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Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire (A.D. 1346 – A.D. 1646) v1.c13: Chapter VII. Justice and Oppression

Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire (A.D. 1346 – A.D. 1646) v1.c13

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English

Contents

Chapter VII. Justice and Oppression

Section 1. Classical and Vijayanagara Theory of Daṇḍa

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ONE of the questions which naturally arises in connection with the history of the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagara is that relating to the administration of justice. This brings us to the topic of the adherence of the Vijayanagara monarchs to classical principles as recorded in the *dharma-śāstras*. The subject of justice and punishment, as is well known to students of Hindu polity, is treated in the *smṛtis* under the caption of *daṇḍa*. Gautama thus defines *daṇḍa*: "They declare that (the word) *daṇḍa* (rule or punishment) is derived from (the verb) *damayati* (he restrains); therefore he shall restrain those who do not restrain themselves".¹ While admitting the inherent weakness of human nature and the tendency it has to over-ride the limits imposed obviously by the State on behalf of society, Gautama also makes provision for a moderate dispensation of justice, especially as regards punishments, in his statement that the king shall only restrain those who do not know how to restrain themselves. Moderation, therefore, is one of the features of the *daṇḍanīti*. There is another feature of the ancient system which may enable us to understand the Vijayanagara theory and practice of *daṇḍa*. This relates to the free access which the people had in making a direct appeal to the king. In the account of the *rājasūya* as described in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, we are told that one of the results accruing from the performance of that sacrifice makes the king the lord of law, and that the supreme state (*paramatā*) is that in which the people can approach the king in matters of law.² The right of direct appeal advocated in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* is to be borne in mind in our estimate of the methods of administering justice under Vijayanagara.

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¹ Gautama XI, 28, p. 238. This is of course an ingenious definition.

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² Sat. Brāh., P. III, V., 3, 3, 9, p. 71; Ghosal, Hind. Pol. Theor. p. 40 (1st ed.) For the importance of the *Rājasūya* sacrifice, Sat. Brāhmaṇa, P. III, p. 42, seq.

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The opinion of Gautama that meting out punishment is a necessary attribute of the State is to be traced to Manu, who explains thus the importance of *daṇḍa*: "For the (king's sake, the Lord formerly created his own son, Punishment, the protector of all creatures (an incarnation of) the law, formed of Brahman's glory. Through fear of him all created beings, both the immovable and the movable, allow themselves to be enjoyed, and swerve not from their duties".¹ The necessity of instituting the law of punishment is seen in the security it gives to all the four orders. "Punishment is (in reality) the king and the male, that the manager of affairs, that the ruler, and that is called the surety for the four orders' obedience to the law. Punishment alone governs all created beings, punishment alone protects them, punishment watches over them while they sleep; the wise declare punishment (to be identical with) the law".² Then again Manu says: "The whole world is kept in order by punishment, for a guiltless man is hard to find; through fear of punishment the whole world yields the enjoyment (which it owes)".³

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¹ Manu, VII, 14, 15, p. 218; Ghosal, Hind Pol. Theor. p. 166. (1st ed.)

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² Ibid., VII, 17-18, p. 219. See also Gautama, XI, 29-31, p. 238; Vishnu, III, 90-5, pp. 22-3; Sukraniti, IV, 11. 92-8, pp. 130-1.

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³ Manu, VII, 22, p. 219.

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But Manu does not advocate indiscriminate or untimely punishment: "If (punishment) is properly inflicted after (due) consideration, it makes all people happy; but inflicted without consideration, it destroys everything".⁴ "Having fully considered the time and the place (of the offence) the strength and the knowledge (of the offender) let him justly inflict that (punishment) on men who act unjustly".⁵ Manu, therefore, conceives of daṇḍa as the motive force which keeps the different classes of society in perfect order, and invests it with an antiquity and importance which make it an inevitable attribute to the rājadharma.⁶

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⁴ Ibid., VII, 19, p. 219.

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⁵ Ibid., VII, 16, p. 218.

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⁶ Ghosal, ibid., p. 107 (1st ed.)

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This orthodox view of the great lawgiver is to some extent modified by Kauṭilya, who brings into relief the suggestion of Manu that justice should be tempered with mercy. Kauṭilya advocates the following: "... for whoever imposes severe punishment becomes repulsive to the people; while he who awards mild punishment becomes contemptible. But whoever imposes punishment as deserved becomes respectable. For punishment (daṇḍa), when awarded with due consideration, makes the people devoted to righteousness and to works productive of wealth and enjoyment; while puishment, when ill-awarded under the influence of greed and anger or owing to ignorance, excites fury even among hermits and ascetics dwelling in forests, not to speak of householders".¹ But Kauṭilya was not unaware of the supreme necessity of instituting punishment for the maintenance of social order. "But when the law of punishment is kept in abeyance, it gives rise to such disorder as is implied in the proverb of fishes (*mātsyanyāyamudbhavayati*); for in the absence of a magistrate (*daṇḍadharābhāve*), the strong will swallow the weak; but under his protection the weak resist the strong".²

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¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. I., Ch. IV, 9, p. 9.

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² *Ibid.*

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With that spirit of compromise which is so characteristic of him, Sukra gives to us the mediaeval conception of *daṇḍa* thus: "Daṇḍa is restraint and punishment, hence the king is also known to be Daṇḍa. The Niti that regulates punishment constitutes Daṇḍanīti, Niti so called because it governs and guides".³ This may be considered along with the earlier definition given by Kauṭilya: "That sceptre on which the wellbeing and progress of sciences of Anvīkṣhakī, the triple Vēdas, and Vārtā depend is known as Daṇḍa (punishment). That which treats of Daṇḍa is the law of punishment of science of government (daṇḍanīti)".⁴ Obviously the reference here is to the importance of *daṇḍa* in the social life of the people as suggested by Manu.

