Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c28: Chapter XXII

Fall of the Mughal Empire v2.c28

Language
English

Contents

Chapter XXII

v2.c28.1

NAJIB-UD-DAULA, DICTATOR OF DELHI, 1761-1770.

§ 1. Ahmad Shah Abdali's doings in India after Panipat

v2.c28.s1.1

From 10th October 1760, when Sadāshiv Rao Bhāu deposed the wazir's puppet Shah Jahan II and proclaimed Shah Alam II Emperor in Delhi, to the 6th of January 1772, when Shah Alam rode into the capital of his fathers for the first time as sovereign, the imperial city was widowed of her lord. True, throughout this long interval of over eleven years, there always lived in Delhi a recognized vicar of the Emperor in the person of his eldest son Mirzā Jawān Bakht, with the title of Wali Ahad or Heir; but the Emperor himself was sighing out his days in exile at Allahabad or elsewhere in the territory of the Nawab of Oudh, unable to control the administration of the realm from its centre. This eclipse of royalty coincides almost exactly with the noontide splendour of Najib Khan's career as the virtual dictator of Delhi and the supreme regulator of the affairs of what still remained of the Mughal empire. Only fourteen months separate the death of Najib (31 Oct. 1770) from the return of Shah Alam to Delhi. Therefore, the history of the centre of the Mughal empire can be best studied as a part of the life-story of Najib-uddaulah, even though he very seldom resided in the city of Delhi during these ten years.

v2.c28.s1.2

The day after his greatest victory, Ahmad Shah Abdali visited the city of Pānipat, dressed in a splendid robe on which glittered the costly jewels (including the Kohinur) taken away by Nadir Shah from the Delhi palace and seized by Ahmad Shah during the plunder of his murdered master’s camp. He made a pilgrimage to the tomb of the saint Bu Ali Qalandar and there knelt down in thanksgiving to the God of Hosts for His crowning mercy. He soon set out for Delhi, which he entered a fortnight after the battle (on 29th January, 1761.) *

v2.c28.s1.3

Throughout the last three months, “a feeling as of death had settled upon that unhappy city from rumours of the Shah’s coming,” and on his arrival “grain became extremely dear.” Its Maratha governor Nāro Shankar, had found his position untenable as soon as the news of the disaster to the Bhāu’s army reached Delhi. The Muslim mob assembled and engaged in plunder without fear or check ; every fugitive from Pānipat was stripped of his all. But, thanks to the grateful support of the ex-Empress Zinat Mahal, Nāro Shankar issued from the city with his property and family without molestation, except for being forced to pay up the dues of the Abyssinian qiladar Habsh Khan and his garrison. He presented 3½ lakhs of Rupees in cash, besides costly articles of the Deccan to the Queen-mother; much dispersed property which he could not collect and carry away in his hurry, came into the imperial treasury.

v2.c28.s1.4

∗ Abdali after Panipat.—Kashiraj, DC. Ghulam Ali, ii. 186-188. Wendel 83. SPD. ii. 142, xxi. 202.

v2.c28.s1.5

Then the Durrani army entered the city and engaged in seizing property "beyond imagination." Habsh Khan was squeezed out of 10,000 gold coins. The Queen-mother welcomed the victor by advancing with the Heir to Narela, 12 kos north of Delhi, and presenting one lakh of Rupees to him and half a lakh to his wazir.

v2.c28.s1.6

During February and the first half of March, Ahmad Shah occupied the Delhi palace, living with his wives in the rooms set apart for Mumtaz Mahal in the reign of Shah Jahan, and holding Court in the famous Diwān-i-khās. After the hardships of the last fifteen months of campaigning and privation, he gave himself and his army up to pleasure and repose for some time in the imperial city.

v2.c28.s1.7

But his peace was disturbed by the mutiny of his Durrani troops who clamoured for their pay,—now two years in arrear,—and also insisted on being immediately led back to their mountain home, as they would not spend another summer on the Indian plains. Najib was called upon to pay the cost of his deliverance from the Maratha menace by Durrani arms. He tried hard to shift the burden from his own shoulders by presenting Nāgar Mal the envoy of the Jat Rajah (21st Feb.) and opening negotiations for the payment of a tribute by that prince in return for Abdali’s forgiveness. But the Queen-mother Zinat Mahal hated Suraj Mal as the protector and ally of her husband’s murderer and she knew from the past that Suraj Mal was only playing to gain time and would pay nothing unless compelled by force. So, she induced the Durrani wazir to dismiss the Jat envoy with a direct refusal. On 8th March, Shah Wali Khan, with Prince Jawan Bakht and Zinat Mahal, set out for Agra in order to put pressure on Suraj Mal; but the Durrani soldiers refused to march to the Mathura region where they had daily lost hundreds of their brethren from cholera in this very month of March only four years ago. The increasing disorder among his troops compelled Ahmad Shah to decide on a prompt return to Afghanistan and he recalled his wazir. In the meantime, a riot had broken out between Shuja’s Shia followers and the Shah’s Sunni troops, and the Nawab of Oudh, in high anger at this return for his valued assistance during the late war with the Marathas, left for his province on 7th March. On the 13th of that month the Shah began preparations for his retreat. Leaving Delhi city on 20th March he halted for two days in the Shalimar garden north-west of the city, and began his return march on the 22nd, reaching Ambala on the 27th. A Maratha letter reports that there was a three days’ plunder of Delhi by his retreating troops.

v2.c28.s1.8

§ 2. How Najib became regent of Delhi.

