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New History of the Marathas v2.c30: Chapter XXI. The Tragic Close at Panipat [1761]

New History of the Marathas v2.c30

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Chapter XXI. The Tragic Close at Panipat [1761]

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[1761]

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1 Cup full to the brim. 2 Position of the Parties in the field. 3 The combat. 4 The Victor's plight, conciliating the Peshwa. 5 The Peshwa breaks down in Bundelkhand. 6 Review of the disaster. 7 Significance of the disaster. 8 The Peshwa's last days. 9 Balajirao's character.

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1. Cup full to the brim.—Govind Pant's death and the manner in which it was compassed, roused both rage and despondency in all Maratha breasts; and hereafter from 21st December to 14th January increasing misery fell upon the Maratha camp and all hope of relief was lost. Another mishap came soon after the death of Govind Pant. He had collected about four and a half lacs of cash and sent it to Naro Shankar to be despatched to Bhau Saheb, who had deputed a special agent to Delhi for that purpose. A little over a lac reached the Maratha camp on 21st December : the remaining 3 lacs were entrusted to Parashar Dadaji, a young captain in Holkar's service. A party of picked horsemen each carrying Rs. 500 left Delhi early in January making secret marches by night. Being unaware of the changed location of the Afghan camp¹ they, in the darkness and cold of the last night of their march, stumbled into the circle of the piquets of the enemy on the south-western or Delhi side of the route. They were at once detected and all put to death, except a few who escaped. This happened on 4th January. Their leader Parashar Dadaji returned to Delhi on the 6th. Bhau Saheb tried to hold on bravely and kept up the spirits of the inmates of the camp now entirely dependent on him. All his efforts to obtain supplies of grain or cash proved fruitless. The small city of Panipat was denuded of every thing, food, timber, grass and gardens, for supplying the crying need of the Marathas ; the populace of that city were mostly Muslims and altogether hostile, as they were dispossessed of all their belongings. Thus the whole camp found starvation and death staring it in the face. The only course now open to the Marathas was either unconditional surrender or a last desperate effort to fight their way through the enemy's ranks. After prolonged deliberation, the latter course was approved and accepted. But Bhau Saheb continued his efforts through his agents with Shuja to obtain terms on which they could secure their release from the dreadful situation.

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¹ Kotah papers 1. 222.

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By this time it was known that the Peshwa had left Poona and was coming to the north with large forces. But while he was growing anxious about the condition of affairs in the north, he had absolutely no news for long, as all letters and despatches were intercepted by the enemy. He had left Poona in October and was slowly raising money, men and supplies both by way of a check over the Nizam and also to meet the probable requirements of the army in the north. He took a second wife, a young girl of nine near Paithan and celebrated the ceremony on 27th December. It is wrong to suggest that he took to amorous pleasure with a second wife and neglected to succour his cousin.² He was already fast declining in health and Sadashivrao was extremely anxious on his account. Nor is it right to hold that Bhau Saheb delayed his final attack under the impression that the Peshwa would soon arrive and in that case they could crush the Muslims between the two Maratha armies. Bhau Saheb was in no need of additional troops. His difficulty was about feeding his men and keeping open his line of communication. So the mystery of Bhau Saheb waiting for two and a half months before he delivered his final attack, cannot be satisfactorily explained.

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² In this connection a fanciful suggestion has been put forth by Mr. Shejvalkar in his recent work on Panipat that the Peshwa took this second wife as a cure for his fast failing health! (See P. 120).

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Abdali's allies, however, became very impatient and urged him to no longer delay the final assault on the enemy. His only reply was, "My duty is that of a general, and let me be full master in this. You can take care of your politics as you wish, but do not interfere with my military plans." He was always alert and constantly on the move. He had a small red tent pitched in advance of his camp to which he regularly came every morning for his prayers and for his breakfast, and spent the whole day in moving round the entire camp, inspecting the arrangements, giving instructions and tightening his hold on the Marathas. He never rode less than 30 miles a day. He reserved a special guard of 5 thousand troops to go round the whole camp and keep a strict look out for the slightest remissness in his army or any activity of the enemy. He asked Shuja and the other allies to enjoy sound sleep and rest as usual, without worrying themselves about the war.

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Conditions in the Maratha camp grew desperate with the passage of time. Many Maratha groups, who in search of food moved out of the camp, were cut down by the enemy patrols. Starvation and death loomed large before every body's eyes. Animals died in large numbers and the consequent stench became most obnoxious. Young and old, leaders and men all urged Bhau Saheb that it was no use waiting any longer, that they would rather die fighting with the enemy than perish through starvation in the camp. All gathered and took full counsel together. There was the annual Sankrant day on 10th January, which they celebrated as best they could, eating away the last stock that they possessed. The next three days were spent in discussing the arrangements for a final dash; assigning duties and giving full instructions on the various points of the ensuing combat. By the advice of Ibrahim Khan, the whole force was to move slowly on in a square formation, all the four sides of which were to be protected by heavy artillery. The ladies and non-combatants were to be put in the centre, and the whole mass was to move in a block under the protection of Ibrahim Khan's cannon. One serious defect of this arrangement was that it could be easily disturbed by the slightest tactics of the enemy, as actually happened.

