A History of the Mahrattas v2.c37.64

v2.c37.64

On the right and left of Colonel Hartley’s line there were two eminences, which, when well secured, completely covered his flanks. These heights were guarded by strong pickets, and Colonel Hartley having observed that the enemy’s skirmishers came very close to the right in the action of the 11th, with that judicious anticipation which always gave the Bombay Sepoys so much confidence in Hartley, he strengthened those points by directing the field engineer to throw up a small breast-work, and a gun was sent to each eminence during the night, both to the right and left. Ramchundur Gunnesh perceived the advantage of carrying one of these points, and next day intended to direct his principal attack on the right flank, as Hartley had foreseen. Orders were given to the Mahratta officers to advance in front and rear; Ramchundur in person, by a circuitous route for the purpose of storming the height, led on a body of Arab foot, and a thousand regular infantry under Signior Noronha,¹ a Portuguese officer in the Peishwa’s service. A body of the best horse supported the infantry, and Ramchundur was determined to carry this post or perish. Taking advantage of a (Dec. 12.) thick fog, by nine o’clock in the morning they had approached close to the picket, but the mist suddenly cleared away, the sun shone forth, and both parties, having now a near and full view of each other, paused for a moment—when a brisk fire opened at once, and the guns did surprising execution; the storming party advanced with great ardour; guns from the right of the line were brought to bear upon the assailants, and committed great havoc among the horse; but the Mahrattas still persevered—when suddenly their fire slackened, and a body was seen borne off towards the rear; it was Ramchundur Gunnesh, who fell with the well-earned reputation of a gallant and skilful officer. Signior Noronha was wounded, when the enemy, dispirited by the loss of their leaders, retired precipitately and with heavy loss. In the action of the 12th, the Bombay troops suffered very little,² and their whole conduct appears to have been much more justly appreciated by the Mahrattas than by their own government³; the fact is, that military service in India seems always to have been commended rather in proportion to the result than to the duty performed, and this trying and well-fought campaign is scarcely known, even to the gallant army by whom it was maintained.