v2.c28.s1.9

The Durrani king's parting instructions were that Shah Alam should be recognized as Emperor, Imad reappointed wazir and Najib Mir Bakhshi, and that these two ministers should bury their old hostility and work in friendly co-operation and singleness of devotion to their master's interests. But a river of blood lay between Shah Alam and Imad, and the opportunist Najib used this fact to secure his own elevation as regent of the empire for the next ten years. He wrote to the Queen-mother that if Imad returned to Delhi and resumed charge of the government, he would set Shah Alam and his branch of the royal family aside and set up a crowned puppet of his own like the late Shah Jahan II. So, the Heir issued a rescript calling upon Najib to come and take charge of the capital. Thus, while Imad, after receiving the wazir's robe from Abdali's agent was delaying at Mathura to assemble his Jat escort and "building castles in the air," Najib stole a march over him, came to Luni, and was brought over to Delhi by the Crown Prince (7th April), the two seated on the same elephant.* This move checkmated Imad; his sole supporter Suraj Mal, when faced with the accomplished fact, refused to instal Imad in the wazirship as it now meant an attack upon Delhi.

v2.c28.s1.10

∗ Nur. 54b-55b. DC. SPD. ii. 144. There are two lives of Najib in Persian, one (extremely well-written) by Sayyid Nur-ud-din Hasan Khan (afterwards Sir C. W. Malet's *munshi*) composed probably in 1773 (Br. Mus. Pers. MS. 24,410), and the other by Bihari Lal, the *munshi* of Najib, written in 1787.

v2.c28.s1.11

Najib became the official head of the army of the empire (*Mir Bakhshi*), governor (*faujdār*) of the metropolitan district, and regent (*mukhtār*) of the imperial administration. "In the whole city his men were installed in the offices of tax collection, control of the grain market, &c. His agent was posted at the gate of the palace-fort as its commandant. Shah Alam ratified the arrangement." Najib put a garrison of some six thousand men in Delhi, and held the capital by means of a trusty lieutenant such as his brother (Afzal or Sultan Khan) or his son Zābita Khan, who governed it. This work Zabita discharged very ably and pleased every one, especially the traders, by his strict justice, suppression of robbery, and sympathy with the people in their distress. [Nur 98b].

v2.c28.s1.12

§ 3. *Abdali's attempt to conclude peace with the Peshwa and Suraj Mal fails.*

v2.c28.s1.13

Ahmad Shah Abdali, like a wise statesman, wished to leave behind him an agreed peace among all the Powers of India: he himself would keep the Panjab from the Satlaj westwards and content himself with an annual tribute of 40 lakhs of Rupees for the rest of the Mughal empire, payable by the minister who would wield the regency of Delhi. As for the Marathas,* during several years after Panipat Abdali persisted in the attempt to placate the Peshwa; he wrote repeatedly to his Delhi agent, Yaqub Ali, to go to the Peshwa and beg him to excuse the Durrani king for the slaughter of his son and cousin at Panipat, as Ahmad Shah had no intention of fighting them, but the Bhau had begun the offensive and forced the Shah to take up arms in self-defence. The envoy was instructed to assure the Puna Court that the Maratha-Durrani boundary as now settled by negotiation would be scrupulously respected, and that all the Indian Powers would have Abdali’s blessing in supporting Shah Alam on the Delhi throne and letting the regular government of the empire start again.

v2.c28.s1.14

∗ Abdali and the Peshwa after Panipat,—Raj. vi. 382, 384, 423,

v2.c28.s1.15

In short, Abdali’s sole interest in India was to get his tribute punctually year after year, without having to send an Afghan army for its collection. It was, therefore, necessary for him that the *status quo* should be maintained in Hindustan, the Ruhelas secured from molestation, and the Marathas induced to come to terms with the Durrani and Shah Alam and not to disturb the Delhi administration and cut off its revenue resources as they had done by their invasions in the past. Such a live and let live policy was the most sensible and business-like plan at the time, if only the Peshwa could be induced to let bygones be bygone and to curb his ambition within the bounds of what was realizable. The Maratha failure to do this shows that they had not a single statesman among them and that by trying to grasp all they were destined to lose all in the end.

v2.c28.s1.16

⁴²⁵ *DC. SPD.* xxi. 202 (completed by ii. 103.) xxvii. 272. ii. 145, 146. xl. 141, 142. xxix. 10.

v2.c28.s1.17

Yaqub Ali Khan, by Abdali's order, left Delhi on 9th April with the robe and jewelled pen-case appertaining to the office of imperial wazir, for delivering them to Imad at Mathura. On the 19th the envoy was presented to Suraj Mal. Long consultations were held by these three, as well as Tatya Gangadhar (Holkar's diwān) and Bāpu M. Hinganē (the Peshwā's resident wakil at Delhi), for settling a peace between the Shah and the Peshwā and restoring the normal administration of the country. Envoys of the trans-Ganges Ruhelas and of Ahmad Bangash and Shujā-ud-daulah too arrived to join in this peace congress. But nothing came of it, partly because with a dying Peshwa on the throne the Maratha State was headless, but mainly because Suraj Mal and Imad were bent upon setting Najib aside and asserting their own authority over the imperial dominions without a partner. A lasting peace with Abdali and Najib was the last thing that they desired. Imad and Tatya Gangadhar prevented Yaqub Ali from going to the Peshwa and settling the peace terms and the boundary question by direct negotiation with him, and asked the envoy to conclude the discussion at Mathura. The envoy protested that the Shah's order was for him to go to Puna, placate the Peshwa by offering condolences for the slaughter at Pānipat, ascertain his demands and make terms then and there. But in view of Balaji Rao’s mental derangement and imminent death, he was detained at Mathura and the congress broke up after two months of futile talk.

v2.c28.s1.18

Yaqub Ali was a mere courier of the Shah’s message; he could undertake nothing on his own responsibility. So, he plainly told Imad that his task was over with the handing of the wazir’s insignia to the latter and that Imad must make himself the *de facto* head of the Delhi government by his own strength. Suraj Mal was now by far the most powerful prince in India, with absolutely unimpaired forces and an overflowing treasury. The recent two years’ Afghan-Maratha contest had left him quite untouched. In the visible decay of all other Powers in North India, he wished, with Imad as his tool and the cloak of legality which Imad’s office of wazir could throw over all his undertakings, to seize the actual government of the empire and wrest the neighbouring provinces from the Ruhelas the Bangash and Shuja in the name of the Emperor but keep them himself “under a veil.”

