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Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c26: Chapter XVIII. Rajputana, 1751-1760

Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c26

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Chapter XVIII. Rajputana, 1751-1760

§ 1. Rajput-Maratha relations during 1751-1753

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By the middle of the year 1751 the three dynastic wars in Rajputana had ended in the victory of the claimants, as we have seen in Chapter 7. In Jaipur and Bundi the Maratha nominees had been installed, while in Marwar alone the new Rajah Bakht Singh had gained the throne unaided by any Deccani mercenary.

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These wars had left the Rajput States under a heavy load of debt due to the Marathas as the price of their armed support. It is possible to form an exact estimate of the monetary claims of the Marathas in Rajputana at this time. The fine of ten lakhs imposed on Kota by Baji Rao in January 1738 seems to have been paid in full. Leaving aside the absurd sums of one *kror* or even half a *kror* so recklessly offered to the Marathas by Maharana Jagat Singh II in his frantic desire to win for his nephew Madho Singh the Jaipur throne or at least half of that kingdom, we find that in 1748 Madho Singh promised them a *nazar* of ten lakhs. To this sum must be added the indemnity of two lakhs imposed on him for the massacre of the Maratha visitors to his capital in January 1751. So, the dues from Madho Singh were twelve lakhs in all. It was laid down by the Maratha king that out of the actual collection made here every year, half a lakh was to be paid to him, and the balance to be shared equally between his two generals Holkar and Sindhia posted there. At Bundi, Ummed Singh during his contest for the throne had bound himself to pay his Maratha allies ten lakhs, out of which two lakhs were paid in 1749 and the remaining eight lakhs were yet to be realized. In Marwar, Bakht Singh was under no obligation to the Marathas; but his defeated rival Rām Singh, immediately after the loss of his realm (July 1751), sent his priest Jago to hire a Maratha army and thereafter became entirely a creature of the Deccanis.

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No part of these contributions was paid * by the Rajput princes during 1751 and 1752, for it was long before the Marathas were in a position to enforce their claims by arms, and without the threat of war nothing could be collected. Throughout 1751 and the first four months of 1752 the Maratha forces in Northern India were entangled in Safdar Jang’s war with the Afghans, and no troops could be spared for Rajputana. When that war ended, their main army under Malhar Rao Holkar started for the South to instal Ghazi-ud-din II in the seat of the Nizam of Haidarabad, as we have seen (Chap. 8, § 10.) This plan ended abruptly in the death of the Maratha nominee by poison on 16th October, 1752. Thus, Rajputana remained denuded of Maratha forces from February 1751 till the end of May 1752, when a body of 5,000 horse under Jayapa Sindhia, detached by Malhar from Delhi with Ram Singh’s envoys, reached Ajmir for attacking Bakht Singh. This force was quite inadequate for defeating the flower of Rathor chivalry under a most gallant and capable chief. The invaders, after reaching Ajmir, sacked that city, burnt many of its houses, slew all who resisted, and then took to plundering the neighbourhood. Bakht Singh, on hearing of the invasion, had arrived with his full tribal levy and encamped about eight miles from Ajmir, guarding his frontier, but not advancing to the defence of Ajmir. He at first bided his time, and then in July struck his blow. Mounting guns on a hillock and planting strong block-houses (nakas) to hold the paths, he bombarded the Maratha position. His fire slew many of the raiders, including one captain; the Deccanis were checked and fled away to the South, accompanied by the discomfited Ram Singh. [TALS. 38b, 101a (regnal year corrected to fifth.)]

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∗ Bundi,—in 1754 five lakhs remained unpaid, but Rs. 60,000 was actually paid in that year. SPD. xxvii. 86. Marwar,—Vad, iii. 143 and 129. Udaipur,—the Mahārānā in 1747 repudiated his promise to Baji Rao I (made in 1737) to pay Rs. 1,60,000 annually, and he required to be coerced. In 1753 the Marathas planned to take from him bonds for 5 lakhs. SPD. ii. 34. Nathji, an aspirant to his brother's throne, offered to pay 15 lakhs after his installation. xxi. 58.

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§ 2. Jayapa Sindhia invades Marwar on the side of Ram Singh, 1754.

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After this, Marwar enjoyed respite for a year and a half. But the hope of preserving that country from Maratha aggression vanished with the sudden death of Bakht Singh only two months after his victory at Ajmir. He had planned to go to Delhi in company with the Jaipur Rajah and there concert measures with the imperial Government for keeping the Marathas confined to the Deccan, when he died of cholera. His son, Bijay Singh, was quite unable to cope with the Deccanis.

