A History of the Mahrattas v2.c37: Chapter XXIX
A History of the Mahrattas v2.c37
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Chapter XXIX
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A.D. 1779.—HYDER ALLY, though mulcted and duped by Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt Phurkay, was amply compensated by the opportunity afforded when they were called away in the end of May, 1778. Dharwar was taken, and the whole tract, as far north as the Gutpurba and Kistna, submitted to his arms. He also took Chittledroog, and extended his territories to the eastward by the reduction of Kurpa. During his stay in that neighbourhood, he was joined by Monsieur Lally, a military adventurer, who had been for some time in the service of Busalut Jung at Adonee, and afterwards with Nizam Ally, but he now came over to Hyder with his corps.
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Prior to this event, Hyder had become thoroughly jealous of the English; and had he not been deterred by fears of a Mahratta invasion, he would probably at an early period have gone to war with them, and declared himself an ally of the French.¹ He had for some time encouraged a close intercourse with that nation, and was supplied with arms, warlike stores, and occasionally with men, from the island of Mauritius. The capture of Pondicherry on the 18th October, 1778, could not fail of occasioning regret to Hyder; and when the Governor of Madras intimated the intended reduction of the French settlement of Mahé, the port through which Hyder drew his supplies, he formally protested against the attack of a settlement, which, being situated in his territory, was, he pretended, under his protection. The expedition however went forward; Hyder, during the siege, hoisted his colours on the works by the side of the French; but the fort fell to a detachment of Madras troops under 1779. Colonel Braithwaite in the month of March. The Governor-General and Council, in consequence of having received intelligence that the French meditated an attack on the English settlements on the west coast, made an application to Madras for the assistance of some troops to reinforce Bombay, including Colonel Braithwaite’s detachment; and accordingly, after demolishing the works of Mahé, these troops were held at the disposal of the Bombay Government, and intended, if necessary, to join General Goddard after the monsoon.
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¹ [War between England and France was declared in 1778, in consequence of the latter supporting the revolted American Colonies. Early news of this declaration of war had reached Hastings by the temporary overland service via Suez, which he was himself largely instrumental in organizing.]
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(June 12.)—The fugitive Rugoba was received, though at first scarcely welcomed, by the English; and on the 12th June, accompanied by his sons, Amrut Rao and Bajee Rao, the latter a child of four years old, visited General Goddard in his camp, from whom he received an allowance of fifty thousand rupees a month, which the Governor-General and Council totally disapproved and condemned as a lavish and unnecessary expenditure. General Goddard had been sufficiently prudent to avoid entering on any terms of alliance with Rugoba: it was considered very impolitic to attempt forcing a person into the Mahratta government to whom the whole nation had manifested indifference or aversion; and therefore, acting upon the terms of the Poorundhur treaty, if all accommodation were rejected, the English, in support of their national honour, could do no less than engage in the war as principals.
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The negotiation between General Goddard and Nana Furnuwees continued for several months; but towards the end of the monsoon Goddard communicated to the Bombay Government some intelligence he had received of a general confederacy of the Mahrattas, Hyder and Nizam Ally, against the English, on whom it was said they meditated an attack at all the three Presidencies. General Goddard, prior to the receipt of this information, had sent to demand explicit answers from Nana Furnuwees, which were obtained sooner than was expected, by his declaring that the surrender of Salsette and the person of Rugoba were preliminaries to any treaty which the English might wish to (Oct.) conclude with the Mahratta state. An immediate requisition was made for Colonel Braithwaite’s detachment, on the first intelligence of a confederacy; but, in consequence of an attack of the Nairs,¹ secretly instigated by Hyder against both Mahé and Tellicherry, the services of the detachment could not be immediately spared; the Madras Government therefore, who then foresaw no impending danger to their own Presidency, prepared another detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, of one hundred artillery, a regiment of five hundred Europeans, and a battalion of Sepoys; but, before they joined Goddard, the campaign of the ensuing season was nearly at an end.
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¹ There were two chiefs in Malabar known by the appellations of prince of Cherika and king of Cartinadee, who were leaders in the hostilities alluded to.
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When General Goddard obtained the answer from Nana Furnuwees, he evaded giving an immediate reply, embarked for Bombay, where he arrived on the 1st November, and immediately consulted with the Government respecting the plan of operations, particularly in regard to the proposed alliance with Futih Sing. His principal motive, however, for repairing thus promptly to Bombay, was to urge dispatch in preparing and sending off a reinforcement. Accordingly, although the Bombay Government recommended delay, they acceded to his desire, and a detachment, under Colonel Hartley, of one hundred European artillery, two hundred European infantry, two battalions of native infantry, one of them a battalion of grenadier Sepoys, volunteer drafts from different corps, principally those who had before served under Hartley on the rearguard at Tullygaom, were speedily embarked for Guzerat.²
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² [The orders to Colonel Hartley, giving the details of his detachment, are contained in a letter dated Bombay, December 2, 1779, signed, ‘Your loving friends, William Hornby and Committee. (Forrest, Selections (Marāthā Series), i. 390.)]