v2.c28.s1.19

The Oudh and Afghan envoys assembled at Mathura were indignant and replied, “If you want us to give up our lands only in order to lease them to the Jat, we shall not surrender them.” The natural result was that the negotiations broke down, the par-Ruhelas, though jealous and afraid of Najib, were antagonized towards Imad, and the titular wazir’s hope of ousting Najib from Delhi entirely disappeared. Suraj Mal bluntly refused to fight Najib single-handed for the sake of Imad. He had a most precious fruit close at hand, ripe for the plucking. On 12th June he captured Agra fort by bribery, after less than a month’s blockade. Najib had come back from Sonepat to Delhi for the Id prayer of 6th May, which he attended seated side by side with the Crown Prince on the same elephant. Now, on hearing of Suraj Mal’s design against Agra, he at first talked of marching out with the prince to the relief of that fort. But after taking a muster of the troops available at Delhi (9th May), he wisely shrank from a war with the Jat myriads, and left Delhi on 14th June with a view to establishing his revenue control over the Sonepat district, now that the country south of Delhi was hopelessly lost to the empire from Suraj Mal’s occupation of Agra fort.

v2.c28.s1.20

§ 4. Survey of Najib Khan’s career from 1761.

v2.c28.s1.21

This is a convenient point for taking a bird’s-eye view of the rest of Najib’s career. The Panipat campaign had left him without a rival in the Delhi Government and supreme in authority and influence in the north, though grievously weakened by the heavy slaughter of his trained soldiery during the long warfare and the draining of his resources through the payment of money subsidies to Abdali and the supply of provisions to his army from his Doab estates for over a year. On the other hand, the Jat Rajah was now the strongest and richest potentate in India. Najib wisely shrank from a trial of strength with Suraj Mal. His ambition was therefore strictly limited to the country north and west of Delhi and his old jagirs in the upper Doab and Rohilkhand, besides such former Maratha acquisitions in the middle Doab as he could easily seize. Further down the Doab, *i.e.*, roughly south of a line drawn west to east through Delhi, the Jat Power now expanding without fear or check impinged upon Najib’s possessions and precipitated a deadly conflict which was to dominate Delhi’s external politics till February 1765. After Najib’s potent diplomacy and still more potent gold had enabled him in that month to finally checkmate the new Jat Rajah and turn his hostile designs to other quarters, the Ruhela chief’s ceaseless preoccupation to the very end of his days was with the Sikhs. In spite of some signal victories gained by him in the field, this eternal trouble wore his strength and resources out, desolated and beggared his Doab jagirs, and converted the northernmost Doab and the sub-Himalayan tract facing it on the west bank of the Jamuna,—*i. e.*, the Ambala district,—practically into Sikh dominion.

v2.c28.s1.22

In this perennial contest, it was only by hard marching, hard fighting, and the relentless sacrifice of everything else to the supreme military need, that Najib could prevent his principality from dissolving and the Sikhs annexing its fragments. But the end was, all the same, the devastation of his lands and the insecurity of the roads every year. At the same time a life of strenuous exertion was telling upon his health, and illness began to sap his vitality from 1763 onwards. After 1764, his patron and potent supporter, Ahmad Shah Abdali, became too much entangled in civil wars at home, the mutiny of his troops, the irrepressible upspring of the Sikh nation and latterly his own illness, to come to Najib’s rescue. Najib was thenceforth thrown entirely upon his own resources. But the folly and failure of Jawahir Singh made Najib safe at home, except for the Sikhs, from March 1765 onwards, as the debacle of Pānipat had removed the Maratha menace from him for a decade after 1761.

v2.c28.s1.23

No doubt, this peace was mainly a pure gift of Fortune, but it was rightly deserved by his marvellous diplomatic tact, political insight, masterly handling of his resources, and power of seizing every opportunity with unfailing skill and prevision. He utilized this respite from war to aggrandize his own power and create a strong and spacious domain of his own, without a thought for the interests of his nominal master, which Najib as an intensely practical man must have perceived to be hopeless.

v2.c28.s1.24

Secure from the dread of any enemy attack northwards up to the Sarhind border, and, after Jawahir’s decisive repulse early in 1765, equally safe southwards to Ballabhgarh, Najib turned to imposing his authority upon the ever-refractory landlords of the North Delhi region, and then expanded his possession and rule over the Hansi-Hisar districts immediately west of the above tract. Southwest of Delhi lay the Baluch settlements in the modern Rohtak district,—such as Jhajhar, Bahadurgarh, Farrukhnagar and Tauru,—the petty barons of which, as his brother-Muslims and fellow trans-Border men, clung to Najib for protection against the growing menace of the Jat expansion through Mewat towards them. "The parganahs of Hariana,—such as Gohana, Rohtak, Dadri, &c.—came into Najib's possession. The Baluch zamindars of that district became obedient to him,"—Musavi Khan of Farrukhnagar joining him with a force of over 2,000 men. "Day by day Najib's power increased. From the faujdari of Saharanpur he realized 75 lakhs of Rupees [a year.] In the Doab places like Mirat, Sikandrabad, Dasna, Baghpat &c., and seven mahals belonging to the Marathas, came into his possession." [Nur. 55b-56a. SPD. ii. 144.)

v2.c28.s1.25

Najib's Baluch protegees formed a line of defence along the south-western frontier of his domain; but this very fact made a war to the death between him and the Jat Rajah inevitable, as we shall see in Chapter 23. The middle Doab also formed a debatable land between him and the Jats who had crossed the Jamunā, recovered their possessions lost to Abdali in March 1759, and rushed in to fill the void caused by the late Maratha withdrawal from that region. Like a wise man of business, Najib seized the substance of power in the Delhi Government, leaving it to Imad and Shuja to fight over the title of wazir—now reduced to a mere shadow, without the least significance in Indian politics. He extended his own sway over the three regions described above and confirmed it beyond challenge by the ruthless sack and massacre of two prominent villages,—Buāna and Bhiwāni,—which struck as much terror and were as effective in cowing all opposition throughout the country, as Cromwell’s massacres at Drogheda and Waterford. With his immense income from the land, he set himself to build a new capital of his own at Najibabad—adorned with splendid mansions, mosques, etc.—and a strong fort at Pathargarh.