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³ *Sukranīti*, I, ll. 313-4, p. 22. For a further evolution of the theory of *daṇḍa*, see Ghosal, *Hind. Pol. Theor.* pp. 228-9, (1st ed.); pp. 59-60, 104-5, 151 (2nd ed.); Sarkar, *Pos. Back.* Bk. II, P. I, p. 31; also his *Pol. Institutions and Theories of the Hindus* (Leipzig, 1923); Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, *Some Aspects of Ancient Hindu Polity*, (Calcutta, 1929).

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⁴ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. I, Ch. IV, 9, p. 8.

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Having ascertained the prominence given to the theory of punishment in the political writings of the Hindu theorists, we may now gather a few details about the constitution of a court of justice as understood by the lawgivers. Manu advocates personal investigation by the monarch. "A king desirous of investigating law cases must enter his Court of Justice, preserving a dignified demeanour, together with the Brāhmaṇas and with experienced councillors. There, either seated or standing, raising his right arm, without ostentation in his dress and ornaments, let him examine the business of suitors, daily (deciding) one after another (all cases) which fall under the eighteen titles of (the law)

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according to principles drawn from local usages and from the institutes of the sacred law".¹ When the king is unable to investigate personally law-suits, Manu ordains the appointment of a law-court. "But if the king does not personally investigate the suits, then let him appoint a learned Brāhmaṇa to try them. That (man) shall enter that most excellent court, accompanied by three assessors, and fully consider (all) causes (brought) before the (king), either sitting down or standing. Where three Brāhmaṇas versed in the Vedas and the learned (judge) appointed by the king sit down, they call that the court of (four-faced) Brahma".²

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¹ Manu, VIII, 1-2, p. 253. ² Ibid., VIII, 9-11, p.

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This served as the basis of the composition of law-courts of the later theorists, some of whom, as for example Gautama, have considerably increased the number of persons who were to constitute a court of justice. According to Gautama: "They declare, that an assembly (parisad shall consist) at least (of) the ten following (members, viz.) four men who have completely studied the four Vedas, three men belonging to the (three) orders enumerated first, (and) three men who know (three) different institutes of law. But on failure of them decision of one Śrotriya who knows the Veda and is properly instructed (in the duties, shall be followed) in doubtful cases".³ Baudhāyana explains the concluding idea of Gautama, thus: "There may be five or there may be three, or there may be one blameless man, who decides (questions regarding) the sacred law. But a thousand fools (can) not (do it)".⁴ Śukra enlarged the scope of a court in these words: "A court of justice is that place where the study of the social, economic, and political interests of man takes place according to the dictates of Dharma Śāstras".⁵

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As regards the authorities which are to guide the judges who constitute a law-court, we have the following in Gautama: "His (i.e. the king's) administration of justice (shall be regulated by) the Veda, the Institutes of the Sacred Law, the Aṅgas and the Purāṇas".⁶ Vishnu enumerates the qualifications of a judge thus: "Let the king appoint as judges men of good families, for whom the ceremonies (of initiation and so forth) have been performed, and who are eager in keeping religious vows, impartial towards friend and foe, and not likely to be corrupted by litigants either by (ministering to their) lustful desires or by (stimulating them to) wrath or by (exciting their) avarice or by other (such practices)".¹ The lawgivers have also set down rules governing the qualifications of witnesses.²

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²⁵⁴ According to Manu a Śūdra can never interpret the law. VIII, 20, p. 255. ³ Gautama, XXVIII, 49-50, p.

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³¹⁰ Cf. Vasiṣṭha, III, 7, 20. pp. 17, 20. ⁴ Baudhāyana, I, 1, 1, vv. 6-9, pp. 143-4. ⁵ Śukranīti, IV, II, 83-4, pp. 186-7. ⁶ Gautama, XI, 19, p. 237.

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¹ Viṣṇu, III, 74, pp. 20-1. ² Manu, VIII, 62-3, 68-78, pp. 264-5, 266-8, 299, 300; Gautama, XIII; p. 246 seq. ³ Gautama, XII, 51, p. 245; Cf. Vasiṣṭha, XIX, 8-10, p. 97. ⁴ Viṣṇu, V, 194-5, p. 41.

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They are unanimous in their opinion that punishment should be in proportion to the crime committed. Gautama says: "The award of punishment (must be regulated) by a consideration (of the status) of the criminal, of his (bodily) strength, (of the nature) of the crime, and whether the offence has been repeated".³ Viṣṇu ordains that the king should consult the Brahmans when awarding punishment. "Let the king dictate due punishments for other offences also, after having ascertained the class and the age (of the criminal) and the amount (of the damage done or sum claimed), and after having consulted the Brāhmaṇas (his advisers)".⁴

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From classical theory we may now turn to the Vijayanagara conception of *daṇḍa* as recorded by Kṛṣṇa Dēva Rāya the Great in his *Āmuktamālyada*. The rough sketch of the classical theory of *daṇḍa* given above enables us to understand that, among other things, the ancients insisted on the institution of punishment for the welfare of society: that its importance was such that they surrounded it with the divinity which was always associated with the person of a monarch; that they enacted that the king or his councillors, while executing it, should be guided by considerations of the nature and time of the crime committed, and the ability of the guilty man to bear punishment; that the ruler should consult a body of learned Brahmans; and that the people were allowed the right of making a direct appeal to the king.

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Kṛṣṇa Dēva Rāya's elucidation of the nature and importance of punishment was, on the whole, in accordance with the classical notions. "The wife's attachment to her husband, the proper relations between men and women, the ascetic subduing his indriyas, the lower castes showing deference to the higher, the servant looking carefully to the interests of the master, you should know that all these are brought about (ultimately) by the fear of the king's punishment".¹ It is evident that the monarch is referring to the importance of daṇḍa in the social life of the people in the above statements. He further says: "It is essential that a king should be able to enforce his commands. Even the Ābhīras and the Bhillas of the forest are able to enforce their orders, as by the sign of the arrow and the piece of thread. Much more therefore is it necessary that an emperor (Sārvabhauma) should be able to enforce his commands".²

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¹ Amuktamālyada, v. 377; J.I.H. IV., P. III, p. 75.

