A History of the Mahrattas v2.c35: Chapter XXVII
A History of the Mahrattas v2.c35
- Language
- English
Chapter XXVII
v2.c35.1
(1774.)—THE Supreme Council in Bengal assumed the powers of general administration in the affairs of British India on the 20th October, 1774¹; and during the ensuing month addressed a letter to the Bombay Government, requiring an account of the state of that Presidency. This letter was received at Bombay on the 7th December, but as the President and members were then in the midst of preparations for the expedition to Salsette, they deferred the consideration of the Bengal letter until after the troops had proceeded on their destination, and sent no reply until the last day of the year.
v2.c35.2
¹ [Three members of the Council, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, arrived in Calcutta on October 19, 1774, and met the following day to hear the instructions of the Directors. The fourth member, Mr. Richard Barwell, who had been in the Company’s service since 1758, took his seat a few days later.]
v2.c35.3
Three months afterwards, or on the 31st March, the Bombay Government further reported to Bengal their proceedings up to that date. But early in February intelligence of the siege of Tannah reached the Governor-General in Council, by the way of Tellicherry and Madras, before they received the reply from Bombay of the 31st December. The delay on the part of the Bombay Government certainly, to say the least, wore the semblance of a premeditated evasion, and, as new authority is generally tenacious, the Governor-General and Council addressed (1775.) another letter on the 3d February, censuring the Bombay Presidency for having gone to war with the Mahrattas, and peremptorily requiring immediate and special information of the causes and motives of their conduct. On the 21st May the Bombay Government received the reply to their first letter, of the 31st December, wherein the Supreme Government offered no opinion respecting the capture of Salsette, but disapproved of the intention of joining Rugoba, not because Rugoba was making war against his lawful prince and was generally obnoxious in the Mahratta country, or because the Bombay Government had unjustly espoused the cause of a man branded with the crime of murder; circumstances of which the Bombay Government, it is justice to them to say, were never well informed, and of which the Supreme Government were ignorant; but they disapproved because, to use their own words, ‘it was inconsistent with your negotiations with the ruling powers at Poona, and with the authority of this government.’ They also expressed apprehensions that the measure might involve them in hostilities with Sabajee Bhonslay, the enemy of Rugoba and their neighbour. To which the Bombay Government replied that they neither have, nor ever had any negotiations with the ministry at Poona, and that they need be under no apprehension in regard to Sabajee Bhonslay, as he had been killed in action by Moodajee, the friend of Rugoba, who was now the acknowledged guardian of Rughoojee and the ruler of Berar; all of which was perfectly true—victory had declared for Sabajee; Moodajee was surrounded by his brother’s troops; and on the point of being made prisoner, when Sabajee, in the exultation of the moment, drove his elephant up to that on which Moodajee was riding, and called out to him to submit. Moodajee replied by the discharge of a pistol, which laid his brother dead and left him undisputed regent and guardian of the young Rughoojee, who, it will be remembered, was his son.¹
v2.c35.4
¹ Mahratta MSS. Where I do not expressly acknowledge my authorities from A.D. 1774 to 1783, I beg the reader to understand that I write from the Records of the Bombay Government.
v2.c35.5
To the report of their proceedings up to the 31st March, the Bombay Government, on the 12th August, received a reply from Bengal, dated on the 31st May. Long before that time the minds of the President and members of the Supreme Government were in a state of strong excitement, caused by those well-known controversies between Warren Hastings and his council, which afterwards occupied so much of the time and attention of the British Parliament.² But on the present occasion President and members united in a violent condemnation of the Bombay measures; they declared the treaty with Rugoba invalid, and the Mahratta war ‘impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjust’; they protested against the Bombay Government for all consequences, and peremptorily required them ‘to withdraw their forces to their own garrisons, in whatsoever state their affairs might be, unless their safety should be endangered by an instant retreat.’ The Governor-General and Council also intimated their intention of sending an agent of their own to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Mahratta state, and desired the Bombay Government to retain possession of Salsette and Bassein, but on no account to form any treaty without their previous sanction.
v2.c35.6
² [The difficulties which Warren Hastings had to face in consequence of the open hostility of Clavering, Monson and Francis, continued until the death of Monson in September 1776, when Hastings was enabled with his own casting vote, and with Barwell as his ally, to defeat further opposition.]
v2.c35.7
The Bombay Government stated in reply that the negotiations which led to the measures thus hastily condemned had been begun before the controlling administration was formed; they defended their conduct on the grounds of the necessity of determining with promptitude, and recapitulated their reasons for deciding and acting in the manner they had done; pointed out the evils prevented by the capture of Salsette, and the fair and honourable advantages secured to their employers and their country by the treaty with Rugonath Rao. They dwelt on the shame and degradation which must be the consequence of retracting a solemn treaty in support of an object equally just and practicable, and pledged themselves, on their own responsibility, to fulfil their engagements. They sent Mr. William Tayler, a member of their council, to Bengal, who advocated their cause with much ability; and his report on Bombay affairs, dated 9th October, 1775, displays, at that early period, a very considerable knowledge of the history and character of the Mahrattas.
