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The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c7.120

The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c7.120

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English

c7.120

The ease with which the king was put to flight and the city occupied, must have surprised even Bakhtiyar himself. The story of 'the 18 horsemen defeating a great king' has, at any rate, evoked sceptical comments from a great number of patriotic scholars². Minhaj's veracity has been questioned and arguments have been advanced to reduce the account to sheer myth. There is however, little need to feel apologetic for the supposed cowardice of the Sena king; even were he really so, to consider his conduct as typical of the Bengali people would be historically incorrect. Hasty, and what ungenerous critics would call, shameful flights have been the lot of even greater men and admittedly heroic peoples. Rajput recklessness has an element of romance in it but of little practical wisdom. Nor is it possible to reject the story altogether. To dismiss it on the ground, as Mr. Banerji did, that the Hindu accounts never speak of Nodia or Navadwip as a Sena capital or that 'Rai Lakhmania' cannot be identical with Lakshmanasena who, in Mr. Banerji's view, had long been dead, is to base positive history on negative argument. For Bakhtiyar's occupation of a portion of the Sena kingdom following his raid on Nadia is an undisputed fact. It is true, one cannot claim a literal accuracy for Minhaj's account, but the results of recent research certainly do not strengthen Mr. Banerji's arguments¹. There is, on the other hand, little improbability in the story, for Bengal from all accounts presented notmany elements of strength A Brahmin ridden, disintegrated society, with a king whose youthful valour and military energy had given way to a supine addiction to religion and poetry, a top-heavy, hollow administration, and with vassals finding strength to declare independence², Lakshmanasena's kingdom was anything but a force that could put up sustained frontal resistance. The *Turushka* had become a bogey and everywhere inspired a paralysing fear. The superstitious "prophecy" about the "long armed Turushka" eventually destroying the Sena kingdom is perhaps an over statement; the king's refusal to fly with his frightened courtiers from the threatened zone³ shows that rational courage had not entirely taken leave of him. But the apprehension of an impending catastrophe was undoubtedly felt; epigraphic evidence shows that the king in his 25th year (1203) performed a great sacrifice to propitiate the gods for help in averting it⁴. Every fresh advance of the Turk only deepened this fear and destroyed self-confidence. The easy success of Bakhtiyar's noon-day attack thus needs no other explanation. Boldly led surprise attacks can paralyse even more courageous and well prepared forces; it is to be noted that the city of Nadia was occupied only after the main force had arrived.