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Having completed his final dispositions for the morrow and issued full instructions to his subordinates, Bhau Saheb, if Kashiraj is to be believed, made during that fateful night a last minute effort by addressing a note to Kashiraj, saying, "the cup is full to the brim : not a drop more can it contain. Please let me have a final reply on the adjustment of the dispute." Early in the morning of the 14th Kashiraj presented the note to Shuja who directed Kashiraj to go and show it to the Shah. By the time the Shah came to know of it, the Marathas were already seen moving against the Durrani Camp. Still Abdali replied, "Wait for a day and we shall think how to end the affair." But by this time the fighting had nearly commenced.

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2. Position of the Parties in the field.—At last the fatal 14th January arrived for Bhau Saheb to get into close grips with the Abdali Shah, for which he had been longing ever since he left the Deccan. The Shah did not take long to realize, when on that early morning he reconnoitred the huge mass of the whole Maratha camp moving in a block towards him, that it was no longer to be one of the light actions which he was having during the last two months. He at once prepared his whole army for a final issue and quickly arranged his line of battle with judicious calculation for reaping the highest advantage. In arranging his men he used his best discretion, assigning suitable positions and duties to his various captains and allies. Of his total of sixty thousand, nearly half was foreign and half Indian, the major portion consisting of cavalry with a small admixture of infantry. He placed Barkhurdar Khan and Amir Beg on his extreme right wing keeping next to their left the Ruhelas of Hafiz Rahmat and those of the Bangash Nawab. Thereafter in his line came his camel swivels and his own Kabuli infantry. Next to these came the central command of the Wazir Shah Vali Khan in whom he had the highest confidence. To the left of the Wazir was posted Shuja-ud-daula leading his own contingent, closely joined on his left by Najib Khan’s party. The extreme left of the line was made up by Shah Pasand Khan along with the Shah’s own slave squadrons and his personal body-guards, the last two having been kept behind in reserve to be moved as necessity would demand. It would here be noticed how the Ruhelas, the Bangash contingent and Najib Khan’s men were purposely wedged in between the Shah’s own foreign troops, as he was suspicious of the loyalty of his Indian allies. He himself remained behind the whole line, directing the operations and repairing any weak points that would develop when the action came to be joined.

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As the Marathas moving in a square formation approached the long and well arranged Afghan line facing them, their original plan of mass movement could not be carried out. Failing to force a passage for moving on, Bhau Saheb precipitately reformed his men in a long line similar to that of the enemy so as to fight them out and obtain a passage through, the main object being to effect an escape rather than annihilate his opponents. This tactical and sudden change created a sort of confusion among Maratha ranks, causing extreme annoyance to Ibrahim Khan, as his plan came to be entirely upset.³ The Khan, however, quietly accepted the situation and tried to do the best he could under the circumstances. When Bhau Saheb prolonged his force in a line, he gave his extreme left wing to the care of Ibrahim Khan and his heavy artillery, with Damaji Gaikwad next to him for the Khan’s support. Bhau Saheb himself took his station in the centre with his devoted Huzrat troops, with which he faced the Afghan Wazir. Antaji Mankeshwar, Pilaji Jadhav’s son Satvoji and some minor chiefs were posted towards Bhau Saheb’s right, the extreme end in the line being specially strengthened by the veteran fighters of Yashvantrao Pawar, Jankoji Sinde and Malharrao Holkar. Bhau Saheb could not keep any portion in reserve, as the whole camp was intended to force a passage through the Afghan ranks. With this disposition Bhau Saheb attempted to rush through the enemy’s ranks with his entire army.

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³ The last night’s plan of square formation was given up. रात्रींच चौबुर्जीचा मनसुबा राहिला. भा० ब०

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Before describing the actual nature of the titanic struggle that now followed, some salient points regarding the position of the two parties deserve to be noticed. Although the two forces and particularly that of the Marathas, were large on account of the vast numbers of the non-combatants, the strength of the actual fighting calibre has now been ascertained to be sixty thousand Muslims and forty-five thousand Marathas. The latter were certainly weakened by starvation and the loss of animals. In this respect the Afghans were in high and buoyant spirits. In generalship also, the superiority of Abdali was obvious, as Bhau Saheb with all his enthusiasm was inferior to the Shah in the military handling of a battle-field. Bhau Saheb had from the beginning a great faith in his powerful artillery of more than two hundred pieces, and in its effective use by his trusted commandant Ibrahim Khan. But this itself proved rather a handicap in the predicament that had developed. The heavy guns took time to be brought into proper position, while the Maratha army was on the move. Otherwise this heavy arm of the Maratha force could have done great execution. On this occasion Ibrahim Khan’s long range cannon overshot their objective and could be easily silenced, when the two sides came close together. The Shah on the other hand had no heavy guns of the Maratha type : he had instead an efficient set of about two thousand light guns, camel-borne swivels, which could inflict severe havoc upon the dense mass of the Maratha ranks at short range. These light-guns of the Afghan Shah were handled each by two expert gunners riding one camel. Besides, this whole corps was kept in reserve by the Shah for a last moment execution, after the Marathas had exhausted themselves in the early stages of the combat. In addition to this light artillery the Shah kept in reserve a select force of six thousand Kazalbash of his personal body-guard, with fine young horses freshly imported from the north-west. The members of this Kazalbash corps regarded themselves as the Shah’s faithful slaves, receiving special treatment in food and dress. It is these two bodies of carefully reserved men which decided the issue.