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On the side of Bengal a detachment of two thousand Sepoys was in readiness to follow General Goddard’s route, but, on hearing that the war was inevitable and might have broken out before they could have reached their destination, their march to Surat was countermanded. Mr. Hastings, desirous it would seem of embracing any proposal for effecting a diversion, and perhaps of giving the country a rallying point of insurrection against the Mahrattas, entered into an alliance with their turbulent tributary, the Rana of Gohud.
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Meanwhile General Goddard, on his return to Surat, dismissed the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees, put his army in a state of readiness, and opened the negotiation with Futih Sing. A treacherous correspondence was about this period intercepted by General Goddard, between the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees and Mr. Vandegraaf, the Dutch chief and director at Surat, from which it appeared that the Dutch had engaged in a plot for assisting the Mahrattas to surprise Surat castle; but Mr. Boddam, the English chief, took effectual precautions to prevent the perfidious design.
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Futih Sing, on the receipt of the proposals, attempted to procrastinate, and showed every disposition to evade a definite engagement with the English. General Goddard therefore put his army in motion, crossed the Taptee on the 1st January, but advanced very slowly to the northward, until his battering train and stores had joined him from Baroach, when he marched to attack the fort of Dubhoy, which was in possession of the Peishwa and garrisoned by about two thousand men. Whilst General Goddard moved forward, Mr. Boddam occupied the Peishwa’s districts near Surat. Mr. Robert Gambier and the gentlemen of the Civil Service at Baroach, having enlisted irregulars, also took advantage of General Goddard’s being in their neighbourhood, drove out the Peishwa’s thannas, and took possession of Oklaseer, Hansot, Desborah, and Amod. Jumbooseer had not been restored by the Bombay Government.
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(Jan. 18.)—The army arrived before Dubhoy on the 18th January. The Bramin commandant, on being summoned to surrender, answered by a vaunting discharge of matchlocks, and kept up a continued fire during the ensuing day, which did no other mischief than that of wounding one subaltern of the Bombay army, Lieutenant Charles Reynolds, the same person who was afterwards Surveyor-General.
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(Jan. 20.)—By daybreak of the 20th, a battery of three eighteen pounders was ready to open within two hundred yards; but the garrison had evacuated the place in the night, and Mr. James Forbes¹ of the Civil Service, with a company of Sepoys and a few irregulars, was placed in charge of the new acquisition. Futih Sing now began to negotiate in earnest; met General Goddard, seemingly with as much cordiality as alacrity, and concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, which was signed on the 26th, on the terms proposed (Jan. 26.) by Governor Hornby and approved by the Supreme Government.¹
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¹ The author of the *Oriental Memoirs*.
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¹ [The treaty was signed near the village of Candeela in the Dubhoi (Dubhoy) District. It contained twelve articles, which are printed in full in Forrest’s Selections (Marāthā Series), i. 394–6. Dubhoi is now the Dubhoi tāluka of Baroda State, with an area of 190 square miles.]
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The Peishwa’s share of territory north of the Myhie was to be given up to Futih Sing, in lieu of which he agreed to cede his share of revenue south of the Taptee, or those districts known by the appellation of Uthawees Mahal (or Attaweesee), his share of the revenues of Baroach, the district of Sinnore on the Nerbuddah, and his villages in the Baroach district. The usual tribute to the Peishwa was to be remitted, at all events during the war, but three thousand horse were to join Goddard’s army. The Company were to be put in possession of the districts ceded from the day that Futih Sing’s troops were put in possession of Ahmedabad. For that place General Goddard marched with (Feb. 10.) expedition, and arrived before it on the 10th February. The walls of Ahmedabad are of immense extent, and, for so vast a city, were remarkably strong. Though this ancient capital was considered in a comparatively deserted condition, even at this period it was supposed to contain upwards of one hundred thousand inhabitants. The Bramin in charge on the part of the Poona government, being summoned to surrender, expressed his willingness to give up the place, but desired a little time to persuade his garrison, composed of six thousand Arab and Sindee infantry and two thousand Mahratta horse, to comply with the general’s desire. This is the ordinary language of Mahrattas when they intend a firm resistance; but General Goddard had afterwards reason to believe there was truth in what the Bramin asserted.
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(Feb. 11.)—Next day, some of the troops having ventured too near the wall suffered for their temerity, and amongst the (12.) rest, an officer, the second in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, was wounded. On the 12th, however, (13.) General Goddard opened a battery, by which a breach was effected, and reported practicable by the evening of the 13th. From motives of humanity, and the fear of excesses in the city, the assault was next day delayed, in hopes that the garrison might be induced to surrender; but the endeavour was unavailing, and the storming party was formed on the morning of the 15th February, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley. The advance was composed of volunteers from the Bombay division. Two unfortunate individuals,¹ of those who had been dismissed for misbehaviour in the preceding campaign, came forward to General Goddard and earnestly solicited permission to accompany the forlorn hope, which was humanely granted, and both survived, after proving themselves worthy of being restored to the service. The command of the party, however, was entrusted to Serjeant Fridge of the Bombay European regiment, a corps always celebrated for gallant volunteers on such occasions. The grenadiers of the Bombay division followed the forlorn hope, with a strong reserve of chosen men from the army. On the preconcerted signal the whole moved off at a brisk pace, rushed up the breach, where the garrison stood ready to receive them and for a short time made a very determined stand, until three hundred of them lay dead, when resistance ceased. The most honourable part of this gallant assault was the subsequent steadiness and good conduct of the troops. No excesses were committed, and two only of the inhabitants, not composing the garrison, lost their lives. Of the British troops one hundred and six were killed and wounded, among the latter were ten European officers and four gentlemen volunteers, three of whom died of their wounds.²
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¹ Their names were Fraser and Clancey. Fraser was dismissed for abandoning his post at the Bhore Ghaut, on hearing of the defeat at Wurgaom. But the infamy was rendered particularly striking and ridiculous, as it was from him that the first intelligence was received in Bombay of the disaster; and, writing from recollection, his note is on the Bombay records, in these words: ‘Dear Sir—Our army is cut to pieces; I can effect my retreat, but I scorn it, at the risk of my honour. This is the last you shall hear from, yours truly, W. Fraser.’ Fraser, however, lived not only to retrieve his honour, but to distinguish himself on several occasions, and to be much esteemed throughout the army. This last, I mention on the authority of Major-General Baillie, who knew him intimately.
