India as Known to Panini: A Study of the Cultural Material in the Ashtadhyayi c11.s3.38

c11.s3.38

Kātyāyana in one place invokes the doctrine of *sarvachetanāvatva* (III.¹.7; II.15), implying that in the higher philosophic sense which may also influence grammatical operations the distinction of animate and inanimate does not exist. Pāṇini, however, seems to have taken a more practical view. Patañjali was probably referring to old definitions when he advocated the view of the two-fold nature of *ātmā* (II.8). He adds that our physical being (*śarīrātmā*) acts and the effect of pleasure and pain is felt by the *antarātmā*, and conversely our mind acts and the effects of *sukha* and *duḥkha* are felt by the physical body. What in Pāṇini's time was called *svānta* (VII.2.18) seems to be the same as *antarātmā*, referring to mind as the internal organ of Self or *Sva*. Pāṇini also refers both to the gross body as experiencing pleasure (*kartuḥ śarīra-sukham* III.3.116), and to its experience by the mind (*sukha-vedanā* III.1.18). *Sukha* is clearly defined as pleasant experience (*ānulomya*, V.4.63) and *duḥkha* as unpleasant (*prātilomya*, V.4.64), same as *anukūla-vedanīya* and *pratikūla-vedanīya* of the Nyāya school. The definition *Sva-tantraḥ Kartā* (I.4.54), held good both in grammar and as reflecting a philosophical doctrine.