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Another handicap from which the Marathas suffered arose out of the difference in the dress of the two combatants. The Marathas of the south wore their plain shirts, while the Afghans dwelling in the cold mountains of their native land were protected with a thick woollen or leather waist-coat; most of the higher men wore besides a plaited armour of iron upon which the swords and spears of the Marathas could hardly make any impression. The Abdali Shah kept his eye steadily upon the slightest move of his opponents and promptly corrected every trifling short-coming in his ranks. He allowed the Marathas to spend themselves in an initial dash, himself standing on the defensive during this stage. He patiently waited till the Marathas became completely exhausted and then brought into action at the right moment not only his reserve but also some of those who had run away and hidden themselves in the rear ranks.

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Bhau Saheb’s original plan of forcing out a passage required a careful combination between his three arms, artillery, infantry and cavalry. Such a combination could not be preserved in the combat as it actually developed. The Maratha units neither understood, nor had a mind to follow accurately the instructions that were issued to them on the basis of the plan advised by Ibrahim Khan.

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3. The combat.—The action was joined at about nine in the morning and continued unabated till nearly three in the afternoon. In their first rage the Marathas fought vigorously and committed great havoc upon the Afghan soldiery. The Maratha left and right wings and the centre maintained a grim struggle for the first few hours. The Gardi-Ruhela duel, Bhau’s clash against the Wazir Shah Vali and the Sindia-Holkar sweep from the Maratha right against Najib Khan and Shah Pasand, brought out the determined valour of the Marathas and inflicted great destruction upon their opponents. The Afghan position was saved only by the timely succours which that Shah rendered wherever he discovered danger threatening. Ibrahim Khan furiously attacked the right wing of the Shah and killed Atai Khan with some three thousand men of his corps, making the Shah for a moment nervous about the issue. He, however, immediately pushed up his reserves and recovered his position. Ibrahim Khan’s infantry corps was outnumbered, surrounded and annihilated, his heavy guns entirely silent during the mixed combat at close quarters.

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The fight in the centre, however, was likewise tenacious and dreadful on account of the presence there of the Maratha Commander and the Peshwa’s son. Before the determined onslaught of Bhau Saheb the Durrani centre of Shah Vali Khan completely broke down. When Shuja perceived the sad plight of the Wazir, he sent Kashiraj to ascertain the facts. The latter found Shah Vali Khan sitting on the ground, beating his forehead in agony and trying to rally his flying followers piteously crying, “Where are you running away my friends : Kabul is far off ; you can’t reach it by running away.” When the Shah came to know his Wazir’s dangerous situation, he immediately detached fresh troops for his relief and had all the fleeing men called back on pain of cutting them down. About thirteen thousand troops that had withdrawn from the battle were thus thrown into the combat at two o’clock in the battle were thus thrown into the combat at two o’clock in the afternoon. Till that hour Bhau Saheb, Vishvasrao, Ibrahim Khan, Yashvantrao Pawar, Jankoji Sindia, Antaji Mankeshwar and the rest had done their best and their attack had developed furiously. The enemy was yielding ground and the Marathas appeared almost within an inch of winning. The combat on the right of the Maratha line was equally stiff, with Jankoji Sindia boldly engaging Shah Pasand Khan and Najib Khan's Rohilas, who suffered heavily.

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The Maratha troops who had been marching from the early dawn and strenuously fighting for over five hours without food and water, now began to show signs of exhaustion. Abdali chose this moment to throw in his reserves of ten thousand men into the battle. These reserves turned the scales decisively against the Marathas; and their destruction was completed by the Afghan squadron of 1500 camel swivels, which wheeled round in three batches of 500 each, doing immense damage at close range. In the midst of such a terrific fight a stray bullet from a *Zamburak* struck Vishvasrao dead on his horse *Dilpak* a little before three in the afternoon. This proved the sign for the rot to set in. Bhau Saheb not bearing to see the sight of his dead nephew, placed him on an elephant and rushed headlong with his personal guards into the Afghan ranks until he quickly disappeared. This last half-hour witnessed a frightful carnage round the Peshwa's flag. According to the Hindu scriptures suffering death on the battle field bestows merit on the warrior. From this point of view the Marathas certainly attained it by their supreme sacrifice at this last moment. The disappearance of Bhau Saheb at once created a panic, and before four in the afternoon of that short January day, a general flight commenced with the debacle consequent upon such an occasion. A small proportion of the common fighters and some of their leaders such as Malharrao Holkar, Damaji Gaikwad, Vithal Shivdeo and a few others made their way safely out of the holocaust, when they realized that the day was lost. But the major portion of that vast army with their families and camp followers perished by the cold steel of the pitiless Afghans. The field was littered with the dead and the wounded of the helpless non-combatants, stragglers, bazaarmen, clerks, accountants and others. Several ran back to the camp where there was none to protect them and where the Afghans cut down as many as they could in the early waning moon-light of the 8th night of the bright half of Poush. The carnage continued the next day also. A few of the Marathas escaped towards Delhi, Rajputana and the country of the Jats. The Jat Raja and his Rani Kishori took the utmost care of these fugitives providing them with food, clothes, and residence and comforting them in their unspeakable suffering.

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The battle-field was examined the next day by Anupgir Gosavi and Kashiraj under instructions from Shuja-ud-daula. They discovered 32 large heaps of corpses, which when counted numbered 28 thousand. Countless corpses were besides found strewn on that vast plain, and the nooks of the jungles around. About 35 thousand were taken prisoners and slaughtered in cold blood by the heartless Durranis. About 8 thousand Maratha refugees and four hundred of the officers took shelter in Shuja-ud-daula’s camp. The latter besides generously affording them all the protection he could, despatched them under a strong escort to Surajmal’s dominion financing their journey from his own purse. The huge trench of Panipat was equally full of dead bodies, and several wounded men succumbed to their wounds in the extreme cold of the night. It is estimated that nearly 75 thousand Marathas were killed in this huge slaughter and some 22 thousand saved their lives by paying ransom.

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Ibrahim Khan Gardi and Jankoji Sindia were captured wounded and subsequently put to death. Not much plunder could be secured by the enemy beyond some horses and the camp equipage in Panipat. The dead bodies of Vishvasrao and Bhau Saheb were recovered, properly recognized and given the due rites by Anupgir Gosavi, Kashiraj and others, for which concession Shuja pleaded with the Shah personally and paid the Abdali a consideration of three lacs. Bhau Saheb’s head was recovered from a Durrani trooper by the exertions of the Nawab and was burnt a day later. Kashiraj himself wrote letters to this effect to the Peshwa. Bhau Saheb’s wife Parvatibai returned, safe to Gwalior and joined the Peshwa near Bhilsa.

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The Afghan monarch Ahmad Shah commemorated his triumph by paying a visit the next day to the shrine of the Muslim saint Ali Kalandar in the Panipat village, wearing a gorgeous dress and jewels including the Koh-i-noor and offered devout prayers for the great victory he had won. Thereafter he struck his camp and started for Delhi where he arrived in three days, and camped outside the city. On 29th January he made a formal entry into the city and took up his residence in the halls once occupied by Shah Jahan and his successors, holding court in the Diwan-i-Khas after the fashion of the Mughal Emperors. But on account of various troubles he had no peace at heart and departed for his native country on 20th March.

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The victor himself wrote the following account of this battle to Raja Madho Sinh⁴ :—

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⁴ Sir Jadunath Sarkar, *Modern Review*, May 1946. Here Abdali definitely says that Sadashivrao was slain : so all theories about the future pretender being the real Sadashivrao must be set at rest finally.

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“ The flame of fighting blazed up and raged on all sides. The enemy too distinguished themselves and fought so well, that it was beyond the capacity of other races. Gradually the fighting passed from the exchange of cannon and rocketfire to the discharge of muskets, from which it proceeded to the stage of combat with swords, daggers and knives. They grasped each other by the neck. Those dauntless bloodshedders ( the Marathas) did not fall short in fighting and doing glorious deeds. Suddenly the breeze of victory began to blow and as willed by the Divine Lord the wretched Deccanis suffered utter defeat. Vishwasrao and the Bhau who had been fighting in front of my Wazir were slain and many other Sardars also on their side fell. Ibrahim Khan Gardi and his brother were captured wounded. Bapu Pandit (Hingne) was taken prisoner. Forty to fifty thousand troopers and infantry men of the enemy became as grass before our pitiless swords. It is not known whether Malhar and Janko have been slain or what else has happened to them. All the enemy’s artillery, elephants and property have been seized by my men.”⁵

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⁵ Graphic descriptions of this bloody battle have come down from the pen of many writers. Kashiraj’s bakhar and the short autobiography of Nana Phadnis can be read with advantage.

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4. The victor’s plight, conciliating the Peshwa.— During his residence of two months at the capital, Shah Abdali confirmed the arrangement that Bhau Saheb had made, by declaring Shah Alam Emperor, his son Jawan Bakht then at Delhi acting as the heir. He appointed Najib Khan to the post of Mir Bakhshi and entrusted the management of the Empire’s affairs jointly to him and Jawan Bakht. He refused to appoint Shuja-ud-daula as the Wazir, a reward which he was ardently expecting from the Shah for the valuable part he had played as an ally in the recent struggle. Shuja felt this as a bitter humiliation and left abruptly for Lucknow on 7th March. This indeed in no way affected the Shah as he hardly cared now for the politics of India. He was now faced with an open mutiny of his own Afghan troops, who had received no pay for the last 18 months of their sojourn in India. They had expected to go back rich and wealthy by the acquisition of Indian spoil, but this could not be, as they had little or no plunder this time. They had not received even their pay. Their maintenance alone cost the Shah as much as the Marathas or about a crore of Rupees per annum. The Maratha camp at Panipat was plundered, but hardly any thing valuable was found there as the Marathas had sold every bit of whatever could fetch them food. The Shah himself lived in a gorgeous palace at Delhi apparently unconcerned about his return, while his troops were longing to go home fearing that as the Marathas were expected to return headed by the Peshwa, another war would be inflicted on them. When the pressure of the clamour became severe, the Shah asked Najib Khan to procure money to pay his troops, as the Khan was now the sole custodian of the imperial affairs. Najib Khan urged his utter helplessness in the matter of funds, and said he had already given away all that he could possibly procure. He suggested that Surajmal Jat should be attacked and made to yield treasure of which he possessed plenty. It meant another war, and the Afghan troops declared they would not move unless they received their past wages. The Shah could find no way out of the difficulty and decided upon returning home. He left Delhi on 20th March and reached Afghanistan in May.