v2.c35.8
The Supreme Government, however, adhered to their opinion of the expediency of the orders which they had transmitted. Lieutenant-Colonel John Upton, of the Bengal establishment, was selected by Mr. Hastings as envoy plenipotentiary, and instructed to repair to Poona and conclude a treaty between the Mahratta state and the Bombay Government. The President and Council of that establishment, being excluded from all participation, strongly remonstrated against this proceeding as a wanton degradation of their authority, and their representations were supported with energy by their deputy at Bengal. ‘I trust,’ says Mr. Tayler, ‘that it will appear to your Honours, &c. that at the time it pleased the wisdom of Parliament to arm you with controlling powers over the Presidencies, it was by no means their intention that they should appear so much degraded, and so contemptible in the eyes of the native government as the Presidency of Bombay must be, unless you will commit the treaty of peace to their management.
v2.c35.9
‘Our honourable employers and the whole British nation may be naturally led to suppose that, in your opinion, the members of that government are devoid in every degree of integrity and abilities; which would be the most cruel and unjust of all imputations; for I can dare to affirm, not a person who concluded that treaty was actuated by any other motive than their obedience and duty to their employers, whose interests appeared to them to be most materially benefited by their engagements.’
v2.c35.10
Such was the language then held by the Bombay Government, with apparent sincerity as well as spirit, and, as far as we have yet detailed of their conduct and prospects, certainly with no inconsiderable degree of reason. It must be recollected that the President and members, throughout the whole of the rise and progress of their connexion with Rugoba, were strongly impressed with the belief of his being innocent of the murder of his nephew. Many of our countrymen, who by long residence in the Deccan have become acquainted with the notoriety of the fact, although perhaps represented with exaggeration, have from this circumstance alone entertained strong doubts of the integrity of Mr. Hornby and his Council; and some inveigh, with a feeling far from reprehensible, against Englishmen who could seek by such an instrument to attain their ends and gratify their ambition. But to account for this belief on the part of the Bombay Government it is necessary to state that Sukaram Bappoo was originally concerned in Rugoba’s conspiracy against the liberty, though not the life, of Narrain Rao. After the murder, as it was deemed by the ministers generally a measure of prudence to affect a disbelief of Rugonath Rao’s participation, of course Sukaram Bappoo had stronger reasons than any of them for professing that opinion. It was this impression, from the reports first circulated at Poona, which the members of the Bombay Government received from their envoy, Mr. Mostyn; and before it was possible for them to ascertain the real circumstances they were engaged as a party hostile to the ministers, when it was as much the interest of the one to uphold Rugoba’s innocence as it was of the other to aggravate his guilt. Parties so influenced diverge from the truth in all countries, more especially in India, where a witness is so apt to suit the word to the wish of his auditor. The same reasons operated in creating a belief that the child named Mahdoo Rao Narrain was supposititious.
v2.c35.11
The Bengal Presidency, where they had Mahratta connexions, received their first information through the government of Sabajee Bhonslay, a partisan of the ministers. They were also, no doubt, irritated at the neglect of their orders and the apparent contempt of their authority; and as we find men, in all situations, too often influenced by their feelings when they should be guided only by their judgment, we may suppose that they saw in their full force the evils of inordinate ambition and the wisdom of that Parliament, which had so opportunely vested them with power to control such an unjustifiable enterprise, by interposing in behalf of justice and moderation. The clause in the Act of Parliament was not sufficiently specific¹; the intention of establishing a uniform plan of action with respect to peace and war required, at a distance so remote as India from England, the strongest authority in the Supreme Council; but, as their powers were not clearly defined, the members of government should have perceived that a firm but calm exercise of power for a long period was the best way of establishing an efficient control, unless they could obtain an amendment of the statute. But they violently stretched their power in support of what they deemed propriety, and issued mandates characteristic of an inexperienced and arbitrary government, which, to gratify temporary resentments or forward its impatient selfish will, weakens much more than it strengthens the efficiency of distant authority.
v2.c35.12
¹ [For a brief analysis of the Regulating Act and an exposition of its major defects, based upon Sir C. Ilbert’s *The Government of India*, see *O.H.I.*, pp. 520–2.]
v2.c35.13
Mr. Hornby and his Council were not blameless even in what has already been mentioned, and their subsequent conduct accelerated rather than averted the misfortunes which ensued. But the precipitate interference of the Governor-General and Council was attended by effects pernicious to the interests of their country; effects which, but for the weak government of France, might, together with the loss of the American colonies, have proved a fatal blow to Great Britain. Confining reflections, however, to the boundary of Maharashtra, suffice it to say that it depressed the Bombay Presidency, lowered its political importance, and obstructed that advancement and prosperity which, from its situation and maritime advantages, it would otherwise naturally have attained; it immediately tended to strengthen the hands of the ministers at Poorundur, and it ultimately cemented the tottering confederacy of the Mahrattas under the administration of Nana Furnuwees.
v2.c35.14
The President and Council of Bombay, on receiving the Bengal order of the 31st May, directed an immediate cessation of hostilities; and as soon as the roads permitted, Colonel Keating, accompanied by Rugoba, returned towards Surat. But instead of strictly retiring within the Company’s districts, Colonel Keating, on the earnest recommendation of Rugoba, was permitted by the Bombay Government to encamp at Karod, a village about twenty-five miles east of Surat, which, although a deviation from the orders of the Supreme Government, was afterwards acknowledged as a useful support in facilitating their (Dec. 28.) negotiations at Poorundur; at which place Colonel Upton arrived on the 28th December.