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² Ibid., vv. 206; ibid., p. 65.

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To the classical idea of balancing punishment with mercy, Kṛṣṇa Dēva Rāya adds a clause which was to some extent an advance on the ancient theory of daṇḍa. The lawgivers opine that the time and place where the offence was committed together with the nature of the culprit are to be taken into consideration; the Vijayanagara monarch declares that the criminal should be given the chance of appealing thrice to the king. "In the matter of people sentenced to death give them the chance to appeal thrice (for mercy)". But this leniency is not to be shown to those who plot against the State. The ruler continues: "But in the case of those people whose escape might bring calamity to yourself immediate execution is advisable".³ In the matter of administering justice and of executing the royal decree, he shows that he is not unacquainted with human nature. "If a king were to propitiate his guards with presents and hands over to them for custody a thief whose guilt has been proved without immediate punishment and if when he escapes, the guards bring before the king another in his place and punish him, as the story of the stout merchant on the spear, will not the king's infamy increase?".⁴ If this may be taken to be a defect in Vijayanagara system of administering justice, because it admits the possibility of the State officers being corrupted by outside agencies, it may also be interpreted to mean that the rulers were prepared to meet such a contingency in order to maintain law and order in the land.

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³ Ibid., v. 243; ibid., p. 70.

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⁴ Ibid., v. 239; ibid., p. 69.

Section 2. Administration of Justice in Pre-Vijayanagara Days

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Wise as Kṛṣṇa Dēva Rāya certainly was, even he had to follow the system of justice as laid down by the ancient rulers of southern India. Custom has always played an important part in the life of the Hindu people; and in matters of justice, ancient usage has been raised to the dignity of law. This explains the injunction found in the *dharma-śāstras* to the effect that rulers were to preserve and respect the ancient custom of the land. Thus in the code of Manu: "The custom handed down in regular succession (since time immemorial) among the (four chief) castes (*varṇa*) and the mixed (races) of that country, is called the conduct of virtuous man".¹ Gautama says: "The laws of countries, castes, and families, which are not opposed to the (sacred) records, (have) also authority".²

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¹ Manu, II, 18, p. 32.

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² Gautama, XI, 20, p. 237.

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Rulers, who, as we remarked while dealing with the local administration of Vijayanagara, were proud to consider themselves as promoters of the *pūrvada-maryāde* of the country, naturally could not have escaped the influence of ancient custom, especially in the south and west, where the Tamil and Karṇāṭaka kings had already established an efficient system of judicial administration. In the Tamil land, for example, even villages had their own well defined courts of justice. In an inscription dated in the third regnal year of king Pārthivēndravarman, the members of the great assembly of Uttaramēlūr-chaturvēdimaṅgalam, enacted the following: "We, *(the members)* of the big Assembly *(also)* ordered that if *(any such taxes are)* shown *(against it)*, each person *(so showing)* shall be liable to pay a fine of twenty-five kalañju of gold in the court of justice (*dharmāsana*)."³

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³ S.I.I. III, P. III, p. 342, see also pp. 261, 348-9, 357-8.

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Some idea of the manner in which these early village courts of justice dealt with cases of grave importance can be gathered from records found in the South Arcot district. These epigraphs contain details about cases of murder under provocation and of accidental death, and the method by which culprits were punished. In A.D. 1054, in the third year of Parakēsarivarman Rājēndradēva, a village officer (?) demanded taxes from a woman, who declared that she was not liable to pay taxes. On the officer putting her through an ordeal, she took poison and died. A general assembly consisting of the people from "the four quarters, eighteen districts, and various countries" was summoned, and the man was declared liable for punishment. This, however, took the shape of a fine of thirty-two kāśu which he had to pay for burning a lamp at the temple of Tirut-tāndōṅri-Mahādēva.¹ A Śūdra, in the third year of Rājakēsarivarman alias Tribhuvanachakravartin Kulōttuṅga Chōḷa Dēva, while out a-hunting, missed his aim, and shot a Veḷḷāḷa. The villagers "from the seventy-nine districts" assembled together, and found the Śūdra guilty of homicide (not amounting to murder). He was ordered to pay sixty-four cows to the Tiruttāndōṅri-Aḷuḍaiyār temple for burning two lamps.²

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¹ 80 of 1906; *Ep. Report* for 1907, p. 77.

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² 67 of 1906. For similar other cases see *Ep. Report* for 1907-8, pp. 77-8.

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That in the conduct of criminal cases the villagers sometimes had the sanction of the State is shown by two inscriptons dated in the reign of a certain Rājakēsarivarman alias Tribhuvanachakravartin (Kulōttuṅga Chōḷa Dēva), who probably lived in the twelfth century A.D. One of these relates that a certain individual shot a man belonging to his own village by mistake. Thereupon the governor and people of the district to which the culprit belonged, assembled together and decided that as the man had committed the offence out of mere carelessness, he was to compensate his guilt by burning a lamp in the Tūṇāṇḍār temple at Siyamaṅgalam. Accordingly, he provided the temple with sixteen cows from the milk of which ghee was prepared for burning the lamp.³

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³ 64 of 1900. For other instances of similar nature, see *Ep. Report* for 1900, pp. 10-11. Mr. Venkayya (ibid.) estimated roughly that the sacrifice which a culprit had thus to undergo was represented by about twenty kalam of paddy, according to the current standard of value.