§ 5. Najib visits Abdali (1762) and Shah Alam (1763.)

v2.c28.s2.1

We shall now turn to the narration of Najib’s movements and other acts. On 10th September 1761 he returned to Delhi from his estate. As he was about to enter the Diwan-i-khas for interviewing the Crown Prince, the porters, in accordance with the rules, refused to admit more than eleven attendants with him. At this he took offence and at once left for his own camp. After two days he was pacified by princely apologies and paid his visit on the 12th. Then he left for Gohana while Nāgar Mal was sent to Kumbher to arrange for a personal meeting between him and the Jat Rajah. This interview took place about 23rd October, but as we shall see in Chapter 23, it produced no real understanding between the two nor any concerted plan for bringing Shah Alam back to Delhi. [SPD. xxi. 89. Nur. 56a.]

v2.c28.s2.2

In the November and December of this year we find Najib engaged in subduing his refractory tenants in the Hansi-Hisar country, aided by Musavi Khan. From this region he was called at the beginning of February 1762 to meet Ahmad Shah who was then busy repressing the Sikhs in the Sarhind-Patiala country. He bore the Shah company till the first week of April and received high praise from his patron, who publicly remarked, "This is the only man among the Indian Afghans. I have shown many favours to that race, but not one of them, not even Shuja-ud-daulah, has come to my side." [Nur. 57a. CPC. ii. DC.]

v2.c28.s2.3

After his return to Delhi on 15th April, Najib paid a fortnight's visit to his city of Najibabad, then in course of construction, and afterwards came back to Delhi (17th May), occupying his official residence, Safdar Jang's mansion. Early in October next he went to Lahor, again to settle the affairs of the empire in consultation with the Abdali king. Yaqub Ali Khan, as well as Shah Alam's agents Munir-ud-daulah and Agha Raza, and the Maratha wakil Bapu Hingane also went there for the discussions. It was agreed that Shah Alam should be recognized as Emperor and Shuja as his wazir, and that forty lakhs a year should be paid to the Afghan king as the tribute of India,—for which Najib was held answerable. Abdali’s letters to this effect were issued to the chief Indian Powers, and robes of honour for Emperor and wazir were despatched from his Court with Razā Quli Khan. Ahmad Shah left Lahor for his home on 12th December 1762, and Najib returned to Delhi on 18th January, the other Indian envoys with him. [DC. Nur. 57b.]

v2.c28.s2.4

Shortly after this Najib received pressing invitations to join the Emperor Shah Alam who was then encamped with Shuja at Sikandrabad, and on whom Hafiz Rahmat and other Ruhela chiefs (but not Ahmad Khan Bangash of Farrukhabad) were in attendance. But Shuja, who was really the keeper of the puppet Emperor, attempted to wrest Ahmad’s territories from him, as a preliminary to the Emperor’s march on Delhi. This antagonized all the Ruhelas, and destroyed the chance of any united action by all the vassal chiefs for installing Shah Alam on his ancestral throne. Najib quickly arrived in the imperial camp, was cordially welcomed by Shuja and presented to the Emperor, who bestowed many costly gifts on him. Under pressure from Najib, the Nawab of Oudh abandoned his hostile designs against the Bangash chief.* In this camp Najib fell ill of a high fever, which caused fits of unconsciousness for hours together; the Emperor graciously visited his sick-bed and showed him every kindness. Soon there broke out a sectarian dispute between Shuja's Shia troops and Najib's Sunni Afghans, and in the rioting that followed a *pir-zada* of the Afghans, when on a visit to the Oudh camp, was killed by the ruffianly Qizzilbashes and Mughalias there. The soldiers on both sides came out for a battle and could not be controlled by their chiefs. So, Najib hurriedly took leave of the Emperor (on 16th May) and marched back to his home, where he made a long stay on account of his illness. [*Ghulam Ali*, ii. 157-167, *DC*. Muna Lal 60.]

v2.c28.s2.5

∗ Najib’s very cogent reasoning, Nur. 59a-60a. Shuja vs. Bangash, Imad 88-91.

§ 6. Najib fights Suraj Mal and Jawahir, 1763-1765

v2.c28.s3.1

He had barely recovered health and strength, when in December he was suddenly recalled to Delhi by Suraj Mal's attack on the Baluch zamindars and threatened invasion of Delhi. Najib tried hard to pacify the Jat king, but without success. The campaign ended in Suraj Mal's being shot dead (25 December 1763) during a night attack and all his troops dispersing, as we shall learn in detail in Chapter 23. The disappearance of the greatest of the Jat kings, the immature character of his youthful successor, and the internal dissensions that ravaged the Bharatpur State, all combined to give Najib a respite from that enemy till November next, when Jawahir Singh, after assembling a vast force of his own tribesmen and hired Sikh Maratha and Gosain troops, attacked Najib to avenge his father's death. This life and death struggle kept Najib busy in Delhi till the middle of February 1765, when he succeeded in defeating the attack, and stood triumphant as the undisputed lord of Delhi. This repulse of the Jat king, even though supported by Imad, Malhar Holkar and the myriads of Sikhs, marks the climax of Najib's greatness. The holy month of Ramzān began on the next Friday, 22 February 1765, and Imad begged leave to enter Delhi and offer his Friday prayers in the Jāmi Masjid of the capital. For six years he had ruled over the city as an wazir mightier than the sovereign and Najib had then ranked among his humble retainers. And today as Imad rode through the Broad Street of Delhi to the Grand Mosque, the citizens saw with wonder that Najib was seated side by side with him on the same elephant. Such was his present exaltation. [Nur. 91.]