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² Major Spaith, Bombay Engineers; Captain Gough, Bengal Native Infantry, and volunteer Wright. [According to a return supplied by General Goddard the total numbers of British troops killed and wounded at the siege of Ahmadābād were respectively 17 and 64, or 81 in all. (Forrest, Selections (Marāthā Series), i. 400.) General Goddard reported on February 15, 1780, that the troops had captured a number
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The capital of Guzerat was scarcely reduced, when General Goddard heard of the approach of Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar, with a body of fifteen thousand horse, to which were to be united seven thousand horse, then engaged in plundering the villages about Baroach.
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After the escape of Rugoba there was some coolness between Sindia and the minister, but they were speedily reconciled; and although Mahadajee did not wish to quit the capital at that time, yet as he had Nana under command by causing him to apprehend an alliance with the English, he at last consented to oppose Goddard in Guzerat; and it is necessary to apprise the reader that Nana Furnuwees was without reserve informed of all the subsequent proceedings of Sindia: a report, however, was spread of Sindia’s being on the eve of a rupture with Nana, which was speedily followed by another report of his intention to make a desperate effort to recover possession of Rugoba’s person by assaulting Surat.
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Rugonath Rao had been persuaded by General Goddard to remain in that city when the army took the field, a circumstance which Mahadajee, from not exactly comprehending that the English were at war as principals, did not expect, and which may have disconcerted the scheme he was hatching. The momentary alarm, however, occasioned by this threat was dissipated on the arrival of the European part of the Madras detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, which had disembarked at Surat before the Mahratta army had passed Candeish.
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(Feb. 29.)—Sindia and Holkar forded the Nerbuddah on the 29th February, with upwards of twenty thousand horse, and proceeded to the neighbourhood of Baroda, where they (Mar. 6.) halted. Goddard crossed the Myhie on the 6th March at Fazilpoor, to give them battle; but on his advancing towards Baroda they retired in the direction of Pawungurh. Sindia, so far from evincing hostile intentions, professed the greatest friendship for the English. The two hostages, Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart, who were still in his camp, and whom he had treated with much hospitality, were restored to liberty, and joined General Goddard on the evening of the 9th. of standards from the enemy which he proposed to send to Bombay to be hung as trophies in the church (now the Cathedral), or in the Company’s armoury at Bombay. (Forrest, Selections (Marāthā Series), i. 399.)]
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This act of kindness was followed by the appearance of a wukeel, Abajee Shabajee, who gave assurances of his (Mar. 9.) master’s friendship for the English and enmity to Nana Furnuwees, declaring that his master had experienced from the latter the greatest ingratitude and treachery. But Goddard, without being drawn in to make proposals for an alliance, which, allowing Sindia to have been sincere, would have afforded him a great advantage, made suitable answers, by assurances of reciprocal regard on the part of the English ; but with respect to the terms of a treaty, he left Sindia to be the judge of what would prove mutually advantageous, as the British Governments in India had no other view than a permanent peace, which they were determined to obtain on terms honourable, defined, and secure.
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Sindia’s object was to waste the time in negotiation, and keep Goddard inactive during the fair season ; but Indian chicane is no match for European honesty. General Goddard was sincere in assuring Sindia of his desire for peace, but he limited the negotiation to a certain time, and allowed Sindia three days from the time his wukeel quitted the British camp, to offer his (Mar. 16.) proposals. Accordingly, on the 16th March the wukeel returned and submitted the following terms from his master :—‘ That, formerly when Rugoba was at Tullygaom, after the return of the English army to Bombay, an agreement had been entered into between him and Sindia, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, when the former consented to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, and to retire towards Jhansee, where he should receive an allowance of twelve lacks of rupees per annum ; that the sicca should continue in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narrain, and that Bajee Rao, the son of Rugoba, should be appointed the Peishwa’s Dewan, but as he was too young to transact the business of the office himself, being only four years of age, the care and management of it should be left entirely to Sindia. He now, therefore, proposed that Rugoba should retire to Jhansee, and that the young Bajee Rao should accompany him to Poona.’