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Brahmans too sometimes took part in these deliberative assemblies. A native of Arumbondai, in the thirteenth century A.D., aimed an arrow at another man, mistaking him for an animal. The latter died of the effects of the wound soon after. The Brahmans together with the nāṭṭār (people of the district)¹ decided that, on behalf of the deceased the accused had to provide for a lamp in the temple of Bhūmīśvaram at Marakkāṇam, in the South Arcot district.² Inscriptions of the same age recording similar instances inform us that the accused persons were sometimes made to provide temples with forty-eight sheep.³

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¹ The nāṭṭār may have been also village functionaries in the Tamil land, although it is equally probable that, like the people of the nāḍ in the Karṇāṭaka, they were merely citizens. See supra, Chapter IV, The Revenue Administration.

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² Ep. Report for 1919, p. 99.

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³ Ibid. For further remarks on this subject, read Mr. A. S. Ramanatha Aiyyar's article entitled Homicide and its Punishment in Mediaeval Times, Calcutta Review, 1925, XV, Nos. 1-3, pp. 313-21.

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These precedents of what might appear to be mild punishments, were, however, not always the rule. In the case of those whose activities disturbed public peace, heavier penalties were imposed by the State. This sometimes took the shape of forfeiture of lands. A certain Āliyaṅgaiyan Saṭṭiyanāvaṇ with his armed accomplices killed one Vāmana Bhaṭṭa on the night of the 25th Arpasi, in the eleventh year of Jaṭāvarman Tribhuvanachakravartin Sundara Pāṇḍya Dēva, while the Brahman was returning home from the temple. Saṭṭiyanāvaṇ eluded imprisonment, but the king ordered that the property belonging to the criminal including his village called Karuvērkrichchi, houses, male and female servants etc., was to be confiscated and added as a tirunāmattu-kāṇi to the temple of Nāyanar Sokka-Nārāyaṇa at Tirukkoshṭiyur in the Rāmnāḍ district.⁴ This drastic action of the king had the desired effect of bringing the guilty person to his senses. A representation was made to the State by several individuals on behalf of the accused, Saṭṭiyanāvaṇ Seramlaip Perumāl, on the ground that he was not an accomplice in the murder; and the village assembly of Tirukkoshṭiyur, obviously at the instance of the king, decided to return to the accused all the confiscated property for a consideration of 800 pon.⁵

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⁴ 301 of 1923.

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⁵ 303 of 1923.

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These instances from the south enable us to conjecture that the Tamil people in the ages preceding those of the sons of Saṅgama, had already put into operation the main injunctions of the ancient lawgivers that justice was to be administered in proportion to the seriousness of the offence, and that the culprit was always entitled to appeal, even after having received his sentence for grave crimes. This practice of dealing with criminals prevalent in the Pāṇḍya and Chōḷa lands must have continued under the Vijayanagara rulers, who, as related elsewhere, were always guided by the pūrvada maryāde of the country in most matters connected with their domestic policy.¹

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¹ For examples of pre-Vijayanagara criminal administration especially in the Karṇāṭaka, refer to the following: My. Arch. Report for 1911-12, p. 44; ibid., for 1926, p. 38; ibid., for 1925, p. 57. For instances of criminal jurisdiction in the Tamil land, see 315 and 352 of 1909 the latter of which is a mixture of superstition and sense. Ep. Report for 1910, p. 95; Rangachari, Top. List., I, Cg. 143, p. 337, dated A.D. 1306.

Section 3. Justice under Vijayanagara

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The accounts of travellers as well as inscriptions give us some details about the manner in which they administered justice in the Hindu Empire. 'Abdur Razzāq says: "On the right hand of the palace of the Sultān there is the diwān-khāna or minister's office, which is extremely large, and presents the appearance of a chihal sutūn, or forty-pillared hall. . . . In the middle of the pillared hall, a eunuch, called a Danāik, sits alone upon a raised platform, and presides over the administration; and below it the mace-bearers stand drawn up in a row on each side. Whoever has any business to transact advances between the lines of mace-bearers, offers some trifling present, places his face upon the ground, and standing upon his legs again, represents his grievance. Upon this, the Danāik issues orders founded upon the rules of justice prevalent in that country, and no other person has any power of remonstrance. When the Danāik leaves the chamber, several coloured umbrellas are borne before him,² and trumpets are sounded, and on both sides of his way panegyrists pronounce benedictions upon him. Before he reaches the king he has to pass through seven gates, at which porters are seated, and as the Danāik arrives at each door, an umbrella is left behind, so that on reaching the seventh gate the Danāik enters alone. He reports upon the affairs of the State to the king, and, after remaining sometime, returns. His residence lies behind the palace of the king".³

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² Infra. Volume II., Chapter V, Section 2.

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³ Elliot, Hist. of India, IV, pp. 107-8; Major, India, p. 25. See also Sewell, For. Emp., p. 91.

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From the above it appears that there were regular courts of justice and judges specially appointed for that purpose under the mediaeval form of government.¹ The *Danāik* of 'Abdur Razzāq was evidently a *daṇḍanāyaka* or military commander; and if we are to rely on the evidence of the Persian Ambassador, the Vijayanagara monarchs entrusted the duty of administering justice to an officer of the army, or to one who had seen service as a general. If this were really the case, no graver error could have been committed by the Hindu rulers of Vijayanagara, since such a procedure would have meant the violation of one of the most important injunctions of the ancient lawgivers in regard to the administration of justice. We have seen that according to Manu, Gautama, Vasiṣṭha, and Baudhāyana, the king was to be assisted by at least three Brahmans well versed in the Sacred Law. A *daṇḍanāyaka* or military commander was in no sense a substitute for a Brahman learned in the *smṛtis*, although, as remarked elsewhere, we have instances of very wise and able minister-governors well acquainted with the *śāstras* and *smṛtis* in Vijayanagara history. The fact that 'Abdur Razzāq is positive about the name of the high dignitary who administered justice makes one suspect that the rulers of Vijayanagara had indeed acted, at least in the important question of the composition of what may be called the court of chief justice, contrary to the classical notions of *daṇḍa*. This supposition is strengthened to some extent by the fact that in the list of the eight ministers (*aṣṭha-pradhāna*), as given in the *Accounts of Rāma-Rāja*, no mention is made of a supreme judge or chief justice.²