v2.c28.s3.2

Meantime, his patron, Ahmad Shah, had been defeated by the Sikhs and recalled quickly to Afghanistan by disorder in his own army and kingdom (end of March 1764.) In the following September, Najib, anticipating the storm visibly brewing from the new Jat Rajah's quarter, sent his own envoy Meghraj to Abdali in Qandahar, via Jammu. In response to this appeal, Ahmad Shah reached Mustafabad-Buria (25 m. s.e. of Ambala) by rapid marches in February 1765; but by that time Najib had already made peace with his enemy, and Abdali hurried back to his own country without giving Najib time to meet him.

v2.c28.s3.3

§ 7. Najib sternly represses refractory villagers in Hariana, 1765.

v2.c28.s3.4

Freed from the Jat menace, Najib marched to the Sonepat district (in the north of Delhi) for subduing the turbulent tenantry, who would not pay rent unless forced to do so. "Here many villages were in rebellion; their leaders were a body of Jats residing in Buānā (16 miles north-west of Delhi), who were notorious for their highway robbery and usurpation of other people's lands and cattle." Najib first went to the district headquarters and peacefully demanded the revenue. On being refused, he rode out at midnight with his troops, came upon the village at dawn, slew the Hindu abbot and his monks who had their hermitage near the place, and tried to seize the cattle that were being led out of the village to their pasture. The villagers opened fire with their matchlocks. A thousand of them were armed with muskets and 2,000 with side arms; besides, three hundred matchlockmen of the Bhangi (sweeper) caste had been hired by them. The Ruhela troopers encircled the village, standing beyond range. The villagers began to parley, but had no real intention of paying, they only mocked Najib.

v2.c28.s3.5

By this time it was noon and the Ruhela troopers and their horses, standing in the open, were suffering dreadfully from the Sun (April 1765); they had brought no artillery with them. The village had a mud wall twice the height of a man, all around it, with a dry ditch below. But Najib’s spirit was up. He could not bear the thought that the Amir-ul-umara of the Empire should lay a regular siege to a peasants’ mud fort or retire leaving it untaken. His plan was quickly formed: dismounting all his troopers and even officers, he made a simultaneous assault from all sides, at a given signal, immediately after firing a salvo from his camel-swivels, which had been advanced to the front. A sudden distraction and alarm seized the villagers, and only one camel-gunner and one infantryman on Najib’s side were killed, while the Ruhelas ran forward, jumped into the ditch, and clung to the wall; climbing on one another’s back they entered the village in spite of the shower of bullets. The villagers, losing heart, took to flight. A body of them, who were mounted along with their women, broke through the Ruhela cordon and escaped by the back gate. The leading men of the village took refuge in a house and continued to hold out with their musket fire. The Ruhela soldiers dispersed for plunder and slaughter, and it was an hour before they could be rallied and made to carry this house by assault. Two thousand men were slain and about the same number of women and children were made prisoners, and finally the sacked village was set on fire. "From the massacre at Buānā a great terror spread throughout Hariānā, and all the landlords made submission and paid their revenue." [Nur. 93a-97b.]

v2.c28.s3.6

Having thus restored Government authority in the north Delhi region, Najib returned to the capital, whence he was soon recalled to Najibabad by the news of the illness of his wife, a daughter of Dundi Khan. She died, leaving two sons and one daughter behind. After spending the rainy season there, Najib in October returned to Delhi, and turned to subduing the peasantry of the region west of the capital, in the modern Rohtak and Hisar districts.* Some 30 miles west of Rohtak city there was a village which had paid no revenue for three years. Parleys went on for ten days, and then the villagers agreed to terms. A collector was posted there, but he was attacked at night. The news reached Najib's camp; at once he rode out, came up to the village while it was still dark and delivered an assault on it. The village was set on fire; many of its inhabitants fled away, the rest were slain or taken prisoner. This terrified the headmen of Bhiwāni, a most important village in the neighbourhood (35 miles s. e. of Hisar), notorious for its bold and successful defiance of the local governors and even of the Emperor in person. After a futile preparation for armed opposition, the villagers realized Najib’s overwhelming superiority and fled away at night, evacuating all their houses. “Next morning the Ruhela soldiers entered the village and brought away heaps of grain to their camp. All the men, and even their animals, fed on this grain for four or five days. When they marched away, they set fire to a great store of grain. Even after that, so much was left that it could not be computed...Najib after devastating Bhiwāni, went towards Rohtak, where he heard of a Sikh raid into his Saharnapur estates and marched thither.”

v2.c28.s3.7

∗ Nur. 98b-100a. SPD. xxix. 99. CPC. ii. Ch. Gulz. 485a.

§ 8. Najib’s repeated contest with Sikh raiders in Hariana and Doab

v2.c28.s4.1

Najib’s conflicts with the Sikhs in his own dominions, as distinct from his engagements with them as an auxiliary in Abdali’s army, had begun in January 1764, [Ch. 24 § 4], when the Sikh forces, flushed with their slaughter of Zain Khan and capture of Sarhind, overflowed across the Jamuna into the upper Doab. “This was the first time that the Sikhs came to the eastern side of the Jamuna and spread through the villages of Bārha, the homes of respectable men whose ancestors had been *umara* in former times. They took booty beyond calculation in coins, gold bullion and jewels, burnt the country, and draggged away captives. Najib, distracted by the news, came up near them by rapid marching, . . . but they went back to their own country.”

v2.c28.s4.2

[Nur 72.] Tahmasp Khan Miskin, who shared these campaigns in Najib’s army, writes, “The Sikhs after having completed their occupation and settlement of the Sarhind district in one year, made a further advance. Four thousand of their horsemen crossed the Jamuna and disturbed and looted the Saharanpur and Mirat districts. Najib for a month or two moved in every direction where the Sikhs were reported to be roving, fought and usually defeated them. As they did not make a firm stand anywhere and offer battle, he had to run about after them, but they did not give up their jackal-tricks. Three years passed in this way.” [266.]