v2.c35.15
Mr. Hastings was sensible that the condemnation of the Bombay measures was unnecessarily violent, but he had been one of the first to recommend a controlling authority in India, which in that remote empire, considered of itself, was an object in the highest degree important. The mandate issued was now irrevocable; Sukaram Bappoo had been informed by a letter from the Governor-General that the conduct of the Bombay Government was contrary to the Company’s order, ‘because they have directed all their officers not to make any war, nor enter on any dispute. My employer, the King of England,’ says the Governor-General, ‘has directed that all the Company’s Governors in India should obtain mine and my Council’s permission, as King’s Governor and Council of Bengal, either to make war or peace.’
v2.c35.16
In short, that he had therefore issued orders to desist from hostilities, requested of the ministers to do the same, and intimated his intention of sending an envoy to negotiate a peace. If the Governor-General of British India had then said ‘to dictate a peace,’ and shown a determination to maintain that ground, however bold the words may sound, he would probably at that moment have succeeded with Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees.
v2.c35.17
After the dispatch of the first letters, the Supreme Government, even for the sake of consistency, would have been obliged to regulate their future measures by the tenor of those orders. Advices having been received of the successes in Guzerat, it seemed not improbable that a revolution might have taken place before Colonel Upton’s arrival at Poona. Adopting, therefore, the same equitable principle with which they had professed to set out, that a substantive state has a right to make any change in its internal government which only affects itself, the envoy was instructed to negotiate a peace with either party whom he might find the acknowledged authority in the empire. But the Governor-General and Council had in effect already become parties; and the members of the Bombay Government, who felt and wrote as if the Supreme Government had ranged themselves on the side of their enemies, remark with some justice in one of their dispatches to the Court of Directors, ‘they have acknowledged the legitimacy of the government of the ministers, before they could have any competent knowledge of the justice of their pretensions.’
v2.c35.18
A.D. 1776.—The ministers soon perceived the advantages thus placed in their hands; and as Bramins in politics misconstrue moderation and attribute concession solely to fear, they assumed a high tone of demand and menace which Colonel Upton, judging by himself, believed to be firm and sincere. The Supreme Government were under a mistake in imagining that Bassein as well as Salsette was in possession of the Bombay Presidency. The envoy was enjoined to require the cession both of these and of the islands in Bombay harbour, and also of the Mahratta shares of revenue in the city of Baroach, with such other advantages for the Company as circumstances might enable him to obtain.
v2.c35.19
Colonel Upton’s correspondence bears ample testimony of sincerity and moderation; but he was ill-qualified to conduct a negotiation with Mahratta Bramins. The ministers greatly extolled the just and honourable motives which ‘had determined the great Governor of Calcutta to order peace to be concluded.’ But when Colonel Upton proposed retaining Salsette, &c., the cession of Bassein, and the revenues of Baroach, they affected to consider such an application as perfectly unauthorized, and pertinently asked the envoy, ‘how the Bengal Government, who had so justly condemned the war, could yet be so ready to avail themselves of its advantages.’ The only reply to this was that Salsette had been taken possession of as a precautionary measure, long deemed necessary to the safety of Bombay and the prosperity of its commerce; but the ministers persisted in their language, and expressed a wish ‘that they had not, on a supposed confidence of the power of the Governor of Calcutta over the people of Bombay, suspended hostilities, and thereby, at an enormous expense, maintained a vast army inactive, with which they should otherwise long since have settled the business.’ They demanded the immediate surrender of the delinquent Rugoba, and the entire restoration of the territory occupied by the Bombay Government since the commencement of the war, on which they would, as a favour to the Governor-General, agree to pay twelve lacks of rupees, in order to reimburse the East India Company for the expenses incurred by the Bombay Government. They seconded their arguments with threats, and mistook the mild remonstrances of the envoy for timidity. Colonel Upton, conceiving the negotiation at an end, expressed this opinion to the Governor-General and Council in a letter, dated 7th February, when they immediately determined to support the cause of Rugoba with the utmost vigour. They prepared troops for embarkation, ordered a large supply of treasure to be transmitted to Bombay, and directed troops to be sent from Madras. They wrote letters to Rugoba, to Nizam Ally, and Hyder; and endeavoured in the same manner to induce Moodajee Bhonslay, Mahadajee Sindia, and Tookajee Holkar to embrace their cause, or at all events to engage their neutrality.
v2.c35.20
The favourable change in the sentiments of the Bengal Government towards himself reached Rugoba almost as soon as it got to Bombay, and raised his spirits and expectations; but the ministers, almost immediately after they had carried their menaces to the highest pitch, acceded at once to the greater part of Colonel Upton’s original demands; and before accounts had time to reach Calcutta that the negotiation was broken off, the treaty of Poorundhur was settled. It was signed on the 1st March, and consisted of nineteen articles, but two of them were afterwards erased by mutual consent, and an additional clause signed. The treaty was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Upton on the part of the Company’s Government, and by Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees on that of the Peishwa’s; but the titles of Rao Pundit Purdhan are only mentioned in the treaty, the name of the Peishwa having been omitted.
