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The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c9: Chapter V

The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India: A History of the Establishment and Progress of the Turkish Sultanate of Delhi, 1206–1290 A.D. c9

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English

Chapter V

c9.1

Within six weeks of the festivities celebrating the Caliphial investiture, news arrived of the death of Iltutmish's crown prince, his eldest son Nasiruddin Mahmud. It nearly stunned him, for all his dynastic plans seemed doomed to frustration. The Sultanate's initial difficulties were by no means over and it could ill-afford the hazards of a dynastic change, for a stable leadership was essential. But he could see no one among his surviving sons competent enough to be entrusted with his responsibilities. Firoz, the eldest among them, was lazy and irresponsible; others were too young. He could detect the necessary courage and alertness in only one of his children, his eldest daughter, Raziah, who, with the requisite training, might prove equal to the task. A queen-regnant was perhaps a novel experiment for India but not to his persianised compatriots whose racial and cultural traditions were familier with female sovereigns. The *Shariah*, it is true, would take a great deal of ingeneous interpretation to countenance the idea, but Iltutmish could perhaps count on his docile ecclesiastics to overlook this departure from a law that was, in any case, continually being reinterpreted all these centuries¹. The real opposition, he apprehended, was to come from his sons and their partisans in the court and in the services. A young woman, besides, was exposed to many dangers; to expect her to hold the crown against the wishes of her courtiers and officers was foolish optimism. Iltutmish could, no doubt, force them to accept her heir-apparentship, but prudence suggested a more cautious approach. And a timely improvement in Firoz's character, may, after all, solve his problems.

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¹ For an exhaustive discussion of this question *vis-a-vis* Raziah, see Habibullah: *Sultana Raziah*, IHQ, 1940, pp. 750-772.

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In 625/1228, Firoz had been given his first appointment in Budaun. For the next few years Iltutmish experimented and kept his counsel. While he watched Firoz's conduct of public affairs, he began to associate Raziah with the administration. A bolder step was to leave her in charge of the capital when, in 629/1231, he set out on the Gwalior expedition¹. The result must have been encouraging, for it decided the question for him. Firoz had not yet shown his worth, and further postponement of the matter was injudicious. Immediately on his return he, therefore, ordered a proclamation to be drafted appointing Raziah as his successor; and in so doing, he gave his courtiers an opportunity to voice their opinion. Objection was raised as he expected, not on legalistic grounds, but for the practical unwisdom of pitting a daughter against a grown-up son and his ambitious mother². Their doubt as to her capacity to hold her own, was, however easily removed, for her talents were widely recognised. A wider publicity was given to her nomination by including her name in a series of the silver tankah³.

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¹ Ferishta, I, p. 68. See also Isami, p. 126. Iltutmish entrusted her with the royal seal.

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² Minhaj, p. 185-6.

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³ JASB, 1896, p. 218, no. 30. Wright, p. 40, no. 161 A, however, ascribes the issue to Raziah herself, and on the evidence of a better preserved specimen, dates it in 635/1237.

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It was a sound choice, but as time passed, to Iltut-

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Nomination of Raziah.

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mish finality seemed difficult to attain. His incompetence notwithstanding, Firoz had the prodigal’s winning grace; his mother, Shah Turkan, was an adept intriguer and counted supporters among the state-officers. Whether the expected change had shown itself in Firoz’s character, or whether in the courtiers’ talk Iltutmish was given cause to read more than mere well-meaning apprehension, the chronicler gives us no clue to ascertain. That Iltutmish was contemplating some concession to him is all that can be gathered from the statement that on his way back from his last expedition in 1236 he brought Firoz with him from Lahore whither he had lately been transferred as, ‘since he was the eldest of his surviving sons, the people had their eyes on him’.¹

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¹ Minhaj, p. 182.

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Nothing, however, is on record, to show that the earlier proclamation was rescinded; the matter was evidently still unsettled when he died. As Iltutmish’s last action concerned Firoz, he had an advantage over his sister; Shah Turkan was quick to act and on the same night, she had her son crowned and proclaimed as Ruknuddin Firoz².

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² Idem. The text has Tuesday, 29th Shaban, but this is clearly wrong as Tuesday fell on the 28th, A second version, noted in the footnote, has night of the 21st, Tuesday; this accords with Raverty’s Mss.

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His accession was technically a supersession of Raziah and was the work of the provincial officers who had joined the late king on his last expedition. It seemed to have the approval of all the interests in the state with the singular exception of the common citizens of Delhi who do not appear to have taken the customary oath of allegiance. The omission would perhaps have been corrected in course of time, but immediately on the departure of the provincial officers, Firoz confirmed by his conduct, his father's misgivings. He commenced a life of gaity and pleasure while power passed to his mother. She was a jealous woman and pitilessly persecuted her co-wives and their children. The treasury was emptied to cater for the Sultan's pleasures. This vicious, petticoat rule produced the inevitable reaction, and his own supporters now set about to make amends for their hasty action. Even the *wazir* Junaidi left the king to join the governors preparing to march against the capital. Firoz's younger brother, Ghiyasuddin, posted at Awadh, started the rebellion by seizing the Lakhnauti revenue on its way to Delhi and "sacking and plundering several towns in Hindusthan"¹. Governors of Multan, Lahore, Hansi and Budaun all combined their forces and arrived at Mansurpur. Firoz marched out to oppose them, but his army officers revolted on the way, murdered his personal attendants and returned to the capital².

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¹ *Ibid*, p. 183.

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² Minhaj, p. 183; Haji Dabir, II, p. 708. *Cf.* TM, p. 22-23.

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There, with their acquiescence, events took a turn which was not at all expected by the governors moving to the city. Taking advantage of Firoz's absence, Raziah very cleverly exploited the general discontent against his mother's rule. Clad in red, she showed herself to the populace assembled for the Friday prayers and in the name of Iltutmish appealed for help against the machinations of Shah Turkan³. This melodramatic gesture produced an intense feeling of loyalty to Iltutmish's memory and the crowd was seized with a great enthusiasm for giving effect to his proclamation. Isami tells us that she even entered into an agreement with the people: she was to be given a chance to prove her abilities and if she did not prove better than men, her head was to be struck off¹. The army officers lent their weight to the action and by the time Firoz arrived back in the city, Raziah's enthronement was complete and Shah Turkan thrown into prison. His own imprisonment and death, following soon after, terminated an inglorious reign of seven months².

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³ Ibn Battuta: *Kitabur Rahlah*, II, p. 25-26.

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¹ Futuhus-Salatin, p. 127.

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² Minhaj, p. 184.

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In giving the crown to Raziah, the army officers and the citizens apparently were carrying out Iltutmish's declared wish; but their action, in effect, negatived the provincial governors' right, established in the case of Firoz, to have a predominant voice in the king's nomination. For, although Firoz's dethronement satisfied their immediate demand, yet they continued their hostile march towards Delhi. They refused to accept the fait accompli not, as their conduct showed, because of Raziah's legal incompetence, but because of the alleged irregularity of the whole procedure. As the highest counsellor of state the wazir also felt ignored and the revolt continued. They arrived and encamped in front of the city and commenced hostilities. Malik Tayasai, whom Raziah appointed to the governorship of Awadh and thus retained on her side, attempted to bring reinforcements but was captured by the insurgents and died in prison³. Her military position was definitely weak but her Machievellian diplomacy proved a great retriever. She came out of the city and tried to sow dissension among her opponents. Persuading Malik Salari and Kabir Khan to join her secretly on the assurance that the wazir, Maliks Kochi and Jani were to be imprisoned, she spread the news of this secret compact among the latter who thereupon took fright and fled. They were closely pursued. Jani and Kochi were seized and slain and the *wazir* died a lone fugitive in the Sirmur hills¹.

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³ Ibid, p. 186.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 185-86. *Cf.* Raverty, p. 640-41, and note; the passage describing Raziah's tactics has been wrongly translated.

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This success stabilized her position, and she now proceeded to organise the government. The *wazarat* went to the *naib wazir*, Khwaja Muhazzabuddin; Saifuddin Aibak, and on his death shortly afterwards, Malik Hasan Ghori, obtained the command of the army. As a reward for betraying his comrades, Kabir Khan was given the governorship of Lahore. Tughril-i-Tughan Khan, the governor of Lakhnauti, who had kept aloof from the late rebellion and now sent in his submission, was raised to the viceroyalty. Uch was placed under Hindu Khan while Budaun went to Malik Aetigin². In the words of the chronicler "from Debal to Lakhnauti all the *maliks* and *amirs* manifested their obedience and submitted"³.

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² *Ibid*, pp. 197, 249, 253, and 293.

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³ *Ibid*, p. 187.

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This recognition of her authority, as the sequel showed, concealed a latent opposition. The officers who had rebelled against Firoz were hardly prepared to submit tamely to a princess who was, after all, their own creation. She was herself aware of the dangerous power of her father's Turkish officers and slaves who monopolised all power in the state. The crown was vindicated when she overthrew the provincial chiefs and in the process arrested the growth of a dangerous constitutional precedent; it was necessary now to follow it up by restoring the monarchy to its rightful position. For, a dynastic leadership could yield the best results, in the circumstances in which the Turks were placed, only when it commanded absolute power; in the 13th century India, the monarch's firmness was the only justification for his existence. Courage and unflinching determination was to be her motto; in strength of character she was to prove herself "better than man". Details of her measures in this direction have not been recorded but it seems certain that by discarding female attire, and riding out in public and holding open courts¹ which her opponents later pretended to consider as scandalous conduct, she intended to emphasise the firmness and vigour of her rule. It is also reasonable to suppose that the 'favour' stated to have been shown to the Abyssinian 'master of the horse', Jamaluddin Yaqut, occurred about this time² and was part of her plan to break the Turkish nobles' monopoly of all important offices. For, the amir-i-akhur, like the amir-hajib, carried great privilege and power and seems to have been always held by a Turk. Isami states that ever since Firoz's accession Yaqut had attached himself to Raziah's cause³; the favour could thus mean only an increased dependence on his support to counter the 'maliks'.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 188. Isami, p. 129, makes it clear that these changes occurred towards the end of her reign. Yahya Sirhindi: TM, p. 26, seems to suggest that she was unanimously advised to adopt these manners.

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² Minhaj, idem, does not date this event but mentions it along with those that happened before 635/1237. Isami p. 129, implies that Yaqut was only confirmed in his post which he held from her father's time; TM, p. 26, however, clearly states that Raziah first appointed him to this post. There is little authority for Ferishta's statement that he was promoted to the rank of Amirul-Umara; I, p. 68.

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³ p. 129.

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By the third year of her reign, in any event, the queen's real aim must have become abundantly clear; the military aristocracy could read in her actions nothing but a challenge to their domination. It is little wonder therefore that a secret conspiracy became active among

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A counter move.

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the *amirs and maliks*, stationed at the court and in the neighbouring provinces, with the object not only of deposing her but also of rendering the future sovereign permanently and constitutionally impotent¹. At the head of this conspiracy stood Aetigin, lately governor of Budaun and now the *amir-i-hajib*, whose proximity to the queen was a great advantage; he was bound by ties of great friendship with Malik Iltuniah, the superintendent of Bhatinda². But the execution of their plan seemed far more difficult than in the case of Firoz. For Raziah commanded strong support in the city; her vigilance left no scope for a palace revolution; and a military siege of the capital stood no better chance of success now, than at the beginning of the reign. It was therefore essential to decoy her to a distant province and there to seize her by overwhelming military power or at any rate, to occupy the capital. Early in 1240 Kabir Khan revolted in Lahore. Direct evidence is lacking, but the coincidence of the subsequent events connect it with the conspirator's general plan. But the queen was prompt to take action. Immediately on receipt of the news she marched out with the available troops and thus forestalled their plan of assembling their forces there. Unaided, Kabir Khan could offer little resistance and was compelled to retreat westwards until at the Chinab, he found his progress barred by the Mongols operating across the river, and halted. As the queen's forces came up, he turned back and surrendered unconditionally³.

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¹ All the Turkish, Ghori and Tajik officers were in the conspiracy. See p. 253.

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² Minhaj, p. 188 and 251.

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³ Ibid, p. 188; on p. 235, it is dated 635.

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Her energetic action thus foiled the conspirator's first move. Within a fortnight of her return, however, a second rebellion was reported from Bhatinda, where, Aetigin's friend, Iltuniah now staged an open revolt. Determined as she was to crush all opposition at the outset, she allowed herself no rest, but disregarding the heat and inconvenience of the month of Ramzan, set out immediately¹. This time the conspirators seemed to have planned their moves carefully and on her arrival at Bhatinda those in her retinue vented their wrath on Yaqut and murdered him. By a process nowhere recorded in detail but doubtless facilitated by the removal of one of her main supporters, they subsequently succeeded in seizing the queen and throwing her into prison². With the royal forces now away from Delhi, the citizens could put up little effective resistance to the conspirators who now proceeded to give effect to their political plan. Choice of the next king having already been made, on the receipt of the news of Raziah's capture, the partisans at Delhi raised Iltutmish's third son, Bahram, to the throne. He took the *jubus* name of Muizzuddin and, seated at the red palace, received the homage and felicitation of his supporters. Having arranged for Raziah's continued captivity at the Bhatinda fort under Iltuniah, the leaders of the conspiracy leisurely returned to Delhi to ratify Bahram's accession by formally taking the oath of allegiance³.

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¹ She returned on the 19th Shaban and started again for Bhatinda, on the 9th Ramazan, 4th April 1240: *Ibid*, p. 188. Minhaj adds that some of the amirs at the court were secretly in league with Iltuniah.

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² Minhaj, p. 188-89.

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³ *Ibid*, p. 189, and 191. Bahram's accession took place on the 27th, Ramzan, 18 days after Raziah set out on the Bhatinda expedition. The ceremony of taking the general oath of allegiance took place, after the maliks' return from Bhatinda, on 11th Shawwal.

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Raziah's deposition was in effect a victory of the Turkish military aristocracy—the *maliks* and *amirs*.

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The elevation of Bahram to the throne as it appears, was conditional on his agreeing to delegate to them all sovereign power; he was only to reign while the oligarchy ruled. This agreement was now given a concrete shape by the creation of a new office, the *naib-i-mamlikat* (deputy of the kingdom) to whom Bahram was made to delegate all his powers by a written proclamation. As the leader of the conspiracy Aetigin was appointed to the post and the *wazir*, Muhazzabuddin, also a party to the arrangement, occupied a secondary position¹.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 191-92 and p. 253. The delegation of power was to be at least for one year, because "of the king's youth".

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Aetigin entered into his position with zest and even assumed some of the royal prerogatives, like keeping an elephant and playing the *naubat* at his gate, and also married one of the king’s sisters. This flaunting of his privileged position soon made Bahram sick of the whole affair; he could not willingly submit to the encroachments on his prerogatives. Unable to swallow the *naib’s* effrontery and seeking a way out of the arrangement to which he had agreed, obviously, under compulsion, he had the *naib* murdered in his office².

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² Ibid, p. 192, and pp. 253-54. The *wazir* was also attacked on this occasion but he escaped.

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Iltuniah had obviously been promised a large share in the spoils of the conspirator’s victory; but the murder of his friend, Aetigin, destroyed his hopes; for the time being his party was disorganised. To rally it again with the same secrecy and on the same basis seemed to require longer time and greater opportunities than he could hope to possess. It is true, Bahram had permanently estranged his former supporters; two of them, Maliks Salari and Qaraqash left his court and joined Iltuniah at Bhatinda¹. But a better plan suggested itself. To marry the captive princess and then lay claim with armed force on her throne seemed to assure better returns and easier success. It suited Raziah also. In August of the same year, she accordingly married the former rebel and having adopted the regal insignia, they marched to occupy the capital by force². Bahram’s regular troops however, proved more than a match for their mercenary forces and sent them flying back to Bhatinda. On the way, near Kaithal, their troops deserted and on the 25th Rabi I, 638/13th October, 1240, while resting under a tree, they were both murdered by Hindu robbers³.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 190.

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² Ibid, p. 190 and 253. See also Haji Dabir, II, p. 704.

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³ Minhaj, p. 190 and p. 192; on p. 252, however, he states that Raziah was captured near Kaithal and Iltuniah near Mansurpur and both attained martyrdom the next day, 25th Rabi I, 638. The former version, that they were murdered by the Hindus, is supported by Ferishta, I, p. 68, TA, I, p. 68, and the Mirat-i-Jahan-Numa, f. 53. The TM, p. 29, states that they were taken prisoner and sent to Delhi where they were put to death under Bahram’s orders. It is hardly necessary to refer to Raziah’s alleged moral lapse, for the story no longer finds place in sober history. Ibn Battuta’s gossip and Ferishta’s suggestion are all that can be cited as authority for it, for Minhaj’s remark qurbati uftad’ can bear no such meaning. The phrase is also used for describing Aibak’s relation with his master; p. 139. TM, copies the exact phrase from Minhaj. Haji Dabir, a very careful and conscientious writer, translates Minhaj’s meaning by a phrase which leaves no ambiguity. The value of Ibn Battuta’s story can be judged from the following quotation; II, p. 26:—“Raziah ruled for four years and was in the habit of riding out like men without her veil. Then she was imputed of having connection with one of her Abyssinian slaves. So the people agreed on marrying her to a near relative of hers and the kingdom passed on to her brother Nasiruddin”. The printed text of Minhaj, p. 253, contains a couplet which seems to show Minhaj’s belief in the truth of the allegation. But the same couplet is found in the TM also and is obviously an interpolation as Raverty has not found it in the older Mss. On the whole question see IHQ, 1940, pp. 769-772.

c9.49

Aetigin’s fall was apparently a victory for the Sultan and no new naib was appointed. But the new amir-i-hajib, Badruddin Sunqar, now assumed dictatorial powers and even issued orders without the king’s consent⁴. The wazir, revengeful at being thus superseded, manoeuvred to destroy him and found in the Sultan a willing listener to false accusations against the *amir*. Apprehensive of his own safety and yet ignorant of the *wazir's* machinations, Sunqar tried with some ecclesiastics of the city to conspire for Bahram's deposition. In one of his secret meetings he invited the *wazir* who took advantage of this chance of wreaking his vengeance and betrayed the whole conspiracy. Sunqar was consequently dismissed and banished to Budaun and on his return shortly after, 'without orders' was seized and put to death'. His accomplices were also similarly punished.

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⁴ Minhaj, pp. 193 and 255.

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SULTANAH RAZIAH.

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Aetigin's assassination had terminated Bahram's agreement with the *maliks*; Sunqar's death now widened the breach still further. The ecclesiastics had also been alienated by the punishment given to some of their members; an indiscreet act on the part of Bahram, leading to the execution of the *qazi* of Mihir, made determined enemies of them². The *wazir*, a most vile and vindictive man, now sought an opportunity to settle his own accounts with the Sultan. Soon the opportunity came. In 639/1241, a Mongol force besieged Lahore and troops had to be sent out to relieve the city. The *wazir* was sent in their company, but as the army neared Lahore, he frightened the officers by disclosing a secret order purported to have been issued by the Sultan for their seizure and execution. Enraged at this treachery, the army revolted and at once prepared to march back to depose the tyrant. The *Sheikhul Islam*, whom Bahram now sent to allay their fears, was also a party to the plot and so fanned the flame of rebellion. The army accompanied by the *wazir* and the *Sheikhul Islam*, returned to besiege Delhi. It was denuded of troops but the citizens put up a stout defence. In the end, however, the *wazir's* partisans succeeded in raising an insurrection within the city in which, even Minhaj, the chief *qazi* and possibly a prominent supporter of Bahram, was severely wounded. Next day the city fell to the rebels and Bahram was taken prisoner and executed¹.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 255.

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² *Ibid*, p. 195. On the instigation of a recluse, named Ayub Turkman, who acquired great respect in Bahram's eyes and who previously had suffered at the hands of Shamsuddin, the *qazi* of Mihir, the Sultan had the latter thrown under the feet of an elephant.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 196-7. The siege dragged on for more than three months and Minhaj throws the main responsibility on one Fakhruddin Mubarakshah Farrukhi, one of Bahram's personal attendants who acquired ascendency in his counsels and refused to listen to proposals for compromise.

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In Bahram’s fall the crown once again suffered a defeat. Masud, the very young son of Firoz, was raised to the throne with the name of Alauddin, precisely on the same conditions as his uncle. In the government that was formed, however, a coalition with different parties is noticeable. For, the *naib's* office was given to Malik Qutbuddin Hasan, a refugee prince of Ghor, and as such outside the rank of the Shamsi slaves², Malik Qaraqash Khan, received the *amir-hajib's* office, while Kashlu Khan, one of the leaders of the anti-Bahram party, was given charge of the extensive province of Nagour, Mandor and Ajmer in Rajputana³. Minhaj-i-Siraj having resigned from office, the chief *qaziship* went to Imaduddin Shafurqani⁴. The entire government was, however, dominated by the *wazir*, the prime author of the last rebellion, and the Turkish *maliks* found their position being increasingly compromised. The *wazir* exercised all power and even assumed regal pretensions⁵; the *naib* became a mere figurehead. To secure his domination, he began to exclude the Turkish aristocracy from offices of state.

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² *Ibid*, p. 198.

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³ *Ibid*, pp. 250 and 261.

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⁴ *Idem*,

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⁵ He assumed the twin prerogatives of the ‘elephant and the *Naubat*’.

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Alauddin Masud; a new government.

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This however, they were in no mood to accept, and saved their position by murdering the wazir¹. Their power was now unfettered and a more submissive wazir was found in Najmuddin Abu Bakr. The coalition being already dissolved, Qaraqash Khan was made to relinquish the amir-i-hajib's office which was now given to one of their junior members, named Balban².

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¹ Minhaj, p. 250.

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² Ibid, p. 285.

c9.65

The last-mentioned appointment was destined to change the trend of the whole situation. Although appointed as one of their nominees, Balban soon overshadowed his partymen, and by superior ability, appropriated all power. With the state administration in his control, he diverted the energy of the military aristocracy to campaigns against the Rajputs and the Mongols. For, he realised that absence of military action was largely responsible for the confusion which characterised the preceding reigns. It was this action which made for the comparative tranquility of Masud's reign and its continuation for four years.

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The circumstances of his deposition are not stated clearly; but it is doubtful if the same forces were active on this occasion also. Minhaj's explanation is hardly convincing³. His sudden removal, at a time when his forces had scored an important victory over the Mongols, and the quiet accession of his uncle Mahmud (Nasiruldin Mahmud), seem suspicious. The malik's power had been greatly reduced and their party disorganised; at any rate, we do not hear of a conditional election.

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³ After Masud returned from the Uch campaign on the 12th Zilhaj, he fell on evil ways and began to seize and kill his maliks; p. 189. It seems strange that this change in his character should have manifested itself so suddenly and that it should have become intolerable within a month after which he was deposed and put to death, on the 21st Muharram; p. 201. The account of Mahmud's secret march at night, disguised as a lady,

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tion again; Balban's position and power continued undiminished in the next reign. These facts point to the probability that Masud's deposition resulted from personal ambitions and was a palace affair and that Balban, in league with Mahmud's mother, had a hand in it, a surmise which explains the chronicler's reluctance to give more details.

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The new reign, which commenced on the 23rd Muharram, 644/10th June, 1246¹, did not affect the state's policy, now firmly in Balban's control. The latter further strengthened his position in 647/1249, by marrying his daughter to the young Sultan². Masud's naib-i-mamlikat Qutbuddin Hasan, does not appear to have survived him, but the office was not filled until Balban got himself formally appointed to it in 1249-50³. His younger brother Kashlu Khan became the amir-i-hajib, while one of his cousins Sher Khan received the important governorship of Lahore and Bhatinda⁴. The submissive Abu Bakr continued as wazir and most probably became one of Balban's partisans. All the key positions being thus held by his men, Balban's domination in the government became unquestioned. To this was to be added the timid and retiring disposition of the king which made it easy for the naib to wield power, an advantage denied to Aetigin.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 208.

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² Ibid, p. 213. Cf. Ibn Battuta, II, p. 28, who asserts that Balban was Iltutmish's son-in-law.

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³ Minhaj, p. 294.

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⁴ Ibid, pp. 277 and 280.

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Because of his weak nature, Mahmud was however, easily persuaded. In 651/1253, under the influence of a party, consisting of the Indian Muslims and certain

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accompanied by his mother, from Bahraich to be crowned at the Delhi palace is highly suggestive of a well-planned conspiracy.

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"Hindi" rule; an interlude. Turks opposed to Balban, led by a man named Imaduddin Rayhan, the king suddenly issued an order for the dismissal of Balban and his brother from their positions in the court. They were directed to leave Delhi and proceed to their respective assignments (iqta)¹. A new government was formed in which the wakil-i-dar, Imaduddin Rayhan became the de facto head, the wazir Abu Bakr, possibly because of his leanings to Balban, being replaced by a man named Junaidi. Sher Khan was forced to leave Bhatinda and Multan which were placed under Arslan Khan, a leading member of the new faction; even Minhaj was relieved from office and Shamsuddin, one of Rayhan's nominees, became the chief qazi².

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 217, 280 and 298.

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² Ibid, pp. 217-18; also 298-99.

c9.79

Rayhan thus tried to fill all the important offices with his own men and the Turkish element in the state administration was sought to be overshadowed. Political realism demanded of Balban a willing association with this non-Turkish administration, for the situation had vastly changed since the days when Iltutmish could effectively insist on keeping out native Muslims. But as in the case of Muhazzabuddin's action a decade earlier, the rule of the "upstart Hindi eunuch" was intolerable. Disgust ripened into opposition and soon, under the leadership of Balban, into armed action. The majority of the Turkish officers, posted in the provinces round the capital, joined their forces and in Ramzan, 652/1254, marched towards the city to impose their will on the king. Mahmud thereupon was persuaded to set out with the royal troops to oppose them and encamped near Samana, facing the insurgent nobles.

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Reinstatement of Balban.

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Armed engagement seemed imminent and Rayhan endeavoured his best to bring it about. But Mahmud lost heart and eagerly responded to proposals for compromise. Balban’s party offered to submit on condition of Rayhan’s dismissal. The latter was accordingly transferred to the province of Budaun and thence shortly afterwards to Bahraich. Balban was re-appointed naib while his kinsmen and supporters were all reinstated. Minhaj and Abu Bakr both received their posts back¹.

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 203-4, 218-20, 300-301. Because of his own dismissal from office Minhaj speaks with great indignation about Rayhan's low origin.

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This brief interruption however, did not affect the governmental policy. A greater emphasis was, instead, laid on the authority of the central government which emerged more secure from the struggle, for, by siding, at the end, with the insurgent Turks, the crown assured itself of their unflinching support. Mahmud’s reign guaranteed the rule of the Turkish nobility.

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Political changes in the capital were bound to affect the hold on the outlying provinces where distance offered a constant temptation to ambitious men to make a bid for independence. The Sultanate had scarcely been integrated into a political unity when Iltutmish’s death opened the way to disruption. This is best illustrated in the history of Lakhnauti.

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It was after two expeditions, conducted within a period of eight years, that the Khalji chiefs could be made to acknowledge his authority. To curtail the governor's power he found it necessary to separate the province from Bihar. But the arrangement lasted only till his death. Tughan Khan maintained a show of allegiance to Raziah and Bahram, but his actions showed little subordination. Having quarrelled with the governor of Lakhanor—probably a separate military division—and occupied it¹, towards the end of Bahram’s reign he reannexed Bihar². Early in the next reign he led a conquering expedition to the provinces of Karah, Manikpur, Awadh and even to the districts further north³. This was a clear challenge to the central government, for, in Awadh he sought to dispossess the king’s representative. Masud’s government however, was powerless to intervene, and the governor of Awadh, Tamur Khan, it appears, could summon little armed assistance in defending his charge. Tughan Khan approached the city and was preparing to install himself there when the much respected Minhaj, then on his way to Lakhnauti, succeeded in persuading him to withdraw.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 242-3. The place is designated ‘Lakhnauti—Lakhanor,’ evidently to distinguish the area south of the Ganges in which Lakhanor was situated, The district is not mentioned again and was perhaps permanently united with Lakhnauti.

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² An inscription found at the Baridargah, Bihar Sharif, and dated in 640/1242, as put up under Tughan Khan’s orders, ascribes to him almost regal titles and makes no reference to the reigning king of Delhi; *JASB*, 1873, p. 45; Cunningham: *Reports*, XV, p. 45. *EIM*, 1913-4, pp. 16-7.

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³ Minhaj, p. 243; see also Raverty: *op. cit.* p. 737, note 9.

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He was destined to pay dearly for this unauthorised aggression, for Balban’s cunning proved as effective as military sanction. Tughan had recently suffered a defeat from the Hindu forces of Jajnagar (Orissa) with whom he had, for sometime past, been carrying on hostilities; the latter now threatened to carry the war into Lakhnauti itself. Unable to meet this threatened invasion singlehanded, he was compelled to appeal to Delhi for aid and Balban quickly responded. He was ostensibly confirmed in his post and the Awadh governor, Tamur Khan, was detailed to proceed with his forces

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The latter was obviously an Indian convert.

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to his assistance. Tamur Khan’s real mission, however, was kept secret; it transpired only when his troops arrived and encamped opposite Lakhnauti. The Hindu forces having in the meantime retired, Tamur Khan picked up a quarrel with Tughan and soon turned it into armed conflict. The latter did his best to defend himself from within the city against what was clearly a siege. At the end, however, he found himself obliged to negotiate and make the province over to Tamur Khan. Delhi’s object was thus achieved. Tughan was later compensated with the vacant province of Awadh. By a curious coincidence which evoked some comment, both Tughan and Tamur Khan died at their posts at exactly the same time in 644/1246¹.

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 244-46.

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Lakhnauti’s history for the next few years is far from clear. Tamur Khan’s immediate successor is not mentioned in the chronicle². Yuzbak-i-Tughril Khan, who is next mentioned as having been appointed over Lakhnauti, is known to have previously held Kanouj in succession to prince Jalaluddin; the latter was transferred thither in 646/1248, from Sambhal and Budaun³. Yuzbak subsequently held Awadh from where he came to take charge of Lakhnauti. An inscription in Maldah, dated 647/1249, however, testifies to the viceroyalty of Jalaluddin Masud Shah Jani who presumably succeeded Tamur Khan⁴. When Masud’s rule terminated cannot be ascertained with precision, but a coin minted at Lakhnauti in the name of Nasiruddin Mahmud and Yuzbak (Yuzbak-i-Tughril Khan) bears a date which cannot be anterior to 651/1253¹.

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² Cf. Salim: *Riyazus-Salatin*, p. 73, who states that Tamur Khan ruled for ten years and died in 655/1257.

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³ Minhaj, p. 212 and p. 262.

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⁴ *EIM*, 1913-14, pp. 19-22; Cunningham: *Reports* XV, p. 45 and 171. He was evidently identical with Kulich Khan Masud Jani son of Alauddin Jani, mentioned as one of Mahmud’s *maliks*; Minhaj, p. 206. He is described as the *malik* of Lakhnauti and Karrah; the last-mentioned place he held subsequently. Salim refers to him under the name of Jalaluddin Khan.

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¹ CCIM, II, p. 23, no. 140; the coin is disfigured, but beside the names of Mahmud, Yuzbak, and the mint name of Lakhnauti, the word *khamsina* is unmistakable; see also Wright, p. 55 no. 225D.

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Yuzbak soon imbibed Tughan’s spirit and tried to follow his example. Following a successful expedition into Jajnagar, he led his troops to Awadh, occupied the city for two weeks and had the *Khutba* read in his name². A reported approach of the royal forces from Delhi, however, compelled him to effect a hurried retreat. But he had greater ambitions to fulfil. Taking advantage of the central government’s pre-occupations with the rebellions following Rayhan’s dismissal, Yuzbak declared his independence, assumed the regal title of Sultan Mughisuddin and struck coins in his name³. The earliest of his such coins with the sovereign titles is dated 653/1255⁴. He does not appear to have reigned long. In a rash expedition which he led for the conquest and occupation of Kamrup, he was taken prisoner by the Hindu forces and executed⁵. His death must have occurred shortly before 655/1257, for in that year a coin minted at Lakhnauti was issued solely in the name of Mahmud⁶, a clear proof of the restoration of his authority. The next viceroy-designate was Masud Jani whose appointment is chronicled under the year 656/1258⁷ but he does not appear to have assumed office on this occasion; for, early next year we hear of the despatch from Lakhnauti of a number of elephants by Izzuddin Balban-i-Yuzbaki—possibly one of Yuzbak’s retainers and the author of the 655 coin mentioned above—who was thereupon confirmed in the iqta of Lakhnauti¹. That, on Yuzbak’s submission, Masud Jani’s appointment was cancelled appears to be the only possible inference. Yuzbaki, however, could not rule for long.

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² Minhaj, p. 263.

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³ *Idem*; Cf. Salim, p. 74, who omits Yuzbak’s rule altogether.

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⁴ JASB, 1881, p. 61, no. 11 & 12; CCIM, II, p. 146, No. 61.

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⁵ For details see *infra*, pp. 139-40.

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⁶ Wright, p. 55, no. 225C. CCIM, II, no. 138.

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⁷ Minhaj, p. 225-6.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 226 and 313.

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Towards the end of 657/1259 or early in 658/1260, Arslan Khan, the governor of Karrah, suddenly advanced on Lakhnauti and taking advantage of Yuzbaki’s absence on a raid in East Bengal, forcibly seized the capital². Yuzbaki hurriedly returned but only to be defeated and slain. This unauthorised occupation, in the tradition of Tughril and Yuzbak, was an open defiance, but Mahmud’s government at the moment had too many anxieties to be able to take immediate action. Arslan was still ruling in Lakhnauti as a rebel when Minhaj closed his account (end of 1260). From the absence of coins in his name he does not appear to have assumed full sovereignty although he is stated to have never acknowledged Mahmud’s authority³. An inscription at Barahdari, Bihar, dated in 663/1264 recording the erection of a tomb under the orders of his son and successor Tatar Khan, fixes approximately the termination of his rule⁴.

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² Ibid, p. 267; Cf. Salim: op. cit. p. 74.

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³ Barani, p. 66. Cf. Salim, p. 74, who, evidently mistaking Yuzbaki for Arslan, states that the latter sent presents to Delhi in 657/1259.

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⁴ JASB, 1874, p. 247. A clearer reading is to be found in EIM, 1918-14, pp. 23-25.

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Unlike Bengal, provinces nearer the capital had a comparatively peaceful history. Their proximity however made them more susceptible to events affecting the central government. The rebellions against Firoz, Raziah and Bahram, as described above, gathered momentum in Awadh and the Doab; aggressions from the semi-autonomous governors of Lakhnauti seemed a recurring feature. The Ganges-Jumna area being the heart of the Delhi kingdom, problems of its control demanded precedence over all others. With Balban’s appointment, continuity of policy and action was assured and Delhi came closer to these provinces than ever before. The almost annual expeditions undertaken by Balban in ‘Hindusthan’ prevented the growth of any rebellious tendency.

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Arslan Khan's aggression.

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From the end of Bahram’s reign, the Mongols proved a far more serious distraction and as in the days of Iltutmish, Delhi’s attention was perforce divided. By 653/1255 they menacingly advanced to complicate the situation in the Punjab and Sind; while Mahmud’s government mobilised all its resources to meet them, potential rebels in Awadh found an opportunity to gather strength. The Sultan’s stepfather, Qutlugh Khan, who held the province, belonged to the anti-Turkish faction which caused Balban’s temporary dismissal¹. After Rayhan’s removal from office Qutlugh became his closest ally and from the adjoining provinces of Awadh and Bahraich they proceeded to negative Mahmud’s authority. Assured of their seditious designs Balban decided to remove Rayhan from office and sent Sanjar Sihwistani to take over Bahraich. Qutlugh came to his friend’s help, intercepted Sanjar and eventually seized him. The latter, however, managed to escape and collecting a small force crossed the Saraju, gave battle to Rayhan and finally slew him². Shortly afterwards Qutlugh was ordered to take over Bahraich and leave Awadh. He refused to comply and openly revolted; he even succeeded in repelling a force sent to coerce him and killed one of the generals¹. Awadh thus threatened to be cut off from Delhi. Balban now personally took the field, whereupon the rebel sought safety in flight to the Himalayan foothills. Balban marched in persuit but on failing to trace him consoled himself by plundering the neighbouring Hindu tribes and rajas suspected of harbouring the rebel². Immediately on Balban's withdrawal, early in 654/1256 Qutlugh emerged from his retreat, re-occupied Awadh and even sought to annex Karra and Manikpur³. Arslan Khan, who then held the province, however, succeeded in expelling him and Qutlugh once again retired to seek shelter with the chief of Santurgarh in the Sirmur hills⁴. The Rana, whom Minhaj calls Ranpal, refused to give him up and Balban was obliged, in 655/1257, to plunder his territory as far as his capital. But the rebel continued to elude capture and lived to aim, as will appear presently, a far more serious blow at Delhi.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 220.

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² Ibid, p. 304.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 220-21.

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² Ibid, p. 306. Balban is reported on this occasion to have penetrated as far as Bishenpur and Tirhut.

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³ Ibid, p. 221.

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⁴ Ibid, p. 266 and 306-1.

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In the western provinces of the Punjab and Sind the central government's authority was equally at a disadvantage, not only because of the distance but also because of the continued Mongol pressure.

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Insecurity of hold on Sind and Punjab.

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Mangbarni had failed to organise any effective resistance in Persia and Iraq. The Mongols never caught him, but his gallant stand against terrible odds did no more than outline a singularly heroic character. Ghazni became a Mongol dependency even before his death. The accession of Uktae Khan to the Mongol Khanate was marked by a decision to gradually annex in the first instance, all the territories upto the Indus and then to extend the operations to the Indian provinces¹. By the end of Raziah's reign the Mongols had reached the Chinab and the governors of the western provinces were hard put to maintain a single-handed resistance; Delhi's failure to send assistance left them little alternative but to evacuate the territory or submit to the invaders. In 639/1241 occurred the first organised attack on Lahore. The local governor appealed for reinforcements but the *wazir*'s intrigues turned the royal army back to the capital. The governor was therefore obliged to flee the besieged city which fell the next morning². Although the Mongols withdrew shortly afterwards and Lahore was re-occupied, the province henceforth became "the frontier" where soon ambitious governors found good scope for self-assertion.

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 382-83, 388, 392-93; see also Howorth: *History of the Mongols*, I, p. 126-127.

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² For details see *infra* p. 200.

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Immediately after Masud's accession Kabir Khan, the governor of Multan rebelled and not only assumed full sovereignty but also forcibly occupied the neighbouring province of Uch³. Delhi was powerless to dispossess him and even suffered his son Abu Bakr to succeed him in 639/1241⁴. Even Abu Bakr's death shortly afterwards did not improve matters for Delhi, for Hasan Qarlugh, after repeated attempts, now succeeded in installing himself in Multan⁵. A second Mongol invasion in 1245, however, gave Delhi an opportunity to reassert its authority. On the approach of the Mongols Hasan Qarlugh evacuated Multan and fled to lower Sind; Kabir Khan's descendants¹, who held Uch, found themselves powerless to oppose the invaders and urgently appealed to Delhi for help, thus giving a tacit recognition to Mahmud’s sovereignty. Balban immediately responded and marched with a strong force, whereupon the Mongols withdrew². The event thus enabled Delhi to recover control over Sind. Multan was placed under Kashlu Khan while Uch was temporarily left with Kabir Khan’s family³. Kashlu Khan was later allowed to annex Uch on the understanding that he should relinquish Nagor which he formerly held; the condition however, had to be enforced at the point of sword⁴. In 1249 Hasan Qarlugh returned from lower Sind and renewing his attacks on Multan forced Kashlu Khan to surrender the city. But Qarlugh was not destined to retain possession, for Multan was soon after recovered by Sher Khan, the governor of Bhatinda⁵. Probably under instructions from Balban, he not only refused to restore it to Kashlu Khan, but, in 649/1251, even dispossessed him of Uch as well⁶.

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³ Minhaj, p. 235.

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⁴ *Idem.*

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⁵ *Ibid*, p. 399.

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¹ Minhaj, p. 287; see also p. 399.

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² *Ibid*, pp. 200, 287 and 399.

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³ *Ibid*, p. 269.

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⁴ *Ibid*, p. 270.

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⁵ The date of Hasan Qarlugh's second occupation of Multan is inferential. Sher Khan's recapture of the city is dated in 648/1250. It must have happened after his dispossession from Nagour which was placed under Kashlu Khan who was at the same time appointed *amir-i-hajib*, in 647; see pp. 214 and 295.

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⁶ Minhaj, p. 271-72. Sher Khan's deputy at Multan, Malik Kurez sent a number of Mongol prisoners to Delhi in 648/1250. See also Haji Dabir, II, p. 715.

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Kashlu Khan was compensated with the governorship of Budaun but he nursed a grievance and secretly allied himself with the anti-Balbani faction. As the first step towards Balban’s dismissal, with Rayhan and Qutlugh he persuaded Mahmud to dispossess Sher Khan. This appears to have been the motive behind the expedition to-

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Changes in Sind.

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wards "Uch and Multan" in 650/1252 in which the leading members of the faction were specially instructed to be present with their forces¹; Balban was formally dismissed during this expedition, from the camp on the Beas, early in 651/1253. Finding his enemies in power Sher Khan left Sind and retired to Turkestan; the provinces of Uch, Multan and Bhatinda were recovered from his retainers and placed, for the time being, under Arslan Khan, who appears to have ultimately joined Qutlugh’s party³. On Rayhan’s eventual dismissal and transferance to Awadh, Kashlu Khan was restored to his former provinces of Multan and Uch shortly after 653/1255³. Firmly installed there, he now threw off his mask of loyalty and transferred his allegiance to Hulaku, the newly appointed Mongol viceroy of Iran, and even received a Mongol agent⁴. By this treachery he made a present of the whole of Sind to the Mongols. Mahmud’s government was hardly in a position to attempt its recovery, for a direct hostility with the dreaded Mongols was beyond its resources.

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 216, 266, and 271; c. Haji Dabir, II, p. 723.

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³ He appears in possession of Multan and Uch sometime before 655/1257; Minhaj, 272.

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⁴ Ibid, p. 271.

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Thus secure under Mongol tutelage, Kashlu remembered his old enmity to Balban and planned revenge. Early in 655/1257 he marched his troops along the Beas to the Himalayan foothills in order to effect a junction with Qutlugh Khan, his old friend and ally whom Balban had failed to trace in the Sirmur hills. They met and their joint army marched towards Delhi⁵. The threat was serious and required great resourcefulness to meet it. Balban equipped a powerful force and moved out to meet them near Samana. As the two forces prepared for engagement a party of Delhi ecclesiastics sent a secret invitation to Kashlu Khan promising to deliver the city. The news somehow leaked out and reached Balban who immediately instructed the Sultan at Delhi to banish all the conspirators. Unaware of this turn of events and expecting an easy entrance, Kashlu avoided a frontal battle and eluding Balban's forces managed to reach Delhi. There he learnt that his partisans had been expelled and that the citizens were determined to put up a strong defence. It is not known what happened to Qutlugh, for he is not mentioned again, but Kashlu Khan is stated to have given up the project and retired to Uch¹. Shortly afterwards he paid a visit to Hulaku in Iraq², the object being probably to induce him to lend armed assistance for the occupation of Delhi. In any case, a Mongol army under Sali Bahadur came towards the end of 655/1259 to take up quarters in Sind³. The Mongols however, did not invade Delhi territory; the preparations set on foot by Balban early in 656 culminated only in a military parade outside the city.

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² Minhaj, pp. 218 and 266.

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⁵ Ibid, p. 272.

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¹ Minhaj, pp. 307-310.

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² Ibid, p. 273.

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³ Ibid, p. 225 and 310.

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Kashlu Khan, a Mongol vassal.

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When and in what manner Kashlu Khan's rebellion was terminated can never be known satisfactorily, for Minhaj's account closes abruptly. Isami speaks of an expedition to Multan led by Balban against Kashlu Khan (called by his nickname of Balban-i-zar) some years after 656 which seems to throw some light on the problem. On the approach of the Delhi forces Kashlu left his son Muhammud in Multan and himself retired to the Punjab to 'bring that country under his control.'

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Position in the west; close of Minhaj's account.

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The people of Multan surrendered to Balban whereupon Muhammad fled and joined his father. The latter realised his own weakness and withdrawing from the Punjab took up his quarters in Baniyan. From there he is reported to have twice attempted the recovery of Multan with Mongol assistance¹. The proceedings of Sali Bahadur in Sind are equally obscure; it seems likely that Balban’s diplomacy succeeded in effecting a kind of non-aggression pact with Hulaku and that the recovery of Sind was more the result of mutual agreement than military action². In any case, when the curtain is again lifted by Barani after six years, we find Balban conferring the Sind viceroyalty on his eldest son and no reference is made to its recent recovery from the Mongols.

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