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The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c7: Chapter III

The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c7

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English

Chapter III

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In the last chapter have been described the stages in which Punjab and Sind were annexed to the growing Ghoride empire. Muslim rule in these countries was not new; the conquest was little more than a dynastic change, and resistance to the invader could never assume the colour of a socio-religious war. Such conflict was bound to occur in territories which had an unbroken tradition of Hindu rule, and there it was that the Turco-Muslims met with real and sustained opposition. Not only were they of an alien race but were followers of a religion which had little in common with that practised in India. Hinduism has amazing powers of assimilation; it has absorbed countless peoples in the past whose identity is now lost in the mosaic of Indian society and culture. But not so the Muslims; they resolutely maintained their identity and refused compromise in religion. For the first time in her history, India was to reconcile herself to the existence of a separate culture-community.

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Before we proceed to describe the initial conquest of the North Indian kingdoms, a few words seem to be called for regarding the geography of the invasion.

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River routes of North India. India is a land of sharp climatic and orographical contrast. Inspite of apparent lack of natural boundaries within her frontiers, an invader has to proceed with caution. The Indus valley region is an world in itself. It has greater affinities with the west and the north rather than with the south and the east. A formidable desert on the east, leads to an inhospitable region where mountains, parched soil and a pitiless sun make subsistence the reward of constant struggle. The stony soil of Rajputana has made restless warriors of her men. And yet, across the Aravalli range, only a couple of hundred miles from Central Rajputana, is the agriculturists' paradise. The Ganges valley, a belt of land not exceeding three hundred miles in breadth and skirted by the forbidding Himalayas and the Central Indian wilderness on either side, has the means of supporting the densest population in the whole of North India. Like the Nile valley, it has been the centre of civilised life from the earliest times, for a kind nature has made man indifferent to struggle for material ends. As if to complete its isolation, nature has provided a narrow entrance to the valley which it is not difficult to guard. The Aravalli hills from the southwest and the Siwalikh (Sapadalaksha) from the northeast approach each other across the plain separating the Punjab from the Ganges valley, leaving a conveniently narrow gap not more than a hundred miles in width. Through this gap, or to use a commoner term, bottleneck alone, Hindusthan could be approached militarily from the west. Nature has decreed that Hindusthan's fate is decided in battles fought not inside the valley, but in the plains extending from the Sutlej to the Jumna. For, once the invader set his foot inside this flat river-country, defence was necessarily at a disadvantage. Progress would be found easy until he came up, at the eastern bend of the Ganges, against a similar entrance narrowed by the northern spurs of the Vindhyas and the Terai. At this point, north of the river, the plains are intersected by numerous swift-flowing hill-streams and broad rivers; on the south, the very narrow ledge of the hills jutting almost on the river, affords the only comparatively easier passage into yet another fertile country of rivers and, of plenty. Bengal is remarkably well-provided with natural defences also. Her climate, marshy soil and countless rivers with seasonal floods are a great deterrent to the northerner. On the west, almost an unbroken chain of hills and trackless forests extend to a great length towards the sea; on the east, she is shut off by a similar barrier pierced only by the Brahmaputra which leads to another narrow valley, equally fertile, but whose uneven soil, flooded streams and moist air are a death-trap to the western invader.

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It is these water-courses that the invader from the northwest had perforce to follow, for living on the lands he traversed was a vital necessity; to misunderstand the direction of geography was to court disaster. Muizzuddin's earlier attempts on India provide a good illustration, but a preliminary remark on the route from Afghanistan appears relevant. The ordinary route from beyond the Sulaiman mountains in those days was not the well-known Khaibar pass, nor the Bolan in the south, but through the Gomal which led to Dera Ismail Khan and thence to upper Sind Sagar Doab. The Khaibar, Bolan and the less accessible Kurram and Tochi passes were not used by trading caravans to the same extent as the Gomal passage which was the normal military route¹.

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¹ On one or two occasions when Muizzuddin came to Peshawar, he might have used the Khaibar, but the southern routes were more convenient. The troops of the Khwarizm Shah, with a view to capture Yalduz, the ruler of Gazni, in 1215, are stated to have siezed the frontier routes into Hindusthan, "leading towards Gardaiz and Karaha pass", that is, the Kurram valley; Yalduz had to take a more southeasterly route, through the "Sang-i-Surakh" mountains, which according to Raverty op. cit. p. 505, is the name given to three or four passes; Minhaj, p. 135. Through the province of "Karman and Sankuran", the old name of the tract between

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This is borne out by the fact that throughout the 13th century the first point of attack for an invading army from beyond the Sulaiman range was Multan or Uch and not Lahore or Peshawar. From Ghazni the shortest route to the Punjab was through Kurram, Tochi and Gomal, and Khaibar involved a long detour through the north. Politically the Khaibar area was not safe; the tribes inhabiting the northern Sind Sagar Doab were perpetually hostile.

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It was Upper Sind therefore which Muizzuddin could reach on his first expedition into India. How easily the dynasties of Multan and Uch fell to his army has been described in the last chapter. His next expedition, bold as it was ill advised, was yet only a continuation of earlier attempts to penetrate through western Rajputana. For, pressure from the Turks had kept the Rajputs busy in that quarter throughout the last fifty years. In an inscription of the Chauhana ruler, Chachigadeva of Nadol, dated in 1262, reference is made to the defeat and destruction of a Turushka army by his ancestor, Anahilladeva, a contemporary of Bhima I of Gujrat¹. His son Kalhana, the dates of whose inscriptions range from 1161 to 1179, also destroyed a Turushka army². It was perhaps one of these expeditions which resulted in the capture of Nagaur (in Marwar state) by Bahlim, Bahram's governor in the

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¹ EI, IX, p. 62-63; Ojha; Rajputana I, p. 269.

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² EI, XI, pp. 46-51.

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Muizzuddin's first defeat in Gujrat.