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Not a farthing having been realized from Rajputana, the Peshwa sent a vast army under his brother Raghunath Rao with Malhar Holkar to that country. This chief crossed the Mukundara pass and entered Kota territory on 30th October 1753. Thence he proceeded through Jaipur to the Kumbher district of the Jat country (arriving there on 20th January 1754.) He was nowhere opposed; Kota and Bundi were old allies, while Madho Singh averted the desolation of his kingdom by sending his diwan Haragovind Natani (16 Dec. 1753) and agreeing to a contribution of 16½ lakhs of Rupees, *—15¼ lakhs being the outstanding tribute, and 1¼ lakhs a present to Raghunath for the honour of his visit! On 17th December, Ram Singh, the ex-Rajah of Marwar, waited on Raghunath and begged his help in recovering his paternal throne. But Raghunath could not be diverted from his main purpose, which was to go to Delhi and support Imād-ud-mulk in getting control of the Emperor. After losing four months on the way in a vain attempt to subdue Imād’s enemy Suraj Mal Jat, the Maratha army arrived opposite Delhi on 1st June 1754. Next day Imād made himself wazir and set up an Emperor of his own creation, and Raghunath had nothing more to do than realize the subsidy promised by Imād and establish Maratha revenue collectors in the districts ceded in the Gangetic Doab and elsewhere.

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∗ Out of this sum, Jago Pandit, the Jaipur minister, paid to Jayapa Sindhia (April 1755) Rs. 7,35,074 in cash and three lakhs in orders on bankers, leaving a balance of Rs. 6,14,926 still due. SPD. xxvii. 108. Interviews,—xxvii. 79.

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So, on 23rd June, Raghunath detached Jayapa Sindhia from his side to Marwar, with orders to restore Ram Singh to the throne. The Gujrat division of the Maratha army, 10,000 strong, was told off for this task. On the way, Jayapa brushed aside the Rathor opposition at Kishangarh, 18 miles north-east of Ajmir. Bijay Singh wisely decided to fall back from the far advanced post of Ajmir to his old frontier fort of Merta, which he held in full strength with a large park of artillery. Here Jayapa arrived on 6th August and was joined by Ram Singh’s adherents. That prince set himself vigorously to enlist his clansmen and soon assembled 12 to 15 thousand Rathors, besides tempting numbers of Bijay Singh’s followers to desert.

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Bijay Singh now issued from Merta and entrenched himself opposite the invader's camp and engaged in daily skirmishes and cannonading. At last on 15th September a battle at close quarters took place. Rajputs of the same clan and even of the same family were ranged on the opposite sides and fought with the blind fury of civil war. "Father slew son, brother killed brother." This unnatural contest raged from 9 o'clock in the morning till sunset. By nightfall Bijay Singh had been completely defeated. The vanquished king spent that night and the next day in Merta, loading what property he could for removal, and then fled away to Nagor. On the 17th Jayapa and Ram Singh entered Merta, looted the city for three hours, and then proclaimed safety to the unhappy citizens. The victors immediately pushed on to Nagor and laid siege to it ; but the siege was destined to last for a year and to cost the Marathas dear. *

§ 3. Peshwa's policy in Marwar how thwarted

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From the beginning of this campaign the Peshwa kept assuring Jayapa of his full confidence in his valour and wisdom, but urging him not to carry matters to an extreme, as the Marwar Rathors were a race of famous swordsmen, justly proud of their having never yet suffered defeat from the Marathas. He advised his general to conclude the Marwar business as quickly as possible by tact and compromise, giving to Bijay Singh his father Bakht Singh's appanage and to Ram Singh his paternal dominions, or even dividing the Marwar kingdom equally between the two. For, there was a far more important and lucrative undertaking before the Marathas in Hindustan than changing the succession in a poor and barren Rajput State. Safdar Jang had recently died, and his son Shuja-ud-daulah had succeeded him in the rich provinces of Oudh and Allahabad ; now was the time to get a large sum out of him and also to secure the transfer of the holy cities of Allahabad and Benares to the Peshwa. The force accompanying Raghunath near Delhi was too small to exact these gains and to enforce the payment of the vast tribute promised by the wazir Imad-ul-mulk. And money was sorely needed by the Peshwa ; he was helpless before his creditors and unpaid officers ; "my Government is eternally in the grip of that consumption, the malady of debt." Fifty lakhs of Rupees if realized from Hindustan would be most welcome to him now. For achieving this object it was fatal to disperse the Maratha troops over a vast area. Jayapa was again and again ordered to free himself from the Marwar entanglement by any means whatever, to satisfy Ram Singh somehow by placing four or five Rathor chieftains under him as his supporters, and to avoid the extremely hard task of crushing Bijay Singh altogether, which would have kept the Maratha army engaged in Marwar till eternity.*

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∗ Jayapa goes to Marwar,—Aiti. Patren, 122, 124. TALS. 21a. Raj. i. 37, 39. DC. Tod, ii. (details of battle.)