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After studying the movements and arrangements made by the Shah Abdali, let us review his attitude as it affected the Marathas. The grand victory of the Afghans and the crushing defeat inflicted by them upon the Marathas, availed the victor but little. He never coveted the crown of Delhi. His only anxiety was to hold the rich province of the Punjab in order to relieve the needs of his poor country, without undergoing the risk of interfering with the affairs of Delhi or the rights of the Marathas in that sphere. Had it not been for the personal animosity of Najib Khan towards the Marathas, the dreadful struggle of Panipat would not have occurred at all. But having gone the length of a stiff and costly war with the Marathas, the Shah was now anxious to close the bitterness that had been roused, and to ensure in future that the Marathas should not molest him so far as the Punjab was concerned. And when he learned at Delhi that the Peshwa himself had arrived as far as Gwalior with large forces, and that the war might be renewed any moment now under conditions very adverse to him, with his own troops in open rebellion, he became impatient to arrive at an understanding with the Peshwa which the Maratha agent Hingne had already offered to bring about immediately on the Shah’s arrival at Delhi. Bapuji Mahadev was sent for with this object within four days of the battle of Panipat ; he writes, “ I met the Shah through his Wazir Shah Vali Khan, and explained to him that the Peshwa had no ill-feeling towards him, that he should safely march back to his country, and that he (Hingne) would undertake to effect a lasting peace between them. The Shah readily agreed to this proposal and at once asked Yakub Ali Khan to proceed to Gwalior and bring about a treaty of peace personally with the Peshwa. The Shah gave his solemn consent to the proposal and then decided to return to his country. When he reached Lahore, he again sent pressing instructions to Yakub Ali Khan not to delay the subject of a lasting peace.”⁶

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Had the Peshwa been in his normal health mentally, a treaty could have been at once arranged : but even here the trouble arose partly through Najib Khan, who was now exposed to the vengeance of the Marathas, and partly through the stunning blow which the whole Maratha nation and their northern policy had received on the fatal 14th January. Several precious months were wasted in gathering the actual facts, even as regards the fate of Bhau Saheb himself. For a time no Maratha general dared to come to Delhi and meet the Afghan monarch. If Malharrao Holkar and Naro Shankar had remained at Delhi or come back as soon as Hingne called them, the peace negotiations would not have been delayed. On 23rd March the Peshwa wrote to Hingne, “I am enclosing my replies to the letters received from the Shah Abdali and his Wazir Shah Vali Khan and delivered here by their agent Gulraj. I am now deputing Anwarulla Khan and Hussain Muhammad Khan to negotiate peace with the Shah. I have authorized Malharrao Holkar to conclude the subject. You must now deal directly with Holkar and accept his decision. I want you to take full counsel with these two advisers, Anwarullah and Hussain Muhammad, and continue to keep me informed of the progress of the negotiations. Where is the Shah Abdali now? Has Ghazi-ud-din interviewed him? Please write all details.”

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The Peshwa repeated the same query on 6th April to Hingne and asked, “Who is now the Padshah at Delhi, who is the Wazir, why has Abdali left so abruptly, what are now the designs of Ghazi-ud-din and the rest?” The Peshwa added, “Malharrao Holkar is now at Gwalior with large forces and will attend to our concerns in north India.”

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Early in May 1761 Gangadhar Yashvant on behalf of Holkar reported to the Peshwa, “before departing for his homeland, the Shah gave definite instructions in the presence of Hingne, to Shuja-ud-daula and his Ruhela allies, that he had effected a lasting peace with the Peshwa and that they all should respect the latter’s authority, which course alone would benefit them most.” The Peshwa cordially accepted the Shah’s proposal of deputing Yakub Ali to Poona with Hingne for fixing up the definite terms of a lasting peace.⁶

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⁶ Hingne Papers I. 202, 205, 207, 210.

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This subject of peace came to be unavoidably delayed for nearly two years. The Peshwa himself died in June, giving rise to the unfortunate domestic dissension between the new Peshwa Madhavrao and his uncle Raghunathrao. One point is thus as clear as day light that the field of Panipat, however dreadful to the Marathas on account of the heavy death roll, decided nothing finally and only maintained the status quo so far as the Delhi politics was concerned.⁷ Abdali himself thus wrote to the Peshwa, “There is no real reason why there should exist any ill-feeling between you and us ; true, you have lost your son and brother in the unfortunate fight : but it was entirely provoked by Bhau Saheb and we could not act otherwise than we did in self-defence. However, we are deeply sorry for these losses. We readily leave to you the subject of the imperial management of Delhi, provided you allow us to hold the Punjab up to the river Satlaj, and support Shah Alam as the Emperor. You must forget the regrettable events that have taken place and entertain a lasting friendship towards us, which we are anxiously soliciting.”⁸

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⁷ P. D. 2. 103, 146 and 21. 202.

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⁸ History of the Sikhs by Dr. Hari Ram Gupta ; Sarkar’s Fall of the Mughal Empire II, p. 379.

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With such gestures and letters breathing a genuine spirit of conciliation and good will, the Abdali Shah sent his agent Gulraj to the Peshwa accompanied by the customary dresses. Gulraj met the Peshwa in Malwa on 10th February 1761 and Gangadhar Chandrachud was commissioned to proceed to Delhi and adjust matters. Thus a considerable delay ensued, and the treaty of peace took nearly two years to be finally concluded, although the essential points had been discussed and determined before 20th March i.e., the day on which both Abdali and the Peshwa left their respective stations for their homes. There was another strong reason for Abdali to come to an immediate understanding with the Peshwa. The Sikhs had grown powerful in the Punjab and violently resisted Abdali’s claim to that province. After Panipat the Shah Abdali had to come to the Punjab year after year and to return each time in discomfiture after being molested and repulsed by the Sikhs. Ahmad Shah lost his health and vigour in the vain attempt to conquer the Punjab, and the last few years of his life were for him sad and inactive. He suffered from a carbuncle which put an end to his life on 14th April 1772, at the age of 48.

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In the mean time Abdali’s agents Gulraj and Anand Ram had arrived in Poona, and the Peshwa Madhavrao I put the final shape in February 1763 to a treaty of peace and good will. The Peshwa sent dresses and a handsome elephant to the Shah from Poona, thus finally effacing the sad memories of the fatal day of Panipat.⁹ 5. The Peshwa breaks down in Bundelkhand.—Here we must go back and review the movements of the Peshwa during the four months from October 1760 onwards, when his son and cousin were being hard-pressed at Panipat. He had received no news of any adverse occurrences in the north and was quite at ease as regards the affairs in that quarter, having provided everything that was needed for Sadashivrao’s expedition. As usual he left Poona at the Dassara time and prepared to march to the north for completing the political settlement in that quarter, after Abdali had been expelled, as was fully expected. The last letter that he received from Bhau Saheb was dated 14 November, when the two opponents had just confronted each other at Panipat and a decision was momentarily expected. So without the least concern the Peshwa moved leisurely to Ahmadnagar and spent two months on the Godavari, but having received no news of the northern affairs he was getting increasingly anxious every day about the fate of his armies and wrote to several persons asking for news. Suspecting some mishap he hurriedly left his quarters on the last day of 1760, with his brother Raghunathrao and another large army led by the two Bhosle brothers, Gopalrao Patwardhan, Sadashiv Ramchandra, Yamaji Shivdev and others. On 9th January he sent back Raghunathrao to watch the Nizam. On 18th January the Peshwa entered Malwa and at once wrote to Bhau Saheb asking him to hold the Abdali Shah until he himself arrived, when they could easily crush him between the two armies. While in wait at Bhilsa for tidings, he intercepted a banker’s private messenger on 24th January, who was the bearer of a letter which indicated by metaphors relating to jewellery, that something serious had happened to the Maratha host. Among other enigmatical expressions there were these words : “two pearls dissolved, twenty-five gold mohurs have been lost, and of the silver and copper the total cannot be cast up.” In due course further details reached him, telling how the Marathas having been cooped up in the entrenchment at Panipat were nearly starved and clamorously rushed forth to fight and were ridden down by the superior weight of the Afghan army. The Peshwa retired to his tent literally with a broken heart, unable to endure the grief. Gradually news filtered to him daily as streams of ill-fated men gradually returned in distress, but no one giving full and satisfactory details as to what had actually happened.¹⁰

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⁹ Madhavrao Roznishi, 1. 1, 6, 7 ; Aitihasik Tipne, 1. 56.

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¹⁰ Raj. 3. 210; Khare 1. 26.

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For over a month a dreadful suspense prevailed in the Peshwa’s mind and in that of his followers. It was only in February when he met Nana Purandare on his return from Panipat that the Peshwa could get some reliable and tangible details of the fate that had overcome the Maratha army on 14th January. The death of his son and the complete destruction of his huge splendid army plunged the Peshwa for a long time into terrible grief, and the uncertainty was heightened by the reports that Bhau Saheb and Jankoji were returning wounded. It took at least two months more to prove the falsity of these reports; but all the same it diverted the Peshwa’s attention to the immediate inquiry about the fate of those who were supposed to be still alive. The shock itself proved too much for the frail and declining constitution of the Peshwa already stricken down by an incurable malady; and the idea of his proceeding towards Delhi had to be given up. It was unfortunate that Malharrao and Naro Shankar left Delhi in a panic. Had they taken their stand at the capital, the Peshwa would have joined them and could have restored Maratha power at Delhi, having brought about a friendly understanding with the retiring Shah Abdali. The Peshwa proceeded north from Bhilsa on 7th February and reached Pachhor about 32 miles further. Here he made a long stay, and after full deliberation retraced his steps to the south on 22nd March and passed through Indore on 6th April. The two months that the Peshwa spent near Bhilsa and Sironj were not wasted. Maratha power and prestige were quickly re-established in Malwa, Bundelkhand and the Doab. Although the Peshwa himself was overcome with sorrow and affliction, there were men and captains about him, who did their best in restoring the Maratha rule which had been shaken for a few months. The panic-stricken leaders, Malharrao Holkar, Naro Shankar, the Pawars and others who had left Delhi, without making a bold stand, were severely dealt with, all their possessions being confiscated for a few months, and later restored to their holders as soon as normal conditions began to reappear. Malharrao Holkar took the lead promptly in restoring the lost Maratha prestige. The leading Rajput prince at this time was Madho Sinh of Jaipur. Malharrao sternly demanded the arrears of tribute, which the Rajah refused to pay and prepared to resist by a recourse to arms. Malharrao took up the challenge readily and in a sanguinary action at Mangrol, 20 miles north east of Kotah, which lasted for two full days, 29th and 30th November 1761, Madho Sinh was completely humbled. This one instance dispelled all rumours of the Maratha power having vanished from north India. By this timely stroke Malharrao regained his former glow of prestige in Maratha politics, lost by his precipitate flight from the field of Panipat.