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¹ For some remarks on this subject see Rice, My. Gaz. I, p. 480 (1st ed.); I, p. 587, seq., (Rev. ed.) A.C.P. dated S. 1578 of the times of Sriranga Rāya (No. 19 of 1916-17) deals with the settlement of a case of *gauḍike* rights by the village court (*dharmāsana*) of Harati. This is ten years after the flight of Raṅga Rāya to Bedhore. If the authenticity of this inscription could be proved, we have some evidence of the existence of village courts in A.D. 1656-7. On the last days of Sriranga Rāya, who is by some styled II, and by others, III, of that name, see S. K. Aiyangar, in Satyanatha, Nayaks, p. 133, n. (60).

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² *Rāma-Rāja Charita*, Mac. Coll. MSS. in the India Office.

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But neither of the above assumptions can be maintained. The *Accounts of Rāma Rāja* do not deal with the judicial administration of the country but with the executive council of the king. And as regards the supposition that the rulers of Vijayanagara had entrusted the question of justice to a military officer, we may dispense with it on the evidence of Nuniz, who not only informs us that the only law of the land was that of the Brahmans, but passes the most adverse judgement on their code of law. "When any one suffers wrong and wishes to represent his case to the King he shows how great is his suffering by lying flat on his face on the ground till they ask him what it is he wants. If, perchance, he wishes to speak to the King while he is riding, he takes the shaft of a spear and ties a branch to it and thus goes along calling out. Then they make room for him, and he makes his complaint to the King; and it is there and then settled without more ado, and the King orders a captain, one of those who go with him, to do at once what the supplicant asks. If he complains that he was robbed in such and such a province and in such and such a road, the King sends immediately for the captain of that province, even though he be at court, and the captain may be seized and his property taken if he does not catch the thief. In the same way the chief bailiff is obliged to give an acount of the robberies in the capital, and in consequence very few thefts take place; and even if some are committed, you give some little present and a description of the man who stole from you, and they will soon know by the agency of the wizards whether the thief be in the city or not; for there are very powerful wizards in this country. Thus there are very few thieves in the land".¹

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¹ Sewell, For. Emp., pp. 380-1.

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One may suspect that Nuniz has relied on superstitious and untrustworthy persons in securing these details about the existence of wizards in the capital. His evidence, nevertheless, indicates that an ordinary citizen had direct access to the king in the matter of presenting a petition; and that, therefore, the Vijayanagara monarchs had put into force one of the principles mentioned in the Sacred Law. Valuable as the information of Nuniz certainly is, it may be accepted with certainty only when it is corroborated by independent evidence. For Nuniz's opinion runs counter to that of 'Abdur Razzāq as regards the existence of a separate court of justice, at least of a distinct high official vested with judicial powers. According to the Persian ambassador, it is the daṇṇāyaka who constituted the highest judicial official in the kingdom; in the opinion of Nuniz, the king gave a sort of a rough-and-ready dispensation of justice, independent of the daṇḍanāyaka. Nothing but confusion would have resulted if this were really the case in Vijayanagara. Moreover, it may reasonably be doubted whether Nuniz does not contradict himself in his accounts of the judicial procedure at Vijayanagara. For, in one place, as we have just remarked, he is sure about the existence of Brahmans and of their law; in another, he gives us the picture of the king, regardless of the presence of his advisers, deciding a case on the spot. It is not denied that the rulers of Vijayanagara, in some instances, may have administered justice independently of the Brahman advisers. But the description of Nuniz, especially that relating to the persons who fell prostrate before the monarch, can in no one sense be taken to be a typical instance of how they administered justice in the Hindu Empire. His remarks of this nature are insufficient to justify the assertion that "the administration of criminal justice was harsh and barbarous".¹ The evidence of contemporary travellers, as well as the few details we can gather from inscriptions, must be examined before such a groundless charge is preferred.

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¹ Iswari Prasad, Med. Ind., p. 434. ² E.C., VIII, Tl. 197, pp. 206-7, op. cit.

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There are interesting instances of the manner in which justice was administered in Vijayanagara. Some of them deal with the settlement of disputes by the officers of the Government with the co-operation of the local bodies. Thus in A.D. 1363 in the reign of Bukka Oḍeyar, a grave dispute was amicably settled in the Āraga-rājya which was ruled over by Virūpaṇṇa Oḍeyar. The people of Hedḍūr-nāḍ and the temple āchāryas disputed with the Sūris as to the boundaries of the land belonging to the Pārśvadēva temple of Taḍatāḷa in Hedḍūr-nāḍ, in the Tirthahaḷḷi tāluka. The great minister Nāgaṇṇa and various important officials like Pradhāni Dēvarasa, along with other arasus or lords, and the Jaina Maḷappa summoned the elders of the three cities and the Eighteen Kaṃpaṇas, and held an enquiry in the Āraga chāvaḍi or hall. "And having made the nāḍ, agree, they fixed the boundaries (specified) according to the former custom as those of the temple endowment of Pārśvadēva".² This refers of course to the state of affairs in a Vijayanagara province.

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We have already seen how the same ruler, Bukka Oḍeyār, in A.D. 1368, personally settled the momentous question of the religious rivalry which threatened to create open enmity between the Jainas and the Śrīvaishṇavas. Since it is impossible to imagine that Bukka Oḍeyar would have ventured to be their arbitrator without seeking the counsel of persons versed in the Sacred Law, we may suppose that these may have exercised some control over the actions of the king. And the example thus set by Bukka Oḍeyar must certainly have had its effect on the judicial traditions of the Empire. While describing social questions which necessitated legislation on the part of the people themselves, we shall narrate some instances of the personal interest which the rulers took in communal matters even in later Vijayanagara history.¹

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¹ Infra, Volume II, Ch. V, Social Legislation, Etiquette and Orthodoxy.