v2.c35.21
The substance of the articles was a general peace between the English East India Company and the Mahrattas. Salsette to be retained or restored at the pleasure of the Governor-General and Council; if restored the Peishwa’s government agreed to relinquish territory worth three lacks of rupees of annual revenue as an equivalent. To this exchange the Supreme Government could not be expected to accede, although Nana Furnuwees afterwards pretended that it had been preferred with perfect confidence as a question of equity, from a reliance upon the justice of Mr. Hastings. All claims on the revenue of the city of Baroach, together with territory in its neighbourhood, producing three lacks of rupees, were ceded, as the treaty states, ‘by way of friendship to the English Company.’ Twelve lacks of rupees were also yielded in payment of the expenses incurred by the Bombay Government. The cessions made by Futih Sing Gaekwar were to be restored to him, provided it could be proved that he had no authority to make such alienations without the consent of the Peishwa’s government. The treaty between the Bombay Government and Rugoba was formally annulled. The English troops to return to their garrisons, and the army of Rugoba to be disbanded within a month. A general amnesty to be proclaimed to all the followers of Rugoba, four only excepted, whom the ministers knew to be particularly implicated in the murder of Narrain Rao. If Rugonath Rao should refuse to disband his army, the English agreed not to assist him. On condition of his assenting to the prescribed terms, the Peishwa and his ministers consented to afford him an establishment of one thousand horse, to allow him two hundred domestics, to be chosen by himself, and to pay him twenty-five thousand rupees monthly for his other expenses, but his residence was fixed at Kopergaom on the Godavery. It was particularly specified that no assistance should be afforded to Rugonath Rao, or to any subject or servant of the Peishwa who should excite disturbance or rebellion in the Mahratta dominions. The treaties of 1739 and 1756, and all other agreements not suspended or dissolved by the present articles, were confirmed. It was mutually agreed to assist the crews and restore the wrecks and cargoes of vessels of the respective nations thrown on each other’s coasts.
v2.c35.22
Nothing could exceed the disappointment of the Bombay Government when they learnt the terms of the treaty. They seemed to consider their own interest and dignity sacrificed to a jealous assumption of authority. They had no power to protest, and could therefore only vent their indignation by entering dissents on their own records against almost every article, with the view of ultimately submitting their objections to the Court of Directors. They certainly had cause for irritation in the manner in which their conduct had been condemned and their power in a great degree suspended ; but they seem to have been determined to find objections, and even petulantly hinted that Colonel Upton must have been in bodily fear, or he never would have consented to terms so derogatory to the English nation : they, however, ‘ with more propriety ask, Who is this Rao Pundit Purdhan ? why is his name omitted ? if Colonel Upton has had proof of the legitimacy of the child, said to be the son of Narrain Rao, why is that circumstance left in doubt ? or if not proved, why is Rugonath Rao, the rightful Peishwa, wholly excluded ? ’ 1
v2.c35.23
Rugoba could never entirely comprehend the nature of the interference on the part of the Governor-General and Council ; but under a supposition that it arose from their deeming the advantages he had granted inadequate, he proposed not only to confirm the treaty of Surat by a new agreement with the Bengal Government, but with the single exception of Viziadroog (Gheriah) to cede the whole Concan, to put the Company’s troops in possession of one of the passes in the Ghauts, to purchase annually ten lacks of rupees’ worth of their woollens and metals, at an advance of fifteen per cent. on the prime cost including all charges; he also proposed that they should unite to subdue Nizam Ally; and made several other offers of which, as none could be accepted, a further enumeration is unnecessary; but one inducement was too remarkable to be passed over, as, with his Mahratta ideas, it must have appeared irresistible. Rugoba offered to cede ten per cent. of all the Jagheers in the Mahratta empire; including, of course, the Mahratta possessions in the Deccan, and those of Holkar, Sindia, and Gaekwar in Hindoostan and Guzerat; which would have placed the East India Company, with respect to those Jagheers, precisely on the footing of Surdeshmookh.
v2.c35.24
¹ Although the circumstance is nowhere explained by the Mahrattas, the omission, on the part of the ministers, of the name of Mahdoo Rao Narrain was most likely a precaution, as in case of the child’s death it probably was their intention to get Gunga Bye to adopt a son.
v2.c35.25
Rugoba, on hearing of the terms stipulated for him by the treaty, declared that he would rather maintain the war himself than submit to them. He pretended to have received overtures from Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, and Dhonsa,¹ one of the officers of Nizam Ally. Mahadajee Sindia had always sent the most friendly assurances to Rugoba, to which he was induced partly from enmity to Sukaram Bappoo, but principally in order to preserve his own consequence and place himself as umpire between the Bramin factions; a situation to which Mahadajee Sindia with remarkable political sagacity early aspired. After the terms of the treaty were promulgated he continued an intercourse with Rugoba, not avowed, but sufficiently known to alarm the ministers; Rugoba, however, whatever he might pretend, was not deceived by these professions; none of his Indian allies afforded him any substantial aid, excepting Hyder, who sent him eighty thousand rupees as a present.²
v2.c35.26
¹ The bye-name by which Ibrahim Beg, Zufur-ud-dowlah Sabit Jung was best known. Dhonsa is the Hindoostanee name for one of the drums usually carried by parties of horse.
v2.c35.27
² Large sums are said to have been sent by Hyder Ally to Rugoba, but except the 80,000 rupees above mentioned, no other money appears by the Bombay Records to have been received, and it could hardly have escaped the vigilance of that Government at a time when they had the greatest difficulty in supplying even a pittance to Rugoba.