v2.c28.s4.3

During this first Sikh invasion of the Doab, Najib, who had just before slain Suraj Mal and routed the Jat army by accident and was expecting a vendetta with his son Jawahir and the entire Jat nation any moment, found it politic to buy off these new enemies at the opposite corner of his territory by paying them eleven lakhs of Rupees. [SPD. xxix. 55.] But, with Sarhind as a secure base, the Sikhs could henceforth most easily cross over at Buriā ghat or Rāmrā ghat to the upper Doab, or marching southwards raid Hariana and the country round Delhi, or even penetrate to Rajputana through the friendly Jat kingdom.

v2.c28.s4.4

In November 1765, a formidable Sikh invasion* descended upon Najib’s territories, but he met it with a skill, firmness and tenacity which mark him out as the foremost Muslim general after Ahmad Shah Abdali among his contemporaries. The struggle this time continued for six months; there was no truce and there could be no relaxation of vigilance and effort on his part. At the end of October 1765, while one band of Sikhs went to raid the Saharanpur district, another vast force, reported to be 25,000 horse, led by Jassa Singh, Tara Singh, Sham Singh and other sardars, attacked Najib’s villages in the region north of Delhi, levied contribution from them, and advanced to Kharkhauda (23 m. n.w. of Delhi). But finding the people on the alert and ready for defence there, they made a lightning raid upon Rewari (in the jagir of diwan Nagar Mal), plundered and burnt that town, dug up the floors of the houses and took away prisoners. “The ryots of Rewari were plundered to an extreme, . . . the place was ruined.” Then they penetrated to Jaipur territory in alliance with Jawahir Singh Jat, but had to retire on the coming of the Marathas and the promise of a subsidy, (late December.) Bands of them continued with the Jat Rajah for some months after.

v2.c28.s4.5

∗ Sikh raids 1765-1766.—SPD. xxix. 99, 102, 128, 121, 133. Nur. 100b-109b. Ch. Gulz. 485. Williams.

v2.c28.s4.6

Early in 1766 the Sikh bands attacked Najib in the Sonepat-Panipat district. He had a force of less than 10,000 men; the odds against him would have overwhelmed a lesser man. At the rumour of the Sikh invasion, Najib’s Delhi agent Afzal Khan warned the citizens not to issue for visiting Kalka-devi (near the Qutb Minar.) He also strengthened the city defences and sent out scouts for news of the enemy’s movements. Next day (17 April) it was learnt that the Sikhs, marching from Okhlaghat, had looted the Patparganj mart and encamped at Masuri. A small band plundering the southern suburbs of the capital was driven away. The Sikhs marched up the east bank of the Jamuna, raiding Kutana, Jhanjhāna and Budhāna, when Najib overtook them,* slew and wounded many and wrested much of their booty (20 April.) A graphic account of one of his campaigns is given by Nur-ud-din, which illustrates the nature of the war and the standard of Najib’s leadership in the field.

v2.c28.s4.7

§ 9. Najib’s manner of fighting the Sikhs illustrated.

v2.c28.s4.8

“Every day there were skirmishes between the two sides. The Sikhs roved round, firing and plundering the villages on all hands. Along the bank of the Jamuna they came to the Shāmli parganah, where a severe engagement took place. Evening came on and the Sikh horsemen stood their ground around Najib for three hours after nightfall. There were many sugarcane plantations at the place, under cover of which the Sikhs plied their muskets, and made a few attacks, band after band emptying their muskets and then riding away. Najib and his troops stood firmly. Then the Sikhs fell back to their camp . . . Next morning Najib marched upon the halting-place of the Sikhs, in a compact formation, with his van right and left under different officers, his baggage in the centre, and his rearguard in charge of his brother Afzal Khan and Sadat Khan Afridi . . . Najib strongly urged his men not to break their formation or leave their places in any circumstance, so that the movements and fighting of every section of the force could be kept carefully under his control . . . The Sikhs appeared on all four sides and kept up a running fight with the marching Ruhelas throughout the day. They charged home the Ruhela left wing (under Zabita Khan) when thrown out of order in crossing a dry nālā. Many men fell on both sides, and unable to bear their heavy loss, a captain of Zabita issued from the column and made a counter-charge upon the Sikh assailants, in spite of Najib’s order to advance steadily without halting to fight. This small section was at once enveloped by the Sikhs and could be rescued only after being heavily reinforced; many men fell on both sides in this contest.”

v2.c28.s4.9

∗ DC. It is probably this fight of which Nur-ud-din, 108b-109b, gives the following description :—Najib crossed at Kutana ghat by night and learnt that the Sikhs had halted 5 kos off. Leaving his camp and baggage there, he set out after them, and sighted the Sikhs after advancing 2 kos. The Sikhs, ignorant of Najib’s approach, had left their camp and were out plundering villages. On hearing the tramp of the Ruhela cavalry and the roll of kettle-drums. they retreated in bewilderment to their camp. But the Ruhelas by hard riding overtook them and captured vast quantities of booty and animals from them. He drove them beaten for 10 miles to near Kandhala, slaying and wounding many of them. In the end they recrossed the Jamuna and went back to their own country. (This was the Budha Dal.)

v2.c28.s4.10

Najib’s unbroken column thus steadily approached the east bank of the Jamuna in order to cut the Sikhs off from it and prevent their escape. The enemy tried to gain time by keeping the Ruhelas engaged till sunset, after which they would be able to cross the river with all their baggage. So, about 3 P. M. they made a combined attack upon Najib’s rearguard, (under Afzal Ruhela and Sadat Khan Afridi) pressing it very hard and causing much loss. But though urged again and again by his sorely stricken troops, Najib would not allow them to arrest the advance of the entire column, sally forth and drive the attacking enemy horse away by a counter-charge. He would not lose sight of his objective, the Sikh camp ahead. Men dropped fast among his rearguard. Sadat Khan said to Afzal Khan, ‘My men are being destroyed by the enemy’s bullets. I have no strength left.’ But such was Najib’s iron discipline and the obedience of his troops, that Afzal Khan forbade a charge for driving the Sikhs away. At last a band of 50 Afridi horsemen under Sadat’s brother, unable to control themselves, galloped upon the Sikh mounted musketeers and a desperate hand to hand fight raged for some time amidst great disorder and noise. Sadat Khan himself was compelled to leave the column for his rash brother’s defence. Najib on hearing of it cried out, ‘He has spoilt my work,’ and himself turned aside to the scene of the fighting in order to save the rearguard, while ordering all other divisions to remain firmly in their appointed places. The Sikhs were now driven back, though after more obstinate fighting. But by this time night had fallen. Najib’s grand plan failed and the Sikhs beat a hurried retreat by fording the Jamuna with all their camp and baggage under cover of the darkness. “Next morning not one of their horsemen was left.” [Nur. 100b-106a.]