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It was this liberal atmosphere which the great example of Bukka Oḍeyar spread that concerns us here. The royal officers appointed in temples, for example, also followed the precedent set by that ruler. Viṭṭappar (also called Viṭṭppar of Anegundi), the treasurer of Kampaṇa Oḍeyar (I), was the officer appointed in the Tiruvorriyūr temple, Chingleput district, in Śaka 1290 (A.D. 1368-9). He found that the padiyilār the ishabhattaliyar and the dēvaraḍiyār had struck work in the local temple. This was the third occasion since the days of Rājanārāyaṇa Sambuvarāya that the Mudaliyar of Perumbarrappuliyūr (Chidambaram) and the trustees of the temple had failed to bring about an amicable settlement in that temple. Viṭṭappar caused an enquiry to be made, and with the co-operation of the Vīraśōḷa-aṇukkar and the kaikkōḷars he summoned a joint meeting of the śrī-rudras, śrī-māhēśvaras, the ishabhattaliyar and the devaraḍyar in the vyākaraṇadāna-maṇḍapa of the Tiruvorriyūr temple. He then fixed upon a procedure in the matter of the order that was to be followed in the temple service. But even this official decision was of no avail. Three years later (in Śaka 1293) [A.D. 1371-2] the assembly composed of the same dignitaries met in the very same maṇḍapa, under orders from Kampaṇa Oḍeyar himself, presided over, this time, by the king's officer Tuṇaiyirunda-nambi Koṅgarāyar. More representatives than those who had met before had now gathered, and these included the trustees (of the temple)

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and the district representatives (nāṭṭār). The whole question of the right of procedure in the temples service was thoroughly threshed out, and settled¹ with a seriousness which does credit to the patience and skill of the judge in handling the significant details of the domestic economy of a temple. The great question however was finally disposed of only in the reign of Harihara Rāya II by the king's officer Mudaliyār Amarkōṇār, after summoning a similar conference.²

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¹ Ep. Report for 1913, p. 118.

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² 196 of 1912.

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A case that recalls the mild treatment of the earlier days is given in an inscription dated Saka 1366 (A.D. 1443-4) of the times of Dēva Rāya II. It refers to a prāyaśchitta (expiatory ceremony) for a criminal offence. The epigraph records a gift of money by the corporation (?) called nakharadavaru of Dharmapaṭṭana to the temple of Nakharēśvara-Mahādēva at the instance of several seṭṭikāras, of Padavakēri, as an expiatory offering for their having murdered two men of that community, while Timmaṇa Oḍeyar was governing Bārakūru-rājya.³

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³ 404 of 1928; Ep. Report for 1928, p. 61.

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The fact that legal proceedings were conducted in the presence of, and settled by, the officers of the Central Government is also corroborated by other inscriptions. A civil dispute between the villagers of Ālattūr and Attipparru, in Saka 1328 (A.D. 1406-7), regarding the supply of water from the tank of Perunagar, Chingleput district, was settled in the presence of the Mahāpradhāni Arasar (Tipparasar ?).⁴ An instance which disproves the theory that the monarchs were arbitrary in legal matters is supplied by a record dated Saka 1467 (A.D. 1545-6) of the times of Sadāśiva Rāya. There was a dispute between two parties of the residents of Kondagai, in the Rāmnāḍ district; and their representatives, the mahājanas of the locality, placed the matter before the Emperor, who was encamping in Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam. Sadāśiva Rāya directed that the case was to be settled by an arbitration board of learned men in the presence of his own officer Sāḷuva Nāyaka. On their arriving at a satisfactory decision, remission of certain taxes was made to the village (temple ?) of Tiruvēṅgaḍapuram.⁵ Evidently the board that was made up of learned men would only have been composed of Brahmans versed in the Sacred Law; and the legal fee which the plaintiff and defendants paid took the shape of remission of taxes to the local temple.¹

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⁴ 357 of 1923.

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⁵ 2 of 1923.

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¹ We admit that the quarrel may have been over some land which the temple claimed to possess. The presence of the royal officer is however to be noted. B.A.S. ² C.P. No. 11 of 1912-13; Ep. Report for 1913, p.

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The presence of a royal officer in legal proceedings seems to have been a feature of this system. A legal dispute arose between the karaṇams and the agrahārikas of Avadūru, in the matter of an inconvenient situation of inām-lands. The question was equitably settled in Saka 1508 (A.D. 1586-7) by Anugoṇḍa Veṅgaḷappa, obviously an officer of the king, who classified the lands into good, bad and medium, and redistributed them.² This delicate question of redistribution of inām-lands or lands given as gifts, sometimes necessitated the intervention of the king himself. It is interesting to observe that we have in this connection the instance of the Emperor Achyuta Rāya about whose alleged injustice Nuniz waxes eloquent in his Chronicle. Achyuta Rāya personally investigated the following case. Whether he intended to inaugurate his reign which afterwards, if the solitary evidence of Nuniz deserves credence, proved unfortunately to be an era of unparalleled oppression, by an impartial attitude towards his people, cannot be determined. But it is certain that in the year Virōdhi on the day of Kārtika-Bahula-Pañchami, Saka 145(2) (Thursday, 21st October, A.D. 1529) on the occasion of his coronation, according to a record dated Saka 1454 (A.D. 1532), the Emperor directed Sāḷuva Nāyaka to assign villages equally, "neither more or less", to the temples of Varadarāja and Ekāmbaranātha. And when Sāḷuva Nāyaka gave more to the former and less to the latter, Achyuta Rāya personally went to Conjeeveram and effected an equal distribution of villages between the two temples by casting lots.³

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These temple disputes seem to have attracted the attention of the Government, if we may say so, from the admirable manner in which royal officers decided the issues.

