar to that of another genus alone;

2.91

Whereas the part which is unfamiliar and unseen, which he perceives— / regarding that much, a confused person conceives non-recognition everywhere;

2.92

So too, in a sentence utterly different due to the presence of [words like] pika (cuckoo) and the like, / he considers there to be recognition of an unreal meaning, as if of something similar.

2.93

In a part of a single [thing] similarity is observed, and in a part difference [is observed], / by an indivisible consciousness regarding an illumination that is partless.

2.94

Even so, similarity in a part and difference in a part are determined, / even though there are no parts, in sentences that possess entirely different properties.

2.95

And when the form of words is lost, how could there be the assumption of a boundary? / And when the boundary of a word-sound is unapprehended, how is the meaning distinguished?

2.96

An apparent blending of forms is established in a word elsewhere; / in diverse forms, that form is held to be another by virtue of being a single entity serving many purposes (tantra).

2.97

In that non-difference, an apparent contact of differences occurs; / that form, not different from that other form, is analyzed.

2.98

In the grammatical treatise, oneness of that which causes cognition is in some places adopted; / in others, a difference between the indicator and the indicated is established by virtue of the thing to be cognized.

2.99

Relying on the non-difference of 'ū', sequential correspondence (yathāsaṃkhya) is constructed; / in the mention of 'lṛ' and 'luṭ', difference is constructed by means of the two items to be cognized.

2.100

This form of 'aṇ', which belongs to 'yasya', is expressive of the items bearing that technical name; / for there is no apprehension of an indicator by means of that which is being understood.

2.101

And this 'ū' is undivided, but is the cause of different sentences; / its apprehension as distinct is like the subsequent form of the two.

2.102

By rejecting the augmentation of the base of a protracted vowel (pluta) and likewise the combination of vowels, / [the author of the Mahābhāṣya] again resorted to absolute difference among word-sounds.

2.103

Just as in words like ardharca and the like, difference of form is sequential, / so, due to an encompassing rule (tantra), when there is oneness of word, the hearing of distinct items is otherwise.

2.104

In the domain of continuous utterance, phonemes, unchanging in their own nature, / seem to become different words, as it were, through the assumption of different powers.

2.105

Through an alteration of sense-organs and the like, a cognition is seen to be differentiated / with respect to perceived objects without [those objects] forfeiting their nature; such is the sequence in hearing.

2.106

Even though word-sounds are unaltered, due to the difference of denotative operations / that very single form appears as completely different.

2.107

A Sāman is either verses or mere melody; it is not, however, a distinct substance; / but due to differences in melody, those very verses are grasped as modified.

2.108

When, by a grammatical device, the audible forms of distinct [words] reduced to a single remainder are compressed, / their single joint utterance is stated in grammar to have grammatical correctness.

2.109

And by adopting a single audible form, even of things possessing different forms, / utterance should be made simultaneously; otherwise they are not grammatically correct.

2.110

And of identical sentences, though not set forth by grammar [individually], / one single form is apprehended as grammatically correct through joint utterance.

2.111

Just as a single [sound] appears as many forms through the adoption of tubes and the like, / in that very manner many [words] can have a single form through joint utterance.

2.112

Just as there can be a distinct occurrence of sentences identical in form to words, / so, in the absence of another sentence, there would be their distinct meanings.

2.113

For him for whom the denotation is the word-meaning and the sentence-meaning is the purpose, / no relation among sentences is tenable.

2.114

In that view, only verbs require one another; / and a relation attached to the verbs is then apprehended.

2.115

Whether there is repetition or reiteration when imagining individuals for word-meanings, / a meaning accomplished in each one resides in them when combined.

2.116

When the sentence-meaning is unconceptualized, conceptual constructions rely on mental impressions; / on this topic, the doctrines of the ancients are considered manifold.

2.117

Others maintain that through practice every word-sound is the cause of intuition, / as in conveying meaning to children and animals.

2.118

And that practice is not from scriptural tradition; some consider it convention, / which indicates: 'Immediately after this, this is to be done.'

2.119

That 'there is meaning to all word-sounds' is the definition of what is to be conveyed; / they declare it to be the same in the case of cows, etc., as with the unseen potency, deities, and heaven.

2.120

The comprehension of a form that occurs from the repeated observation of usage, however, / is not the province of the word-sound; for it depends on a different effort.

2.121

Some distinctions are revealed by word-sounds expressive of them; / one considers certain word-meanings to be consequential byproducts.

2.122

When a word-sound conveys a universal, the individual that accompanies it / does not cause the word for the universal to rest upon distinctions belonging to that individual.

2.123

And an expressive word does not convey the forms of pots and the like; / because it applies to the mere thing, understanding them is an invariable concomitant.

2.124

An action enjoined by a word-sound is not seen without application; / but the application is an attendant byproduct, understood as the word-meaning.