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6. Review of the disaster.—It is now over 180 years since the third battle of Panipat was fought by the Marathas and it has made a permanent mark in the history of India. Patient and critical enquiry is still being persistently carried on by writers and students each trying in his own way to assign praise and blame. Let us here take a short dispassionate review of the whole struggle which proved so fatal to the Marathas at Panipat, and properly assess the responsibility for that momentous result.

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Such an important affair as this national disaster could not have remained without a formal inquiry. It stands to reason to suppose that the Peshwa Madhavrao I got a full and formal report prepared about the event dealing both with its antecedent and remote as well as immediate causes.¹ These

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¹ These

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11. The two valuable documents known as Bhau Saheb’s Kaifiyat and Bhau Saheb’s Bakhar are possibly the result of such an enquiry instituted for the edification of the future administrators. These two tracts practically summarize all the salient features eloquently expressed for the appreciation of an average reader. They are evidently based on original materials. Holkar and Naro Shankar were punished by the dying Peshwa himself for their dereliction. History is often blind and cruel towards the authors of a lost cause, and the victors usually win their case in public estimation. Recent research has brought to light a large quantity of literature in Marathi and Persian particularly the three volumes 2, 21 and 27 of the P. D. Selections and the Purandare Daftar volume 1, the excellent Persian accounts of Kashiraj and Nuruddin Hussain, letters in Rajwade Volumes 1 and 6, along with the clear reasoned analysis presented by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in his *Fall of the Mughal Empire*. Volume 2. These will be found of immense help in elucidating the subject.

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have been already made clear in the preceding pages.

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Maratha affairs in the north came to be mishandled by Raghunathrao, who could not compose the growing differences between the two leading chiefs Sindia and Holkar.¹² Sadashivrao was mainly sent to set right past abuses, a task which he quickly and effectively executed. He was doubtless the fittest leader that the Maratha nation then possessed. He was respected and feared, and possessed unflinching courage. He was certainly often obstinate and hot-tempered, but these drawbacks were the result of a genuine desire to serve his nation. He had never before gone to the north, but this point he soon made up by constant inquiry and labour. Compared with his Afghan opponent, he must be reckoned inferior in generalship being seven years junior to the Shah Abdali, who had possessed matchless experience of warfare in central Asia, having received his training under Nadir Shah, the Napoleon of Asia, dealing with varied characters and situations, overcoming obstacles of flooded rivers, difficult mountains and human eccentricities. This is well illustrated by the cool and patient manner in which Abdali managed every detail of this campaign, and the way in which he soon dexterously turned a critical situation against his opponents. He took possession of the Jamuna and assured for his army plentiful supplies from the country beyond, having cleverly succeeded in besieging the Marathas in their entrenched camp.

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¹² The Peshwa himself never went to the north after the death of Shahu. He could easily have gone there during 1759, when there was no major issue in the Deccan to occupy his attention.

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Malharrao Holkar and others had suggested to Bhau Saheb to keep the women and the non-combatants behind somewhere near the Chambal or near Mathura : the rejection of this precaution proved disastrous. He encumbered himself with an unnecessarily large number of non-combatants at least three times that of the actual fighters. If he had not been so hard pressed to feed this large number, the starvation would not have been so acute.

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We can here thus summarise the main causes of the Maratha disaster at Panipat : (1) Raghunathrao's failure to maintain order and discipline among Maratha agents in the north; (2) the failure of Holkar to restrain Najib Khan from doing mischief; (3) the Peshwa's failure to go to the north and adjust matters when it was yet time to mend them. These were the antecedent causes. The immediate causes were (4) the failure of Bhau Saheb with Dattaji Sindia's example before his eyes, to keep women and non-combatants behind at Bharatpur or even at Delhi at the time when he left that place to advance upon Kunjpura; (5) as soon as the two armies came face to face about the last day of October, Bhau Saheb should have at once attacked Abdali and maintained communications with his base at Delhi. He wasted two and a half months on the defensive in a besieged camp until starvation compelled him to make the last desperate effort for escape. But we have now no means of knowing why Bhau Saheb waited so long. (6) And the last culminating point was reached, when Bhau Saheb finding Vishvasrao killed, rushed headlong into the fight, perhaps under the impression, "after me the deluge." (7) One serious handicap from which the Marathas suffered may be noticed in passing. The strength of the Maratha fighter was in his horse. It was his horse that gave the strength of mobility to the Maratha army. Bhau Saheb commanded at Panipat a large body of the finest troops that ever went out from the south. But during the months of starvation in his besieged camp, most of the horses died, compelling all troopers to play the role of infantry for which they were not trained. This drawback could not be remedied.

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One school of critics argue that the Marathas lost the day at Panipat because they gave up their traditional method of guerilla warfare. But such a view has no basis in fact. It is doubtless true that it was this method which enabled the Maratha nation in the last century to rise above others. But this warfare was suited only to the hilly regions of the Deccan plateau; it could not be effective in the vast plains of northern India, where not a single natural barrier exists from the Indus to the Bay of Bengal. Nor were the Marathas at home in these foreign regions, the inhabitants of which were not only strangers but positively hostile to them. To obviate these defects Bhau Saheb equipped himself with an efficient artillery, with which he reduced Delhi and Kunjpura.

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The situation so changed on the last day at Panipat that the same artillery proved an encumbrance.