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⁹ We have, of course in earlier period cases of Crown Officers assisting local authorities or sharing in their sessions. ³ 544 of 1919; Ep. Report for 1920, p.

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¹¹⁴ See also 547 and 548 of 1919.

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An inscription dated only in the cyclic year Raktākshi, Kārttigai, 27th day, but assigned to the times of Virūpāksha II, son of Harihara II, gives us the details of the settlement of the question of the right (kāni) of worship in the Āragaḷūr temple, Salem district. The judgment was given by Tirumalli Nāyaka, who was evidently an officer placed over the district or deputed for the purpose. The dispute was between the sthānikas or temple managers themselves of the Kāmēśvara temple at Āragaḷūr. The judgment of Tirumalli Nāyaka contains, among other things, the following: "(1) A has been enjoying for a long time the privilege of worshipping all the thirty days of the month in the temple, while actually only fifteen days belong to him by right, and fifteen days belong to another person named B; (2) the privilege of B thus enjoyed by A without proper authority, requires settlement; (3) in support of the latter part of the statement made in (1), there are records in the temple to prove that fifteen days of B (now abandoned by him and enjoyed by A) have under orders been counted as 'unclaimed' (iṟaṅgal); (4) of this privilege of fifteen days so declared unclaimed, you have sold (on your own responsibility) seven and a half days to a third person C and given him a sale-deed; (5) by so doing you have deprived the acquired right of A enjoyed by him for the last eight or ten generations; (6) at this stage, the nāṭṭār (i.e., the representatives of the nāḍu) appeared to have volunteered to settle the question of enjoyment—A being found issueless(?)—and to have called the parties to present themselves before them together with A; (7) you,—the managers—were also required (under my orders) to be present on the occasion, to hear the case, and to carry out the decision arrived at by the nāṭṭār and to have, in the meantime, during this period of hearing (by the nāṭṭār), the worship of the temple performed by outsiders, on payment; (8) A having then appealed to me while I happened to be present at Āragaḷūr, to hear the case personally and give a just decision, I and the nāṭṭār together advised the parties to put their case before the mahājanas and issued an order to this effect; (9) in obedience to our order the mahājanas of the agrahāra of Kuḷattūr, Ālambalam, Saḍaiyanpaṭṭu and Maṭṭiyākuṟichchi met together, heard both sides and decided that although A may have been the hereditary holder of only fifteen days of the privilege, it was not fair to sell a part of the disputed portion there to an outsider like C while the right to purchase (in virtue of long enjoyment) primarily rested in A; (10) accordingly, therefore, to this decision of the mahājanas we order that A must continue to enjoy the full thirty days as before and that the sale-deed you have given to C should be cancelled".¹

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¹ 413 of 1913. Ep. Report for 1914, pp. 96-7. 430 of 1913 dated Saka 1306 (A.D. 1384-5) gives the clue to the age to which 413 of 1913 could be assigned. B.A.S.

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This decision of a provincial officer conclusively shows that the State not only controlled the regulation of worship in a temple but also decided justly the minutest points of privileges with the co-operation of the representatives of the district, in a manner which we have now become accustomed to associate with the working of a modern court of justice. The above instance is by no means a solitary example of the care which the State bestowed on bringing civil disputes to a successful issue. As we have related elsewhere, in about A.D. 1500, Yallappa Oḍeyar was the governor over the Āraga-rājya. He granted the Kuppaṭūr-Bhāraṅgi-sīme to the junior queen Bommarasi-ammā of the female apartments for her portion. And his minister Mallarasayya was ordered to assume the management of the province. This officer seems to have found certain discrepancies in the management of the lands belonging obviously to the junior queen, for he is said to have set on foot a detailed enquiry and to have inflicted a singular penalty on the local temple. For, as the inscripiton relates, "in the course of his enquiries from village to village (grāmavan(n)ū-grāmagalan(n)ū-pokku), coming to Beṇṇagere, he stopped the daily allowance at the Nārāyaṇa temple, (Sohrab tāluka), and having had proper prōkshaṇe (or purification) performed for the god, granted a śāsana regulating the worship and ceremonies".²

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² E.C., VIII, Sb. 323, p. 55; P. II, p. 148.

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We have already mentioned the great care which Billappa Nāyaka and Keṅgappa Nāyaka, the sons of Hanumi Nāyaka, bestowed on the question of granting a dharma-śāsana to Liṅgaṇṇa, younger brother of Appā Bhaṭṭa, a Brahman, in A.D. 1565.³ The settlement of the temple disputes in Tiruvoṛṛiyū in A.D. 1368, in A.D. 1371, and, finally, in the reign of Harihara Rāya II; the case which Achyuta Rāya decided in connection with the equitable distribution of lands between the Varadarāja and Ekāmbaranātha temples; the laudable manner in which Tirumalli Nāyaka ended the dispute as regards the rights of one of the priests of Kāmēśvara temple; and the opinion which Billappa Nāyaka and Keṅgappa Nāyaka received from the old residents of the Saṇte-Bennur-sīme, —all these prove that the Vijayanagara monarchs did not mete out a rough-and-ready justice, as has been asserted in some quarters; but that, on the contrary, they solved knotty points of etiquette and privilege, left untouched or decided unfavourably by their own officials; and that they allowed their subjects the right of appeal, even though it was against the decision of powerful temple authorities, and, sometimes, of the officers of the Crown. To a certain extent their judicial procedure is not incompatible with the following regulation of Śukrāchārya: "The king must personally inspect every year the grāmas, puras, or cities, and dēśas or districts, and provinces, and must know which subjects have been pleased and which oppressed by the staff of officers, and deliberate upon matters brought forward by the people".¹ Neither the compilers of the Sukranīti nor the monarchs of Vijayanagara were unaware of the oppression which the officials of the State caused to the people.

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³ Supra, Ch. VI, Administration (continued), p. 339.