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Such were his proposals, without declaring himself further respecting the English, whose part he still reserved for Goddard to propose ; but General Goddard merely objected to what was wrong, declared that no force should be put on Rugoba’s inclination, that he had sought the protection of the English, and that his quitting it should be voluntary; that even allowing the English did assist Sindia to acquire the entire powers of the state, for the sum of his proposals amounted to nothing less, Sindia, on his part, in the name of the Peishwa, should previously consent to certain conditions favourable to the British interests, as well in consideration of the benefits he was to derive, as in compensation for the wars of the Mahratta state in which they had been compelled to engage. The negotiation was thus brought to a point within seven days, which Sindia probably intended to have spun out into as many months; when it would have been his study to balance Bramin fears and jealousy against the policy of the English and that sanguine temperament of Europeans which is usually accompanied by credulity.
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Mahadajee Sindia continued to profess his friendly regard, but perceiving that Goddard was not to be duped, he opened a negotiation with Govind Rao Gaekwar, for putting him in possession of Guzerat; and Goddard had now no other desire than to bring an action, which the Mahrattas as carefully avoided. Sindia apprehending a surprise, sent his heavy baggage under the protection of the hill-fort of Pawungurh, which was in his own possession, and threw out a number of small parties of horse to retire on the first alarm, and enable him to avoid any sudden attack that might be meditated.
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(Mar. 27.)—In this manner, fancying himself secure, he allowed the British army to encamp on the 27th March within six miles of his main body, in which situation they lay watching each other for a week; but Goddard, on the night of the 2d April, prepared a detachment of ten companies of grenadier Sepoys, headed by the two European grenadier companies of the Bombay regiment, two battalions of Bengal, and one of Bombay native infantry, with the regiment of Bengal cavalry, and a small body of horse belonging to the Nabob of Oude, the whole being supported by twelve pieces of artillery. This force he disposed in two lines; the first line was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Baillie, the second by Major Hopkins, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 3d, the time when the guards of irregulars begin to be overpowered by drowsiness, they moved off silently under General
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(April 2.)
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(3d.)
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Goddard’s personal command: Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley remained in camp, in command of the rest of the army. The detachment passed the Mahratta out-parties without being discovered—came upon their grand guard of several thousand men, —pushed on for their camp, still a mile and a half in front, without firing a shot; but the day dawned, the alarm had been communicated, and the main body were ready mounted. They stood for a short time, and even advanced as if to charge, but they were received with a heavy fire, on which they turned their horses until they were beyond reach of the guns; a spirited charge by the body of cavalry belonging to the Nabob of Oude, distinguished from the regiment of Bengal cavalry by the name of *Candahar Horse*, on a body of the Mahrattas, completed the rout and drove them beyond the reach of pursuit.
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Of the regular troops not a man was touched, but fifteen of the Candahar Horse fell in the charge. The loss of the Mahrattas was supposed to be considerable; and General Goddard imagined he had gained a victory; but as soon as he had encamped, Sindia took up the same distance as before, observing a greater vigilance in guarding against surprise. On the 14th Colonel (Apr. 14.) Browne, with the Madras troops, joined, and General Goddard on the 19th made another attempt on Sindia’s camp, but the Mahrattas only waited until he came within sufficient distance, when they let off a flight of rockets and retired as before.
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The Bombay Government expressed some impatience at General Goddard’s allowing himself to be thus amused, as they imagined that his army might have been better employed in reducing the fort of Bassein, which they considered of value as a permanent acquisition ¹; but General Goddard was constrained to this mode of operations; the time would not have admitted of his forming a regular siege, and to quit Guzerat at that period was to leave their ally Futih Sing at the mercy of the enemy. It was evident that Sindia wished to draw him into a long pursuit; and although no decisive advantage was gained, the mere circumstance of forcing Sindia and Holkar to decline a battle and retire before his army, was of importance in the neighbourhood of the new acquisitions. At the request of the Presidency, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley was ordered down to Bombay, and (May 8.) quitted the army near Baroda on 8th May. The presence of this reinforcement in the Concan was very necessary.
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¹ [In a letter to General Goddard of April 30, 1780, President Hornby and Council wrote: ‘The possession of Bassein, considered in every point of view, is an object of so much importance to the Company, that we cannot help expressing our anxiety at the probability there appears of this season elapsing and Bassein still unsubdued. The danger of such a fortification, so contiguous to our possessions, remaining in the hands of the enemy at this time of a European war, and the advantage and security the acquisition of it would give to this Presidency, makes us very earnest in our wishes not to leave the reduction of this place to the hazard of future accident or circumstances; nor can we think that any other object can claim a preference to your attention or bring this campaign to a more honourable and
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The greater part of the provisions for the consumption of the inhabitants of Bombay being drawn from the neighbouring continent, in order to prevent the Mahrattas from cutting off the supplies, in which they had partly succeeded, detachments were sent from Salsette and Bombay, which had seized and occupied several posts, and one party, consisting of two companies of Sepoys headed by four European subalterns, pushed on to the Ghauts, occupied one of the passes where they established a post, got up three pieces of cannon, and were reinforced by a small detail of European artillery. But the principal acquisition was the town of Kallian, where a captain’s post was established under Captain Richard Campbell. Nana Furnuwees, who set a high value upon that place, assembled a large force for the purpose of recovering it, and driving the English from the continent: the post at the Ghauts was attacked before it could be withdrawn; the party was cut off or dispersed, and the guns were taken. Three of the officers were killed, and one of them was made prisoner. The Mahrattas, elated with this success, advanced towards Kallian, threatened to exterminate the garrison if they dared to resist, and forced their prisoner, Ensign Fyfe, to write ¹
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¹ advantageous conclusion.' (Forrest, Selections (Marāthā Series), i. 410.)]