v2.c35.28
The Bombay Government magnified everything that could tend to forward their own views or verify their predictions. Instead of submitting as became them;—instead of using every endeavour to give effect to the spirit of the orders from the Supreme Government, and to a solemn engagement under the constituted authorities of their country, every symptom of commotion, and every prospect of obstructing the treaty of Poorundhur, was hailed with a satisfaction which they had the caution not to express, but scarcely the decency to conceal.
v2.c35.29
An impostor, already mentioned, who had assumed the name of Sewdasheo Chimnajee, eight or nine years after the battle of Panniput, was made prisoner during the lifetime of Mahdoo Rao, and after being confined in different places, was finally delivered over to the custody of Ramchundur Naik Paranspey, Soobehdar of Rutnaguiry in the Concan. Paranspey, perceiving the distracted state of affairs at Poona, the dissensions among the heads of the state, and the probability of attaining a sovereignty for himself, released his prisoner and proclaimed him as Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, unjustly imprisoned by the traitorous ministers. The impostor is known to have been a Kanoja Bramin from Hindoostan, a man of some abilities, and of the same cast as the famous Kuvee Kulus of Sumbhajee. His story obtained immediate credence, and the Bombay Government, to whom he very soon sent wukeels and addressed letters, received the overtures of *Suddaba*, as they called him, with complacency, and were evidently hopeful that this fresh insurrection would work in their favour.
v2.c35.30
Rugoba, from the date of the treaty, was allowed the space of one month to disband his army, a period which was afterwards prolonged, but perceiving that there was no immediate chance of inducing the Governor-General to assist him, he asked and obtained an asylum from the Bombay Government in Surat, where he was admitted with merely his baggage and two hundred domestics. From Surat he appealed to the Court of Directors, and following the example of his brother Ballajee Rao, addressed a letter to the King of England. Colonel Upton remonstrated against the breach of treaty occasioned by the protection afforded to Rugoba. The Bombay Government declared it no breach of the treaty : they justified their conduct on a former letter from Bengal, dated in the preceding October, which permitted them to afford an asylum to Rugoba in case his personal safety should be endangered; and they declared that nothing but absolute necessity should compel them to give up the unfortunate man to his persecutors; that Colonel Upton must know little of Asiatics in the situation of the ministers, if he was not aware that until they had rid themselves of so just an object of dread they would never consider themselves safe, and that common humanity, as well as the law of nations and good policy, dictated the propriety of what they had done, even if unsupported by authority from Bengal.
v2.c35.31
The army of Rugoba, before it disbanded, encamped, for a short time after the final period allowed had expired, close to Surat, waiting, as they said, for the payment of their arrears. Hurry Punt Phurkay in a letter to Poona intimated his intention of attacking them; but from the position in which they were allowed to remain he could not but apprehend that the English intended to support them. The Bombay Government, on the plea of apprehending danger from the contiguity of the contending Mahratta armies, but in reality to await events, threw their field army into Surat and Baroach.
v2.c35.32
It was in vain that Colonel Upton complained, or the ministers threatened, in consequence of these proceedings; the Bombay Government paid little attention to the one, and they treated the other with scorn; they expressed their astonishment and surprise that the envoy of the British nation should suffer the Mahratta ministers to declare that they should be induced to follow the example of Hyder, who had secured a peace on terms very honourable to himself, and that, in case of a renewal of the war, they would carry fire and sword to every part of the Company’s possessions in India. Such a menace was indeed derogatory to the British character and highly discreditable, not to Colonel Upton, but to those of his nation who by a perverse conduct provoked the threat, and compelled their envoy to admit that the measures they pursued were not regulated in that spirit of good faith which should certainly have actuated them from the moment a treaty was concluded.
v2.c35.33
The language used in vindication of the protection afforded to Rugoba was specious. The measure had its supporters in the Council at Bengal, but the majority condemned it, as well as the pernicious nature of the opposition which was practised by the Bombay Government.
v2.c35.34
Mr. Hastings, although he ratified the act of his envoy, did not approve of the treaty of Poorundhur, as terms more suitable might have been obtained. Several of the articles were certainly far from specific, and the ministers afterwards took every opportunity, not merely of putting the most constrained interpretations on doubtful passages, but of contravening what they must have known was really intended in the articles to which they had subscribed. The consequence was, that though hostilities had ceased, peace could not be considered as established.
v2.c35.35
Whilst affairs were in this unsettled state a dispatch was received at Bombay, on the 20th August, from the Court of Directors, dated 5th April, 1776, in which they approved, ‘under every circumstance,’ of the treaty of Surat; and recommended that the Bombay Government should retain possession of the districts ceded. It being likewise known that prior to the date of that dispatch the Court of Directors had received information of Colonel Upton’s being deputed to treat with the ministers, the President and Council of Bombay at first came to a resolution of keeping possession of all such districts as were not given up. This determination was tantamount to a renewal of the war, and several of the members, stating their belief that very great commotions were about to take place, in which their own safety would require them to bear an active part, expressed their satisfaction at having obtained this sanction to their measures, and recommended a vigorous prosecution of their former intentions. But Mr. Draper, who was not present at the first consultation, entered a dissent, which gave a different interpretation to the Court’s dispatch and induced the Government to alter their resolution. Mr. Draper was of opinion that the Court of Directors only meant that they should retain possession whilst the negotiation by Colonel Upton was pending, but that after a treaty was concluded under the sanction of the Governor-General and Council, it could never be intended that the terms should not be exactly fulfilled.
