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India as Known to Panini: A Study of the Cultural Material in the Ashtadhyayi c11.s3: Section 3. Ascetics

India as Known to Pāṇini: A Study of the Cultural Material in the Ashṭādhyāyī c11.s3

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Section 3. Ascetics

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Pāṇini refers to religious mendicants as *bhikshus* (III.2. 168) from their obligatory duty of begging; whence they were also known as *bhikshāchara* (III.2.17). The ordinary beggar was known as *bhikshāka* (III.2.155). Pāṇini mentions both Brāhmaṇical ascetics and heretical sects. As to the former he mentions those following the *Bhikshu-sūtras* promulgated by Pārāśarya (IV.3.110), and Karmanda (IV.3. 111); of the latter reference is made to Maskarī mendicants (*maskarī parivrājaka*, VI.1.154) who were most probably the followers of Makkhali Gosāla. The term *tāpasa* (V.2.103) or *tapasvin* (V.2.102) was applied to an ascetic practising penance. This was denoted by the special root *tapasyati* (III.1.15). The several epithets like *śamī*, *damī*, *yogī*, *vivekī* and *tyāgī* (III.2.142) were indicative of the stages of spiritual culture. There are also two other terms *dānta* and *śānta* (VII.2.27), signifying control of the senses and the mind. The use of the term *yogī* points to Yoga as a system of spiritual discipline then known.

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A mendicant subsisted on what he obtained by begging. The word *sarvānnīna* was applied to a person who accepted all kinds of food in his begging rounds (V.2.9). The *Kāśikā* states that a monk indiscriminately accepting alms from persons was so called. Some ascetics lived by gleaning corn (*Uñchhati*, IV.4.32). The *uñchhavṛitti* ascetics held stock of corn to last for some time. In *sūtra* VI.2.9. Pāṇini explains the word *śārada* as 'new'. Literally *śārada* should denote that which belongs to the Śarad season. The transition of meaning can be understood from Manu stating that a *muni* should gather his stock of corn twice a year, which was called *vāsanta* and *śārada* respectively after the names of the two crops harvested annually (*Manu*, VI.11). It is further laid down that he should renew his clothing and corn in the month of Āśvayuja, *i.e.* the beginning of autumn (*Manu*, VI.15). These fresh stocks obtained in Śarad were responsible for the secondary meaning of *śārada* as 'new'. The word *naikaṭika* (*nikaṭe vasati*, IV.4.73) is taken by the commentators to refer to a monk who had become a Vānaprastha, and in obedience to the rules of his order took his abode near the village outside it. Similarly *kaukkuṭika* is taken by the *Kāśikā* as a mendicant who walks with his gaze fixed to the ground to avoid harming life (IV.4.46).

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There were also sham ascetics, called *dāṇḍājinika* (V.2.76) *i.e.* one who passes for an ascetic by the outward signs of staff and deer-skin only.

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AYAHŚŪLA—Pāṇini refers to a class of false ascetics known as *āyaḥśūlika*, 'who flourished by the method of *ayaḥśūla* or iron spikes' (V.2.76). Patañjali's comment is of some historical interest. 'If *ayaḥśūla* literally means an iron spike, the word so formed will apply to a Śiva-Bhāgavata which is not the intention of Pāṇini's *sūtra*. Therefore the term *ayaḥśūla* indicates the practice of violent methods (*rabhasa*) to recruit followers as distinguished from the softer method of persuasion and instruction' (*mṛidu upāya*, *Bhāshya*, V.2.76). Patañjali here gives the information that there was a sect of the Śiva-Bhāgavatas who worshipped Śiva as Bhagavān and whose outward sign was an iron trident (*Ind. Ant.*, 1912, p. 272). As opposed to them the *āyaḥśūlika* Śaivas pierced their tongue or arms or other parts of the body with iron prongs and extracted forced sympathy.

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MASKARIN—Pāṇini mentions *Maskarin* as a *parivrājaka* (VI. 1.154, *Maskara-maskariṇau veṇu-parivrājakayoḥ*). Here Maskarin is taken to be the name of Maskarī Gośāla, the founder of the Ājīvika order and a contemporary of the Buddha. Patañjali enlightens us on this point as follows: 'A Maskarin *parivrājaka* is not so-called because there is a *maskara* (bamboo-staff) in his hand. What else is then the explanation? Do not perform actions, but seek peace as the highest end’. This is their teaching, who are therefore called Maskarins’ (*Mā kṛita karmāṇi mā kṛita karmāṇi, śāntirvaḥ śreyasītyāhāto Maskarī parivrājakaḥ*, *Bhāshya*, III.96). No doubt Patañjali’s reference is to the philosophy of inaction taught by the great teacher Makkhali Gosāla whose identity with Maskarī thus become a certainty. He was a Determinist who ascribed every cause to fate or destiny (*niyati*). He held that the attainment of any given condition or character does not depend either on one’s own acts, or on the acts of another, or on human effort. There is no such thing as power, energy, human strength or vigour. All beings are bent this way and that by their fate. In his system chance (*yadṛichchhā*) has no place, but everything is ordered by an immutable Fate (*Niyati*) (*Dict. of Pāli Proper Names*, II.398). According to Buddhist books Makkhali was considered by the Buddha as the most dangerous of the heretical teachers.