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But Jayapa would not listen to his master, and even less to his local chief Raghunath or to his colleague Malhar. He was obsessed by the idea of capturing Bijay Singh’s forts and winning the whole kingdom for Ram Singh.

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§ 4. Early successes of Jayapa Sindhia in Marwar, 1755.

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At first fortune seemed to favour him. The strong fort of Ajmir was stormed by a Maratha division (under the local tribute-collector and not by Jayapa), on 21st February 1755. And shortly before this, the city of Jalor, where Bijay Singh’s hereditary hoards were deposited and which was regarded as his safest refuge in a day of adversity, fell into the hands of a body of Ram Singh’s partisans. A mixed Rathor-Maratha force under Jagannath Purohit and Santaji Bābhlé had invested Jodhpur itself and their sap was approaching the walls of the Rathor capital.

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At the same time, the rigour of the blockade of Nagor began to press its garrison hard. In March 1755 one tank of water within that fort dried up and there remained only one other to keep the defenders and other inmates alive. Famine raged in the beleaguered city; salt sold at 1½ seers per Rupee, rice at 13 seers, and opium—so indispensable to the Rajput, at Rs. 20 per seer, while firewood and grass were totally unobtainable. Men began to escape from Nagor whenever they could. Bijay Singh opened negotiations for terms through a holy abbot, Gosain Bijay Bhārati, but Jayapa demanded the impossible sum of fifty lakhs. At the same time, Jayapa finding his own water-supply failing with the approach of summer, wrested from the enemy's possession a well-watered village, Tausar, seven miles south of the fort, and shifted his camp there.

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∗ Aiti. Patren, 125, 127 (kshay-rogā samān karz-rog), 131 (partition proposed). Raj. vi. 327, 341.

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Hence, there was every prospect of his being able to capture Nagor and end the war in a few weeks. So, when, towards the close of February, Malhar and Sakharam Bapu, now free from their campaigns in the Doab and Mewat, offered to come to Nagor to reinforce him, Jayapa told them that it was unnecessary as he would successfully conclude the Nagor business in a few days, and that they had better go and attack Rupnagar. Raghunath Rao, too, was put off with exactly the same reply when he reached Pushkar (3rd March) and proposed to come to Nagor and personally effect a reconciliation between Jayapa and Bijay Singh and do what he could for reinstating Ram Singh on the throne of Jodhpur.

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Thus, the Maratha cause in Marwar, and in consequence of it, throughout Northern India too, was for the time being ruined by the selfish insubordination of one over-proud officer. And soon things began to turn against him. In March Jalor was recovered by Bijay Singh’s men. Jodhpur held out, and so did Nagor in spite of deepening privation hunger and thirst.* But Jayapa clung to his trenches with blind obstinacy. He wanted to wipe out the disgrace of his repulse by Bakht Singh in July 1752, and after his recent boast to the Peshwa and Raghunath he had not the face to turn back from the walls of Nagor without taking it.

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§ 5. Murder of Jayapa Sindhia, 24 July 1755.

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The exasperation grew bitterer on both sides, and at last the storm burst on 24th July, 1755. Peace-talks had been opened on behalf of Bijay Singh by Gosāin Bijay Bhārati some time ago, but no settlement was reached. The negotiator and his associates used to go and come between the city and the Maratha camp. On 24th July the Gosāin came to Jayapa’s tent with Rāj Singh Chaubān and Jajneshwar from Nāgor. They were joined by Rāwat Jait Singh Sisodiā, who was living in the Maratha camp as the Mahārānā’s ambassador, to lend his services as a neutral mediator. That day the discussion was prolonged and feelings ran high.* The Rathor envoy asked the Maratha general, “What do you mean by coming to our territory and demanding tribute? What do you take yourself to be?” Jayapa haughtily pointed to his sword as his authority. The Rathor pleaded, “Do not be too proud of your swordsmanship and strength of arm. Know that God alone can grant one man supremacy over another.” But these words only heightened Jayapa’s fury. After abusing the Rathor Rajah and his agents as cowards, he thundered out, “By the stroke of my shoes I shall collect tribute from you.” This was more than the ancient peers of Hindustan, claiming descent from the Sun and the Moon, could bear from a Brahman’s hereditary slipper-bearer. In an instant the Rathor’s dagger leaped out of its scabbard and was plunged again and again in Jayapa’s bosom; his companions completed the work with their swords. At once the alarm was sounded, and a wild tumult swept through Jayapa’s camp. The Marathas flew to arms; the three envoys of Bijay Singh were cut down, and the innocent

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∗ Raj. i. 44. SPD. xxi. 67 (for Dānaghās read Indānās), 69. xxvii. 106, 108, 105 (Ajmir captured.)