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7. Significance of the disaster.—It is a popular mistake of long standing to suppose that the third battle of Panipat destroyed the Maratha power in the north or that it essentially shook the Maratha Empire of India. Notwithstanding the terrible losses in man power suffered on that field by the Marathas, the disaster decided nothing. In fact it pushed forward in the distant sequel two prominent members of the dominant race, Nana Phadnis and Mahadji Sindia, both miraculously escaping death on that fatal day, who resuscitated that power to its former glory. Not long after the battle of Panipat the Maratha power began to prosper again as before and continued to do so for forty years, until the death of Mahadji Sindia or until British supremacy was established early in the 19th century by the second Maratha War (1803). The first set back the Maratha power received was by the premature death of their greatest Peshwa Madhavrao, which enabled the British power to come forward so easily on the stage of history and dispute Indian supremacy with the Marathas for a quarter of a century. The disaster of Panipat was indeed like a natural visitation destroying life, but leading to no decisive political consequences. To maintain that the disaster of Panipat put an end to the dreams of supremacy cherished by the Marathas, is to misunderstand the situation as recorded in contemporary documents. The truth is correctly stated by a learned scholar who asserts that,

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“ The fall of the Angrias (1756) and the disaster of Panipat (1761) freed the British from the thraldom of insidious neighbours and hastened their rise.”¹³ This is indeed the indirect but important consequence of the Maratha disaster. Instead of this event crushing Maratha aspirations for good, it certainly gave them a new strength and a fresh vigor in their efforts to establish supremacy over the Indian continent. Their mettle was severely tested and found to be as vigorous as ever before. In the midst of the extreme misery and distress of the beleaguered camp, there was absolutely no sign of panic or re-

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¹³ Gerson da Cunha's *Origin of Bombay*.

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volt, no wail of despair or defeat. Bhau’s courage inspired every soul to supreme exertion, and even after the final rout, people wrote and spoke of the event as if they were heroes. The Marathas have been a practical people possessing a temperament which never was overenthused under victory or crushed under disasters. Writes Maj. Evans Bell, “The battle of Panipat was a triumph and a glory for the Marathas. They fought in the cause of “India for the Indians,” while the great Muhammadan Princes of Delhi, of Oudh and the Deccan stood aside, intriguing and trimming. And though the Marathas were defeated, the victorious Afghans retired and never again interfered in the affairs of India.”

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It is significant that while the two combatants, the Marathas and the Muslims, were locked in a deadly combat on the field of ancient Kurukshetra, Clive the first founder of the British Empire in India, was on his way to England to explain the feasibility of his dreams of an Indian empire to the Great Commoner Lord Chatham, then the Prime Minister. Panipat indirectly ushered in a new participant in the struggle for Indian supremacy. This is indeed the direct outcome of that historical event, which on that account marks a turning point in the history of India.

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Oppressed by the Wazir Ghazi-ud-din’s vulgar ambition and relentless ferocity, the Crown Prince Ali Gauhar was compelled to flee from Delhi in May 1758 and seek safety in exile. The Wazir’s foolish measures brought down on his head and on his Maratha confederates the wrathful invasion of Ahmad Shah Abdali, and led to the prolonged contest between the two for the mastery of the Punjab and the paramountcy over Hindustan. It finally culminated in the Maratha rout at Panipat two years later. This absorbing contest made it impossible for the Wazir and his Maratha allies to take note of the political revolution that had come over Bengal by the battle of Plassey and its sequel. The English merchants were thus enabled to make a successful bid for the position of King-makers in Bengal and Bihar, and to use the power thus acquired to cleverly throw their net of supremacy over the whole land. The ignorant and mutually quarrelling Indian chiefs failed to realize the significance of these British activities and the meaning of their political and territorial ambition. Ali Gauhar, Shuja-ud-daula, Surajmal, Ghazi-ud-din, Najib Khan, Raghunathrao, Malharrao Holkar, each and all unaccustomed to take long views, could not appreciate the trend of the epoch-making events that were happening in Bengal and in the Karnatak. They all wasted their energies in personal squabbles at Delhi.

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The battle of Panipat was fought on 14th January 1761. The very next day the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam in his effort to recover Bengal sustained a severe defeat on the river Son at the hands of the British forces led by Major Carnac. Shah Alam’s French officers were taken prisoners and he had to throw himself on the British protection. The day after this event, that is on the 16th January, Pondicherry, the rival of Madras, fell into British hands, thereby smashing the French power in India. These three days proved momentous in determining the future fate of this country. The Peshwa sank to his grave under the blow of Panipat, and for a few years the British had no rival on the horizon. The tone of their behaviour and correspondence markedly changed from the days of the Peshwa Bajirao I to those of Madhavrao, as the missions of Gordon and Price amply testify. The rise of Haidar Ali in the South was also the direct result of the Maratha rout at Panipat.

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If these broad political issues of the Indian situation are kept out of sight, Panipat in itself brought to the Marathas a unique experience in politics and war, and heightened their national pride and sentiment, as nothing else could have done. The disaster instead of damping, their spirits, made them shine higher as, when a nation is on the path of advancement and progress, such ups and downs are inevitable. Such valiant soldiers as Dattaji, Jankoji, Ibrahim Khan, Sadashivrao and Vishvasrao did not die in vain. They left their mark on the fortunes of their nation and prepared it for a greater effort such as the young Peshwa Madhavrao actually put forth. Out of death cometh life, is only too true. Although one generation, the older one, was cut off, the younger generation soon rose to take its place and perform the nation’s service as before. The disaster was felt as personal by almost every home in Maharashtra, and every soul was stirred by it to rise to the nation’s calls.

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