2.125

Those applications which are fixed, however, and the accomplishing factor which is fixed— / the status of being denoted by the word-sound belongs to them, as understood by others.

2.126

The aggregate is the denotation, or an undifferentiated collection, / or even an unreal connection is accepted by some as the word-meaning.

2.127

Or that which is real, having unreal limiting adjuncts, is grounded in word-sounds; / or the word-sound itself, having attained the state of verbal identification, becomes the expressed meaning.

2.128

Because its form is unified with the meaning of the word-sound through the relation 'this is that', / they call that word-sound 'verbal identification'.

2.129

When the two are nondifferent in nature, conventional usage is invariable; / a certain form stands out somewhere as primary.

2.130

In the world, the word-sound operates having assumed the form of the meaning; / but in grammar, its dual nature is differentiated by speaker's intention.

2.131

Whether from incapacity or omnipotence, the fixed conceptual construction of action and the like / for a single object is fashioned by word-sounds alone.

2.132

Or the meaning which is an object of intellect, grounded in an external thing, / is known as the external thing and understood as the word-meaning.

2.133

Possessing form, perceptible, and grounded in the memory of individuals, / these appear; pure consciousness, however, is otherwise.

2.134

Just as a sense-organ, when coming into contact [with an object], reveals it with variety, / in that very manner the understanding of meaning from a word-sound is manifold.

2.135

Though undertaken by the speaker in one way, among different hearers / the word-meaning is differentiated in accordance with each one's cognition.

2.136

Even regarding a single visible object, perception differs individually; / and after a period of time, even a single person sees it differently again.

2.137

And even of a single word-sound, through unstable causes, / the meaning is conceptualized in many ways by one person and by many.

2.138

Therefore, the perception or speech of those who have not seen the truth / is faulty, full of deception, and eternally unstable.

2.139

And whatever vision of the seers is somewhat established in the truth, / there is no ordinary practice through that, nor is it based on word-sounds.

2.140

The sky is seen as a surface, and a firefly like fire; / yet there is no surface in the sky, nor fire in a firefly.

2.141

Therefore, a wise person should examine even a perceived object by reason; / one should not determine a perceived object merely on the authority of perception.

2.142

Just as there is designation in worldly practice by ordinary people / of things whose true nature cannot be described, an intelligent person should not construct doubts about that.

2.143

When word-meanings are grasped separately, a distinct intuition arises; / that, produced by the word-meanings, they call the sentence-meaning.

2.144

It cannot in any way be explained to others as 'this is that'; / established as functioning within each individual, it is not described even by its agent.

2.145

Without being reflected upon, it effects an embrace, as it were, of the meanings; / assuming universal form, as it were, it exists as their object.

2.146

Whether generated directly by word-sound or following upon mental impression, / in what is to be done no one transcends it.

2.147

The whole world follows it as an authority; / through its power, undertakings are begun even by animals.

2.148

Just as the intoxicating and other powers of particular substances / are seen to arise effortlessly from maturation, so are intuitions in those who possess them.

2.149

Who alters the pitch of the male cuckoo in spring? / How are creatures and the rest instructed in building nests and the like?

2.150

In actions such as feeding, mating, hostility, and jumping, / known through hereditary lineage, who impels the beasts and birds?

2.151

This arises solely from scriptural tradition that is accompanied by mental impression; / but scriptural tradition is distinguished by proximity and distance.

2.152

Produced by nature, practice, illusion, meditation, unseen merit,
and imparted by a distinguished person—thus they know intuitive flash (pratibhā) to be sixfold.

2.153

Just as the word 'cow' is applied to an object indicated by conjoined substances,
yet it is not an illuminator of their particular distinctions;

2.154

Even when operating with respect to cows and the like conjoined with shape, color, and parts,
that word-sound does not incorporate them.

2.155

The word-sound is applied to an object distinguished by configuration, color, and parts;
its application to a [mere] part is not observed.

2.156

Perception of all parts in the world is rare for anyone;
yet when some parts are perceived, the entire object is inferred.

2.157

Likewise, the ascertainment of qualities of blue lotuses and the like,
which are co-occurring through fragrance and eternally connected, is observed.

2.158

Independent of number, measure, or configuration,
the expressive word operates equally regarding a drop or a collection, in water and the like.

2.159

Residing in oil and the like delimited by preparation and so forth,
it states a part as the whole reality through that which resides in the parts.

2.160

When a designation is used as connected with a particular object,
upon the departure of that object, its usage ceases.

2.161

However, the word-sound does not necessarily require the presence of those properties
which, though possible, it includes internally when applied.

2.162

Just as the word 'cow' is seen even in the absence of hair, hooves, and so forth,
it does not operate likewise in the absence of the universal.

2.163

Therefore, when there is comprehension of a possible object from a word-sound,
that object whose separation is not seen is understood as connected [with it].

2.164

Case endings may be expressive or suggestive of duality and the like;
or the aggregate [word-form] may be the designator of the object possessed of number.