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the Salt Range and Gardaiz, south of the "Safed Koh", passed the lower route into Hindusthan usually used by Muizzuddin. Minhaj, p. 132; Raverty: op. cit. pp. 498-9; see also Raverty: Notes on Afghanistan, pp. 80-84. It was probably within this area that the passes of the "Sang-i-Surakh" (perforated mountain) were situated through which both Yalduz and Aibak retreated from Ghazni. Minhaj, p. 134-35; see also Raverty: Notes on Afghanistan, pp. 38-9; Trans. Tab. Nas., p. 538, note.

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Punjab, as recorded in the *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*. All these were destined to fail, but in so doing they were to bring geography to the forefront of military calculations.

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Following these examples, Muizzuddin directed his forces against the Chalukya state of Gujrat, a province rich in resources and holding, as it might have been presumed, the key to the Indian hinterland. It held, at any rate, an effective paramountcy over the western Rajput states and was thus an obstacle to his plan of outflanking the Ghaznawides and opening up a route into Hindusthan. Passing through Multan and Uch in 1178, he struck across the Rajputana desert and arrived with an exhausted army at the foot of Mt. Abu where he found the fresh troops of Mularaja II waiting to oppose his progress. In the engagement, fought near the village of Kayadra² in a position which was not of Muizzuddin's choosing, he suffered a signal defeat. He was lucky to be able to escape with his beaten army.

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² Minhaj, p. 116. It mentions Bhima as the reigning king of Anhilwara, but inscriptions and other Hindu records ascribe this victory to Mularaja, II, *IA*, 1877 p. 186, and 198; see also Forbes: *Rasmala*, (ed. Rawlinson), I, p. 199-200. Ojha: *Rajputana*, I, p. 220. Cf. Ray: *Dynastic History*, II, p. 1004-5. A mutilated inscription at Kiradu, near Mt. Abu, dated V.S. 1235/1178 A. D., records the repair of an idol temple broken by a Turushka army, an obvious reference to Muizzuddin's invasion; *EI*, XI, p. 72.

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It was a defeat not only of his forces but also of his plans. For him, Hindusthan now appeared to have only one practicable approach and the annexation of the Ghaznawide Punjab became more a strategic than political necessity. The next few years accordingly found him making a determined and gradual advance through Khusrau Malik's dominion. Peshawar, as we have seen, was taken in 1179; Sialkot fell in 1185; and Lahore after three expeditions was finally occupied in 1186. Three years later he began his operations against India proper.

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¹ P. 24.

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It is worth while to refer to earlier attempts in this quarter, for Muizzudin’s victory on the plains of Tarain was not, as is generally supposed, an isolated personal triumph, nor was it an accident. It was on the one hand, the execution of a deliberate plan by a resolute conqueror and on the other, the fulfilment of a process which extended over the whole of the 12th century. His was only the most successful of the many attempts made by the Turks from the northwest to get a foothold in Hindusthan, and which, therefore, may be regarded as priliminaries to Tarain. The Shansabani conqueror thus, perhaps, unwittingly, brought to a successful end a century of reconnoitering activity, a programme of military action of which he was not the originator. Mahmud’s brilliant campaigns had shown the way, and the Ghaznawide governors of the Punjab, although living under a fast declining empire, maintained pressure on the Hindu states of the Gangetic valley. According to Baihaqui¹, Ahmad Niyal-tigin, in course of his expedition, penetrated as far as Benares. The same authority also credits Masud with the capture of Hansi². Ibrahim is also said to have conducted expeditions against the “infidels”³. The cumulative effect of these raids at the end of the 11th century could not have been great, but the seriousness of the Turkish menace was realised by the Rajput kings. This is clear from the mention of the tax called “*Turushka danda*” (probably collected either to pay off the Turks or to meet the increased cost of fighting them), in a grant of the Gahdvala ruler, Govindachandra¹. The language of the grant suggests that the tax was a familier impost. These attacks increased in frequency and extent in the following century. A grant of Madanapala, dated in 1109, refers to his father Govindachandra as having “compelled the *Hammira* to lay aside his enmity by his matchless fighting”². In an inscription of the feudatory prince, Lakhanapala of Budaon, his great-grand-father Madanapala is mentioned “in consequence of whose distinguished prowess there never was any talk of the *Hammira* coming to the bank of the river of the gods”³. The queen of Govindachandra extols her husband as one “who had been commissioned by *Hara* (God) in order to protect Baranasi from the wicked *Turushka* warrior as the only one who was able to protect the earth”⁴.” The reference to Benares seems to indicate its connection with the expedition of Hajib Tughatigin, the governor of the Punjab under Masud III who is reported to have penetrated to a place across the Ganges which no one except Mahmud had reached before⁵. Vijayachandra (1150-1170) also claimed to have “swept away the affliction of the globe by streams of water flowing from the eyes of the wives of the *Hammira*, the abode of wanton destruction to the earth”⁶ The last Gahdvala ruler, Jayachandra, is also credited in later Sanskrit works with having overcome the “king of Ghor"¹. This must refer to some priliminary inroad before the final engagement.

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¹ Tarikh, p. 497.

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² Ibid, p. 665. Minhaj, p. 14, states that he led armies into Hindusthan on several occasions. Raverty: trans, Tab. Nas. p. 93, note, states, without citing his authority, that near Zafarabad, in Jaunpur, Firoz Tughluq witnessed ruins of temples believed to have been destroyed by Masud.

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³ Raverty: op. cit. p. 105, note 4.

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¹ *IA*, XIV, p. 113.

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² *Ibid*, 1889, pp. 14-19.

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³ *EI*, I, p. 62.

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⁴ *EI*, IX, pp. 234-37.

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⁵ Minhaj, p. 22. It is also mentioned in some detail in the *diwan* of Masud-i-Sad b. Salman, a contemporary poet; Elliot; IV, pp. 526-27.

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⁶ *IA*, XV, p. 9.

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¹ Vidyapati: *Purusapariksha*, pp. 146-7. In a Sanskrit drama named *Rambha Manjari*, Jayachandra is called "the destroyer of all the *Javanas*".

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The most vigorous pressure, however, was bound to be felt by the Chauhanas who ruled the territory from Ajmer to Delhi and thus guarded the entrance.