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∗ Murder of Jayapa,—TALS. 59a and *Chahar Gulzar* 400b both assert that Jayapa abused Bijay S. and the Rajputs in general during the last discussion. *Aiti. Patren*, 139, 141. (I have rejected 143 written in 1799). *SPD*. xxvii. 116, ii. 148. *DC*. under 26 July.

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The above are the authentic contemporary accounts. For the opium-eaters’ tales concocted later, see Tod, i (Personal Narrative) and *Vamsha Bhaskar*, iv. 3649-3652 (10 lakhs fine for the murder) and their echoes in Marathi in *Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar*. A beautiful cenotaph was built at Nagor over Jayapa’s ashes.

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mediator from Udaipur shared their fate. Every Rajput present in the camp was hunted out and slain. Only Sardar Singh, the dispossessed heir of Rupnagar and a protege of Jayapa, was saved, but with the utmost difficulty.

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The crime did not benefit Bijay Singh at all. The confusion quickly subsided; Jayapa’s son Jankoji was proclaimed as the new chief in the masterless camp. The timid proposal to fall back on Ajmir was at once rejected as a cowardly surrender of Maratha rights and a blow to Maratha prestige throughout Hindustan. The siege trenches at Nagor were manned as firmly and the Maratha armies throughout the entire theatre of war presented as bold a front as before. This prompt and vigorous control of the situation was the work of Jayāpā’s brother Dattāji, the guardian of the lad Janko, and a first-rate soldier in courage and enterprise, though lacking in sagacity and diplomatic tact.

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§ 6. Rajput efforts against Marathas fail, 1755.

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Bijay Singh tried to seize the opportunity presented by the removal of Jayapa and to build up a coalition with Madho Singh, the Emperor, Suraj Mal, and the Ruhela leaders, for driving the Marathas out of North India altogether. He sent his agent to Delhi and through the wazir presented five lakhs to the Emperor, begging him to take the field against the Marathas and promising to pay him Rs 10,000 for each day of march and to join him with the Rajput tribal levies The puppet Padishah and his feeble wazir sent off letters summoning the vassal chiefs to the royal banner, and did nothing. Nearer home, Bijay Singh was more successful. Madho Singh, the Rajah of Jaipur, heartily entered into this plan of liberating his country from Deccani domination. He began to recruit new troops in Malwa and wrote to the Rajahs of Bundelkhand to join in this war of their common interest. He first got rid of the Maratha tribute-collector quartered on his capital, Govind Timaji, by encircling his house with troops and threatening to dishonour him, at which Govind took poison (September.)

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∗ This section,—SPD. xxvii. 112, 119, 117, 275. xxi. 71, 73, 77, 76, 80. ii. 49, 55 (which is completed by xxi. 74), 50, 51 (-53), 54, 87 (reply to xxvii. 112).

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Attacks were now delivered on the Maratha posts throughout Marwar. A band of Bijay Singh’s men, strengthened by troops from Jesalmir and Pokharan, started from Jalor against the Marathas who were besieging Jodhpur. But Dattaji was now completely master of the situation and promptly made effective arrangements for defence. While a detaining force continued before Jodhpur, a strong detachment from Dattaji’s own camp advanced against the oncoming enemy. The encounter took place at Godawas, 32 miles north-east of Jalor; the Rathors were defeated and driven into Godawas fort, which was at once blockaded by the Marathas and its provision supply cut off, so that grain sold in the beleaguered city at 2 seers a Rupee. While keeping his grip on Nagor unslackened, Dattaji sent out smaller detachments to every village where the Rathors had raised their heads.*

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Then a Jaipur force under Anurudh Singh Khangārot with allies from Shābpur, Rupnagar, Kerauli and Harawati, making a total of 25,000 men, and strong artillery, was reported as coming to the relief of Nagor [SPD. xxi. 74, 77.] The Jaipur army had at first marched in two divisions, under Anurudh and Jagannath Sah, against Naraina and Ramgarh respectively, but in fear of the Maratha detachment under Ranoji Bhoité advancing against them they had united at Ramgarh. Dattaji countered this move by pushing up to Bhoité a strong reinforcement of 6,000 men, partly composed of his own Marathas and partly of Ram Singh’s Rathor partisans. Anurudh was completely cowed by this superior force, and saw these Maratha generals on 10th October, asking for peace and agreeing to go to Dattaji for settling the terms. But on hearing that Bijay Singh’s retainers and a party of Bikanir troops under diwan Bakhtawar Mal were coming to his aid, in a body of some 2,500 fresh men, he broke off negotiations, and on 15th October set out from Ramgarh towards Nagor. Next day, from Datia he crossed the frontier and entered the Marwar territory. But during the preceding night a light force of Marathas under Bhoité, Narsingh Rao Sindhia, and Khanaji Jadav, had made a forced march from their halting place, and they now overtook and attacked the rear of the Jaipur army three hours after dawn. An obstinate combat raged for four hours. The Deccani moss-troopers galloped upon the cumbrous artillery of Jaipur, cut down the gunners, and in the end gained a complete victory. Anurudh lost seven to eight hundred men slain, and a thousand horses, 50 camels, two guns, and six tumbrils of munitions given up to plunder (16th October.) But a still greater disgrace befell him; his dead were not allowed to be removed for cremation. The Maratha losses were only two killed and forty-three wounded among the men and 70 horses.

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∗ Godawas, on the Sukri river, 32 m. n. e. of Jalor. Didwana, 55 m. n. e. e. of Nagor. Nagor, 43 m. n. w. of Merta. Daulatpur, 5 m. s. e. of Didwana. Naraina, 8 m. s. of Sambhar town. Ramgarh, 32 m. n. of Naraina and 38 m. e. of Didwana.

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Severely shaken by this defeat, the Jaipur general turned his face towards Didwana, moving by regular marches, his baggage placed in the centre of the column and his artillery in front. Constantly harassed and robbed of horses and transport cattle by the Maratha bands roving round him and his men and beasts worn out by want of water, he could not advance more than five miles a day. In this sorry plight he reached Didwana, 38 miles from Ramgarh on 20th October. During the last day of this march he had to pass twelve hours absolutely without any water, the Marathas having blocked up the wells and seized the tanks along the entire route in advance. The enemy, by repeatedly charging his rear and flanks, killed 300 of his men and took 125 of his horses and three of his guns, while large numbers succumbed to thirst.

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He durst not move out of Didwana. Similarly his expected allies, the men of Bijay Singh, were cooped up at Daulatpur (5 miles e. of Didwana.) A convoy of food coming from Bikanir to the Jaipur army in Didwana was cut off by the Marathas near Daulatpur, a hundred men of the escort being killed and the rest put to flight. The greatest scarcity raged in the Rajput camps; rice sold at 3 or 4 seers the Rupee, while fodder was almost unprocurable. Anurudh saw all hope of succour vanish and the way for advance and retreat alike closed. He came out with 200 horse and saw the three Maratha generals facing him on 31st October, but nothing was settled. Bijay Singh, too, sent envoys from Nagor proposing to visit Dattaji for arranging terms of peace (about 5th November.)

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§ 7. Jaipur and Marwar Rajahs make peace with Marathas, Feb. 1756.*

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In the mean time, on hearing of Jayapa’s murder, the Peshwa had ordered reinforcements to Marwar for retrieving the Maratha position there. The first to arrive was Antaji Manakeshwar, with 10,000 men (including Jat and Bhadauria allies), who had started from Kunch on the bank of the Jamuna on 4th September, and by making a safe detour through the hills by way of Indragarh, Khatauli and the Lakheri pass, had entered Jaipur territory near Nevai. Without coming to Nagor, he first ravaged the Kachhwa territory and then joined the Maratha force before Didwana (4th November), helping to make the blockade complete.

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∗ This section.—SPD. xxi. 70, 82, 83, 85. ii. 54, 56, 62, 63, 65. xxvii. 128. Aiti. Patren 142.

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The year had been marked by drought, and even in the open Maratha camp grain was selling at five seers a Rupee, while fodder was so scarce that a Rupee's worth of grass a day did not suffice for one horse. The water level in the wells had sunk to 225 feet below the surface. The situation within the blockaded city of Nāgor was even worse. At last life there became well-nigh unbearable, and on 12th November Bijay Singh slipped out of Nagor with 300 foot and 100 horse, intending to join the Jaipur army at Didwana. But finding that place enveloped by large enemy forces, he quickly changed his route and fled in headlong haste to Bikanir, where he arrived after ten hours of ceaseless riding.

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But the situation was no better at Bikanir. Around that city all the wells had dried up for 24 miles round, and Bijay Singh's attempts to raise a fresh army there failed. So, early in December he returned to Nagor, and reopened peace parleys with Dattaji. Madho Singh decided to secure the release of his army in Didwana by promising five lakhs of Rupees to the Marathas.

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The Maratha forces assembled in Rajputana were in overwhelming strength at this time (the end of 1755) and the Rathors could make no head against them. So, at last, Bijay Singh bowed to the inevitable and agreed to make peace on the following terms (end of February 1756) :

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(i) Ajmir fort and district were to be ceded to the Marathas in full sovereignty.

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(ii) A war indemnity of fifty lakhs was to be paid,—25 lakhs in the course of one year and the balance in two years more.

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(iii) The city of Jalor and half the territory of Marwar were to be delivered to Ram Singh, while Bijay Singh would rule over the other half and the cities of Jodhpur, Nagor and Merta. None of these terms except the first one was ultimately fulfilled.

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These negotiations having been concluded, at the end of February 1756, Dattaji halted before Nagor for some time, in the hope of collecting the money, and then moved on to Merta, and thence to Rupnagar, against which city he opened trenches on 22nd April. Here another division of the Maratha army under Shamsher Bahadur joined him on 5th May and completed the investment. Bahadur Singh, the usurping junior prince of the Rupnagar State, submitted to the invaders and yielded his city to his elder brother Sāmant Singh, whom he had ousted and whose cause had been taken up by Rām Singh and the Marathas. Then Dattaji returned (early in June) to his own fief of Ujjain,* while Shamsher Bahadur went back to Malwa. Thus, the Marwar adventure of the Sindhia family, begun four years ago, at last ended.

§ 8. Raghunath Rao invades Rajputana, 1757—his failure and sufferings

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At the end of this year, 1756, first Malhar Holkar and some weeks later Raghunath Rao were again ordered by the Peshwa to Rajputana to exact the promised but long-delayed tribute. Raghunath reached Indor on 14 February 1757, and on being joined by Malhar there, at first proposed to march on Delhi, which was then being robbed by Ahmad Shah Abdali.

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But such a task was really impossible for him. Apart from his own constitutional lethargy and incapacity, he was severely handicapped by his utter lack of resources and his constant friction with his great lieutenant. The Peshwa had inherited from his dashing father Baji Rao vast territorial claims, but also a crushing legacy of debt, which he had only increased by following a policy of aggressive expansion during 15 years, and he looked to this north-Indian expedition as his only possible means of relief. He had therefore been unable to fit out Raghunath in proper strength. Raghunath’s own force (led by Vital Shivdev) was 4,000 and Malhar’s contingent 2,000, making a total of 6,000 men immediately under his banners. And even counting the scattered detachments of Shamsher Bahadur and Naro Shankar and Antaji’s army (which last was really an imperial service corps), the full Maratha strength in the north did not exceed 16,000 men. But their leader had no money, nor any prospect of getting money soon; the Rajput States were themselves impoverished and merely negotiated to gain time. In consequence, Raghunath and his soldiers were starving. Far from being able to remit tribute to the Peshwa, he constantly begged for funds from Puna, in order to subsist! As he writes, “I am feeding myself only by looting villages. In this country most places are fortified, and not a grain of food can be obtained without fighting. I have no money, and cannot even raise a loan. My soldiers have been fasting for one or two days at a time.” He laid on Malhar the entire blame for the failure to clinch matters with the Rajput Rajahs and hasten the collection of tribute. [Raj. i 52, 67, 71.]

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∗ On 15 October 1756 Antaji writes,—"Before this the Maharao of Kotā [ Durjan Sal ] died childless. On hearing of it Dattaji by rapid marches went to Kotā and secured promise of 40 lakhs as nazar,—20 lakhs were paid down and bonds given for the remaining 20 lakhs. He has come back to Ujjain." SPD. ii. 66. Vamsha Bhaskar, p. 3654-'5 places the death in July and gives 12 lakhs as the succession fine imposed on Ajit S. Hada, the new Rajuh.