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The identification of Maskarī with the founder of the Ājīvika sect, if accepted as is highly probable, is of the utmost importance for the relative chronology of Pāṇini himself. Another evidence in the *Ashṭādhyāyī* supports Pāṇini’s knowledge of the philosophical school of Makkhali. He refers to three kinds of philosophic beliefs (*mati*), viz. *Āstika*, *Nāstika* and *Daishṭika* (IV.4.60). *Mati* here corresponds to *diṭṭhi* of the Buddhists signifying a philosophic doctrine. The *Āstika* philosophers were those whom the Buddhist books call *Issarakāraṇavādī* or the Theists, who held that everything in the universe traces itself to Īśvara as the supreme cause (*ayaṁ loko issaranimmito*, Mehta, *Pre-Buddhist India*, p. 333). The *Nāstika* philosophers correspond to those who are called *Natthikadiṭṭhi* in Buddhist works (C. D. Chatterji, A Hist. Character in the Reign of Aśoka, *Bhandarkar Com. Vol.*, p. 330). These included the Annihilationist school of another great teacher Ajita Keśakambalī (*ito paralokagatanāma n’atthi, ayaṁ loko ucchijjati*, *Jāt.*, V.239). This was a materialistic doctrine famous as the Lokāyata school. The third category of thinkers who are mentioned as *Daishṭika* by Pāṇini certainly refer to the followers of the determinist philosophy preached by Makkhali Gośāla who repudiated the efficacy of *karma* as a means for improving the lot of human beings.

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In the canonical scriptures of the Jains, Makkhali Gosāla has been mentioned as Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta (*Uvāsaga Dasāo*, Hoernle, p. 97), while in the Sanskrit Buddhist texts he figures under the name of Maskarī Gośāliputra (*Divyāvadāna*, p. 143) (Chatterji, op. cit. p. 331, who concludes that Makkhali was undoubtedly a Maskarī ascetic). The views of this teacher are echoed in the Brahmanical literary tradition under the name of Maṅki who discarded *paurusha* in favour of a belief in destiny alone (*Śuddhaṁ hi daivamevedaṁ haṭhe naivāsti paurusham*) and preached *nirveda* (cf. the doctrine of *Śānti* attributed to Maskarī in the *Bhāshya*) as the best principle (*Śāntiparvan*, Ch. 177, vv. 1-14).

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As Mr. C. D. Chatterji has shown there were various traditions about the accurate form of Gośāla's name; Maṅkhali was the form according to the Jaina Prakrit and a tradition in the *Bhagavatī Sūtra* makes him the son of a mendicant or beggar (*Maṅkham, Bhag. Sūtra*, XV.1). We have no doubt that Maṅki of the *Mahābhārata* represents the name Maṅkhali in an abbreviated form. Pāṇini explains *Gośāla* as one 'born in a cowshed' (*sūtra*, IV.3.35), which accords with the traditional explanation of this part of Makkhali's name.

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*ŚRAMAṆA*—Pāṇini refers to *Śramaṇas* and unmarried female ascetics (*kumārī śramaṇā*, II.1.70). This *sūtra* is connected with another in the *Ashṭādhyāyī*, viz., *Kumāraścha* (VI.2.26) which regulates the accent of the word *kumāra* in such compound words as *kumāra-śramaṇā* and others of this class. This *gaṇa* also mentions *kumāra-pravrajitā*, and *kumāra-tāpasī*, a girl embracing the life of a wanderer, and a girl taking to penance. In the oldest *Śrautasūtra* literature the meaning of *śramaṇa* is an ascetic in general; for example, in Baudhāyana a *muni* is described as *śramaṇa* and asked to offer *puroḍāśa* to Agni standing in knee-deep waters of the Sarasvatī (*Baud. ŚS.*, XVI.30, ASB, edit., p. 276).