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¹ The following is a copy of the letter:—
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‘Dear Sir, ‘I am now a prisoner in the Mahratta camp, with seven European artillerymen, one Subedar, two Jimmadars, and fifteen Sepoys. They are encamped within a very little distance of Callian, and are about sixteen or eighteen thousand fighting men. They have eight guns, and one howitzer. This is the best account I can give you. I write to the commanding officer, Captain Richard Campbell, to demand the surrender of the town. To all which Campbell replied, ‘that they were welcome to it if they could take it,’ and made a most spirited defence. Colonel Hartley fortunately arrived from Guzerat just in time to prevent the assault which was to have taken place on the morning of the 25th May; but on the night of the 24th Hartley surprised the Mahratta camp, followed them up for several miles, killed a great number, but could not succeed in taking the guns. They retired, however, from the Concan, and left the British troops unmolested during the remainder of the fair season.
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General Goddard in the meantime being incommoded for want of forage, was obliged to send to a distance to procure it; a covering party was briskly attacked, but repulsed the enemy, and shortly after this event Goddard moved to the Nerbuddah in order to place his troops in convenient stations during the approaching rains.
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He received a pressing application from the Bombay Government to endeavour to seize Parneira, a hill fifteen miles north of Damaun, fortified by Moro Punt Pingley in the time of Sivajee; but their wishes had been anticipated. Gunnesh Punt, a Mahratta officer, who had been stationed in the Concan, quitted that quarter, plundered such parts of the Attaveesy as did not acknowledge the ministerial party, and advanced close to Surat,
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this at their desire, to demand that you will immediately deliver up Callian and Ballapore, otherwise they threaten to kill every one of us, to storm both those places, and put every man to the sword. You may act as you think proper, but I beg you will return the bearer, as I have pledged my head you will not hurt the messenger; so be sure to return an answer soon. Our situation is none of the most agreeable. I should be obliged to M’Lean for a few clothes, as I have none.
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‘I am, Dear Sir, Camp, near Callian, ‘Your most obedient humble servant, 12th May, 1780. (Signed) ‘THOMAS FYFE.’ ‘To Captain Campbell.’
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P.S.—‘This does not please Mr. Bappoojee, the Bura Surdar; he also demands he may be paid for all the batty (rice) that has been taken, and a tribute for the expense of his army. He also says, that General Goddard, with the grand army, is at present surrounded in Guzerat, and if you will peaceably comply with the above terms, he will get the grand army released, and further threatens us on refusal where he had committed great devastations. Lieutenant Welsh, an officer of the Bengal cavalry, having been sent forward by Goddard at the requisition of the civil authorities in Surat, with the regiment of cavalry, the Candahar Horse, and a body of infantry, surprised the camp of Gunnesh Punt at four o’clock on the morning of the 23d April, killed upwards of a hundred of the Mahrattas, mortally wounded Gunnesh Punt the commander, took his guns, three in number, and the whole of his baggage.¹ Lieutenant Welsh went on to the southward, and greatly distinguished himself by reducing Parneira, Bugwara, and Indergurh, three forts in the neighbourhood of Damaun, of which the Bombay Government were very anxious to obtain possession. A detachment of the Bengal Sepoys under Major Forbes also distinguished themselves by attacking and routing one of Sindia’s detachments near Sinnore, on the banks of the Nerbuddah, which ensured tranquillity to the newly acquired districts in Guzerat during the approaching monsoon.
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¹ Lieutenant Welsh’s dispatch to the chief of Surat. Mahratta Letters. Lieutenant W. does not seem to have been aware that Gunnesh Punt was mortally wounded, which the Mahratta letters mention. The following is a copy of the dispatch:
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In the Concan, after the rain fell, the Mahrattas in small parties returned to molest the different posts; but Major Hopkins and Captain Abington, who were stationed with the eighth² and ninth battalions at Kallian, prevented any attempt upon that place.
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² The grenadier Sepoys, who accompanied Hartley to Ahmedabad, were formed into a separate corps, but on their return lost their name of the grenadier battalion, and were called the eighth battalion; a circumstance which nearly created a mutiny in the corps. To restore the name to men who remonstrated in a manner so unsoldier-like,
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‘Dear Sir, ‘I have the pleasure to acquaint you that I rode on at the head of the regiment and Candahars, and reached Gunnesh Punt’s camp at four o’clock this morning, when I took his camp standing, bazar, and three guns, killed ninety, and wounded fifteen. I have only lost one Duffedar, and two troopers wounded, one Candahar killed. In short, there was nothing wanting to complete this matter, but sending you in Gunnesh Punt’s head. I don’t think he has much to brag of now. The inhabitants of the villages seem exceeding happy, and are coming in from all quarters. ‘I am, Dear Sir, ‘Your very obedient humble servant, (Signed) ‘THOMAS WELSH.’