v2.c35.36
The Court of Directors could not be insensible to the advantage of a supreme authority in India; but the control over themselves, established by the new Act of Parliament, had not perhaps quite ceased its operation on their minds; their feelings were enlisted against the innovation, and the natural bias, occasioned by a prospect of great advantages on the West of India from the treaty with Rugonath Rao, prevented their fully perceiving the dangerous tendency of supporting men in the situation of the Bombay Government. They might have withdrawn censure from them, and condemned the precipitancy of the Governor-General and Council, but they should have supported constituted authority and insisted on an adherence to one plan and one interest. The Court, by their approval of the first measures of the Bombay Government, encouraged the members to persevere in their covert opposition, when the circumstances, by the conclusion of the treaty of Poorundhur, were entirely changed.
v2.c35.37
Before the opening of the season the pretended Suddaba was at the head of twenty thousand men and had got possession of upwards of twenty forts in the Concan. A very great proportion of the vulgar among the Mahratta population, with whom impostors of that description are always dangerous, believed that he was the real Sewdasheo Chimnajee, and the Bombay Government were equally convinced of the reality. They countenanced his cause in various ways; and, although they did not actually join in the insurrection, they permitted one of their surgeons to attend and accompany this Suddaba, and Mr. Dick, the commercial resident at Fort Victoria, waited upon him to pay his respects. After the impostor had possessed himself of the greater part of the Concan, he ascended the Ghauts in the month of October. He was opposed at the Bhore Ghaut, and his troops were temporarily checked, when he headed them himself with spirit and speedily carried the pass.¹ The fort of Rajmachee shortly after sent him offers of submission. Pretended overtures of accommodation were made to him by the ministers, by which he was for a short time amused, until Ramjee Patell, one of Sindia’s officers, and Bhew Rao Phansay came suddenly upon him in the neighbourhood of Rajmachee, when his whole force fled precipitately into the Concan, closely pursued by Sindia’s troops. Some of the insurgents were sheltered under the walls of Tannah, and the impostor having embarked at Bellapoor fled to Bombay, where he would have been allowed to land, but as Mr. Hornby was absent on Salsette at the time, the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, who probably judged it better to make another effort before finally abandoning his party, excused himself from landing, promised to come back on the return of Mr. Hornby, and repaired to Kolabah. On his arrival at that place he was seized and confined by Rughoojee Angria, to whom the Bombay Government made an unsuccessful application for his release; but Angria conveyed him as a prisoner to Poona, where he was bound to the foot of an elephant and trampled to death.¹
v2.c35.38
¹ Letter from Dr. Blakeman who saw the action.
v2.c35.39
¹ The Bramins of Poona have two stories respecting the fate of this criminal, both intended as apologies for the execution of a Bramin under a Bramin government. One is, that the impostor was not a Bramin, but a goldsmith; and the other is, that he was secretly removed and immured in a dungeon at Ahmednugur, where he was starved to death, and a condemned criminal, by trade a goldsmith, substituted to deceive the populace. Starvation, insufficient, unwholesome food, and a damp dungeon was really the dreadful execution frequently reserved for Bramins, and practised by the Bramin government by way of evading the inexpiable sin of depriving one of that sacred class of life. Amongst other stories, raised by the Peishwas to prejudice the vulgar against the race of Sivajee, it was pretended that the boon of the goddess Bhowanee, the truth of which no one could deny, which granted the Mahratta sovereignty to his lineal descendants for twenty-seven generations, had been taken away because Sivajee killed two Bramin spies with his own hand, having shot them with arrows, by means of that unerring aim which was one of the gifts of the goddess, and impiously hit them in the forehead, right through the distinguishing mark of their cast.
v2.c35.40
The countenance shown to the impostor naturally occasioned complaints from the ministers,² but their remonstrances became still more strong when they received information that Rugonath Rao had on the 11th November repaired to Bombay,³ where he had been received, and an allowance settled upon him of ten thousand rupees a month. Rugonath Rao had in the month of August refused a fresh offer of five lacks of rupees annually, with permission to reside at Benares, which was made through Colonel Upton; and it appeared that he had quitted Surat as if he had intended to join the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, but having been obliged to seek shelter in the fort of Tarrapoor, he requested the commander of one of the Company's cruisers to give him a passage to Bombay, which the officer did not consider it proper to refuse.
v2.c35.41
² [A letter from the Pēshwā to Colonel Upton, received on November 19, 1776, began as follows: ‘I have just now heard that Raghunāth Rāo arrived at the port of Bombay on the 28th of Ramzān, and the Governor of that place gave him an asylum in the said port. He, also, before gave protection in the above port and Salsette to the followers of the seditious Sadāshivrāo with elephants, horses, and baggage belonging to the Sarkār. These actions are very foreign to the meaning of the treaty under the Company’s seal, concluded by you between the Sarkār and all the English.’ (Forrest’s Selections (Marāthā Series), 1885, i. 286.)]