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Patañjali, however, states that the Śramaṇas and the Brāhmaṇas belonged to different religious groups whose opposition was of a permanent nature (*yeshāṁ cha virodhaḥ śāśvatikaḥ*, Pāṇini, II.4.9, *ityasyāvakāśaḥ*, *Śramaṇa-Brāhmaṇam*, *Bhāshya*, I.476 on *sūtra* II.4.12). It shows that Śramaṇa in grammatical literature referred to non-Brahmanical ascetics.

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Early Buddhist literature distinguishes between Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas as distinct ascetic orders. King Alābu addresses the Bodhisattva as Samaṇa (*Jāt.*, III.40). The *Udāna* says that there were very many and various sectaries of Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas, all Parivrājakas, followers of different *Diṭṭhis*, *i.e.* Darśanas or Systems, and organisations (*sambahulā nānātitthiyā Samaṇa-Brāhmaṇā paribbājakā nānādiṭṭhikā nānādiṭṭhi-nissayanissitā*, P. T. S. edition, p. 66-67). The *Aṅguttara* (IV.35) mentions two classes of ascetics whom it calls Parivrājakas, *viz.* (1) Brāhmaṇa and (2) Annatitthiya, *i.e.* other non-Brahmanical ascetics. The Greek writers of Alexander's time also noticed these two classes of ascetics, the Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas (*Strabo*, XV.1.59, M'Crindle, 1901, p. 65, footnote). In the inscriptions of Asoka the Brāhmaṇa and the Śramaṇa ascetics are separately mentioned as worthy of equal honour.

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The reference to monk's garment (*chīvara*), and the verb *saṁchīvarayate*, 'he dons the monk's robe' (III.1.20) again smack of the institution of Buddhist monks, as *chīvara* signified only monk's dress (cf. *tichīvara*, *Jāt.*, III.471; *paṁsukūla chīvara*, *Jāt.*, IV.114).

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The word *Arhat* was applied to a person worthy of reverence (*Arhaḥ praśaṁsāyām*, III.2.133). The state of being an *Arhat* was *ārhantya* (*arhato num cha*, *Gaṇa-sūtra*, V.1.24). Pāṇini refers to a class of ascetics called *yāyāvara* (III.2.176), According to the *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra*, 'To be a *yāyāvara* means that one proceeds by the most excellent livelihood' (*vṛittyā varayā yāti*, III.1.4), and 'the word *śālīna* is used for them because they dwell in houses (*śālā*, III.1.3). Most probably it referred to those house-holders who like Janaka lived in their home although following the ascetic discipline. The *Śrautasūtra* of Baudhāyana adds that, even when itinerant, the Yāyāvara mendicants halted on the way and performed fire oblations (XXIV.31, तत्रोदाहरन्ति यायावरा ह वै नामर्षय आसंस्तेऽन्वन्यश्राम्यंस्ते समस्तमजुहवुः ).

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The other aspects of religious life included domestic rites, vows like *Chāndrāyaṇa* (V.1.72), and *Japa* or repetition of *mantras* (I.2.34). One who took the vow of restraint of speech was called *vāchaṁyama* (III.2.40), and similarly the vow to sleep on hard ground *sthāṇḍila* (IV.2.15). These epithets applied to one observing *pārāyaṇa*, a Brahmachārī or a *bhikshu* (IV.2.15). One who silently performed *Japa* as a habit (*tat śīla*) was called *jañjapūka* (III.2.166). Such muttering would sometimes be for mere show or a sham practice (*bhāvagarhāyām*, *jañjapyate*, III.1.24). Reference is also made to the offering of *bali*, probably to different deities (II.1.36), *e.g.* *Mahārāja-bali* offered to the Mahārāja class of deities like Kubera. Special food stuffs selected for preparing *bali* were called *bāleya* (V.1.13).

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ŚRĀDDHA—Reference has already been made to the fire *kavyavāhana* (III.2.65) to carry oblations to the manes. The *Piṭris* are mentioned as *devatās*, deities to whom oblations called *pitryam* were offered (IV.2.31). The *śrāddha* ceremony held in the Śarat season (the *Pitṛipaksha* in Āśvina) has been mentioned as *śāradika śrāddha* (IV.3.12). One who dined at a *śrāddha* was marked out as *śrāddhī*, *śrāddhika* (*śrāddham-anena bhuktam*, V.2.85), but Kātyāyana points out that the epithet was applied to that person only for that particular day (II.389). The necessity for this term seems to have arisen from the fact that the *śrāddha-bhojī* was required to perform some purificatory rites on that day. A *śrāddhika* Brahmachārī would be marked out from other students and would get leave from his class for performing *japa*, etc.

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Religious tonsure was in vogue (*Madrāt parivāpaṇe*, V.4.67), the tonsurer being called *madraṁkara* or *madrakāra* (III.2.44).

