Praudhamanorama 60_363

60_363

On the rule 'anabhihite' (Pā. sū. 2.3.1): If one objects—just as in 'bahupaṭuḥ' ('very clever') kalpap and the like do not occur because their meaning is already expressed by bahuc, so too in 'kriyate kaṭaḥ' ('the mat is made') the second case ending will not occur because [the object] is already expressed by the finite verbal endings and the like; furthermore, the second case ending, which has scope in 'kaṭaṃ karoti' ('he makes a mat'), will be barred in 'kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ' ('the mat has been made') by the first case ending because [the first case ending] has no other scope; nor can 'vṛkṣaḥ' ('a tree') and the like be its scope, since there too the third case ending would apply on account of its being the agent with respect to the understood action of being (asti); now if you say that in 'nīlam idaṃ na tu raktam' ('this is blue, not red') and the like, where the purport is the exclusion of another attribute, the action of being is not necessary, and thus there is scope for the first case ending, then let the first case ending apply due to conflict of rules (vipratiṣedha); and thus the heading rule 'anabhihite' is useless—if this is objected, we say: do not say so. For the rule is commenced on the view that number is the meaning of the case ending. And so the sentence-meaning is: 'when the object is not expressed, the singular of the second case ending occurs in [the sense of] that oneness.' And if the rule were not commenced, the sentence-meaning would be: 'the singular of the second case ending occurs in [the sense of] the oneness that is in an object.' That being so, in 'kṛtaḥ kaṭaḥ' and the like, although the object in general is expressed by the affix kta, its oneness is not expressed, so the affix am would be unavoidable. Nor can one say that the first case ending applies because it is later (para), because in 'kartavyaḥ kaṭaḥ' ('the mat is to be made') and the like, the sixth case ending conditioned by connection with a kṛt affix (kṛdyoga) would apply, being later even than that. On the view that a kāraka is the meaning of a case ending, the rule is rejected in the source text.
On 'hariṃ bhajati' ('he worships Hari'): Since pleasure is produced in Hari by the action of worshipping, Hari is the object (karman) because he is reached by the action as characterized by pleasure. The sentence-meaning is worship characterized by that [pleasure/Hari]. In 'hariḥ sevyate' ('Hari is served') also, it is just like this, because of the established conclusion that 'the finite verb has action as its principal meaning.' For its meaning is: the action presented by the verbal root is the qualificand with respect to the meaning of the finite verbal affix, not a qualifier as it is with respect to the meaning of a kṛt affix. Precisely for this reason, unlike 'pācako vrajati' ('the cook goes'), 'pacati vrajati' ('he cooks, he goes') is not a single sentence. For the meaning of 'pācakaḥ [vrajati]' is a going whose agent is the agent of cooking. The action of cooking and the action of going having a single agent are distinctly the separate meanings of 'pacati' and 'vrajati'. And so the proclamation of the Naiyāyikas that 'the verbal cognition has as its qualificand that which ends in the first case ending' is not to be respected by those who follow the Mahābhāṣya and other authoritative texts. Yāska also said: