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Twilight of the Sultanate c15: Chapter 10: Sultanate Under Ibrāhīm Lodī

Twilight of the Sultanate c15

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Chapter 10: Sultanate Under Ibrāhīm Lodī

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It may be recalled that shortly before his death Sikandar Lodī had summoned his nobles to the capital to finalise plans for the conquest of Gwalior.¹ In the meantime he breathed his last. Thus most of the nobles of the Sultanate as well as his sons like Ibrāhīm Khan, Jalāl Khan, Ism‘aīl Khan, Mahmūd Khan and Āzam Humayūn were present in the capital when the Sultan died. Ibrāhīm and Jalāl were the eldest and most capable sons of Sikandar Shāh. They were the offspring of the same mother and Ibrāhīm was the elder of the two. Moreover Ibrāhīm's personality, intelligence, penetration, courage and "praiseworthy moral qualities", for which he was well known, too, had marked him out for kingship.²

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¹ Ferishta, I, 186.

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² T.A., I, 341; T.S.A., 66; Ferishta, I, 186-188.

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Consequently, Ibrāhīm was elected to the throne unanimously, but the nobles vitiated their choice by having two monarchs instead of one.³ Ibrāhīm was to occupy the throne of Delhi and rule up to the boundary of the kingdom of Jaunpur, while his brother Jalāl Khan, who was already governor of Kalpi, was to rule from Kalpi to Jaunpur, that is, in the eastern and southern part of the Sultanate with his capital at Jaunpur.⁴

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³ *Makhzan*, 72 (a).

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⁴ T.A., 341; T.D., 104; T.S.A., 66; Ferishta, I, 181.

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This division of sovereignty was not without a precedent. The freedom loving but intriguing Afghan nobles had all along asserted their right to choose their sovereign. They had influenced Bahlūl's nomination of his successor, compelling him to change his decision at the eleventh hour.⁵ After Bahlūl's death they had once again discussed the question of accession threadbare, and while the throne was given to Nizām Khan (Sikandar Lodī), his brother Bārbak Shāh was recognised as the ruler of Jaunpur. Thus the "election" of the sovereign and the division of the empire were phenomena which had been witnessed in the last regime itself and there was nothing new about it. The point to be noted in the present case, however, is that while Bārbak Shāh was already ruling in Jaunpur when Sikandar Shāh ascended the throne, and it was thought correct not to relieve him of his dominion, here the kingdom was divided between the two brothers and both were to ascend two thrones at the same time. Again, while the accession of Sikandar had been objected to on the ground of his alleged or real impurity of blood, no such stigma attached to the name of Ibrāhīm.

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⁵ See Chapter 9 and Ferishta, I, 178.

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Why then did the nobles of the State divide the Sultanate of Delhi? Most of the chroniclers are silent about their motives. Badaonī and Ahmad Yādgār⁶ furnish no information on the point, while the explanation of Ferishta is far from convincing. According to Ferishta, Sultan Ibrāhīm Lodī had given great umbrage to the Afghan nobles by renouncing the customs and traditions of his father and grandfather and by declaring soon after his accession, that sovereignty knew no kinship, that there was to be no distinction among officers whether of his own tribe or otherwise, and that all were to be treated as servants of the State as "the kings have no relations". He also adds that the Afghan chiefs who hitherto used to sit in the court, were now constrained to stand in the Sultan's presence with folded hands. This attitude of the Sultan disgusted the nobles. They conspired together and leaving Ibrāhīm in possession of Agra and a few dependent districts, raised Jalāl Khan to the throne of Jaunpur.⁷ Thus Ferishta would like us to believe that Ibrāhīm was given a trial as Sultan of the whole of the Empire but when he failed to come up to the expectations of the nobles, they truncated his kingdom. The fact is not so. The division of the Sultanate was not an after-thought. Both the brothers were declared Sultans simultaneously. If Ferishta wants to suggest that the nobles had an inkling of the Sultan's strictness, rash temper and indecorous behaviour, he only contradicts himself for he attributes Ibrāhīm's election to the throne to his qualities of bravery, generosity and fair-mindedness.⁸ Moreover, if the barons had had the slightest suspicion that Ibrāhīm would not treat them well they would have found ways and means of setting aside his candidature altogether.

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⁶ Badaonī, Ranking, I, 430; T.S.A., 66.

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⁷ Ferishta, I, 188; Briggs, I, 590-91.

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⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 188 line 9. Also T.A., I, 341 and Dorn, I, 70.

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The motives of the nobles in taking this major decision of division of sovereignty are hinted at by Nizāmuddīn and Ni‘āmatulla. One has to read between the lines of their circumlocutory statements to understand the motives of the Afghan nobility. "Soldiers, and especially men of war and action", says Nizāmuddīn, "have for the sake of proper arrangement of their affairs and the reputation and grandeur of their service and command, and the greatness of their retainers and equipages, always directed all their plans and endeavours to this, that the rule of the government in the kingdom, and the passing of the orders from a well established throne should not have great power and complete predominance, for this reason they decided that Sultan Ibrāhīm should sit on the throne of Delhi . . . . . and that Shāhzādā Jalāl Khan should sit on the Masnad of Sultanate of Jaunpur."⁹ Similar is the language of Ni‘āmatulla.¹⁰ Thus it was the selfishness and love of power of the barons that prompted them not to leave all regal authority in one hand.¹¹ The nobles had been dealt with rather sternly by Sikandar Lodī, so they thought it prudent not to leave all power in the hands of Ibrāhīm from the very beginning. The Afghan nobles were not a homogeneous lot. They were a conglomeration of races and tribes. There were the Lodīs, the Nūhānīs, the Farmūlīs, the Sarwānīs, the Yūsufkhails, etc. Their interests oftentimes ran parallel. The Lodīs considered themselves as belonging to the ruling class and the rest as "servants of the Lodis".¹² It was, therefore, difficult for the nobility of the State to work in co-operation not to speak of having unanimity of opinion. Division of sovereignty would certainly reduce the power of the Delhi Sultan, and provide the nobles full scope for enhancing their power individually and collectively. It was for this that the kingdom was divided.

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⁹ T.A., I, 341; Trs. by De., 393.

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¹⁰ *Makhzan*, 72 (a).

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¹¹ M.R., I, 478.

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¹² W.M., 63 (b).

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Ibrāhīm Lodī accepted the arrangement without protest. To begin with he probably did not suspect any evil motives on the part of the nobles. Even if he did, he was helpless. He could be the Sultan only with their consent. Too much assertion of authority and too much greed for having the whole might have cost him even his half of the kingdom. Moreover, Jalāl Khan was after all his own younger brother. He could rule in Agra and Delhi and his brother at Jaunpur just as his father and uncle Bārbak Shāh had done before.

CIVIL War

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All being well Ibrāhīm was crowned at Agra on 22 November, 1517 (8 Zilqa'da, 923 H), the very next day of Sikandar's death.¹³ "So splendid a coronation had never been witnessed before, and the people long remembered it."¹⁴ At the same time prince Jalāl Khan with the nobles and officers appertaining to his kingdom started off towards Kalpi *en route* to Jaunpur.

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¹³ *Makhzan*, 72 (a); T.S.A., 64; T.A., I, 341 gives no date.

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¹⁴ T.S.A., 66.

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After about four weeks Khan-i-Jahān Nūhānī, governor of Rapri, who had learnt with disapproval¹⁵ about the division of sovereignty, came to Agra.¹⁶ His mission ostensibly was to congratulate the new Sultan, but in fact it was to address the ministers (vazīrs) and nobles on the folly of their decision to divide the Empire. On arrival he reproached them, declaring that sovereignty could not flourish in partnership just as two swords could not fit in one scabbard.¹⁷ His arguments impressed the nobles, more so because the partisans of Jalāl Khan had already gone away with him and there was nobody in the capital to speak in his support. How sincere Khan-i-Jahān was in his intentions, it is difficult to say, but his appeal contained seeds of a civil war. The Sultan, the nobles and officers of Delhi now put their heads together to find a way to nullify the ill-advised partition. They thought that Prince Jalāl was still at Kalpi; he had not yet fully established himself in Jaunpur, and a reconsideration of the question was still possible. Consequently it was decided to invite Jalāl Khan to Agra to discuss the issue of partition once again. The nobles, however, do not seem to have been sincere or quite decided in their minds as yet. According to Ni'āmatulla what they really wanted was to open up the whole issue of sovereignty once again on the arrival of Jalāl, and were determined to keep up the discussion for their own sake, "as they never considered it convenient that public affairs should be under the restraint of one absolute monarch."

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¹⁵ *Makhzan*, 72 (b).

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¹⁶ His name is variously given as Khan-i-Khanān Farmūlī by Ahmad Yādgār (T.S.A., 66-67 and n.), Khan-i-Jahān Lodī by Ni'āmatulla (*Makhzan*, 72 (b)), and Khan-i-Jahān Nūhānī by Nizāmuddīn (T.A., I, 342) and Ferishta (I, 188). According to Ahmad Yādgār, Khan-i-Khanān (Jahān) arrived four months after the accession of Ibrāhīm, but four weeks seems more probable. According to his version only Jalāl Khan had not even reached Jaunpur when Khan-i-Khanān arrived in Agra (T.S.A., 67). Khan-i-Jahān had come to congratulate the new Sultan. He had obviously started on the first news of the death of Sikandar and the accession of his son. Moreover, a little later, we find Sultan Ibrāhīm marching against Jalāl Khan only a month and a half after his accession, when the two brothers had broken out in open hostility. This fact rules out four months.

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¹⁷ T.A., I, 342; T.D., 106; M.R., I, 479; *Makhzan*, 72 (b).

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Sultan Ibrāhīm was gradually acquiring a correct appreciation of the situation. Sovereignty had been divided not because two sons of the same mother had equal rights and should have ruled jointly, but because such an arrangement was to give the nobles a chance to play the one against the other. The nobles had assumed too much power. They had put the crown into commission. The cunning and selfishness of the old, strong and veteran noblemen of Sikandar was now unfolding itself before his eyes. The king must not be made a tool in their hands, he thought. He decided to crush them. Ibrāhīm's mind was made up. In days to come Ibrāhīm Lodī waged a relentless war on the senior nobility. In court and in camp he showed them their place. He fought them at the cost of his life and his Empire. But he did fight them.

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Having fully grasped the situation, and apprehending the intrigues of the nobles, Sultan Ibrāhīm decided to cast the agreement of partition to the winds¹⁹ and bring his brother to obedience. He planned his course of action with great wisdom. Firstly, he sent to Jalāl Khan a *farmān*, couched in gracious and kind language, asking him to come immediately to the court to discuss certain urgent matters. Haibat Khan,²⁰ who was reputed to possess cunning with a persuasive tongue,²¹ was entrusted with the delivery of the message and was commissioned to fetch Prince Jalāl unattended and with all speed.²² Secondly, he addressed *farmāns* to the nobles and officers of the eastern districts to refrain from paying allegiance to Jalāl Khan or attending his court. To each of these important chiefs like Dariyā Khan Nūhānī, governor of Bihar, Nāsir Khan, governor of Ghazīpur and Shaikhzādā Muhammad Farmūlī, governor of Avadh and Lucknow, who had thirty to forty thousand retainers each, Sultan Ibrāhīm sent a horse, a special *Khil'at*, a jewelled waist-dagger and other presents and asked them not to recognise the authority of Jalāl. These noblemen who loved unbridled freedom could not have wished for better. They not only turned from their allegiance to the ruler of Jaunpur but even became hostile to him.²³ Thirdly, and lastly, Ibrāhīm Lodī sent to jail his brothers like princes Isma'īl Khan, Husain Khan and Mahmūd Khan so that they might not try to fish in the troubled waters.²⁴

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¹⁸ Dorn, *I*, 70-71; *Makhzan*, 72 (a).

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¹⁹ T.S.A., 67.

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²⁰ Ferishta, *I*, 188. Haibat Khan is reported to have won the title of Gurgandāz (wolf-slayer) by once slaying two wolves with one arrow. T.S.A., 109-110.

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²¹ T.S.A., 67.

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²² *Ibid.*, 67; T.A., I, 342.

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²³ T.A., I, 342-43; T.S.A., 68; Ferishta, I, 188; T.D., 107; *Makhzan* 74 (a).

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²⁴ T.A., I, 344; Ferishta, I, 189; *Makhzan*, 76 (a) has Shaikh Daulat in place of Mahmūd Khan.

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Jalāl Khan was taken aback at the turn of events, but he acted with the greatest caution and diplomacy. He received Haibat Khan Gurgandāz well, returned artifice for artifice and cajolery for cajolery, but refused to move from Kalpi. Haibat Khan reported his failure to the Sultan, who still favouring persuasion to coercion, sent some other nobles like Shaikhzādā Sultan Muhammad, Malik Ism'ail and Qazi Hamīduddīn Hājib (the Chamberlain)²⁵ to make another attempt to induce the prince to come to Agra. They too failed in their mission.

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²⁵ T.A., I, 342; Ferishta, I, 188; *Makhzan*, 73 (a-b).

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Jalāl Khan now knew no peace. The enmity of the Amīrs of the eastern districts inspired by the order of Sultan Ibrāhīm to seize Jalāl and send him to the court,²⁶ had made the prince's position precarious. There was no alternative left for him but to publicly declare his hostility to Sultan Ibrāhīm. He held a coronation Darbār with great pomp and eclat,²⁷ and received anew promise of support from his partisans whom he lavishly rewarded. He assumed the title of Sultan Jalāluddīn, appointed Fatēh Khan, son of Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī, as his Prime Minister, and got the Khutba read and coins struck in his own name.²⁸ He reorganised his army, improved its accoutrements and also succeeded in gaining the support of the Rājās and Zamindars of the surrounding parganas.²⁹

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²⁶ Badaonī, I, 326; Ranking, I, 430.

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²⁷ T.S.A., 68-69.

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²⁸ T.A., I, 341, 343-44; Ferishta, I, 189.

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²⁹ Dorn, I, 71.

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Finding persuasion of no avail, Ibrāhīm now determined on action. "To cast new rings of obedience" and to impress on his countrymen that he was the sole monarch of the Empire, Ibrāhīm held a second coronation ceremony on 30 December, 1517 (15 Zilhijja, 923 H).³⁰ A gorgeous throne encrusted with fine gems was placed in the Dīwān Khānā and a grand Darbār was held. The Sultan conferred on all civil and military officers titles, distinctions, robes of honour, offices and *jagīrs* according to the status of each. To attach them more and more to his side he bound them by favours and kindnesses. To please the soldiers and the common people he opened the door of munificence to the needy and the poor. By his liberal acts and dignified bearing he conferred new glory on kingship and sovereignty. In Ibrāhīm's court one was reminded of the awe-inspiring grandeur of the courts of Balban and 'Alāuddīn Khaljī.³¹ Ibrāhīm introduced the custom that when the Sultan was in the Darbār, no one howsoever great should be seated in the court.³²

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³⁰ T.A., I, 343; M.R., I, 480. T.S.A., 66 has 10 Zilhijja. T.D., 107 gives these very details in connection with Jalāl's coronation.

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³¹ Cf. R.P.Tripathi, *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, 89.

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³² Ferishta, I, 188.

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Having proclaimed himself the sole monarch of the Sultanate, Ibrāhīm despatched Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī to attack Jalāluddīn and reclaim the eastern districts. Sarwānī marched to Kalinjar,³³ which belonged to Jalāl,³⁴ and laid siege to it. Sultan Jalāluddīn immediately marched to its relief but before meeting Āzam Humayūn in battle, he addressed Malik Sarwānī a letter to this effect: "You are like a father or an uncle to me, and you know that I have committed no fault, and the breach of promise has been from the side of Sultan Ibrāhīm. The small portion of territory and wealth which he had decided to allot to me as my inheritance, on that also he has shut his eyes .... and broken the bond of affection.

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³³ Only *Makhzan*, 75 (b), has Gwalior. All other chroniclers have Kalinjar.

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³⁴ Ferishta, I, 189.

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It behoves you that you should not abandon the side of justice, and should help the oppressed party.”³⁵ The letter was so true in its contents and so importunate in its appeal that Āzam Humayūn could hardly refuse the request. Moreover, his son was the Vakil of Jalāluddīn and he himself bore an ill-feeling towards Ibrāhīm.³⁶ He was also not strong enough to oppose Jalāluddīn and so he thought it best to join Jalāl, and raised the siege of Kalpi because of “financial weakness”.³⁷

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³⁵ T.A., I, 344; T.S.A., 69; Ferishta, I, 189. Similar is the language of *Makhzan*, 75 (b).

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³⁶ T.A., I, 344; T.S.A., 69; Ferishta, I, 189.

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³⁷ *Makhzan*, 75 (a).

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The two now began to plan their future course of action. It was decided that Jalāluddīn must re-establish his authority in Jaunpur. With that end in view their joint forces marched against the governor of Avadh, S'aīd Khan, son of Mubārak Khan Lodi.³⁸ They attacked S'aīd Khan with such alacrity that he sought safety in a precipitate flight to Lakhnau,³⁹ and reported the matter to Sultan Ibrāhīm.

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³⁸ On p. 342 Nizāmuddīn says that Shaikhzādā Muhammad Farmūlī was the governor of Avadh and Lakhnau, and it was to him that Ibrāhīm had sent a robe of honour before starting his fight with Jalāl Khan. On p. 344 the governor of Avadh and Lakhnau, whom Jalāl attacked, is said to be S'aīd Khan, son of Mubārak Khan Lodī. Ferishta repeats the statements on p. 188, line 25 and p. 189, line 10 respectively. Ni'āmatulla also says that the governor of Avadh was S'aīd Khan. The only explanation I can offer is that in all probability at the Darbar of 30 December, 1517, at which many administrative changes were effected, the governorship of Avadh and Lakhnau was transferred from Muhammad Farmūlī to S'aīd Khan Lodī.

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³⁹ T.A., *Makhzan* and Ferishta also have Lakhnau only. Only T.S.A., 70 says that he withdrew to Kara. That is not correct, for Kara was in the charge of Āzam Humayūn himself. Badaonī, Ranking I, 432; T.A., I, 347.

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To all appearances it was Jalāl Khan who had started off with aggression, but the fact is that he had been compelled to do so because of Ibrāhīm's breach of faith. Anyway, now open hostilities had started between the two brothers, and Ibrāhīm Lodī decided to crush Jalāl Khan in rebellion. Before leaving Agra he took the precaution of sending his brothers, whom he had earlier imprisoned at Fīrōzābād,⁴⁰ to the fort of Hansi,⁴¹ where they were provided with all comforts but were kept under the strict vigilance of Daulat Khan with a contingent of 500 horse.⁴²

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⁴⁰ Ferishta, I, 189, line 12; T.A., I, 344; *Makhzan* 76 (a).

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⁴¹ W.M., 40 (a).

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⁴² Ferishta, I, 189; T.S.A., 70.

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He left Agra on 7 January, 1518 (24 Zilhijja, 923 H)⁴³ with a large army. At Bhongaon he was informed that Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī and his son Fatēh Khan, who to save their skin had deserted Jalāluddīn, were coming to join him.⁴⁴ This made Ibrāhīm Lodī extremely happy and his position quite strong. The Sultan now marched to Qannauj, where Āzam Humayūn had the honour of an interview with him. Jalāluddīn's side was greatly weakened by this desertion and he retreated to Kalpi. At Qannauj, Ibrāhīm was joined by many more nobles from Avadh, Jaunpur and Lakhnau including S'aīd Khan and Shaikhzādā Farmūlī, the latter of whom had deserted Jalāl Khan. Qāsim Khan, governor of Sambhal, flushed with a recent victory over the zamindar of Jartoli,⁴⁵ also came to wait upon the Sultan.⁴⁶ Ibrāhīm Lodī now despatched Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī, Āzam Humayūn Lodī and Nāsir Khan Nūhānī with a large army against Jalāl Khan. Before they reached Kalpi, Jalāl Khan left it for Agra. Leaving the defence of Kalpi to his foster mother Ni'āmat Khatūn, Qutb Khan Lodī, Imādul Mulk and Badruddīn, Jalāluddīn marched out to Agra with thirty thousand horse and many trained elephants⁴⁷ to deliver a surprise attack on Ibrāhīm's capital denuded of its troops and without its king. It was a fine stroke of strategy, and gave Ibrāhīm some very anxious moments. He immediately sent Malik Ādam Kākar to save Agra promising to send reinforcements soon. Meanwhile in the absence of Jalāl Khan, Kalpi was easily taken, though not without a siege and consequent fight, which provided an incentive as well as an excuse for its sack.

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⁴³ Dorn, I, 72; Ferishta, I, 189; T.S.A., 70 has Rabiul Ākhir in place of Zilhijja.

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⁴⁴ T.S.A., 70.

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⁴⁵ In Aligarh district. The name of the Zamindar is variously given as Khan Chand or Mān Chand. T.A., I, 344; Dorn, I, 72; M.R., I, 481-82; *Makhzan* 76 (a-b).

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⁴⁶ Ferishta, I, 189.

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⁴⁷ T.S.A., 71; Ferishta, I, 189; *Makhzan*, 76 (b).

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Jalāluddīn learnt of the sad fate of Kalpi when he was besieging Agra. He was determined to wreak his vengeance for the sack of Kalpi by ravaging the capital of Ibrāhīm. But he was dissuaded from doing so by Malik Ādam Kākar, who had been rushed to its defence by Sultan Ibrāhīm. Ādam Khan kept him off by such soft words and speeches as were pleasing to him, and gained thereby time for saving the city from pillage. Later when Malik Ism‘aīl, son of ‘Alāuddīn Jalwānī, Kabīr Khan Lodī and Bahādur Khan Nūhānī with their contingents amounting to 18,000 horse and fifty elephants⁴⁸ arrived from Qannauj, he sent word to Jalāl to give up all pretentions to sovereignty and come to terms with Sultan Ibrāhīm. If Jalāl was agreeable to it, Ādam Khan promised to persuade the Sultan to keep him in possession of his old Jagīr of Kalpi. Jalāl Khan was advised by his leading nobles and well-wishers not to accept any humiliating terms but to offer fight, for Ibrāhīm was revengeful and devoid of all good feelings.⁴⁹ But the Prince lacked both ability and strength. He was in a very good position to fight, having 30,000 brave horsemen and 160 war elephants, but even amidst vehement protests from his officers and men, he agreed to Ādam Khan's condition.⁵⁰ He gave the insignia and paraphernalia of royalty to Ādam Khan upon which his officers left him and his army dispersed. Ādam Khan took Jalāluddīn's Umbrella and Kettledrum to Sultan Ibrāhīm Lodī, who had arrived at Etawah from Qannauj, and conveyed to him the terms of agreement. Ibrāhīm was unwilling to come to any terms with Jalāl. He knew that safety lay in completely destroying his enemy and thereby once for all putting an end to the intrigues of the Afghan nobles. But his attitude was very unfair to Jalāluddīn. Ni‘āmatulla avers that “out of self-conceit, arrogance, youthful vanity and abundance of military equipments”, Sultan Ibrāhīm rejected these terms.⁵¹ Jalāl was now without any army and was in no position to demand fulfilment of Ādam Khan's promise. But in turning down the representation of Ādam Khan, Ibrāhīm was both indecorous and impolitic. Soon the nobles, who had served the Sultanate for long, came to know one thing—Sultan Ibrāhīm could not be trusted.

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⁴⁸ T.S.A., 71-72; Dorn, I, 73; T.A., 346; M.R., I, 482-83.

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⁴⁹ T.S.A., 72.

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⁵⁰ *Makhzan*, 77 (b); Dorn, I, 73. Also T.S.A., 72.

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⁵¹ *Makhzan*, 77 (b).

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Being convinced that Ibrāhīm was not prepared to honour the terms offered by Ādam Khan, Jalāl Khan fled to seek shelter with the Raja of Gwalior.⁵² Ibrāhīm returned to Agra. His power was firmly established. His only rival was lying low, with no chances of recuperation. The nobles who had earlier opposed him were asking for pardon and joining his service.⁵³ Since the death of Sikandar Shāh, Ibrāhīm had not been able to pay any attention to administrative affairs. Now he found time to look to that side also. He sent Haibat Khan Gurgandāz, Karīmdād Taugh and Daulat Khan Indārā⁵⁴ to administer Delhi. Shaikhzādā Manjhū⁵⁵ was despatched to wrest Chanderi from the grandson of Mahmūd Mālwi "who had failed, since Sikandar's death, to acknowledge in an adequate manner the sovereignty of Delhi".⁵⁶

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⁵² T.A., I, 346; T.S.A., 73.

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⁵³ T.A., I, 346; Ferishta, I, 189; T.S.A., 73.

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⁵⁴ T.A., I, 347; Ferishta, 189. Also T.S.A., 72. The spelling of Indārā differs in T.A. and Ferishta.

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⁵⁵ Manjhū means the middling, the young.

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⁵⁶ Ferishta, I, 190; C.H.I., III, 248. *Makhzan*, 78 (a).

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*Conquest of Gwalior*

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The Sultan then turned his attention to Gwalior. Gwalior had provided asylum to the rebel Jalāl Khan and it must be reduced. This was in consonance with the expansionist policy of the Lodī Kings. The occasion was also favourable for the brave Raja Mān Singh had recently died.⁵⁷ Besides, its reduction would add a feather to Ibrāhīm's cap for his predecessor had not been able to take it despite his best efforts.⁵⁸

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⁵⁷ T.S.A., 74-75; *Makhzan*, 78 (b).

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⁵⁸ T.A., I, 347.

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The Sultan deputed Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī, governor of Kara, to march against Gwalior with 30,000 cavalry and 300 elephants.⁵⁹ Many other officers like Bhīkhan Khan, son of 'Ālam Khan Lodī, Sulaimān Farmūlī and Khan-i-Jahān were also sent to support Āzam Humayūn.⁶⁰ On arrival at Gwalior the royal commander laid siege to the fort. Raja Mān's son and successor Vikramāditya, was an illustrious son of a distinguished father. He strengthened the defences of the fort. The besiegers shot fireballs and rockets (*haqqahā*) into the outer citadel of Bādalgarh while the Rajputs retaliated by hurling at the enemy burning bags of cotton soaked in oil, and many were burnt to death on both sides.⁶¹ While the siege was in full swing Jalāl Khan, not to embarrass his host any more, left for Malwa.⁶² Meanwhile the royalists had mined the walls. They effected many breaches and with the help of *sabāts* entered the outer walls of the fortress.⁶³ Finding further resistance impossible, Vikramāditya started negotiations for peace. Ibrāhīm treated the Tomar chief well. Though he deprived him of Gwalior, he assigned to him the fief of Shamsābād.⁶⁴

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⁵⁹ T.A., I, 347-48; Ferishta, I, 190. *Makhzan*, 78 (b) has 350 elephants.

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⁶⁰ T.A., I, 347-48; *Makhzan*, 78 (b).

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⁶¹ T.S.A., 83-84.

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⁶² Badaonī, Ranking, I, 432 and Ferishta, I, 190 give an impression that he left before the siege began. But Ni‘āmatulla says that "Jalāl Khan, unable to bear the blows ... went to Malwa". *Makhzan*, 79 (a).

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⁶³ There they found a brazen bull, which the Hindus had worshipped for years. It was sent to Agra wherefrom the Sultan ordered it to be taken to Delhi and placed at the Baghdād gate. Up to the time of Akbar it was there, and Nizāmuddīn claims to have seen it. Badaonī claims to have seen it too, but he says that he saw it at Fatehpur (Sīkrī) where it had been removed in 992 H, A. D. 1584. Later, by orders of Akbar, it was converted into gongs and bells and implements of all kinds. T.A., I, 348; Badaonī, Ranking, I, 432-33. Also *Makhzan*, 79 (a). T.S.A., 75.

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⁶⁴ C.I.S.G., I, 234; Ferishta, I, 190. This gesture touched Vikramāditya. He remained firmly attached to Ibrāhīm and died fighting in his cause against Bābur at Panipat. Ferishta, I, 205; B.N. (B), II, 477.

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Sultan Ibrāhīm had been greatly annoyed at the escape of Jalāl Khan and suspected in it the hand of his nobles at Gwalior including Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī. Therefore, a little before the reduction of Bādalgarh, he had ordered the recall of Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī and his son Fatēh Khan⁶⁵, and on their arrival at Agra had put both of them behind bars.⁶⁶ Although in the past Āzam Humayūn had made himself notorious by his shifting loyalties, yet he had made amends by faithfully serving the Sultan for many months past. Nay, even knowing what was in store for him, he had obeyed the orders of the Sultan and had returned to Agra.⁶⁷ Thus Āzam Humayūn’s complicity in Jalāl’s escape was perhaps only a baseless suspicion.

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⁶⁵ Ferishta, I, 190 line 13, wrongly has Qutlugh Khan.

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⁶⁶ Badaonī, Ranking, I, 433; W.M., 40 (a).

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⁶⁷ T.S.A., 84-86.

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In fact Ibrāhīm Lodī had started a policy of persecution of such noblemen about whose loyalty he entertained even the remotest suspicion. A little before Āzam’s incarceration, he had imprisoned his Vazīr, Miān Bhuā. Son of the respectable Khawās Khan, Miān Bhuā had been the Vazīr and trusted councillor of Sikandar Lodī for no less than twenty-eight years; and there does not seem to have been any definite charge against him. Ni’āmatulla accuses him of indifference towards the Sultan. He also says that the onset of old age, and consequent infirmity of limbs and sight, had rendered him unfit for the exacting duties of his responsible office.⁶⁸ But physical infirmity was not a crime to merit incarceration. ’Abdulla even goes on to say that Bhuā was in league with Daulat Khan Lodī of the Punjab, and made no efforts to win him over to the side of Sulṭan Ibrāhīm. On the contrary he had begun to show signs of disobedience.⁶⁹ Whatever the reasons, the old and venerable Vazīr was put in “several maunds of chain” and to add insult to injury he was placed in charge of a subordinate of his, Malik Ādam.⁷⁰ True the Sultan gave to Bhuā’s son the office of Vazīr, but that was only trying to correct one wrong with another. No loyalty could be expected from one whose blind old father was in jail.

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⁶⁸ *T.A.*, I, 347, *Makhzan*, 78 (a).

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⁶⁹ *T.D.*, 113-114, 143. The *Afsānā-i-Shāhān* relates an incident bearing upon Miān Bhuā’s behaviour. It says that once Sultan Ibrāhīm ordered the Vazīr to pay a few lacs of rupees to the son of Raja Mān. The Vazīr was reluctant to pay and observed that “The monarch accumulates treasure as a matter of policy and spends it on proper objects. It is not desirable that money should be spent without good reason.” At this the Sultan flew into a rage. *Afsānā-i-Shāhān*, 45 (b) cited in Tripathi, *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, 192-93 and translated in Hindi in *Uttar Tīmūr Kālīn Bharat*, I, 386-87.

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⁷⁰ *T.A.*, I, 347.

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The treatment meted out to Shahzādā Jalāl Khan is equally revolting. After his departure from Gwalior the prince had gone to seek shelter with Maḥmūd Khaljī II of Malwa. At that time Maḥmūd was fighting for his life and throne against Medinī Rai, his Vazīr and councillor, who had become all powerful in Malwa. Maḥmūd could hardly pay any attention to Jalāl Khan, and the latter retired towards the east. When he arrived at Garha Katanga⁷¹ near Jabalpur, its Gond king Sangrām Shāh⁷² imprisoned him and sent him to Agra⁷³ to gain the goodwill of the Emperor. Ibrāhīm Lodī held an impressive Darbār in which his brother was brought with his hands bound behind him. He was ordered to be incarcerated in the fort of Hansi where, it may be recalled, other brothers of Ibrāhīm Lodī were already imprisoned. On the way to Hansi, Jalāl Khan was murdered by poisoning.⁷⁴

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⁷¹ For the location of Garha Katanga see Appendix D.

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⁷² Persian chroniclers do not give the name of the Gond king, but he was certainly Sangram Shāh. Sangram Shāh came to power in 1480 and ruled beyond A. D. 1530. His capital was at Garha near Jabalpur and he had 52 districts (garhs) under his control.

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⁷³ T.A., I, 348; Badaonī, Ranking, I, 433; Ferishta; I, 190.

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⁷⁴ T.A., I, 348; Badaonī, Ranking, I, 433; *Makhzan*, 79 (a).

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A retrospective glance at the relations between these two brothers leaves no doubt in one's mind that Ibrāhīm Shāh had always been guilty of breach of promise. It was he who had repudiated the convention dividing the kingdom between the two. It was again he who had violated the terms on which Ādam Khan, negotiating for the Sultan, had secured Jalāl's submission. In the end also, while pretending to send Jalāl Khan to Hansi as prisoner, he had got him murdered. Ibrāhīm's treatment of his other brothers also does not do him credit. We do not hear of their release even after the trouble with Jalāl was over. In all probability they perished in their dungeons, except for Mahmūd who was placed on the throne for some time on Bābur's arrival in Hindustan.

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The arrest of Miān Bhuā and the assassination of Jalāl Khan, though acts of heinous cruelty in themselves, were nothing compared to the uncalled for arrest of Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī and his son. In ordering their confinement the Sultan had brought the hornets' nest about his ears. True Āzam Humayūn had joined Jalāl Khan formerly, but he had made sufficient expiation by deserting him and fighting for the Sultan. His work in Gwalior was also without blemish and his arrest, which he had courted with a hero's grace,⁷⁵ was simply revolting. The mere fact that "at this time Sultan Ibrāhīm had lost faith in the Amīrs of his father's, and he imprisoned most of the great Khans",⁷⁶ is no justification for such deeds of deliberate provocation. Veteran nobles were being incarcerated and killed and a new class of parvenus was coming up—this was

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⁷⁵ T.D., Trs. in N.B. Roy, 181.

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⁷⁶ T.A., I, 349.

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For a history of the Rajas of Garha-Mandala see J.A.S.B., VI, 1837, 621 ff. Also Imp. Gaz., Central Provinces, 1908, 15,197,209,229.

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the complaint of senior men like Miān Husain.⁷⁷ They felt that Ibrāhīm had failed to "appreciate the merit of the well-wishers of his father's time".⁷⁸ If Ibrāhīm felt that he could completely crush the senior nobles or do without them, he was thoroughly mistaken. According to 'Abdulla, by such acts of his Ibrāhīm "pulled down with his own hands the bulwarks of his kingdom".

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⁷⁷ T.S.A., 81.

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⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 84.

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In such an atmosphere of suspicion on the part of the Sultan and intrigue and defiance on that of the nobles, Ibrāhīm could hardly succeed in war against neighbouring rulers. He had started with high hopes against the Raja of Gwalior, but had thought it politic to be generous towards him. His war against Rana Sangrām Singh of Mewar met with still less success. It weakened his resources and damaged his reputation.

Ibrāhīm and Rana Sāngā

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We have already referred to the strength and influence of Rana Sāngā of Mewar in an earlier context. Supreme as he was in the whole of Rajasthan, Sāngā had also extended his influence in the decaying State of Malwa by taking up the cause of Medinī Rai. But the Lodīs had also been casting longing looks on the territories of this neighbouring State. They had already occupied Chanderi and Narwar and had missed the acquisition of Ranthambhor by a narrow margin. Thus both the Lodīs and the Sisodiyās had their eyes on Malwa and a conflict between them was inevitable.

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Ibrāhīm had inherited the animosity of Rana Sāngā from his father Sikandar Lodī. To do away with the dominance of Medinī Rai in Malwa, its ruler Mahmūd Khaljī II had sought help from the king of Gujarat and his nobles Behjat Khan and Muhāfiz Khan from Sikandar Lodī of Delhi to fight the forces of Sangrām Singh whom Medinī Rai had invited to come to his rescue. In the end the king of Gujarat was defeated, the forces of Delhi were compelled to retire, and Medinī Raī was reinstated.⁷⁹ That is how conflict between Mewar and Delhi had started. After the death of Sikandar Lodī the Sultanate was faced with a serious civil war between Ibrāhīm and his brother Jalāluddīn. Rana Sāngā could not fail to take advantage of the situation and started his encroachments upon the territory of the Sultanate.⁸⁰ Ibrāhīm immediately marched against the Raja, fought a hotly contested engagement at Khatoli near Gwalior,⁸¹ but had to beat a retreat. The Rajputs had scored a victory and had captured Ghayāsuddīn, a prince of the Lodī royal family, but Rana Sāngā had been crippled in this engagement. He had lost his left arm by a sword cut and an arrow had made him lame for life.

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⁷⁹ Ferishta, II, 263-65; T.A., III, 383-395.

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⁸⁰ Har Bilās Sārdā, *Rana Sāngā*, 56.

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⁸¹ Khatoli was included in the Sarkar of Gwalior in the time of Akbar. *Aīn.*, II, 187. For details of the war see Ojha, *Rajputānā Kā Itihās*, II, 663 and Sārdā, *op. cit.*, 56.

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The Rana was in a rage after this battle. Ibrāhīm was also keen on getting back the Lodī prince who, it was reported, had been set up by the Rana as a rival candidate for the Delhi throne.⁸² So the next year (1518-19), the Sultan renewed hostilities against Sangrām Singh. Miān Mākhan, Husain Khan, Miān M'ārūf and Husain Khan Farmūlī were sent at the head of a mighty force towards Rajputana.⁸³ Near Dholpur the Rana's army was contacted. From the very beginning the Rajputs had the upper hand in many stray battles. The Lodī officers were not united in opinion and action. Miān Mākhan was comparatively young, and Husain and M'ārūf had felt aggrieved at their supersession.⁸⁴ The climax was reached when Miān Husain Farmūlī, fearing arrest at the hands of Miān Mākhan, deserted to the side of the Rana.⁸⁵ This defection made the Rana's task easy and he inflicted a crushing defeat on the royal forces. According to 'Abdulla, Miān Husain even led the Rana's forces in pursuing Miān Mākhan as far as Bayana.⁸⁶ On learning of this disaster, Ibrāhīm started for the scene of action.⁸⁷ The presence of the Sultan in the camp raised the morale of his men and also encouraged Miān Husain to rejoin him. His decision was also the direct result of the slights he had experienced at the Rāna's court.⁸⁸ A few indecisive battles between the rival forces, put a stop to the war. This finds corroboration in Tod who gives Barkole and Gattoli as the sites of the battles. He adds that after the last battle Bayana became the northern boundary of Mewar, which had Sinde river to the east and touched Malwa on the south.⁸⁹ When after some time the Sultan ordered the murder of Chanderi's governor, Miān Husain Farmūli, the Rana occupied this southernmost outpost of the Lodī Kingdom also.⁹⁰

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⁸² W.M., 63 (a).

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⁸³ Ojha, *op. cit.*, II, 663-64.

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⁸⁴ T.D., 116.

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⁸⁵ W.M., 59 (a).

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⁸⁶ T.S.A., 82-3; W.M., 61 (a), 65 (a). In the narrative of this campaign all the chroniclers are incoherent and confused. Also E and D, V, 20 n.

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⁸⁷ T.D., 118; Tod., *op. cit*, II, 349-50.

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⁸⁸ Rizqulla relates many incidents of Miān Husain's slights. One such is that once many Hindu and Muslim officers were sitting in the Rana's camp. Ghyāsuddīn, the Sultan's brother who had deserted, was also there. Presently the exultant cry of "Ram, Ram" arose from the side of the Hindus and the Muslims also joined in the refrain. It greatly hurt Miān Husain's feelings as a Muslim. W.M., 63 (a). Another is that one day Miān Husain sent a message to the Rana through Miān Tah expressing a wish to see him. Tah saw many people including Ghayāsuddīn busy conversing in Rana Sāngā's tent, but he was told that the time was not suitable and that the Rana had retired for rest. At this Husain felt greatly humiliated. W.M., 63 (b).

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⁸⁹ Tod, II, 349; W.M., 61 (b).

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⁹⁰ B.N. (B), II, 593; W.M., 64 (a). Also Ojha, II, 666 and Erskine, *Babur and Humayun*, I, 480.

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Sultan Ibrāhīm lost in this war both materially and in reputation. Colonel Tod credits Rana Sāngā with winning eighteen pitched battles against the kings of Delhi and Malwa. The battles mentioned above were a few of these, and they undoubtedly affected the Sultan's position and prestige. Internally too his government was weakened by his constant friction with the nobles.

Nobles in Revolt

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We have seen the injustice of the imprisonment of Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī and his son Fatēh Khan at the hands of the Sultan. At the news of the disgrace of Āzam Humayūn, his son Islam Khan unfurled the standard of revolt at Kara.⁹¹ He seized the treasure, arms and stores of Kara and enlisted a number of good and experienced soldiers. With the strong force so collected, he defeated in battle Ahmad Khan, whom the Sultan had sent against him.

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⁹¹ T.A., I, 349; Badaonī, Ranking, I, 433-34; *Makhzan*, 79 (b); Ferishta, I, 190. Only W.M., 40 (b) has Fatēh Khan in place of Islām Khan.

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Worse still, having heard of the cruel treatment of nobles like Sarwānī and Bhuā, Āzam Humayūn Lodī⁹² and Sʻaīd Khan Lodī fled from the Sultan’s camp to their Jagirs in Lakhnau, and joining hands with Islām Khan began to fan the flames of rebellion in the east. Because of their activities the whole of Avadh, from Kara to Qannauj, was up in arms against the Sultan.⁹³ Whatever the responsibility of the king in the creation of such a situation, he took immediate steps to curb the insurrection. He built up a large force and placed it under some young nobles as the older ones had proved to be undependable. The young commanders included Ahmad Khan, brother of Āzam Humayūn Lodī (in rebellion), sons of Husain Farmūlī, Dilāwar Khan, son of Ahmad Khan (recently defeated by Islām Khan), Qutb Khan, son of Ghāzī Khan Jalwānī, Bhīkan Khan Nūhānī, and Sikandar, son of Ādam Kākar.⁹⁴ Thus the royal commanders included officers of all tribes of Afghans. They might have been so selected as to keep a watch over one another. It also shows that the loyalists did not belong to any particular section and comprehended all sections of the nobility. The army was ordered to quell the insurrection.

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⁹² Āzam Humayūn was only a title and not a name.

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⁹³ *T.A.*, I, 349; *Makhzan*, 79 (b).

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⁹⁴ *T.A.*I, 349; also Badaonī, Ranking, I, 434. *T.D.*, 114, has twelve names. Also *Makhzan*, 80 (a).

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On their way to the east, the royal army was ambushed at Bangarmau near Qannauj.⁹⁵ Iqbāl Khan, a cavalry commander (Khasa Khail) of Āzam Humayūn Lodī, suddenly came out of his ambush with 5,000 and killed and wounded a large number of royalists (A. D. 1519).⁹⁶ This discomfiture evoked a just reprimand from the Sultan, who, while sending them fresh reinforcements, warned them not to return without achieving their objective.⁹⁷ Stung to the quick and sufficiently strengthened, the royalists resumed their march. The rebel forces by now had swelled to 40,000 horse and 500 elephants.⁹⁸ As the two armies lay facing each other, everybody could see that the battle was going to be sanguinary. Shaikh Yūsuf Qattāl, a leading contemporary saint,⁹⁹ intervened between them and advised the rebels to come to terms with the Monarch. They agreed to do so on the condition that Aʻzam Humayūn Sarwānī was released from prison,¹⁰⁰ but the Sultan, who insisted on their unconditional surrender, refused to come to terms with them. At the same time he ordered Dariyā Khan Nūhānī, governor of Bihar, Nāsir Khan Nūhānī of Ghazīpur and Shaikhzādā Muhammad Farmūlī to advance upon the rebels from the east. With their advance the rebel forces were sandwiched between two loyal armies. The forces fighting on the side of the Sultanate were now in a position of vantage which they had gained through the initiative of the Sultan as well as the complacency of the enemy. On the day of the battle the two sides were locked in mortal conflict, “and shed such streams of blood, that the eyes of the age became blind and old an beholding it”.¹⁰¹ In the words of Niʻāmatulla, “For many years such a sanguinary action had not occurred in Hindustan. … Dead bodies, heap upon heap, covered the field, … and streams of blood ran over the plain. Brother against brother, and father against son, urged by mutual rivalry and inborn bravery, mixed in the conflict; and restraining their hands from long arrow and spear, they contended only with dagger, sword and knife. In that battle 10,000 gallant Afghans fell on both sides.”¹⁰² Islām Khan was killed and Saʻīd Khan with a number of rebel chiefs was captured by the soldiers of Dariyā Khan Nūhānī.¹⁰³ Thus the rebel forces were utterly routed, and the insurrection suppressed. All chroniclers have moralised on the ingratitude of the rebels,¹⁰⁴ but none has blamed the cruelty and obstinacy of the Sultan in fanning this civil war. He might have found satisfaction in the fact that this war had broken the backbone of the rebellious nobility. In fact he felt exceedingly happy on the occasion and profusely rewarded those who had fought on his side.¹⁰⁵ Little did he realise that such a great conflict, in which the flower of the army had been lost, was bound to affect the strength and stability of his own Empire.

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⁹⁵ Bangarmau lies half way on the road joining Hardoi and Unao.

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⁹⁶ *T.S.A.*, 76; *M.R.*, I, 485. Ferishta, I, 190.

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⁹⁷ Dorn, I, 75. *Makhzan*, 80 (a).

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⁹⁸ *T.A.*, I, 350; Ferishta, I, 190; *T.S.A.*, 77; *M.R.*, I, 486; *Makhzan*, 80 (a).

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⁹⁹ Nizāmuddīn and Ferishta give the name of the saint as Shaikh Rājū Bukhārī. According to ʻAbdul Haqq, Saiyyad Sadruddīn Rājū Qattāl Bukhārī was the son of Saiyyad Ahmad Kabīr. He obtained the gaddī from his brother Makhdūm Jahāniyān. *Akhbārul Akhyār*, 150. But Rājū Qattāl Bukhārī had died in A. D. 1423 (827 H), almost a century before the present war. The saint who intervened was most probably Yūsuf Qattāl who died at Delhi in A. D. 1527 (933 H). *Akhbārul Akhyār*, 219.

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¹⁰⁰ T.A., I, 350; T.S.A., 77; Ferishta, I, 190.

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¹⁰¹ T.A., I, 350; Also T.S.A., 77.

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¹⁰² *Makhzan*, 81 (a); Dorn, I, 76. Also E and D, V, 15 n. 4.

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¹⁰³ T.S.A., 77; *Makhzan*, 81 (b).

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¹⁰⁴ T.A., I, 350; Ferishta, I, 190; T.S.A., 77.

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¹⁰⁵ T.A., I, 351.

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Ibrāhīm's success only prompted him to destroy those remaining barons whose loyalty he suspected. Some of them had fought for him in the last war, but that did not win for them the confidence of the Sultan. His nature was certainly suspicious, although it is difficult to correctly apportion the blame between the king and the barons for the sad state of affairs. All the same Ibrāhīm's not too short a reign of nine years was spent in fighting a fruitless and disastrous war with his own nobility.

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In pursuance of his vindictive policy Sultan Ibrāhīm got Husain Khan Farmūlī murdered by some low Shaikh-zādā at Chanderi.¹⁰⁶ He even rewarded the assassin with 700 gold coins and ten villages.¹⁰⁷ This murder created great alarm coming as it did close on the death of Miān Bhuā and Āzam Humayūn Sarwānī in prison under very suspicious circumstances. It was reported that a gunpowder plot had been hatched and these unsuspecting prisoners had been induced to shift to a cell in which they were blown to pieces.¹⁰⁸ Suspicion breeds suspicion and these murders created widespread consternation, and disaffection increased all the more. Dariyā Khan Nūhānī, governor of Bihar, Khan-i-Jahān Lodī and others like them unfurled the standard of revolt in the east.¹⁰⁹ These were the barons who had fought for the Sultanate in the last war, but their loyalty was now undermined. The situation only worsened with Dariyā Khan Nūhānī's death shortly after. His son Bahādur Shāh¹¹⁰ declared complete independence in Bihar. He took the title of Sultan Muhammad and instituted the Khutba¹¹¹ and issued coins in his own name. He was readily joined by many Amīrs who had forsaken allegiance to Delhi, and the forces under him soon swelled to one hundred thousand horse.¹¹² He reduced to submission the whole of the upper Ganga country from Bihar to Sambhal,¹¹³ situated as close as eighty miles from Delhi as the crow flies. Nāsir Khan Nūhānī, the governor of Ghāzīpur, being defeated by Miān Mustafa¹¹⁴ on orders from Sultan Ibrāhīm, also went over to Muhammad Shāh. Other disaffected nobles of the eastern region also flocked to Muhammad Shāh.¹¹⁵ With time Muhammad Shāh's power went on increasing in Bihar.

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¹⁰⁶ T.A., I, 351; Badaonī, Ranking, I, 435; Ferishta, I, 191; *Makhzan*, 81 (b).

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¹⁰⁷ E and D, V, 20 n.

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¹⁰⁸ T.S.A., 75-76; T.D., 122-25.

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¹⁰⁹ T.S.A., 86; Dorn, I, 76.

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¹¹⁰ M.R., I, 487; *Makhzan*, 82 (a). T.S.A., 87 wrongly calls him Shahbāz Khan. W.M., 41 (a) has Bihar Khan.

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¹¹¹ W.M., 41 (a).

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¹¹² T.A., I, 351; Dorn, I, 76; Ferishta, I, 191. T.S.A., 87 has only 70,000.

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¹¹³ T.A., I, 351; Badaoni, Ranking, I, 435.

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¹¹⁴ This Miān Mustafa was the brother of Shaikh Bayezīd Farmūlī who made himself conspicuous under Bābur.

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¹¹⁵ Dorn, I, 76.

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The east having got out of control and the Rajputs having become too strong in the south and west (with Bayana having become the boundary between the Sultanate and Rana Sāngā's dominions), Ibrāhīm must have felt deeply distressed. The *de facto* ruler of Bihar had fought several battles with the forces of the Sultanate and had come off with flying colours.¹¹⁶ In these circumstances Sultan Ibrāhīm sent for Daulat Khan Lodī, son of Tātār Khan and governor of the Punjab for the last twenty years,¹¹⁷ in all probability for consultations and help. But Daulat Khan was scared by the happenings in eastern Hindustan, and being in arrears, he avoided coming. Instead, he sent his youngest son Dilāwar Khan to Agra. Sultan Ibrāhīm at once guessed the reasons for Daulat's excuse of absence, and threatened Dilāwar and his father with dire consequences if the latter did not obey his orders. Dilāwar, greatly alarmed, managed to escape to Lahore and related to his father what had transpired between Ibrāhīm and himself. Daulat Khan could clearly see what was in store for him. To escape from the wrath of the Sultan, he, in 1523, invited Bābur from Kabul to destroy the power of Ibrāhīm Lodī.

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¹¹⁶ T.A., I, 351; Ferishta, I, 191; *Makhzan*, 82 (a).

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¹¹⁷ T.S.A., 87. Tātār Khan, it may be remembered, was one of the leading Afghān nobles of the Punjab who had helped in the elevation of Bahlūl Lodī to the throne.

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Ordinarily it would have sufficed to discuss Bābur's relations with India from about this date. But since the Mughal conqueror had already carried out a number of raids into north-western Hindustan, it would be proper to study, howsoever briefly, such events of his early career as have a bearing on his conquest of India.

Bābur's Invasion of Hindustan

c15.s4.1

Zahīruddīn Muhammad Bābur¹¹⁸ had descended from two mighty empire-builders—Tīmūr on the paternal side and Chingīz Khan on the maternal—fourth in descent from the former and fourteenth generations from the latter. He was born on 14 February, 1483 (6 Muharram, 888 H) at Andijān, capital of Farghānā, his father's fertile kingdom, now a small state in Russian Turkistan. Bābur's grandfather Abū S'ayīd Mirzā, after constant conflicts, had come to possess the Mawārunnehr or Transoxiana, which on his death in A. D. 1469 was divided amongst his sons, one of whom was Bābur's father 'Umar Shaikh Mirzā. 'Umar Shaikh obtained the kingdom of Farghānā. Caution and patience were equally denied to him, and he constantly intrigued and fought against his brothers. His unwisdom invited against him a joint attack by his brother and brother-in-law, Sultan Ahmad Mirzā and Sultan Mahmūd Khan. While their armies lay on the outskirts of Farghānā, 'Umar Shaikh died on 8 June, 1494, when a pigeon cot collapsed with him inside it. Curiously enough his death saved his kingdom. The two uncles of Bābur had hated his father. They bore no grudge against their eleven-year-old nephew, who now became the ruler of Farghānā.

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