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*BELIEFS*—Belief in divination from bodily signs is mentioned in *sūtra* III.2.52 (*Lakshaṇe jāyā-patyoshṭak* as read with III.2.53). The marks on the body of the husband or the wife were believed to have effect in respect of each other, *e.g.* *jāyāghnas-tilakālakaḥ*, 'the black mole indicative of wife's death'; *patighnī pāṇirekhā*, 'the line on hand indicative of husband's death'. Probably this topic came under Aṅgavidyā to which references is found in the *Ṛgayanādi gaṇa* (IV.3.73), in the Brahmajāla sutta of the Dīghanikāya and some Jaina Āgamas.

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Questioning a foreteller about future good luck was called *vipraśna*. The *sūtra Rādhīkashyor-yasya vipraśnaḥ* (I.4.39) deals with its linguistic form *e.g.* *Devadattāya īkshate*, 'the astrologer is busy calculating about the future of Devadatta'.

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*Mantras* to captivate the heart of others (*vaśīkaraṇa*) were known as *hṛidya* (*hṛidaya-bandhana ṛishi*, IV.4.96, in which *ṛishi=mantra* or *veda*).¹

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The idea that certain days (*puṇyāha*, V.4.90) and nights are auspicious (*puṇyarātra*, V.4.87) was also prevalent. The idea that good actions lead to merit is also referred to (*Saptamyāḥ puṇyam*, VI.2.152), *e.g.* *veda-puṇyam*, *adhyayana-puṇyam*. Good and bad actions originated from their doers called *puṇyakṛit*, *sukarmakṛit*, or *pāpakṛit* (III.2.89). Transgression of moral conduct was *kshiyā* (=*dharma-vyatikrama*, *āchāra-bheda*), expressed by a special linguistic form, using the exclamatory particle *ha* (VIII.¹.60), and pronouncing the verb with *pluta* accent, *e.g.* स्वयं ह रथेन याति ३ उपाध्यायं पदातिं गमयति 'Fie on the pupil himself riding in a chariot and making the teacher drag on foot!'; स्वयं होदनं भुंक्ते ३ उपाध्यायं सक्तून् पाययति 'Fie on the pupil himself feasting on rice and suffering the teacher to live on groats!' (VIII.2.104).

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¹ *Para-hṛidayaṁ yena baddhyate vaśīkriyate sa vaśīkaraṇa-mantro hṛidya ity-uchyate, Kāśikā.*

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Heinous sins (*mahāpātakas*) like *bhrauṇahatya* (VI.4.

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174) and *brahmahatyā* (III.2.87) are mentioned (cf. *Manu*, XI.54).

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Amongst moral virtues, Pāṇini mentions *prajñā*, *śraddhā*, *tapa*, *tyāga*, *viveka*, *dharma*, *śama*, *dama* (VII.2.27; III.2.142). Persons endowed with high moral character were recipients of social honour as *śamī*, *damī*, *tyāgī*, *vivekī*, *dharmī*, *tapasvī*. Persons who performed meritorious actions relating to life in this world and in the other (*Ishṭa* and *Pūrta*) were honoured as *ishṭī*, *pūrtī* (V.2.88). Religious gifts constituted a pious act (*dharma*) and the use of one's wealth for such objects was called *upayoga*. These benefactions were expressed by such linguistic forms, as *sahasraṁ prakurute*, *sahasraṁ vinayate* (I.3.32; I.3.36).

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*DHARMA*—The word *dharma* has a two-fold meaning in the *Ashṭādhyāyī*; firstly *dharma* denoted custom or *āchāra*, as in the *Dharmasūtras* (cf. *Kāśikā* on *sūtra* IV.4.47). That which was in accordance with custom was called *dharmya* (IV.4.92, *dharmādanapetam*). Pāṇini explains *dharmya* as approved by local usage or custom (VI.2.65; cf. *Kāśikā*, *dharmyaṁ ityāchāraniyatam deyaṁ uchyate*). Even the charges levied as legal dues, *e.g.* toll-tax, are called *dharmya*, because they were sanctioned by usage. Secondly *dharma* denoted religious or moral duties, as in the expression *dharmaṁ charati*, *dhārmikaḥ* (IV.4.41).

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*INTELLECTUAL FERMENT*—The philosophic thought of ancient India in the period from about the eighth century B.C. was marked by a new awakening and intellectual upheaval in her history. It led to the foundation of various schools centering round different doctrines as to the ultimate cause and nature of the world and soul. The atmosphere was charged with the keenest intellectual ferment as if a new god of wisdom had become manifest.