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In regard to the affairs of Bengal, the treaty on the part of Mr. Hastings with the Rana of Gohud was opposed by some of the members of the Bengal Government with more reason than is always to be found in their objections; such an insignificant ally, without troops, resources, or extensive popularity, was more likely to embarrass than to aid a regular army, unless in regard to supplies whilst actually within the Gohud territory. A diversion, by attacking the Mahrattas on the north-east part of Malwa, by passing through Gohud, was strongly recommended by Goddard and supported by Sir Eyre Coote. The latter, however, disapproved of sending a small force; and when at the requisition of the Rana, Captain Popham was ordered to cross the Jumna, Sir Eyre Coote deemed the measure extremely injudicious.
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The detachment under Captain William Popham was composed of drafts intended to recruit the Bengal battalions serving with General Goddard, but in consequence of the renewal of the war, they were not allowed to march across India, as had been originally ordered, and were now selected for this service. The whole amounted to two thousand four hundred men; they were formed into three battalions of equal strength: a small body of cavalry, and a detail of European artillery, with a howitzer and a few field-pieces accompanied them. Captain Popham crossed the Jumna in the month of February; he immediately attacked a body of Mahrattas, who were plundering in the neighbourhood of Gohud, drove them from the country, and at the request of
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was deemed improper; but they afterwards behaved with such extraordinary valour that their name of grenadier battalion was restored in 1783. They distinguished themselves during the arduous campaign in the Concan, which will be presently detailed. For their conduct in the battle of Paniany, by the side of the 42d regiment, they received the highest compliment ever paid to a Sepoy regiment. ‘The Royal Highlanders,’ says Colonel M’Leod, in his dispatch of the 29th of November, 1782, evinced the ardour which always inspires their countrymen in battle. The eighth battalion of Sepoys showed themselves equal to any troops in courage, coolness, and discipline.’ They then petitioned through Colonel M’Leod to have their name restored; but it was refused. In the following year, however, the eighth battalion formed part of the garrison which maintained the heroic defence of Mangalore, and their name was restored, as the only reward, which the sickly, famished men, on their return to Bombay, solicited. They were long fortunate in a succession of excellent commanding officers; and on every occasion of service the spirit of Stewart and of Hartley has lived in their ranks.
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the Rana marched against Lahar, a fortified place fifty miles west of Kalpee, in possession of the Mahrattas. Having summoned the fort, which refused to surrender, he was obliged to commence an attack, although he found it much stronger than had been represented, and that battering guns were necessary to ensure its capture. But the determined bravery of the troops overcame every difficulty; long before the breach was, in the ordinary sense of the word, practicable, Captain Popham, foreseeing that field-pieces might never effect the purpose, determined to storm. Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardiner led on the advance; both fell in the breach; but Mr. O’Dell, a volunteer, rushed forward to supply their place, mounted the works, gallantly followed by the party, and, after a persevering assault, the place was carried, although with the heavy loss of one hundred and twenty-five men of the storming party. This success was entirely unexpected by Sir Eyre Coote, who, on hearing of the attack without battering cannon, only anticipated disaster; and in consequence of his representations, another detachment of four regular battalions, with a battering train, was held in readiness to cross the Jumna, under Major Jacob Camac. But if the successful assault of Lahar was unexpected, the capture of the strong hill-fort of Gwalior, without the loss of a man, excited the utmost admiration. Captain Popham, after his return from Lahar, was encamped during the rains within five *kos* of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior, expecting to be relieved as soon as the season permitted. Gwalior was in possession of Mahadajee Sindia, and in Hindoostan, where the stupendous fastnesses of the west of India were little known, it was accounted one of the strongest forts in Asia.
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Captain Popham, with equal enterprise and prudence, was employed for about two months in laying his scheme; and at last, assisted by spies furnished through the Rana of Gohud, he determined to carry his plan into execution. Every preparation had been made with the utmost secrecy, and on the night of the 3d August he formed his party. The command of the advance was conferred on Captain Bruce, who had before distinguished himself in the attack of the Mahratta horse, upon the first arrival of the detachment in the Gohud territory. The advance on this occasion consisted of two companies of Sepoys, chosen grenadiers and light infantry. They were led by four lieutenants, Wilson, Scott, Allen, and Paterson; and as the surprise of natives was intended, twenty Europeans followed the Sepoys; a judicious disposition, as they were near enough to gain the head of the column if necessary, and where they were placed, less likely to lead to discovery; two battalions of Sepoys followed: scaling ladders applied to the foot of the scarped rock, which was sixteen feet high, enabled them to mount with ease. Thence they had to climb a steep ascent of about forty yards to the foot of the second wall, which was thirty feet high. The spies ascended, made fast ladders of ropes, by which the Sepoys mounted with alacrity, and each man as he got inside squatted down. Twenty of the Sepoys with Captain Bruce had entered the fort, when three of them so far forgot themselves as to shoot some of the garrison who lay asleep near them. This indiscretion occasioned an immediate alarm; but the Sepoys stood their ground, their comrades mounted to their support, the garrison became intimidated, and the sun had scarcely risen on the 4th August, when the assailants had obtained possession, almost without resistance, of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior.