v2.c35.42
³ [Raghunāth Rāo, during his sojourn in Bombay, ‘fixed his residence on Malabar Hill, where he built a lofty, habitable tower, since removed. He was in the habit occasionally of passing through the cleft (i.e. the Yoni at Malabar Point); and being a Brahman of considerable piety, was doubtless much benefited by such regeneration.’ (Moor, Hindu Pantheon (1810), p. 397.) Possibly Raghunāth Rāo sought, by passing through the sacred orifice, to cleanse himself from the stain of implication in the murder of the Pēshwā Narāyan Rāo. The ruins of the tower in which he resided are mentioned by Maria Graham in her Journal of a Residence in India (1811).]
v2.c35.43
At last, Colonel Upton having received an order of recall from Bengal, and the Bombay Government having been directed to send a resident envoy to Poona, Mr. Mostyn was selected by them for this purpose. The ministers objected to that gentleman's appointment, as they conceived that he was the person who suggested the capture of Salsette and that he was their enemy, but this objection was overruled.
v2.c35.44
A.D. 1777.—Mr. Mostyn was of opinion that the Poona ministers were able to maintain themselves in power, that the object of the British Government should therefore be directed to keep well with them whilst they could support an efficient authority. He appears to have had a sincere desire to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, and to settle every point in an equitable manner, but the ministers were prejudiced against him, and he was determined to uphold the dignity of his situation. He repaired to Poona about the middle of March, and immediately entered upon the adjustment of the articles, which remained nearly in the same unsettled state as when the treaty was signed.
v2.c35.45
It was evident that ‘a country of three complete lacks of rupees,’ as expressed in the treaty, meant territory producing annually a revenue amounting to three lacks of rupees complete; but the Persian word Kumal, or Kamil,¹ which was employed to express complete, is also a revenue term which, though variously explained, may be said to signify the highest assessment ever known to have been fixed; and to this interpretation the ministry adhered, although the Bombay government offered to accept the cession at an average of a certain number of years.
v2.c35.46
¹ [Jama Kamil, or Kamal, means complete or standard assessment. In Bengal the term usually denotes the settlement made by Akbar's minister, Todar Mall. In Madras it was applied to the assessment of the revenue of the Northern Circars made about A.D. 1512-70; also to one subsequently framed about 1684-7 for the whole of the Deccan on the principles of Todar Mall's assessment. In Khāndesh accordingly it denotes the highest rate which any village had been made to pay, although this not infrequently fell short of the estimated rental calculated at an earlier date. (Wilson's Glossary, p. 229.) See also B.G. xiii. pt. ii. 559.]
v2.c35.47
The article in regard to Futih Sing Gaekwar was artfully designed on the part of the ministers to induce the Gaekwar to declare, not only his dependence on the Peishwa, but his having no right to make any alienation, or to conclude any treaty without the express approbation of the Mookh Purdhan. Futih Sing readily acknowledged his dependence¹; but, as he perceived the design of the ministers, he evaded the other concessions, and claimed restitution from the Bombay Government, not as the ministers wished, but because Rugonath Rao had failed to perform the agreement for which the cessions were made; these and some other points continued in dispute; the ministers offered to settle five lacks of rupees to be paid annually to Rugoba through the Governor-General and Council, provided he would retire to Benares. But a new impediment soon presented itself.
v2.c35.48
¹ This acknowledgement on the part of Futih Sing was not an admission that he had no right to alienate the districts; one of the agreements produced by the ministers rather inferred that the Gaekwar's share of Guzerat was at his own disposal.
v2.c35.49
The mere suspicion of a French intrigue always awakened the most active vigilance of the English Government in India, and an ostensible agent of France, received with distinction by the ministers at Poona, a distinction more pointedly marked by studied neglect towards the British envoy, aroused the attention of the Governor-General; and as a war with France was expected the circumstance naturally excited very considerable anxiety.
v2.c35.50
A French merchant ship arrived at Choule in the middle of March with a cargo consisting of military and marine stores, cloth, and other staples of European exportation. From that ship several Frenchmen landed and proceeded towards Poona. One of the strangers had announced himself as ambassador from the Court of France, and in that character he was received by the Mahratta court in the beginning of May.² But before entering on the object or proceedings of this mission, which are interwoven with the progress of the British nation in India, and are reserved for a future chapter, it is requisite to mention a few circumstances relative to Mahratta history, both to account for what may immediately follow, and to preserve a link in the chain of other events which will be explained at a future period.
v2.c35.51
² Bombay Records, and the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, from which last, for the ensuing five years, there is very complete information as far as the British government was concerned.