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*JÑA*—Patañjali takes the word *Jña* to mean Brāhmaṇas as embodiments of *jñāna* or spiritual knowledge and refers to their descendants who carried on the ancient philosophic tradition. The term probably originated in the *Upanishads* (*Jñaḥ kālakālo guṇī sarva-vid yaḥ*, *Śv. Up.*, VI.2). Patañjali also mentions *Jña* as a deity named *Jñā Devatā*, to whom householders were to offer special oblations (*Jñā devatāysa sthālīpākasya Jñaḥ sthālīpākaḥ*, *Bhāshya*, VI.4.163; III.232). Pāṇini mentions *Jñaḥ* (III.1.135) as an independent word signifying 'One who knows'. It appears as if the monosyllabic *Jña* stood for the ideal of the Sophistic movement beginning in the *Upanishads* and reaching its climax in the time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra. Patañjali refers to celebrated families of these Sophists as *jñānāṁ Brāhmaṇānām apatyam*, descendants of Brāhmaṇas who followed the *Jña* deity and were themselves known as *Jña*. (*Bhāshya*, IV.1.1; II.190).

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Pāṇini refers to a philosophical doctrine promulgated by a thinker as *mati* (IV.4.60), corresponding to Buddhist *diṭṭhi*, and the means of knowledge as *matya* (*matasya karaṇam*, IV.4.97).

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*DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT*—Pāṇini classifies the views of various philosophical thinkers under three categories according to the basic points of view implied in their teachings. They were (1) *Āstika*, (2) *Nāstika* and (3) *Daishṭika* (*Asti nāsti dishṭaṁ matiḥ*, IV.4.60). A list of principal philosophic doctrines or *matis* is preserved in the *Śvet. Up.* I.2 (also *Charaka*, Sūtrasthāna, ch. 25; *Suśruta*, Śārīrasthāna, 1.11). At the head of the list appears *Kāla* or Time as the cause of the world, known as *Kālavāda* (*Mūlapariyāya Jātaka*, II.pp.260-61). It occurs in the *Mahābhārata* in a more elaborate form (*Śāntiparva*, 220. 29-110). According to Pāṇini, the time-denoting words had attained the status of a deity (*devatā*) fit to be worshipped (IV.2.34). Stars and Seasons (IV.2.31, *Ṛitur-devatāsya ṛitavyam*) were similarly deified.

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Next is *Svabhāva*, a view which had its counterpart in the Buddhist *Akiriyā-vāda* or doctrine of Non-causation advocated by Pūraṇa Kassapa (cf. Śāntiparva, 215.15-16). *Yadṛichchhā* or fortuitous origin was represented by the *Ahetuvādins* who put forward the hypothesis of chance (cf. Śāntiparva, 168.21-22; also called *paryāya-vāda*). The *Niyativāda* corresponds to the Determinist school of Makkhali Gośāla (cf. Śāntiparva, ch. 171). The view of the *Bhūtas* (the four material elements) creating the world was represented in the materialistic doctrine of the *Lokāyata* school. The Annihilationist school of Ajita Keśakambalī (*Uchchhedavādins*) took the same view (*chātum-mahābhūtiko'yaṁ puruso*). *Yoni* or the privileges and incidence of birth as a potent factor directing the world of men and animals was probably represented by the Militarist doctrine which believed in the efficacy of force to rectify human ills. (*Khattavijjā-vāda*, *Jāt.*, V.240; cf. Śāntiparva, ch. 173 for Yonivāda doctrine). Lastly, *Purusha* or *Devamahimā* or Power of the Creator was taken to be the cause of the cosmos, a view termed in the Jātakas as *Issarakāraṇavāda* (*Jāt.*, V.238). The *Śvet. Up.* advocating *Purushavāda*, refers to other thinkers, like the advocates of *Svabhāva* and *Kāla*, as *parimuhyamāna*, i.e. holding erroneous views.

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These distinctions of philosophical thought mentioned in the *Svet. Up.* and the *Mahā-Bodhi Jātaka* (*Jāt.* V, p. 228 ff.) are presupposed in Pāṇini. For example, Pāṇini's *Āstika mati* is the Theistic school of *Purusha* or *Issarakāraṇavāda*. We know that orthodox Brahmanical thought laid great stress on this view which was developed in the earliest Sāṅkhya and attained its climax in the *Vedānta sūtras*. Pāṇini also mentions by name the *Bhikshusūtras* of Pārāśarya (IV.3.110), which probably denoted the earliest Vedānta treatises written in *sūtra* form. The nucleus of such a text did exist in Pāṇini's time. The *Purusha* or *Adhyātma* school ultimately absorbed other minor doctrines as *Prāṇa*, *Jyoti*, etc., by evolving a synthesis of all such causes in *Purusha*, and in course of time other views on matter and creation aligned themselves with that view, so that *Āstikavāda* as expressed in a number of orthodox schools became the most predominant pattern of Indian philosophy.