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From Indor, through Mewar,—where he took a ransom of one lakh from Jāwad and plundered Ranikheda (March),—Raghunath Rao reached Jaipur territory, and while dunning Mādho Singh for payment, laid siege (April) to the fortalice of Barwada* belonging to the Shekhawats, who were the most stubborn fighters in the Kachhwa kingdom. Raghunath had no siege-materials and was long held up by this garhi. His insane pride and lack of business capacity prolonged the sufferings of his army. The Jaipur minister Kāniram offered to buy him off by paying the same tribute as agreed upon in the past ; but "Raghunath would not listen ; he demands 40 to 50 lakhs in cash and the cession of the 14 lakhs worth of jagir given by the Emperor to Jaipur some years ago as appertaining to fort Ranthambhor, in addition to Rāmpurā-Bhānpurā, Tonk-Todā, and Hinglājgarh. He is determined either to secure these gains by consent, or to remain here for four months and gain territory worth 40 to 50 lakhs by war." [c. 12 April, SPD. xxvii. 152a] Rajah Madho Singh wisely rejected these exorbitant terms and put his capital and other forts in a vigilant and active state of defence. The total Maratha force in that region, including Malhar’s contingent now numbered 13,000. But Jaipur fort had a garrison of 17,000, and the Rajah’s generals patrolled round it in strength day and night. Sanganer was held by Dilel Singh Rajawat, who was strengthened (10 May) with six tumbrils of powder and shot. Madho Singh called his feudatories one by one and made them swear on the sacred *bel* leaf to resist the southern invaders to the death. His determination to fight rather than accept Raghunath’s humiliating terms became manifest to all. [*SPD.* xxi. 121 and 120 ; Raj. i. 71 differs from xxvii. 152*a*.]

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∗ Marked on modern maps under the expressive name of Chauth-ka Barwara, 20 m. w. of Ranthambhor fort and 16 m. n.w. of Sawai Madhopur Rly. station. Raj. i. 63. SPD. xxvii. 155. Jawad, 10 m. n., and Ranikheda, 18 m. n. w. of Neemuch.

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But though there was no actual clash of arms, except for the ineffective siege of Barwada, the strong attitude of Madho Singh, forced Raghunath to lose more than three months and feed his huge army in idleness in Jaipur territory. At last he came to his senses and about 10th July agreed to accept eleven lakhs from Jaipur, six of which was paid down, and shared between Raghunath and Malhar in the proportion of 2 to 1. By this time Raghunath Rao had been reduced to a desperate state of destitution; as he wrote to the Peshwa on 12th July in support of his prayer for a remittance, “I have no money, nor is any loan available. My troops are in debt. Prices here are very high. I am daily getting my food only by sacking the villages.” [Raj. i. 71.]

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Meantime Ahmad Shah had come and gone without Raghunath lifting a finger to defend the holy places of Hindustan or to prevent the foreign invader from carrying away the treasures of the land and leaving it sucked dry for the Marathas who would come after him.*

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Having thus at last settled the Jaipur business, Raghunath and Malhar waited for some days more in Jaipur territory for the arrival of Holkar's wife Gautami Bāi, and on being joined by her left Rajputana at the end of July 1757, and that country enjoyed peace for nearly a year after.

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§ 9. The Sindhias in Rajputana, 1758.

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The tribute of 50 lakhs which Bijay Singh of Marwar had been forced to promise to Dattaji Sindhia (in Feb. 1756), was beyond the resources of that desert land and remained unpaid for years after, keeping a source of friction perpetually open. During Raghunath's march through Rajputana in June 1757, the Marwar ministers had waited on him and begged him to abate these terms and dictate some reasonable compromise between their Rajah and Sindhia. But Marwar had been assigned by the Peshwa as the special hunting-ground of the Sindhia family, and therefore Raghunath did not choose to interfere, even if he could have imposed his will on Dattaji, which was doubtful. [ Raj. i. 66. ]

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∗ Raghunath assumed a despondent tone from the outset. "Our troops are not yet assembled. I have no money. Abdali is strong ; it requires very great resources to chastise him. Send Dattaji Sindhia quickly to me from the Deccan" (Raghunath's letter, 16 Feb.) On 16th Feb. his diwan Sakharam Bapu writes, "The month of Falgun (Feb-March) will be over before my contingent and that of Malhar are mustered. Abdali is a powerful enemy." [Raj. i. 52 and 53.]

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So, Rajputana received another visit from the locust swarms of the south about the middle of 1758. In the July of that year Jankoji Sindhia was pressing Ummed Singh Sisodia of Shāhpurā for his tribute, and he paid a hurried visit to Raghunath Rao, then on his return journey from the Panjab to Maharashtra through eastern Rajputana and Malwa. At the end of that month Jankoji secured a promise of four lakhs from Shāhpurā and went to Kota, where the new Rajah had died. Here he imposed a succession fee on the late Rajah’s successor, and here Malhar soon afterwards joined him (August) and helped to realize the money. The two Maratha generals now came to some sort of settlement of the long-standing rivalry between their families for sharing the Maratha acquisitions in Rajputana and Malwa. Jankoji then passed into Jaipur territory via Mālpurā. Rajah Madho Singh had entered into every anti-Maratha coalition since 1754, and he was now coerced into promising 36 lakhs, payable in four years, the present year’s instalment of 9 lakhs to be enhanced by the addition of a nazar of three lakhs (September.) Since July last Jankoji had been receiving repeated letters from the retreating Raghunath Rao, urging him to leave Rajputana for the present and march to Delhi, where a strong Maratha force was needed for defending their new gains in the Doab and the Panjab, as there were persistent rumours of Abdali's intention to invade India again. Jankoji halted during October and November on the eastern side of the Jaipur kingdom for the coming of his uncle and guardian Dattaji, who had at this time taken post in Rupnagar, "thinking day and night how to lighten the Peshwa's load of debt." At last uncle and nephew united, started for Delhi, and reached Najafgarh on 26 December 1758. *