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On that very night a similar attempt was made with different success on the western side of India. Captain Abington, afterwards so well known from his gallant defence of Tellicherry, made an attempt to surprise the strong fortress of Mullungurh, or as it is frequently termed Bhow Mullun,¹ one of the most conspicuous objects of the beautiful view to the eastward of the island of Bombay. Captain Abington succeeded in possessing himself of the lower hill; but the garrison, before his men could get sufficiently near to mingle with them, took the alarm and made good their retreat to the upper fort: an enormous mass of perpendicular rock that defied all attempts at an assault.
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¹ [i.e. Bāwa Malang, known familiarly as the Cathedral Rock, ten miles south of Kalyān, Thāna District.]
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During the rains the Bombay Government had full leisure to contemplate the state of their affairs. Their greatest distress was their total want of funds. They looked to Bengal for a supply of treasure; but the hostility of Hyder, which the Supreme Government had doubted, and which the majority of the Madras rulers disbelieved, burst with appalling certainty on the province of Arcot, which was invaded in the month of July with the most formidable army that had ever opposed the British power in India. This new difficulty, superadded to their own distress, induced the Supreme Government to declare that they could afford no assistance to the Bombay presidency.¹ ‘We have no resource,’ says Governor Hornby in his admirable minute of the 1st August, ‘but such as we may find in our own efforts’; and in this strait his measures showed much judgment and vigour. To raise funds was the subject of immediate deliberation, and the difficulties are best expressed in the means taken to obviate them. A quantity of copper in the Company’s warehouses, valued at ten or twelve lacks of rupees, was disposed of to the highest bidder; loans in Bengal, on the credit of the Bombay Government, were proposed to be negotiated, and a plan laid of seizing as much as possible of the enemy’s resources, by anticipating them in the collection of their revenue.
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¹ [As early as May 15, 1780, the Bengal Government had written to Bombay that ‘our distress for money is such that we shall be unable to make adequate remittances for the support of your Presidency, and the pay of the large army under command of Brigadier-General Goddard. We must therefore desire that every accession of revenue which may immediately arise to the Company from the operations and successes of General Goddard’s army be set aside and appropriated exclusively to that expense.’ (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 420.)]
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General Goddard was to besiege Bassein as soon as the season permitted: the European part of his army was sent down to Salsette by sea, the battering train was prepared in Bombay, and the Sepoys were to march by land. Early in October the whole of the disposable force at Bombay and in the neighbourhood, consisting of five battalions, was placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, who was instructed to drive out the enemy’s posts and cover as much of the Concan as possible, so as to enable the agents of the Bombay Government to collect a part of the revenues and secure the rice harvest, which is gathered at the close of the rains. There is perhaps no part of Mr. Hornby’s minute more expressive of the distress under which that government laboured, than that where, alluding to the field force they were preparing, he observes, ‘Our troops will better bear running in arrears when employed on active service, and subsisting in the enemy’s country,’ for it is a principle with the British Government and its officers in India, than which nothing has more tended to the national success, always to consider the peasantry under their strictest protection. As General Goddard advanced to invest Bassein, it was intended that Colonel Hartley should then take up a position a little to the east of that fortress, and prevent the Mahratta army from attempting to raise the siege.
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Hartley, however, in the first place was required to march to the relief of Captain Abington, who still occupied the lower part of the fort of Mullungurh; but a large body of upwards of three thousand of the enemy, principally infantry, had cut off his communication with Kallian, so that he was attacked by the garrison from the works above him, and surrounded by the body in question. This service Colonel Hartley effected on the first of October, without loss; and another corps under Captain Jameson joined the party at Mullungurh, which now consisted of the 2d and 8th battalions under Major Hopkins. The enemy, however, were also reinforced and pitched their camp next day on the south-east side of the hill, where they began to lay waste the country. Colonel Hartley immediately prepared to attack them, and for this purpose marched from Kallian with the Bombay European regiment and the 1st battalion of Sepoys, directing Major Hopkins to send down the 8th battalion under Captain Jameson to assist in the attack. The Mahrattas were apprised of Colonel Hartley’s advance, and met him at the foot of the hill. Thence they gradually retired towards their camp, which was left standing in the confidence of perfect security, and maintained a running fight, as if they had intended to draw the troops into an ambuscade; but all at once, Captain Jameson’s corps, advancing from the hill, came upon the whole body, and without waiting for the rest of the troops instantly attacked them; to use the words of Colonel Hartley, ‘with the utmost eagerness and spirit, pursued them to their camp (of which they took possession), and were shortly afterwards joined by the rest of the troops.’ This spirited success, which was effected with the loss of only a few men of the 8th battalion, put the troops into high spirits, of which Hartley took immediate advantage, followed up the enemy’s parties with alacrity, drove them out of the Concan, occupied a position not far from the Bhore Ghaut, and thus for a short time enabled the Bombay Government to carry their plan of collecting the revenue into effect.