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Pāṇini's *Nāstika mati* represents the views of those who were opposed to the school of *Purusha* and they included amongst them rather earlier philosophers of various denominations, such as the believers in *Svabhāva* (Non-causationists), *Yadṛichchhā* (Fortuitous Originists, *Ahetuvādin*), *Bhūtas* (Materialists) of which Ajita Keśakambalin was the famous exponent (cf. Śāntiparva, 172.13-18), and *Niyati* (Determinist). Of these *Nāstika* schools Pāṇini has noted the name of Maskarī (Makkhali Gosāla) and his *Dishṭa-mati* or the view of *Niyati-vāda*, which as we have discussed above was based on the repudiation of action (*kiriyā*) and human edeavour (*viriya*). Patañjali states the pivotal points of their doctrine in explicit words (*Bhāshya*, VI.1.154; III.96).¹ The *Mahābhārata* deals at length with the philosophic approach of such thinkers, citing five main points of their belief, *viz.* equanimity or indifference towards creatures (*sarva-sāmya*), immobility or absence of endeavour (*anāyāsa*), straightforward utterance (*satya-vākya*), complete disregard of action leading to cynical peace (*nirveda*) and indifference to seeking knowledge (*avivitsā*, Śāntiparva, 171.2). There Maṅkhali is presented as the sage Maṅki who cheated of his two bulls by a cruel fate dismisses all effort as stupid (*Śuddhaṁ hi daivamevedamato naivāsti pauru-shaṁ*, Śāntiparva, 171.12). The followers of this school were the Daishṭikas or Determinists.

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¹ मा कृत कर्माणि मा कृत कर्माणि शान्तिर्वः श्रेयसीत्याहातो मस्करी परिब्राजकः ।

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LOKĀYATA—The name of this school which was identical with the theory of elements as the prime cause (*Bhūtavāda* and *Uchchhedavāda*) is not found in any *sūtra*, but occupies the second place in the *Ukthādi-gaṇa* (IV.2.60). A teacher and a student of this doctrine were both known as Lokāyatika. There is a strong possibility that the Lokāyata School was known to Pāṇini. Kauṭilya refers to the *Lokāyatas* (*Arth.* p. 6). The antiquity of the school is also suggested by a reference in the *Dīghanikāya*, and by the mention of a Brāhmaṇa well-versed in the Lokāyata doctrine asking the Buddha a series of questions (*Saṁyuttanikāya*; *Dict. Pali Proper Names*, II.787). A *Jātaka* passage refers to Lokāyatika doctrine (*na seve Lokā-yatikam*, VI.286). The *Kāmasūtra* has preserved an intensely worldly-wise saying of the Lokāyatikas, *Varaṁ sāṁśayik-ānnishkād-asāṁśayikaḥ kārshāpaṇa iti Laukāyatikāḥ* (*Kām.*, I.2.30). 'A silver Kārshāpaṇa in hand is worth more than a gold Nishka in the offing', with which may be compared the modern saying 'A bird in hand is worth two in the bush'. There is an interesting reference in Patañjali, *Varṇikā Bhāgurī Lokayatasya*, 'the view-point of Bhāgurī is a specimen of the Lokāyata doctrine (III.325; VII.3.45), which shows that Bhāguri was an exponent of the Lokāyata school. (Cf. also *varttikā Bhāgurī Lokāyatasya*, i.e., the way of life preached by Bhāguri is that of Lokāyata, III.326). The Chārvākas of the Lokāyata school are mentioned in an old grammatical illustration as models of dialectical proficiency (*jñāna*, I.3.46) and convincing exposition of their doctrines (*saṁmānana*, I.3.36, *Kāśikā* and *Chāndra*, I.4.82).¹ Chārvī or Chārvāka was not a proper name but an epithet derived from their brilliant discourses. A Lokāyatika appears as a friend of Duryodhana. Jābāli, a counsellor of Daśaratha, was also a follower of Lokāyata. The antiquity of the Lokāyata School being thus indicated, it must be one of those comprised in the *Nāstika mati* of Pāṇini.

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Of the terms of Yoga philosophy Pāṇini mentions *yama*, *niyama*, *saṁyama* (III.3.63), *yogī* (III.2.142); of Nyāya, *nigṛihyānuyoga* (VIII.2.94) which were the same as *nigraha* (*Nyāya*, I.2.19; V.2.¹) and *anuyoga* (ibid V.2.23) meaning defeat and censuring of an opponent. *Parimaṇḍala* in *sūtra* VI.2.182 seems to be the same technical term as *Vaiśeshika* VII.1.20, signifying an atom.