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Pressure on the Chauhanas. Durlava II of Sambhar is said to have lost his life in fighting the Turks. Ajayadeva is credited with having repeatedly defeated the Muslim intruders². During the reign of Arnoraja, the Turks destroyed Pushkar and reached as far as Anasagar. In the following reign of Vigraharaja IV, they advanced on Balbera (modern Rupnagar, Kishangarh state)³. The Delhi pillar inscription of the same monarch, dated V. S. 1220/1163 A.D., records his conquest of the land between the Vindhya and the Himalayas, his extermination of the *mlecchas*, and to his restoring the country to the *Aryas*⁴. He exhorts his descendants to continue the war against the unclean invaders. A more definite evidence of the threatening advance of the Turks is furnished by an inscription of Prithviraja I recording the fortification of the frontier town of Hansi to check the progress of the "Hammira who has become the cause of anxiety to the world"⁵. The inscription also mentions the conquest of "Pachapur", probably identical with Pachapattan (Pakpattan) on the old bank of Sutlej. The mention of Hansi along with Pakpattan indicates the tract through which these attacks were delivered. The fortification of Hansi points to a policy of occupying important towns on this area for better defence. No epigraphic records exist to show the extent to which this policy was subsequently continued by the Chauhanas, but a few years later, as we know from the Muslim accounts, Bhatinda, situated about a hundred miles north of Hansi, had become a Chauhana frontier stronghold when Muizzuddin, opening his attacks on Hindusthan¹, closely besieged it in 587/1189.

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² Ojha: *Rajputana*, I, p. 266.

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³ *IA*, XX, p. 202; Sarda: *Ajmer*, p. 79.

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⁴ *IA*, 1890, pp. 215-217.

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⁵ *IA*, XLI, p. 17-8; Thomas: *Chronicles*, p. 59, noticed a coin of one Kilhana with the Arabic legend, *Sina* inscribed on the obverse, which, according to him, is found only on the coins of Masud III. Kilhana originally must then have been Masud's feudatory who had later rebelled and fortified the route from Pakpattan.

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¹ Ishwariprasad: Medieval India, p. 117, states that Sirhind, in Patiala, 100 miles N.W. of Karnal, was the first place captured. He relies on the printed text of Minhaj, p. 118, which has Sirhindah, and in this, is supported by later histories like the Mirat-i-Jahan Numa, f. 50a, and Zubdatut-twarikh, f. 7b. Ferishta and TA however, have Bhatindah; Tarikh I, p. 5 and 7; TA, I, p. 37, Raverty: op. cit. p. 457, note 3, however, informs us that in all the Mss. collated by him, it is written Tabarhindah, which is also found in TM, p. 7, Budaoni, I, p. 49, and Haji Dabir, II, p. 677. No such place is known to have ever existed. No one acquainted with the hurried style of writing Persian characters, can fail to see that a transposition of a few dots and a careless joining of letters are all that is required to make Bhatinda read Tabarhindah and even Sirhindah. Sirhind seems to be entirely improbable, for the shortest route from Lahore to Hindusthan lay through western Patiala in which Bhatinda is situated. No remains of any strong fort, such as that withstood Prithviraja's assaults for over a year, are found in Sirhind. See Cunningham: Reports, II, p. 205. On the otherhand, in Bhatinda, Garrick noticed a strong massive fort and also heard local legends respecting Muizzuddin's attack on the place. Cunningham: Reports, XXIII, p. 2-3. According to Raverty: op. cit. p. 458, note, the Lubbul-twarikh-i-Hind, states that "Tabarhindah is now known as Bhatinda". But Prasad asserts that "Sirhind was known as Bhatinda".

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It was probably a surprise attack, for the garrison failed to hold out and quickly surrendered. This easy victory, however, Muizzuddin was not prepared to follow up by an immediate advance into Chauhana territory. Instead, he left Ziauddin of Tulak, with 12,000, troops to hold it till his return next year. But before he could start on his way back, Prithviraja came in person to recover the fortress². According to Ferishta his army consisted of "two hundred thousand horsemen and thirty thousand elephants¹. Muizzuddin turned round to meet him, but in the battle fought near the village of Tarain², not far from the fort, he was decisively beaten. Wounded seriously, he was helped to escape by a Khalji cavalryman, and with the remnant of his forces managed to reach Ghazni. Prithviraja immediately invested the fortress but it took him thirteen months to force Ziauddin into surrender.

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² Minhaj, p. 119.

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¹ I. p. 5 and 7. Ibnul Asir, XI, 255.

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² Minhaj, p. 118. Ferishta, I, pp. 5-7, and TA, I, p. 37, state that it was fought at Narain near Tarai, "in the district of Sarsuti". For a discussion of the site, see appendix B.

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According to Ferishta the battle was lost owing to the negligence of the Afghan, Khalji and Khurasani officers whom he subjected to great humiliation at Ghazni. Next year he returned to the attack with a force of one hundred and twenty thousand cavalry and once more met his Chauhana adversary on the field of Tarain. He naturally was cautious this time. In order, possibly, to gain time for completing his preparations and also to throw the enemy off his guard, he sent Qiwamul Mulk from Lahore demanding Prithviraja's submission³. The answer, full of defiance and scorn, was probably expected. When battle was eventually joined, Prithviraja's army is reported to have numbered three hundred thousand men "according to the most authentic accounts"⁴. Muizzuddin divided his forces into five divisions, four of which engaged the enemy on all sides. At the end of the day the fifth division, kept in reserve, attacked the exhausted enemy and thus decided the issue¹. Khandi Rai, (Govinda Rai), who had wounded Muizzuddin in the last year's engagement, was killed and Prithviraja, trying to escape, was captured near Sarsuti². According to Hasan Nizami, he was taken to Ajmer where after some time, on being found guilty of treason, he was put to death³. A few of his coins with the Sanskrit superscription "Hammira" on the obverse, would however, indicate his initial acceptance of Muizzuddin's suzerainty⁴.

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³ Tajul Maasir I. O., No. 1486, f. 34. See Ferishta, I. p. 58, who obviously borrowed from Ibnul Asir, XI, p. 43-4, for the story of Muizzuddin's feint to throw Prithviraja off his guard which succeeded remarkably well and was taken full advantage of. Cf. Ray: Dynastic History, II, pp. 1010-1013, where it is fully reproduced from Raverty's supposed quotation from the Tajul Maasir. Hasan Nizami, however, does not mention the story at all, and Ibnul Asir's account is admittedly based on questionable authority. See Isami, Futuhus-Salatin, p. 71-2, for the ingeneous manner in which Muizzuddin provided for the lack of elephants whose presence in the Indian army frightened his horses.

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⁴ Ferishta, I, p. 58.

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¹ For details of the tactics followed see *TM* p. 9.

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² Minhaj, p. 120.

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³ *Tajul Maasir*, f. 44b. Minhaj states that he was immediately executed. For the absurd story of Chand Bardai of how Prithviraja, blinded and kept in confinement at Ghazni, was yet able, with the help of Chand himself, to slay Muizzuddin before his own execution, see *Prithviraja Rasau*, VI; also *Raj Darashani*, f. 49a.

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⁴ Thomas: *Chronicles*, p. 12, no. 15.

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This victory laid the whole Chauhana kingdom at Muizzuddin's feet. Hansi, Kuhram, and Sarsuti, all places of military importance, were occupied and garrisoned⁵. But immediate taking over of the administration did not seem convenient and so Ajmer was allowed to be retained by Prithviraja's son on condition of vassalage⁶. The same policy was adopted towards the Tomaras of Delhi where Khandirai's successor acknowledged Muizzuddin's suzerainty. An occupation army was stationed at Inderpat, near Delhi, under the command of Qutbuddin Aibak who was to act as Muizzuddin's representative⁷.

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⁵ Minhaj, p. 120; Fakhre Mudir, p. 22.

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⁶ Hasan Nizami calls him Kola or Gola (lit. an illegitimate son). He is not mentioned in the *Hammira-maha-kavya*. Vaidya: *Downfall of Hindu India*, III, p. 339, calls this prince Rainshi, while Ojha: *Rajputana*, I, p. 270, prefers Govindarai. This last-named person, however, according to the *Hammira-maha-kavya*, was Prithviraja's grandson; *IA*, 1879, p. 55. On this last point see also Ray: *Dynastic History*, II, p. 1093, note.

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⁷ *Tajul Maasir*, f. 46.

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The conqueror returned to his Central Asian projects leaving Aibak with wide powers to consolidate and extend the conquests. A serious rising by the supporters of Prithviraja, however, engaged the latter's immediate attention. In Ramzan, 588/1192, a Hindu chief, whom Hasan Nizami calls Jatwan, (possibly meant for Chauhana), besieged the Muslim garrison at Hansi. Aibak at once rushed to its relief, raised the siege and pursued Jatwan upto Bagar. There the chieftain faced, gave battle, was defeated and slain¹. Having refortified Hansi towards the end of the same year, Aibak crossed the Jumna to establish a military foothold in the upper Doab². The greater part of the region was held, under the Gahdvalas, by the Dor Rajputs with their stronghold at Baran, who were by no means pacifically disposed to the Muslim power established just across the river³. Their traditional accounts, emphasising the hard fight they put up against the Turkish forces under the leadership of Chandrasena, find partial confirmation in Muizzuddin's Firman wherein Ajaipal, a relation of Chandrasena, is rewarded for his help in the capture of Baran, a clear proof that treachery expedited the event⁴. Meerut was also occupied on this occasion, and the two places, fortified and garrisoned, became spearheads of attack from the north on the Gahdvala dominions⁵.

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¹ Tajul Maasir, f. 55a and 60a. Bagar would seem to be a general term applied to western Rajputana.

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² Ibid, f. 67a.

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³ They held extensive territories in Meerut, Aligarh, Bulandshahr, Mathura, Etah and also across the Ganges in Moradabad. For their history see JASB, 1879, p. 273.

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⁴ See appendix, A. According to the Dor traditions Chandrasena lost his life in defending Baran against the Muslims in 1194. This date, however, against 1192 of the Firman and of the Muslim chronicles, is obviously wrong.

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⁵ Minhaj, p. 139, dates the capture of Meerut in 587/1191, but he is

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Aibak next set himself to find a central and permanent headquarters. The camp at Inderpat was clearly a temporary residence and could hardly satisfy the growing needs of a political capital. Ajmer, situated well inside Rajputana, appeared unsuitable as a centre of Turkish power which was meant to be expanded towards Hindusthan. Delhi was a better alternative; its situation and historical traditions provided the necessary features. A timely discovery of hostile designs of the Tomara ruler furnished the pretext and accordingly, early in 589/1193, Aibak moved his forces against the city. It was occupied with comparative ease, the Hindu prince being allowed to evacuate his men. Delhi thus became the capital of Muizzuddin’s Indian dominions¹.

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¹ Tajul Maasir, f. 67b, places the conquest of Delhi towards the end of 588/1192, as is done also in Minhaj, p. 120, TM, p. 11, TA, I. p. 38-39, and Ferishta, I, p. 58. Thomas read the date on the Qutb Minar inscription as 587; Chronicles, p. 22. But this may also be read as 589.

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Very soon Aibak had to take the field again. Hariraja, the brother of the late Chauhana king, collected a Rajput force and besieged Ranthambhor where, earlier in the year, Aibak had placed a garrison under Qiwamul Mulk². The Chauhanas also drove out the feudatory prince, Prithviraja’s son, and occupied Ajmer. On Aibak’s approach, they withdrew from both the places enabling the prince to be reinstated, but before Hariraja could be effectively persuaded, the Muslim general was called way by the news of another rising headed by the dispossessed ruler of Delhi. This was however easily crushed³. Hariraja

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² Tajul Maasir, f. 70a; Fakhre-Mudir, p. 22. For a grant dated in 1194, of a village near Ajmer, by Hariraja’s wife, Pratapadevi, see Annual Report of the Rajputana Museum, 1911-12.

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³ Tajul Maasir, f. 72b.

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more correct in assigning it to 588/1192, on p. 120.

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was still at large when, according to Hasan Nizami¹, Aibak was sent for by his master at Ghazni where, for reasons nowhere adequately explained, he stayed for nearly six months. How in his absence the Turkish garrisons fared against the attacks of Hariraja and other chiefs like him the chronicles give us no means of knowing. The Dor Rajputs, possibly, became a more serious menace calling for urgent action, for immediately on his return in 590/1194, Aibak is stated to have crossed the Jumna a second time and captured Kol (Koil, Aligarh)².

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¹ Tajul Maasir, f. 75a. Ibn Battuta, II p. 19-20 relates a curious story of how his master summoned him secretly to confound his enemies who accused him of disloyalty.

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² Tajul Maasir, f. 103b. Minhaj places it in 589; p. 120.

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He was still in the Doab when Muizzuddin once again marched his forces to Hindusthan. The operations against the Dors in the upper Doab were clearly designed to prepare the way for an eventual conquest of the Gahdvala dominion, for it contained the coveted Hindusthan proper. Aibak probably visited Ghazni to assist in the formulation of plans which his master now came personally to execute. With the Delhi forces having joined him, Muizzuddin marched at the head of the invasion army numbering fifty thousand horsemen, towards Benares³. Jayachandra's reconnoitering force suffered defeat in a priliminary engagement with Aibak's advance guards⁴. The two main armies eventually met in the vicinity of Chandwar, on the Jumna between Kanouj and Etah. The battle was severely contested, the Gahdvalas, led by Jayachandra in person, almost carrying the day when his own death threw his army into confusion. Muizzuddin was quick to take advantage of the development and turned the confusion into a rout¹.

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³ Tajul Maasir, f. 123b. The Tarikh-i-Alfi f, 485, states that Jayachandra with an army of a hundred thousand horse and seven hundred elephants, was himself marching against Muizzuddin's territories.

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⁴ Only Ferishta, I, p. 58, mentions this priliminary engagement.

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¹ Fakhre Mudir, p. 23; Tajul Maasir, f. 112, 117-8; Ibnul Asir, XII, p. 49.

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This victory added another great kingdom extending as far as Monghyr to the Shansabani empire. It was made a military division and Malik Husamuddin Ughulbak became its first commandant (Muqti). Garrisons were placed in Benares, Asni and other towns whose occupation, because of the treasure they were reported to contain, took precedence over that even of the capital city of Kanouj², which was not taken until 595/1198-9. Gahdvala rule however, still survived in the country. A grant discovered at Machlishahr, dated in 1199, was issued by Jayachandra's son, Harishchandra who appears therein as an independent sovereign³. An inscription of Ranaka Vijayakarna discovered in the Mirzapur district, refers to the Gahdvala kingdom as if it was still continuing; it however, omits the reigning king's name, possibly to indicate the recent political change⁴. Even Kanouj must have been recovered to necessitate its subsequent reconquest by Iltutmish⁵.

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² Tajul Maasir, f. 123b.

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³ EI, X, pp. 93-98.

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⁴ JASB (N.S.) VII, p. 757. Tradition has it that Zafarabad, near Jaunpur, was the capital of the later Gahdvalas. See Cunningham:

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⁵ He issued coins to commemorate its conquest; CCIM, II, Pt. I, p. 21, no. 39. Smith, however, asserts that after the fall of the Gahdvalas, for eight generations Kanouj was ruled by the Chandellas; JASB, 1881, p. 48-9.

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After Muizzuddin's departure Aibak had to proceed to the relief of the garrison in Kol, hard pressed, possibly, by the Dor Rajputs. On his return to Delhi in 591/1195, news arrived of fresh trouble in Ajmer. Hariraj had once again driven out his nephew and was reported to be sending an army under Jhatrai to attack Delhi. Leaving a part of his forces to guard the capital, Aibak quickly set out to intercept Jhatrai. The latter thereupon turned and took shelter in Ajmer. On being closely besieged and unable to hold out any longer, Hariraja with all his followers sacrificed himself in the funeral pyre. Aibak then entered Ajmer but as Prithviraja's son had proved to be a liability as a vassal, he decided on direct annexation and a Muslim officer was installed there for the first time. The prince, was, however, compensated with Ranthambhor which later was to become the seat of a revitalised Chauhana dynasty¹.

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¹ Tajul Maasir, f. 136.

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Next year, in 592/1195-6, Muizzuddin again came to India and moved against Bayana, the capital of the Jadon Bhatti Rajputs. Without offering any frontal resistance the ruler, Kumarapala, withdrew to entrench himself in the neighbouring stronghold of Thangir (Tahangarh)². An effective siege however, soon compelled him to surrender and evacuate the fortress. Thangir and the fortified Vijayaymandirgarh were then occupied and garrisoned under the command of Bahauddin Tughril³. The latter founded a military station called Sultankot which was meant to serve as base of operations in the plains. The strong fort of Gwalior, held by a prince of the Parihara dynasty, named Sallakshanapala by Hasan Nizami⁴, next engaged Muizzuddin's attention. The hill-fortress stood the siege well and showed that it could do so indefinitely. Muizzuddin, therefore, was glad to raise the siege when Sallakshanapala, obviously a man of practical wisdom, sent messages offering to acknowledge his suzerainty¹. To allow a half-subdued enemy to continue in occupation of a strong fort was, however, strategically inadvisable, and its reduction, at a suitable time in future was, accordingly, decided upon. Tughril was selected for this purpose, who, the chronicler tells us, continued from the Sultankot base, to harry and cut off Gwalior's communications with the plains. Within a year and a half the Rajputs' position became untenable. They offered to evacuate the fortress and thus enabled Aibak to occupy it in the name of his master².

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² Written Kupala by Hasan Nizami, f. 144a; Kumarapala is mentioned in the annals of the ancestors of the Jadon Bhatti dynasty of Kerauli; Cunningham; Reports, XX, pp. 6, 7-8.