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¹ Sukranīti, I, ll. 751-2, p. 51. For an interesting inscription dealing with the settlement of a civil dispute in connection with the office of a śannbhōga and the award of a jayarekhe-patrike in A.D. 1664 see My. Arch. Report for 1918, p. 54. For the decision of the Agent of Nāgama Nāyaka in a dispute between two factions in Tittagudi, S. Arcot, see 6 of 1903.

Section 4. Oppression

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In studying this aspect of their institutions, we come across interesting features of their political life. That there was oppression in Vijayanagara times there cannot be any doubt. No less a personage than Kṛṣṇa Dēva Rāya the Great himself admits the hardships which the people suffered under tyrannical officers of Government. That monarch writes thus: "That king is never prosperous even though he conquers all the seven Dwīpas, who has an officer who does not call back the subjects when they leave the State on account of suffering, who would sell away their cattle and stores of corn and would consider their houses as fit for fuel and who thus resemble the jackal in the battlefield".¹ The suffering to which Kṛṣṇa Dēva Rāya refers here may have been caused by natural calamities like floods or famine; but it may equally well have been the result of the rapacity of the servants of the Government. In all likelihood it was the latter, since both on the evidence of inscriptions and of the writings of foreign travellers, some officials, and a few monarchs as well, practised a policy of unvarnished extortion.

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¹ Amuktamālyada, v. 237; J.I.H. IV, p. 60.

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A dam had been breached in A.D. 1424, and the king's minister solved the question by bringing official pressure to bear on Chāma-nṛipāla, the commander of the forces, in the manner related in the following inscription: "The messengers of Nāgaṇṇa Daṇṇāyaka the Mahā-pradhāna of śri-Vira pratāpa Dēva Rāya Mahārāya, having brought intelligence that the Haridrā dam had been breached, on enquiring who would undertake the meritorious work of restoring it, looking upon Chāma-nṛipāla, the commander-in-chief of all the forces of the auspicious great king of kings (Dēva Rāya II) (the descent of Nāgaṇṇa Daṇṇāyaka stated)—(he said): 'The dam which by order of Dēva Rāya Mahārāya I built to the river Haridrā having breached, to restore by the assistance of merit the provision for the service and decorations of the god Harihara and the property acquired by the Brahman residents in that kshētra, except you there is no one else. That the fruit of the merit of building this dam will according to the Veda and the dharma śāstra be beyond calculation you are well aware. You therefore must repair his work of merit.' Hearing this order, and with submission undertaking the work, in the Śaka year 1346, (details of the date specified), Chāma-nṛipāla, with his own hands pouring water on behalf of the god Harihara and the Brahmans, and committing the work with pouring of water into the hands of Bukkarasa, sent him saying, 'Do you in my behalf build the dam and excavate the channel', and had it repaired".² The prospect of holding out the "fruit of merit" "beyond calculation" which was placed before Chāma-nṛipāla was only an apology to cover the real nature of the behest which Nāgaṇṇa Daṇṇāyaka, evidently with the object of pleasing the monarch, conveyed to the great commander.

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² Rice, My. Ins. Intr. pp. lxxxii, 40; E.C., XI, Dg. 29, pp. 38-9. The history of the dam is also given in ibid., Dg. 23, pp. 31-2.

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An example of people migrating on account of the tyranny of the officials is given in an inscription from Kiḷūr, South Arcot district, dated Saka 1368 (A.D. 1446-7): "In this kingdom the ministers had been taking presents (by force) from all ryots belonging to both the right-hand and left-hand classes at the commencement of each reign. In consequence of this all the ryots were harassed and ran away to foreign countries. Worship and festivals ceased in the temples; the country became full of disease; all people (that remained) either died or suffered".¹

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¹ 23 of 1905; Ep. Report for 1905, p. 50; Rangachari, Top. List. I. S.A. 728, p. 212; A.S.R. for 1907-8, pp. 246-7.

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Firishtah narrates a long story of a learned but villainous Brahman who induced the "Ray of Beejanuggur" (evidently Dēva Rāya I) to abduct a beautiful damsel named Nehal of the town of Mudkul, of the consequent estrangement with the Muhammadans, and the complete humiliation of the Hindu ruler at the hands of Firūz Shāh.²

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² Firishtah, Briggs, The Rise, II, p. 380, seq. See infra, Volume II, Chapter III, pp. 132-3.

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The strange ending of an inscription of A.D. 1356 makes one suspect that the kings sometimes really oppressed the people. This is as follows: "Be it the thief or plunderer prowling by night or day, be it the honourable mahā-maṇḍalēśvara, the emperor who rules the world or the king of kings, who thinks to himself, I will seize the villages, lands or grants bestowed in this village—at the mere word, thrust him, with his father and mother and all into the hell filled with worms, for seventy-seven crores of years, and continue to visit him with all manner of torments, do you see, O Sin?"³

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³ E.C., XI, Cd. 3, p. 2.

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Another inscription which suggests that even the property of Brahmans was sometimes seized by kings and their relatives, is dated A.D. 1530. It ends thus: "Whoso seizes the property of Brahmans of substance, that are bountiful and have families,—whether they be kings or of the king's family, roast in Kumbhīpāka without intermission as long as the tears from their eyes moisten the dust".⁴ Whether these strange tirades were directed against actual cases of royal and official tyranny or whether they were merely inscribed as a guarantee against possible mischief at the hands of people cannot be determined with any certainty for the present.¹

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⁴ Ibid., Dg. 28, p. 38.

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¹ For another instance, see Rice, My. Ins. p. 229.

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Official malevolence is also seen in the fate which befell the unfortunate Persian Ambassador at the court of Dēva Rāya II, due to the mischievous machinations of the Hormuzians. 'Abdur Razzāq was reduced to a state of misery and uncertainty because of the daily decreasing rations sanctioned by the State.²

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