2.165

Or words such as 'cow', without expressing number,
speak of objects endowed with differences of number through their own formal distinction.

2.166

Those word-sounds that are eternally connected, whose power is known in isolation—
their meaning is differentiated by positive and negative concomitance.

2.167

As far as the formulation of both can be made without deviation,
there is a rule; but there is no such rule in the case of [affixes like] nuṭ, śap, and so on.

2.168

When direct designation is possible, secondary signification is not assumed;
for word-powers are relative and fixed in combination.

2.169

No continuity of meaning is seen among kūpa, sūpa, and yūpa;
hence it is understood that the composite whole alone expresses another meaning.

2.170

Grammatical explanations differ in the operations of word-derivation;
when many meanings are possible, some specific cause is accepted.

2.171

Terms like vaira, vāsiṣṭha, giriśa, and aikāgārika
are explained by some in various ways through confusions of cause and boundary.

2.172

Just as the description of a path by trees, anthills, and mountains,
or of cows and the like by various co-occurring [traits], is uncontradicted;

2.173

And an explanation is made otherwise by those who perceive differences of state,
ascertaining [the whole] from a part in the case of kiṃśuka and so on.

2.174

By some, different etymologies are pointed out for 'go' (cow):
from gṝ, from garj, from gam, from gav, or even from gad.

2.175

Or the word 'cow' applies to cows from its own intrinsic form as 'cow';
either everything is not derived, or by some it is accepted both ways.

2.176

And general instruction is adopted in the treatise for the sake of brevity;
like another universal, particular instances convey another [meaning].

2.177

And that which occurs in another meaning, they know to be a different base;
even if of identical form, it is not joined to another in conventional usage.

2.178

The roots ij and yaj are distinct, restricted to different domains;
they are indicated by some in various ways, for instruction is manifold.

2.179

And thus vālavāya and the like should be treated like jitvarī;
upon accepting difference and non-difference, there is no contradiction whatsoever.

2.180

The separate assumption of verbal root and prefix in the treatise is for fixing [affixes like] aṭ and so forth;
but the verbal root itself is of such a nature.

2.181

For thus a rule is taught from saṃgrāmayati which has a prefix;
such distinctions of action are undertaken in the composite whole.

2.182

Thus operations between verbal root and prefix have internal immediacy;
that action itself, being of such a nature, comes into relation with accomplishing factors.

2.183

An object, being established among usage meanings, is qualified when to be differentiated;
and prior to relation with accomplishing factors, action does not arise at all.

2.184

Just as from the undertaking of the future relation of the verbal root to accomplishing factors
arise its nature as a root and its nature as an object, so let other things also be viewed.

2.185

Just as lac-juice and the like, through connection at the time of the seed,
assist the fruits through the transformation of color and so forth,

2.186

So, through an internal connection residing in the mind between verbal root and prefix,
a distinction becomes manifest at the time of the word.

2.187

Distinctions that are possible in some cases, not indicated by [roots] alone,
are revealed upon connection with a prefix such as pra, ni, and so on.

2.188

It is either expressive of distinctions because of their possibility, or suggestive,
or used as an auxiliary to impart power to the verbal root.

2.189

And since departure and the like are not understood from sthā and so forth alone,
there, from twofold inference, pra and the like are said to possess that quality.

2.190

And in the non-usage of adhi and pari, as far as another action is seen,
the verbal root is expressive of it, and meaningless together with those two.

2.191

Likewise, some [affixes] meaning the base itself occur in other composites;
joined with what is meaningless, they reiterate the meaning of the base.

2.192

Some particles are suggestive when a separate meaning is assumed;
while some, like grammatical augments, accomplish the meaning by combining.

2.193

Whether placed after or placed before, their suggestiveness does not differ
when they are used, even when the meanings are altogether distinct.

2.194

Words such as ca are not used alone, even though they are words;
an affix is not used alone, even though it is expressive.

2.195

In aggregate expression, however, there is no difference;
and being (bhāva) not rendered as a concrete entity is expressed by finite verb forms.

2.196

Even in aggregate expression, words that express a qualified meaning
have relation through qualities, but words like ca are dependent.

2.197

Having produced a relation, a certain action disappears;
when an action-word is heard, a relation is produced somewhere.

2.198

There, a genitive case is prescribed for each word to preclude compounding;
but to illustrate it, a syntactic factor is countered by example.

2.199

And that relation which has arisen when the verb has disappeared
is regulated in various instances by a karmapravacanīya.

2.200

That which implies a verbal predicate is connected with the case-endings of syntactic factors, / as vi- [in vi-likhati]; but its status as a prefix is denied in [the isolated form] likhā.

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Commentaries (1)

Prakīrṇaprakāśa — Helārāja, Sanskrit

Other recensions (1)

English (machine translation) (mt) — English, machine translation

Linked texts (1)

Vākyapadīya — Bhartṛhari (grammarian), Sanskrit