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The land being clear of the southern invaders, Madho Singh, who received a visit from Suraj Mal at Amber in March 1759 and probably concerted a defensive plan with him, soon afterwards expelled the Maratha outposts from his dominions. [ TALS. 202a. ]

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§ 10. Malhar Holkar's campaign in Rajputana, 1759.

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Soon after parting from Jankoji at Kota, Malhar returned to Indor (September 1758) and had a severe illness. On recovering, he made a journey to Puna, where he arrived in January 1759, after having been detained for some weeks at Sendhwa (midway between the Narmada and the Tapti) by a general Bhil rising in Khandesh. At the Maratha capital his tact and diplomacy removed the Peshwa's recently kindled suspicions about him, and he was sent back to Malwa, reinstated in trust and power. In July he received orders from the Peshwa to go and put pressure on the Maharana of Udaipur, who had not paid a pice of his annual tribute for the last four years, nor the extra contribution laid on him by Jankoji in 1758. The Peshwa's need of money was most pressing and he wrote to his agents in Rajputana not to spare the Maharana's feelings, but to exercise every kind of harshness that was likely to enforce payment from the defaulter. [SPD. xxi. 167, 172.]

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∗ SPD. ii 95, 94, 96. xxvii. 230, 236. Jankoji writes to the Peshwa that he was delayed long near Pushkar by his efforts to collect the promised tribute. ( ii 101.)

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But the main task of Malhar was to realize the heavy contributions laid on the Jaipur Rajah,—namely 12 lakhs for 1758 and 9 lakhs for 1759. This was no easy task, because Jaipur was now the strongest power in Rajputana, and its master, safely sheltered within his strongly fortified capital, could laugh an invasion to scorn. Moreover, as Raghunath had found in 1757, in this kingdom most of the villages had protective walls and a martial population. Thus, the Maratha general could only occupy a portion of the country and try to starve the enemy out by stopping cultivation and commercial traffic. At last, in November the Rajputs came out in a body 4,000 strong, under Jot Singh Nathawat, to attack the Marathas. Malhar had been praying for such an opportunity of fighting in the open. With his superior numbers and artillery, he enveloped the Rajputs at Lakhori and completely crushed them, twenty of their captains being slain. Thereafter the Rajputs ceased to confront him, and merely held their outposts at different places.

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Malhar next laid siege to Barwara, which was defended by Vikramajit and other captains of the Rajawat and Shekhawat clans. Calling up his big guns from Rampurā, he pressed the garrison so hard that they cried for quarter and were allowed to go away with their lives only, and the Marathas occupied this fort renowned for its strength. Their signal success frightened the Rajput chiefs all around; from Uniara, Isarda, Sewarh, and Jhilara envoys came to Malhar’s camp with offers of tribute as the price of peace. His aim was to make them restore the Maratha jagirs in Kota-Bundi lately usurped by them and then to confirm these local chieftains in the possession of their ancestral estates, on condition of their agreeing to pay tribute annually for the rest of the lands they held. But before these arrangements could be completed, he received, on 27th December, an urgent call from Dattaji Sindhia to come at once to his aid, as Abdali had crossed over into the Sarhind district and a decisive trial of strength with him was imminent. So, Malhar abruptly abandoned the Rajput business just at the point of maturing, and set off on 2nd January 1760 for Delhi, by way of Jhilāra (3rd January.)*

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∗ *SPD.* ii. 113, 115, 117 (=xxi. 177). Raj. i. 150. Jhilara seems to be Jhilai, 23 m. n. w. of Barwara and 40 m. s. e. of Jaipur.

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Thus, the Maratha interests in Rajputana remained unsettled and uncared for throughout the entire year 1760, that intervened between Malhar’s departure and the battle of Panipat. It was only after the retreat of the Afghan king from India about the middle of 1761 that the Marathas were able to turn again to Rajputana and settle accounts with the Rajput princes who had been exulting over the debacle of Panipat.

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