v2.c35.52
(A.D. 1776.)—The peace of Poorundhur was of the greatest consequence to the ministers, and the suppression of the insurrection under the pretended Sewdasheo Rao added materially to the stability of their government; they detached Bhew Rao Yeswunt Phansay into the Concan, who speedily reduced the forts garrisoned by the forces of the late insurgent; but their affairs to the southward were in a less prosperous state. Hyder had occupied the whole of the Peishwa’s districts south of the Toongbuddra; Bellary, in possession of a chief originally under the authority of Busalut Jung, had been taken by treachery; Gootee, after a respectable defence, was also acquired in a dishonourable manner, and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray was shamefully immured in the noxious atmosphere of an unhealthy hill-fort, where he perished. Under a pretended authority from Rugonath Rao,¹ Hyder advanced for the purpose of taking possession of the whole Mahratta country to the southward of the Kistna; and before the rains of 1776 he had pushed his conquests as far as the territory of the Nabob of Savanoor, but withdrew the greater part of his army to the south of the Toongbuddra during the monsoon. The ministers sent a small force under Koneir Punt Putwurdhun to drive Hyder’s garrison from Savanoor; but his troops were defeated, and Pandoorung Punt Putwurdhun,² the second in command, was taken prisoner by Mohurnmud Ally and Bajee Punt Burway³; the former, one of Hyder’s officers, the latter, the agent of Rugoba in command of a body of auxiliary Mahrattas,⁴ who acted in concert with Hyder’s troops. In the ensuing season the troops of Nizam Ally, under Ibrahim Beg (Dhonsa), and those of the Mahratta ministers under Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, took the field for the purpose of co-operating against Hyder; but the former was bribed, and the latter re-crossed the Kistna without risking an action. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after the rains of 1777, was detached into the Carnatic with the greater part of the disposable force, but met with no success. Mannajee Phakray, who had joined the army of the Poona ministry after the troops of his master Rugoba were disbanded at Surat, was induced by Bajee Punt Burway to unite with Hyder, and many of the Mahratta Mankurees had engaged to accompany him¹; but Hurry Punt defeated a part of the scheme for corrupting his army by an able retreat,² and shortly after extinguished the treacherous intrigues of his officers by seizing Yeswunt Rao Manay, the Deshmookh of Muswar, a powerful chief, and blowing him from a gun.³ But, besides the war with Hyder, other disturbances to the southward demanded the attention of the ministers.
v2.c35.53
¹ Colonel Wilks mentions that Hyder sent Rugonath Rao sixteen lacks of rupees at different periods. I can only find 24,000 pagodas, and, as before remarked, I scarcely think that such receipts could have escaped the notice of the Bombay Government.
v2.c35.54
² Father of the present Chintamun Rao.
v2.c35.55
³ He was a near connexion of Rugonath Rao by his first wife, whose surname was Burway [Barvē]. Anundee Bye, his second wife, was of the family of Oak [Oke].
v2.c35.56
⁴ Mahratta MSS. Wilks.
v2.c35.57
¹ Mahratta MSS.
v2.c35.58
² Wilks. Hyder himself, in a letter to the Bombay Government, the known friends of Rugoba, gives Hurry Punt no credit for his retreat, but takes abundance to himself, by representing it as a victory he had gained. [The letter from Haidar Ali to the President of the Council, dated January 9, 1778, will be found in Forrest’s Selections (Marāthā Series), i. 308.]
v2.c35.59
³ Mahratta MSS.
v2.c35.60
Sumbhajee, Raja of Kolapoor, the last of the lineal descendants of the great Sivajee, died in December, 1760, without issue. About two years afterwards his widow, Jeejee Bye, adopted as her husband’s heir a boy named Sivajee, the son of Shahjee Bhonslay, Patell of the village of Kanwut in the district of Indapoor, and having placed him on the musnud, conducted the affairs of the principality in his name. Great irregularities took place during the minority of Sivajee, both by sea and land. Piracy prevailed to an extent before unknown on the coast, which induced the English to send an expedition in 1765, and reduce both Malwan and Rairee, the former belonging to Kolapoor and the latter to Sawuntwaree. The reigning Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was exasperated against Kolapoor, both on account of plundering incursions into his territories and the hereditary connexion which the Kolapoor state maintained with the Nizam. In order to circumscribe its power and punish its aggressions, Mahdoo Rao dispossessed the Raja of several districts, and added them to the Jagheer of his own relations, the family of Putwurdhun; but during the late disturbances the Kolapoor state, having embraced the cause of Rugonath Rao, recovered the districts, and one of the ministerial officers named Ramchundur Hurry, in attempting to re-occupy them, was defeated by Yessajee Sindia, an officer of the Raja. Mahadajee Sindia was therefore sent to support Ramchundur Hurry, and succeeded in restoring order.
v2.c35.61
A.D. 1778.—In the meantime Hyder reduced Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, and in the end of April formed the siege of Dharwar. Hurry Punt proceeded to Merich, apparently with the design of forming a junction with Mahadajee Sindia at Kolapoor, and advancing in concert to attack Hyder. Nothing could be more distant from their real intentions; but the report was credited by every person, excepting Hurry Punt, Mahadajee Sindia, and Nana Furnuwees. Hyder fully believed it; and as Hurry Punt’s army was now more to be depended upon, the former foresaw that he should be compelled to recross the Toongbuddra as soon as the Mahratta generals advanced. He therefore used every endeavour to bring about an armistice; but Hurry Punt pretended to be inflexible until Hyder paid him a large sum of money,¹ and purchased the return of the Mahrattas to their capital, a measure which on their part had become absolutely necessary; and on this occasion Hyder was outwitted.
v2.c35.62
¹ Mahratta MSS. I could not discover the amount in the state accounts, nor is the sum specified in the Mahratta manuscripts.
v2.c35.63
This artifice on the part of Hurry Punt is connected with a stroke of policy which ranks high in Bramin estimation, and which will appear in the course of our narrative; but in the meantime, that we may not lose sight of the other Mahratta authorities in following more interesting events, it may be mentioned that the pageant prince, Ram Raja, worn out with years and infirmities, died at Satara on the 12th December, 1777. Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, also died about the same time, and was succeeded by his son, Pureshram Sree Newass, the present Pritee Needhee, born on the day of his father’s death.
First 63 of 70 passages. Read on