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General Goddard having before sent down the Europeans by sea, commenced his march from Surat on the 16th of October. For the protection of Guzerat, six companies from the Bengal and two of the Bombay detachment had been left with Futih Sing Gaekwar to strengthen his garrison at Ahmedabad; that party was accordingly directed to remain there for the present. In Baroda Futih Sing had a considerable force of his own, and Dubhoy was guarded against all but a regular siege. Two Bengal battalions were stationed on the Nerbuddah at Sinnore; two battalions of Bombay Sepoys, one of which was held ready at Surat and the other at Baroach, to act conjointly or separately, were placed under the orders of Major Forbes, a Bengal officer of approved merit, to whom the charge of the general defence of the Guzerat province was assigned, and Futih Sing Gaekwar’s quota of three thousand horse were to join Major Forbes if necessary.
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General Goddard arrived before Bassein on the 13th of November, and having carefully reconnoitred it, he found the north face the only side on which it could be attacked by regular approaches, a mode which, owing to the great strength of the place, although it might require more time, he determined to adopt.
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He accordingly opened trenches, and completed his first battery on the 28th of November, at the distance of nine hundred yards; other batteries were opened at the distance of eight and five hundred yards successively. He had a very powerful artillery, principally twenty-four pounders, and one battery of twenty mortars, at the distance of five hundred yards, which did great execution.
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In the meantime Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay were making every preparation to recover the Concan and raise the siege of Bassein. The horse did not arrive until the Dussera, and the guns and equipments which had been before furnished, principally by Mahadajee Sindia, were not in sufficient readiness to enable them to take the field. Ramchundur Gunnesh, Pureshram Bhow, Anund Rao Rastia, and several other officers were sent forward, and as fast as the Mahratta troops were assembled, they were sent down to join them in the Concan.
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The division under Colonel Hartley were for upwards of a month engaged in daily skirmishes; a great deal of their ammunition was expended, and the sick, many of whom were wounded, amounted to six hundred, which, with his detachments, reduced his number to little more than two thousand effective men. Having heard that the enemy intended to throw succours into Bassein and cut off his communication with that place, it being no longer possible to cover the country, Colonel (Dec. 8.) Hartley judiciously moved to Titwalla on the 8th of December, from thence he continued his march towards Doogaur, nine miles east of Bassein. The Bombay Government, over-anxious to recover the revenue, disapproved of his quitting the neighbourhood of the Bhore Ghaut, but they were not fully aware of the strength of the Mahratta army, or the experience and enterprise of the principal commander, Ramchundur Gunnesh. Finding that the precautions of Goddard had effectually prevented an attempt to succour Bassein, the Mahrattas had determined to make amends for its loss by the destruction of the covering army. On the 10th December, their united force, amounting in horse and foot to upwards of twenty thousand men, thrice attacked the Bombay division in front and rear, but were each time steadily repulsed. Five thousand of their horse made a spirited charge on the left of Hartley’s line, but they were so well received that no impression was made, and the troops sustained but little loss, having only eighteen killed or wounded; two, however, were officers, Lieutenants Drew and Cooper. On the ensuing day the attack was renewed, the horse (Dec. 11.) did not charge, but the Mahratta guns did considerable execution, and the division lost Lieutenants Cowan and Peirson, with upwards of one hundred men; the troops, however, though weakened and harassed during a period of nearly six weeks’ constant fighting, behaved most gallantly, and ‘their conduct,’ says Colonel Hartley, in his spirited but modest dispatches, ‘only confirms me in the high opinion I shall ever have of them.’
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On the right and left of Colonel Hartley’s line there were two eminences, which, when well secured, completely covered his flanks. These heights were guarded by strong pickets, and Colonel Hartley having observed that the enemy’s skirmishers came very close to the right in the action of the 11th, with that judicious anticipation which always gave the Bombay Sepoys so much confidence in Hartley, he strengthened those points by directing the field engineer to throw up a small breast-work, and a gun was sent to each eminence during the night, both to the right and left. Ramchundur Gunnesh perceived the advantage of carrying one of these points, and next day intended to direct his principal attack on the right flank, as Hartley had foreseen. Orders were given to the Mahratta officers to advance in front and rear; Ramchundur in person, by a circuitous route for the purpose of storming the height, led on a body of Arab foot, and a thousand regular infantry under Signior Noronha,¹ a Portuguese officer in the Peishwa’s service. A body of the best horse supported the infantry, and Ramchundur was determined to carry this post or perish. Taking advantage of a (Dec. 12.) thick fog, by nine o’clock in the morning they had approached close to the picket, but the mist suddenly cleared away, the sun shone forth, and both parties, having now a near and full view of each other, paused for a moment—when a brisk fire opened at once, and the guns did surprising execution; the storming party advanced with great ardour; guns from the right of the line were brought to bear upon the assailants, and committed great havoc among the horse; but the Mahrattas still persevered—when suddenly their fire slackened, and a body was seen borne off towards the rear; it was Ramchundur Gunnesh, who fell with the well-earned reputation of a gallant and skilful officer. Signior Noronha was wounded, when the enemy, dispirited by the loss of their leaders, retired precipitately and with heavy loss. In the action of the 12th, the Bombay troops suffered very little,² and their whole conduct appears to have been much more justly appreciated by the Mahrattas than by their own government³; the fact is, that military service in India seems always to have been commended rather in proportion to the result than to the duty performed, and this trying and well-fought campaign is scarcely known, even to the gallant army by whom it was maintained.
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