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*OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS—Ātmā*: Pāṇini uses the term *Ātmā* in such expressions as *ātma-prīti*, *ātma-māna* and *ātmanīna* (*ātmane hitam*, V.¹.9). *Sva* was the word for *ātman* as Self. *Jīva* in such terms as *jīva-nāśaṁ naśyati* (III.4.43) means ‘life’. The Ṛigvedic word *akshetravid* (Ṛigveda, X.32.7, *akshetravit kshetravidaṁ hy-aprāt*) occurs as *akshetrajña* in Pāṇini; and a new word, *akshaitrajña*, had come into existence to denote absence of self-knowledge (VII.3.30).

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*Prāṇabhṛit* or *prāṇin*, ‘one endowed with *prāṇa*’ included both men and animals, as distinguished from herbs and trees or the plant kingdom (IV.3.135). Pāṇini also distinguishes animate kingdom, *chittavat* (I.3.88) from *achitta* or the inanimate world (IV.2.47).

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Kātyāyana in one place invokes the doctrine of *sarvachetanāvatva* (III.¹.7; II.15), implying that in the higher philosophic sense which may also influence grammatical operations the distinction of animate and inanimate does not exist. Pāṇini, however, seems to have taken a more practical view. Patañjali was probably referring to old definitions when he advocated the view of the two-fold nature of *ātmā* (II.8). He adds that our physical being (*śarīrātmā*) acts and the effect of pleasure and pain is felt by the *antarātmā*, and conversely our mind acts and the effects of *sukha* and *duḥkha* are felt by the physical body. What in Pāṇini's time was called *svānta* (VII.2.18) seems to be the same as *antarātmā*, referring to mind as the internal organ of Self or *Sva*. Pāṇini also refers both to the gross body as experiencing pleasure (*kartuḥ śarīra-sukham* III.3.116), and to its experience by the mind (*sukha-vedanā* III.1.18). *Sukha* is clearly defined as pleasant experience (*ānulomya*, V.4.63) and *duḥkha* as unpleasant (*prātilomya*, V.4.64), same as *anukūla-vedanīya* and *pratikūla-vedanīya* of the Nyāya school. The definition *Sva-tantraḥ Kartā* (I.4.54), held good both in grammar and as reflecting a philosophical doctrine.

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¹ वदते चार्वी लोकायते । भासमानो दीप्यमानस्तत्र पदार्थान्ब्यक्तीकरोति । वदते चार्वी लोकायते । जानाति वदितु मित्यर्थः । काशिका, I. 3. 47.

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*INDRA AND INDRIYA*—Indra, the famous Vedic deity is referred to in the *Ashṭādhyāyī* by his older synonyms as *Marutvat* (IV.2.32), *Maghavan* (IV.4.128), *Vṛitrahan* (III.2.87). Pāṇini also records the synonym *Mahendra* (IV.2.29), a word used only thrice in the *Yajurveda* in a late prose formula (VII. 39-40; XXVI.10). The conception of Mahendra seems to have arisen out of that of the Chief Vital Air (*Madhya Prāṇa*) enkindling others through the five sense-organs (*Śatapatha*, VI.1.1.2), symbolised as a group of Five-Indras (cf. Udyogaparva, 33.103, *Pāṇḍoḥ putrāḥ pañcha Pañchendra-kalpāḥ*). But the reference to the new metaphysical meaning of Indra as Self is truly remarkable (V.2.93). This new meaning had been evolved in the religio-philosophical cogitations of the *Brāhmaṇas* where new *adhyātma* interpretations of the hymns were being discussed. Pāṇini derives *Indriya*, 'sense-organs', from the word *Indra* meaning 'Self'. He sums up the various derivations in five clauses of equal rank, and also provides for other possible views by adding the phrase *iti vā* in the *sūtra*.¹ We learn from Yāska that the derivation of Indra was a major point of discussion in which eminent teachers like Āgrāyaṇa and Aupamanyava had participated. The fifteen different etymologies of Indra compiled by Yāska (*Nirukta*, X.8; cf. H. Sköld, *The Nirukta*, p. 210) were taken from different *Brāhmaṇa* and *Āraṇyaka* passages, some of which can still be traced (cf. my article 'Studies in the Grammatical Speculations of Pāṇini', *J.U.P.H.S.*, April, 1936, pp. 95-104). Pāṇini also refers to them as shown below.