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³ Tajul Maasir f. 144b; Minhaj, p. 114, dates the event in 591/1195, but Fakhre Mudir p. 23, confirms Hasan Nizami. A locally current couplet in Hindi has preserved the date and name of the Muslim officer; Cunningham; Reports, VI, p. 55.

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⁴ Tajul Maasir, f. 146b. According to Cunningham, he is probably to be identified with Lohangdeo, the fifth king in the list of Hiraman

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¹ Tajul Maasir, f. 146a; Minhaj, p. 145.

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² Minhaj, p. 145; Neither Hasan Nizami, nor the Gwalior Namah, records its final occupation. Fakhre Mudir places the event in 597/1200-1.

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Towards the end of 592/1196, Aibak had to face another and as yet the most serious threat from the Rajputs. The Mher tribe inhabiting the neighbourhood of Ajmer³, in alliance, obviously with the dispossessed Chauhanas, asked the Chalukyas for armed assistance for expelling the Turks out of Rajputana. The garrison at Ajmer was not strong enough to meet the combined forces and sent to Delhi urgently for reinforcements. Setting out immediately, Aibak attacked the Mher forces assembled in front of the

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³ In all the Mss. of the Tajul Maasir that I have been able to examine, the tribe's name is written as Tunir or Natir; Ferishta also has the same form; I. p. 62. Elliot: II, p. 228, however, writes it as above, which in any case was the name of the tribe originally inhabiting Ajmer. See Cunningham: Reports, VI, p. 8.

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Munshi's Gwalior Namah, f. 9a; see also the version of Motiram and Khushal: I. O. 860 f. 8b. The prince, Sallakshanasinha, is mentioned in a fragmentary inscription discovered in Jhansi, as being engaged in fighting the Javanas. It is however, without date; EI, I, p. 214-15.

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Chalukya forces besiege Aibak.

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city awaiting the Chalukya army. In the midst of the fiercely contested battle, however, the latter arrived to compel Aibak to withdraw into Ajmer. The Rajputs thereupon commenced a close siege and Aibak found himself in a highly critical situation. Luckily for him, a relieving contingent arrived from Ghazni on whose establishing contact with the city the Rajputs withdrew¹.

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¹ Tajul Maasir, f. 156a.

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From Ajmer, early next year, Aibak led his forces towards Anhilwara to avenge the treacherous attack. Passing through south-west Rajputana he arrived to find the Chalukya army under Dharavarsha of Abu and Kelhana of Nadol², drawn up at the foot of the mountain where Muizzuddin had suffered his first defeat. Realising the strength of their position Aibak showed open hesitation to attack. Mistaking this prudence for fear the Chalukyas came out in the open where the Turkish horse could manoeuvre to the best advantage. In the resulting battle, superior mobility and shock tactics decided the issue³. Having obtained a clear victory Aibak found the way open to the capital, Anhilwara, from where the reigning king Bhima II, fled⁴. The expedition was intendd to be a purely punitive measure but easy success probably tempted the victor to turn it into an occupation. The city was subjected to a thorough plundering and according to Ferishta, a Muslim officer was placed in charge of the country⁵. Its hazardous distance from Delhi, however was bound to make it a liability; the imperfect hold on Rajputana became a serious obstacle. The conquest, in any case, was soon nullified. Contemporary Chalukya inscriptions boastfully record the expulsion of the Turks; Ibnul Asir’s informant speaks of Aibak himself eventually restoring the country to its Hindu rulers¹. The Chalukya king is epigraphically proved to have retained his independent sovereignty down to 1240 with his hold on Abu remaining unimpaired².

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² Hasan Nizami calls Kelhana, Karwan Rai. For his inscription referring to this event, see, EI, XI, pp. 46-51.

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³ Minhaj, p. 140.

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⁴ Ojha: Rajputana, I, p. 271. He seems to have confused the sequence of events.

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⁵ I, p. 52.

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¹ EI, I, p. 22, 338-9; II, p. 439. *al-Kamil fit-twarikh*, XII p. 79.

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² *Asiatik Researches*, p. 289; *IA*, 1877, p. 187.

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Fakhre Mudir alone furnishes details of Aibak’s military activities during the next six years. The country across the upper Ganges, hitherto unaffected by Turkish operations in the Doab, sheltered a large number of Gahdvala emigre from the south; Budaun presumably still retained its Rashtrakuta dynasty. To this part Aibak seems to have directed his arms. In 594/1197-8, Budaun was captured, followed by a second occupation of Benares³. Next year, in 595, “Chantarwal” (Chandwar?) and Kanouj are reported to have been captured. His subsequent operations were in Rajputana where, after the reduction of the kingdom of “Siroh” (Sirohi?), Fakhre Mudir mentions, under the year 596/1199-1200 the conquest of Malwah⁴. This later fact however, needs confirmation. It is not improbable that the hold on Rajputana was sought to be extended, and the process caused a Chauhana migration from Nadol southwards. The foundation of the Chauhana ruling families of Bundi, Kotah and Sirohi are, at any rate, ascribed to this period of Muslim penetration⁵. Aibak’s acquisition in Rajputana, however, was not, as will be seen in the next chapter, destined to be permanent.

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³ Fakhre Mudir, p. 24. The *Tajul Maasir*, f. 176b, mentions Aibak’s stay in Budaun in 599/1202-3.

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⁴ p. 24. Minhaj makes an obscure reference to the event by stating that Aibak subdued territories as far as Ujjain; p. 140.

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⁵ Erskine: *Rajputana Gazetteer* p. 237.

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The opening of the thirteenth century saw the Turkish forces engaged against the last surviving imperial Rajputs, the Chandellas of Bundelkhand.

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Their northern boundary touched the Muslim dominion; the occupation of Benares and Asni must have affected their security, for predatory raids in the neighbouring countries was a favourite exercise with the Turkish militarists. Latent hostilities in any case culminated in an open attack, in 599/1202-3, on Kalinjar, the military capital of Paramardideva. The Chandellas offered strong resistance on the field but on being defeated were compelled to take refuge in the fort. As the siege dragged on and became effective, Paramardideva opened negotiations and offered to accept a tributary vassalage. Before he could execute his agreements, however, he died and the negotiations fell through. His chief minister, Ajayadeva, withdrew the offer and relying on the supply of water from a hillside spring, recommenced hostilities. The Turks, discovering the source of his strength, found means to divert the watercourse and thus compelled him to sue for terms. Being allowed to evacuate the fortress, the Chandellas withdrew to the neighbouring stronghold of Ajaigarh. Kalinjar, Mahoba and Khajuraho were then occupied and grouped into a military division under the command of Hasan Arnal¹.