v2.c28.s4.11

A newsletter written on 13 January 1768 shows that this battle or one very much like it took place a day or two before that date near Jalalabad (10 m. n. e. of Ghaziabad): “Intelligence was brought that the Sikhs were hovering in detached bodies round Najib’s camp, beyond cannon shot . . . to intercept the convoys of grain . . . Immediate orders were issued by Najib to get the artillery in readiness and prepare for battle . . . The advanced guards engaged. A heavy fire of artillery and small arms began and was maintained with great vigour. Najib, mounted on an elephant, was present in the rear of the artillery. The first line which bore the brunt of the battle behaved with singular intrepidity. In the midst of this, the Sikhs found means by a feint to throw the line of artillery into some confusion and were advancing with great impetuosity, when some timely assistance was given by Sayyid Md. Kh. and a chosen body of Afghans, and the Sikhs were repulsed with loss. Towards the close of the day Najib ordered his troops to desist from the engagement but to stand armed and prepared . . . Several sardars of distinction were killed and wounded in the battle.” [*CPC.* ii. 776.]

§ 10. Najib’s movements, 1765-1767

v2.c28.s5.1

The Sikh bands, on return from the Doab (April 1766) attacked the Patiala State. Abdali’s shrewd diplomacy, by making Ala Singh (the founder of the Patiala royal family) a friendly tributary and also giving him the office of governor of the Sarhind district (now a Durrani territory), had set up this Phulkian Sikh against the trans-Satlaj or Manjha Sikhs. It was the Patiala Rajah’s interest to cling to Najib against the common enemy, and he had sent his son to Najib’s camp in the Rohtak district in October 1765, for concerted action against those Sikhs who were then out levying blackmail all over the country. In May 1766, when the Sikhs invaded the territory of Ala Singh’s successor, Amar Singh, and tried to capture his capital, Najib marched up to Mustafabad on the way to Patiala for helping the Rajah. Amar Singh, however, succeeded in averting the hostility of the Sikh bands (*Dal*) through the mediation of Jassa Singh Ahluwalia (the founder of Kapurthala), evidently by paying a subsidy. [*SPD.* xxix. 99. xxvii. 133. Patiala records.] Soon afterwards the rainy season began and suspended military operations till October next.

v2.c28.s5.2

At the beginning of 1767, Ahmad Shah Abdali again entered the Panjab—for the last time,—and encamped on the Bias. The Sikhs were torn by internal dissensions and could not oppose him or molest Najib’s territories for some time. Abdali summoned Najib to join him* with the 7 years’ arrear tribute of Hindustan. Najib interviewed him on 9th March, and was treated with the greatest honour and kindness, as will be fully narrated in Chapter 24 §6-7. The Sikh raid into Mirat, which was crushed by a combined Durrani force (8,000 cavalry under Jahan Khan) and Ruhela contingent (5,000 horse under Zabita Khan), about 15 May 1767, will be also described there. After sending his patron back to Afghanistan by promising 25 lakhs, Najib left the Durrani camp and reached Delhi on 30 July.

v2.c28.s5.3

In the following cold weather, Najib went from Delhi to Aonla, where he celebrated the marriage of his son Kalu Khan with the daughter of Sadullah Khan (the successor of Ali Md. Ruhela) with the most lavish pomp and extravagance. At the end of the festivity, he returned to Delhi. The Sikhs spread through the Karnal district [Nur. 113], and even menaced Delhi.* Najib’s health had now completely broken down. Ever since 1763 he had suffered off and on from an intermittent fever. In youth he had been attacked by an inflamed ulcer (*chaude pisse*), and now that malady took an aggravated form. Throughout this year he was constantly unwell. On the other hand, the Sikhs were year by year increasing in number and spirit; the final retreat of Ahmad Shah, practically beaten, in May 1767, had given them boundless courage. Even at that time, while the Shah was still on this side of the Satlaj, “the Sikhs to the number of 120,000 men, both horse and foot, all devoted to each other and equipped for war, were assembled at Amritsar.” [CPC. ii. 345.] And now the dying Najib confessed himself beaten. It was only against an entire nation in arms, fired with all the energy of a newly risen and hungry people and all the unity of the early Islamites before their dissolution into sects, and multiplying “like ants and locusts,” that he had at last to admit defeat. He had served his sovereign loyally and defended his capital and family as long as he could. But he now begged leave to resign a burden beyond his physical powers. He wrote to the Emperor Shah Alam: “Until this hour I have manifested the firmest devotion and loyalty to the young princes and ex-Empress [in Delhi fort.] But I am no longer able to continue that support to them which is necessary for their protection. Let your Majesty advance to your capital and yourself defend your own honour. Your vassal frankly represents that he is not equal to the charge in his present situation.”

v2.c28.s5.4

∗ *SPD.* xxix. 119. After taking leave of the Shah, Najib came to the Sarhind district and halted long at Mustafabad (25 m. e. of Ambala), attacked many parganahs of the Sikhs... Then he came to Delhi. (Nur. 113a.) Minute details of this campaign of Abdali in *CPC.* ii. 12-415. Shah honours Najib, *ibid.*, 310 and 415, refuses him Sarhind, 323.

v2.c28.s5.5

∗ Acc. to SPD. xxix. 143, this invasion was led by Jai Singh, who recalled all the Sikh bands then in Bharatpur territory to join him against Najib.