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(i) *Indra-liṅgam*; the sense-organs are the outer sign of Indra. According to the *Kāśikā* Indra here is *Ātmā* and this meaning goes back to the *Maitr. Up.*, VI.8. So long as the organs function, Indra resides within the body. Indra is the life-giver of the Indriyas: 'Verily, in the beginning there was the *Asat* named the Ṛishis who were doubtless the Vital Airs, *Prāṇāḥ*. The invisible *Prāṇa* incarnated in the body; he is Indra, propelling by his power the senses which thereby stand as proof of his existence' (*Śatapatha*, VI.¹.1.2). Thus the functioning sense-organs are the visible symbols of life within (*Indra-liṅgam*).

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¹ इन्द्रियमिन्द्रलिङ्गमिन्द्रदृष्टमिन्द्रसृष्टमिन्द्रजुष्टमिन्द्रदत्तमिति वा । (५।२।६३)

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(2) *Indra-dṛishṭam*; the senses were 'seen' or experienced by Indra. Yāska ascribes this opinion to Aupamanyava (*Idam darśanād iti Aupamanyavaḥ*), a view also expressed in the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* (*Idam adarśam tasmād Indro nāma*, III.14). This Aupamanyava was a grammarian mentioned by Yāska as holding a different view about the onomatopoeic derivation of names (III.18). It is likely that Pāṇini took this etymology from Aupamanyava. *Idam* in the above two citations stands for the non-self, or senses.

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(3) *Indra-sṛishṭam*; the organs were 'created or produced by Indra.' Yāska attributes this view to the teacher Āgrāyaṇa (*Idaṁ karaṇād iti Āgrāyaṇaḥ*, X.8), and a similar suggestion is made in the *Aittareya Up.* (II.¹, *Tā etā devatāḥ sṛishṭāḥ*).

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(4) *Indra-jushṭam*; 'loved by Indra', who feels delighted in the company of the senses. The *indriyas* are the receptacles of Soma which is Indra's delightful drink. The *Aitareya Br.* (II.26) describes the sense-organs as the Soma-cups (*Soma-graha*), and since Indra loves his sweet mead he is never so happy as when he is in the company of the senses (cf. *Indra* as *indau ramate*, Nir.). The epithet *Indra-jushṭa* is thus appropriate in view of the intimate relationship between the Self and the sense-organs.

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(5) *Indra-dattam*; 'assigned to their respective objects of enjoyment by Indra' (*ātmanā vishyebhyo dattaṁ yathā-yathaṁ grahaṇāya, Kāśikā*). The same view is found in the *Aitareya Up.*, describing the primeval Self as assigning to the senses their respective functions in the human person (*purushe*): 'He said to them: Enter into your respective abodes.' Pāṇini's *Indra-dattam* is in relation to this old legend.

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(6) *Iti Vā.* This part of the *sūtra* provides for an unknown quantity and puts the grammarian's seal of approval on such other derivations as were taught by ancient teachers but not included in the above list of five.¹ The *Kāśikā* brings out the spirit of the words by stating that the word *iti* points to the *manner* of derivation which thus made room for other similar etymologies also, all of them being of equal force. For Pāṇini to be so liberal with words is rather exceptional and points to the synthetic spirit in which he had conceived his work.

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PARALOKA (*OTHER WORLD*)—A belief in the other world and in the continuity of Self in after life was an article of faith with the people who so conducted themselves in this life as to attain happiness in the next world (*Sidhyater-apāralaukike* VI.¹.49). The *sūtra Lipsyamāna-siddhau cha* (III.3.7) refers to the attainment of supreme objective (*siddhi*) which, according to the commentators, was *Svarga*. In the Vedas *Svarga* is called *Nāka*. The word *nāka* is derived in the *Brāhmaṇas* (*ŚB.*, VIII.4.1.24) from *na*, 'not', and *aka*, 'pain', because those who go there are free from sorrow (*Vedic Index*, I.439). Yāska and with him Pāṇini splitting the word into *na* and *aka* (VI.3.75) retain its association with the final abode of happiness, as heaven was believed to be in the earlier literature.

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¹ For seventeen similar crude derivations of *Indra*, see Fatah Singh, *Vedic Etymology* (Kota, 1952), p. 94.

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Pāṇini also mentions *Niśśreyasa* (V.4.77) which in the *Upanishads* denoted supreme bliss or beatitude into which the soul entered. On the contrary, the word *Nirvāṇa* was also known to the *Ashṭādhyāyī* (VIII.2.50). It denoted something negative, *i.e.* extinction, as of a lamp or flame of fire. The term was possibly associated with Buddhism, as indicated in *Kāśikā's* example *nirvāṇo bhikshuḥ*.

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