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¹ Tajul Maasir, f. 185b; Fakhre Mudir, p. 25; Cf. Cunningham: Reports, II, p. 456 who erroneously asserts that Kalinjar was attacked twice, in 1196 and again in 1202.

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Under Malik Husamuddin Ughulbak, the commander of the Benares and Awadh division, was employed a Khalji troop-leader, named Ikhtiyaruddin Muhammud Bakhtiyar¹ for reconnaissance work in the adjacent territories. Refused service both in Ghazni and Delhi for his ungainly figure², Bakhtiyar, however, soon proved himself to be possessed of great daring and resourcefulness. He was assigned the villages of Bhagwat and Bhiuli³ by whose income he soon collected a band of adventurers, mostly drawn from the Khalji tribesmen living on the eastern border of Afghanistan. With these he commenced raids on the Magadha region east of the Karmanasa river where, after the fall of the Gahdvalas, as has been shown above, but little organised opposition could be encountered. By frequent raids into the district of Maner Bakhtiyar earned fame and also wealth to augment his military resources. He even pushed as far as Uddandapur Vihar, the monastic university town which gave its name to the country around⁴.

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¹ I prefer this simpler form of the name as found in the printed text and also in the B.M.Mss. of the Tabaqat-i-Nasiri, inspite of Raverty’s craze for the izafat inserted between Muhammud and Bakhtiyar, as a substitute for bin.

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² Minhaj, p. 146-7. A different version, given in the footnote, would imply Bakhtiyar’s employment after his rejection at Ghazni, under the Muqti of Kanouj. Isami, however, refers to Bakhtiyar’s first employment under ‘Jaisingha of Jitur’ (Chitor?); p. 95.

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³ The printed text has Sahlat and Sahli, but Raverty’s reading has been generally upheld; Hodivala: Studies in Indo-Moslem History, p. 206. Ferishta and the TA (I, p. 292, and I, p. 47 respectively) have “Kampilah and Patiali near Budaon”. The mistake is due to phonetic resemblance with Patitah and Kuntilah which, like Bhagwat and Bhiuli, are situated close to each other in the neighbourhood of Chunar; Cunningham: Reports, XI, p. 128.

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⁴ Minhaj, p. 147. For Uddandapurdesa, see Cunningham: Reports, III, p. 118; VIII, p. 75; XI, p. 185. One of these early raids on Uddandapur is probably referred to by Taranath who talks of the Turushkas being defeated; Samaddar: Glories of Magadh, p. 131-32.

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Emboldened by success in these raids Bakhtiyar obtained Aibak’s commendation for a final attack on the monastic town⁵. Minhaj speaks of the fort (Hisar and Qalah) of Bihar, although it is extremely uncertain if it possessed any effective military force. The citadel containing the university proper seems, in any case, to have been defended by some sort of armed men, the majority of whom, however, were the "shavenheaded" Sramanas, (Bhuddhist monks) whom the Muslims mistook for Brahmins¹. But it only resulted in their being put to the sword, for Bakhtiyar with his two hundred well-armed fighters, easily captured the town. Too late he learnt, on being apprised of the large number of books stored there, of the real nature of the place². According to the 15th century Tibetan chronicler Taranath, Bakhtiyar on this occasion also captured the monastery towns of Vikramsila and Nalanda and erected a fortress on the site of Uddandapur³.

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⁵ Minhaj, p. 147.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 148. Cf. Banerji: Banglar Itihasa, I, p. 252-53, who thinks it was Govindapala, then ruling in the districts round Uddandapur, Nalanda and Vikramsila, who was killed on this occasion by Bakhtiyar's forces. Cf. with this view JASB, 1921, p. 14, and Ray: Dynastic History I, p. 369. On the point of the Sramanas offering resistance see Taranath, quoted in Samaddar, op cit. p. 26, and 148.

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² There is no evidence for Banerji's statement that the books were all destroyed; op. cit. I, p. 322. See Minhaj, p. 148.

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³ IA, IV, p. 366-7.

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The date of this event, important as it is for the chronology of the subsequent conquest of Bengal, is not found in the Tabaqat-i-Nasiri and has only to be inferred from the sequence of events⁴. Occupation of the area brought the Turks to the Sena frontier; and yet, showing a shortsightedness characteristic of the contemporary Hindu strategists, they made no move to throw them out of Bihar or to strengthen their own frontier defence. Their very passivity was thus an invitation to the adventurous Khalji troop-leader. After the capture of Uddandapur Bakhtiyar visited Aibak and received commisions for further conquests but evidently no material reinforcement. The report of a rich demoralised country ruled by an almost incapacitated old man living a retired life and given to letters, decided his next move. A full-scale invasion of the Sena kingdom was beyond his resources; he could only aim at destroying the Sena morale by a lightning raid on the king's residence. He would gain prestige and, what is more, the wherewithal for bigger attacks in future; with luck, he might even obtain a defensible footing in the country.

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⁴ Fakhre Mudir, p. 25, mentions the conquest of Bidur (Bihar) in 600/1203-4; Hasan Nizami, op. cit. f. 176b, states that after his conquest of Kalinjar in 599/1202-3, while at Budaun Aibak received Bakhtiyar who came "from the direction of Udandbihar". This is also alluded to in Minhaj, p. 147 and 150. On this date of 599 in the Tajul Maasir, see Raverty: op. cit. Appendix D.