v2.c28.s5.6

To the Dowager-Empress Zinat Mahal, he wrote in the same terms, resigning the task of defending Delhi and offering to escort the whole royal family in that fort to the Emperor at Allahabad if she desired it. He added that the Sikhs had prevailed and he was unable to provide for his own security. He talked of seeking his political *nirvān* by making a pilgrimage to Mecca, or retiring to some obscure retreat. [*CPC.* 1101, 847. *SPD.* xxix. 143 of which the correct date is 26 Mar. 1768.] He withdrew his deputy Sultan Khan, troops and property from Delhi.

v2.c28.s5.7

§ 11. Najib resigns his government to Zabita Khan and retires to Najibabad, March 1768.

v2.c28.s5.8

Realizing, that his end could not be far off, he took counsel with his household and with his usual foresight provided carefully for the future. While on his usual cold weather march in the Hisar district with his army, he one day assembled all his sardars and in their presence declared Zabita Khan his successor and deputy, tied his own turban to his son’s head as a symbol of his chieftainship, and transferred all authority over his army and territory to him during his lifetime. He advised his heir to confirm his own authority immediately by crushing those of his generals (i.e., the partisans of Zabita’s step-brother Kalu Khan) who were reported to be ill-disposed towards their new master and were sure to cause trouble after Najib’s death. Najib now retired to Najibabad to lead a life of relief from public cares. Zabita, to whom unfettered discretion in foreign policy had been given, came to terms with the Sikhs, evidently by a money payment, near Jalalabad-Nahari, north of Delhi. Two of his father’s high officers,—Ali Muhammad Kur and Sayyid Mian Asrar-ud-din (popularly called Lambi Miān),—who defied Zabita’s orders, were suppressed by force. “By these means the entire army was brought under discipline and made to recognize Zabita Khan as their supreme master.” [Nur. 114a-115a. Miskin, 270.]

v2.c28.s5.9

On 15th October 1769, Najib returned towards Delhi, and leaving his camp at Shahdara paid a visit to the Crown Prince in the palace in the afternoon and was highly honoured in return. Three days later, his deputy Zabita Khan was presented to the prince and the Dowager-Empress. He was given a dinner and entertained with dance and song in the palace, and sent back with a present of the Crown Prince’s own headdress. |DC.|

v2.c28.s5.10

§ 12. Renewed Maratha invasion of Hindustan, 1770; Najib's subtle policy.

v2.c28.s5.11

Early in 1770, a vast Maratha army, led by Ramchandra Ganesh (the Peshwa's deputy), Visaji Krishna Biniwala, Tukoji Holkar, and Mahadji Sindhia, advanced to the north of the Chambal for restoring the Maratha authority in Hindustan which had been eclipsed for nearly a decade as the result of the defeat at Panipat, and recovering their lost estates in the Doab. Their coming was preceded by letters calling upon all the chiefs of Northern India to present themselves and pay tribute or release the Maratha jagirs they had usurped in the interval. Tukoji Holkar, the successor of Malhar, wrote a private letter to Najib to confirm the friendship between the two houses which had subsisted in Malhar's time and by which Najib had benefited so often and so signally. Najib replied, "I have for a long time past renounced the world on account of age and made Zabita Khan my heir and supreme agent. He will not deviate from your counsel."

v2.c28.s5.12

But the return of the Deccani myriads ten years after Panipat alarmed Najib with good reason. His protector Ahmad Shah Abdali was dying; the Peshwa had by now healed his domestic discord and made peace with the Nizam and Haidar Ali, and was free to devote all the resources of his Government to his northern interests. The Marathas could not have forgotten that Najib had been the cause of their ruin in 1761. The house of Sindhia bore sleepless vindictiveness towards Najib and was sure to annihilate him if it could. As Najib wrote to his son, after unfolding the political situation, "Not one of the potentates of Hindustan has the courage to gird up his loins for opposing them. I cannot bear on my shoulders the heavy burden of this task without the aid of troops from the Durrani kingdom." He had lost his old health and strength, and could no longer ride forth on campaigns as in the past. No succour was to be expected from the house of Durrani, now involved in domestic brawls.

v2.c28.s5.13

He felt that Zabita was too young and inexperienced to handle such a situation, while a single injudicious step towards such irresistible enemies would ruin his newly founded kingdom and dynasty. So, Najib decided to go himself to the Marathas, "incline them by face to face meeting and parley to maintain peace with him, and, by offering his co-operation in their present undertakings, keep them firmly on his side."*

§ 13. Maratha policy towards Najib and Jat Rajah

v2.c28.s6.1

There was a sharp difference of opinion in the Maratha camp as to their policy and plan of war.

v2.c28.s6.2

∗ As he wrote to the Emperor, "In order to gain time, I have inclined this race (Marathas), more numerous than ants and locusts, by my friendliness and suppleness to remain loyal to your Majesty and have thus preserved the capital Delhi safe and intact." [Ghulam Ali, ii. 258.] At this time Najib was very ill and had

v2.c28.s6.3

Ramchandra Ganesh welcomed Najib's offer of co-operation as a godsend, remarking, "We have come to this country after ten years, and if we do not first make friends with Najib, then all the par-Ruhelas and Shuja would join him against us (in self-defence), and he is also very powerful in himself. With such a combination of enemies against us, we shall have to fight a hard fight, the result of which none can foresee. Therefore, we ought to reassure this man, make him our ally, first attack the Jat Rajah, and easily exact a large contribution from him. Whatever was done by Najib against us (in 1759-61) is now a thing of the past." Tukoji Holkar was the hereditary friend of Najib and used to supply him with secret intelligence about the happenings in the Maratha camp and timely reports of Mahadji's intended treachery towards him, or merely Tukoji's own suspicion of such designs. They expected to win over the par-Ruhelas through Najib and thus secure tribute and restitution of territory from them without a blow, so that the undivided forces of the Marathas might be employed to squeeze the friendless Jat Rajah.

First 65 of 239 passages. Read on

Linked texts (8)