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"A year after" his success in Bihar, i.e. about 1204-5¹, Bakhtiyar accordingly set out on his second adventure in the lower Ganges valley. Taking the available forces with him he marched so swiftly through the unfrequented and difficult Jharkhand region in south Bihar, that "not more than eighteen horsemen could keep pace with him"². Mistaken as a horsedealer and hurting no one on the way, he had an easy and unopposed march to the very gates of Lakshmanasena's residence at Nadia, or as Minhaj calls it Nodia. The king was reported to have just sat down to his midday meal when the uproar at the gate, occasioned by the horsedealers cutting down the guards, caused him to sense danger and prepare for flight. As

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¹ Bakhtiyar's capture of Uddandapur Bihar nearly synchronised with that of Kalinjar by Aibak which is dated 1203 by Hasan Nizami; *Tajul Maasir*, f. 176b. Fakhre Mudir also seems to refer to Bihar under the year 1203 which he assigns for the capture of Bidur (?); *Tarikh*, p. 25. Next year, according to Minhaj, p. 150, would bring us to 1204. In 1203 and 1205/6 (25th and 27th year) Lakshmanasena was issuing grants from Dharyagrama, possibly on the Bhagirathi; *JASB*, 1942 pp. 70-72. In March 1206 Bakhtiyar's army was destroyed on the Barnadi bridge; see infra, p. 77. Lakshmanasena was certainly alive in 1206 as is proved from the preface to the *Saduktikarnamrita*; see Ray: *Dynastic History*, I, p. 374. To date the event earlier, would conflict with Minhaj's statement that the Sena King 'died in Bang soon after the sack of Nodia'. See, however, *DHB*, I, pp. 223-24, 232 and 247.

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² Minhaj, p. 150.

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Raid on Nadia.

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the raiders entered the palace he hurriedly left by a postern door and fled along the river to the safety of his eastern province. The king's flight decided the issue; before his troops could recover from the surprise and really to action, Bakhtiyar's main force arrived and resistance became useless¹.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 150-51.

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The ease with which the king was put to flight and the city occupied, must have surprised even Bakhtiyar himself. The story of 'the 18 horsemen defeating a great king' has, at any rate, evoked sceptical comments from a great number of patriotic scholars². Minhaj's veracity has been questioned and arguments have been advanced to reduce the account to sheer myth. There is however, little need to feel apologetic for the supposed cowardice of the Sena king; even were he really so, to consider his conduct as typical of the Bengali people would be historically incorrect. Hasty, and what ungenerous critics would call, shameful flights have been the lot of even greater men and admittedly heroic peoples. Rajput recklessness has an element of romance in it but of little practical wisdom. Nor is it possible to reject the story altogether. To dismiss it on the ground, as Mr. Banerji did, that the Hindu accounts never speak of Nodia or Navadwip as a Sena capital or that 'Rai Lakhmania' cannot be identical with Lakshmanasena who, in Mr. Banerji's view, had long been dead, is to base positive history on negative argument. For Bakhtiyar's occupation of a portion of the Sena kingdom following his raid on Nadia is an undisputed fact. It is true, one cannot claim a literal accuracy for Minhaj's account, but the results of recent research certainly do not strengthen Mr. Banerji's arguments¹. There is, on the other hand, little improbability in the story, for Bengal from all accounts presented notmany elements of strength A Brahmin ridden, disintegrated society, with a king whose youthful valour and military energy had given way to a supine addiction to religion and poetry, a top-heavy, hollow administration, and with vassals finding strength to declare independence², Lakshmanasena's kingdom was anything but a force that could put up sustained frontal resistance. The *Turushka* had become a bogey and everywhere inspired a paralysing fear. The superstitious "prophecy" about the "long armed Turushka" eventually destroying the Sena kingdom is perhaps an over statement; the king's refusal to fly with his frightened courtiers from the threatened zone³ shows that rational courage had not entirely taken leave of him. But the apprehension of an impending catastrophe was undoubtedly felt; epigraphic evidence shows that the king in his 25th year (1203) performed a great sacrifice to propitiate the gods for help in averting it⁴. Every fresh advance of the Turk only deepened this fear and destroyed self-confidence. The easy success of Bakhtiyar's noon-day attack thus needs no other explanation. Boldly led surprise attacks can paralyse even more courageous and well prepared forces; it is to be noted that the city of Nadia was occupied only after the main force had arrived.

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² See for example, Vaidya: op. cit. I, pp. 126-29; Banerji, op. cit. I, p. 324-25; Indian Culture, 1935, pp. 133-36.

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¹ A fuller discussion will be found in *DHB*, I, pp. 230-238; also 242-246.

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² See *IHQ*, X, p. 321, for a grant found in the Sundarbans area of an independent ruler, named Samanta Madommanapala, dated Saka 1118/1196. Or the Sena administration, see Ray, N.R., *Banglar-Hindu Rajattver Abashan*; *Chaturanga*, B.S. 1350, No. 3.

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³ Minhaj, p. 150.

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⁴ *JRASBL*, 1942 p. 17-21. The ceremony called *Aindri Mahasanti* is performed only to avert great calamities.

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The occupation was presumably intended to be temporary; a permanent stay in Lower Bengal would have undoubtedly strained Bakhtiyar’s resources and communications. The Ganga dynasty in Orissa was a reputedly great power; the Sena army was still intact and could not be expected to retire without a struggle. A place nearer his base in Bihar would offer greater security and freedom of expansion. Bakhtiyar accordingly sacked Nadia and retreating northwards took up his quarters at Lakhnauti (Lakshanavati), the western capital of the Senas, on the Ganges, near the present site of Gour, in the district of Maldah¹. His calculations proved correct, for over the Rarh country including Nadia, Hindu rule continued for the next fifty years; a grant of Lakshmanasena himself, dated in 1205, was issued from the place which seems to answer the description of Nadia². Minhaj states that ‘Lakhmania’, like his panicky courtiers,—‘Brahmans and the Shahas’ (merchants)—retired to the country of Sanknat and the towns of Bang and Kamrud’, where he soon after died. Sanknat is perhaps a mispronunciation for Sankat or Sankakot, a stronghold of the baniks (merchants) in the twelvth century³ and situated not very far from Vikrampur where Lakshmanasena’s dynasty is archaeologically known to have ruled for three generations.

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