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Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c37: Chapter XXXI. Regency of Mirza Najaf and His Failure

Fall of the Mughal Empire v3.c37

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Chapter XXXI. Regency of Mirza Najaf and His Failure

§ 1. Najaf Khan's moral degeneration after becoming regent

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Mirzā Najaf Khan held the regency of Delhi for a little over two years,—from 19th November 1779 till his death on 6th April 1782. He lived at the capital all this time and was never able to go out on tour or campaign. A march to Rajputana for tribute-collection in the company of the Emperor, or at least one of his sons, was twice proposed, in March and October 1780, but both times the project was given up owing to illness of the leader or lack of funds for fitting out the royal train. The first half of the next year was taken up in making arrangements for the gorgeous celebration of the marriage of the Emperor's favourite son Akbar Shah. And in August 1781 Najaf fell into a decline which grew worse in time and by the end of the year was found to be a hopeless case of consumption. For the first three months of 1782 he continued to linger, but more dead than alive. Therefore, his period of actual work as regent extended over twenty months only, namely from 11th December 1779 when he removed to the regent's official residence, the mansion of Qamruddin, to the beginning of August 1781. In this period only two expeditions were undertaken, viz., the joint attack on Jaipur by Murtaza Khan Barech and Mahbub Ali Khan (April 1780—Feb. 1781) and Mirzā Muhammad Shafi's long campaign against the Sikhs (Feb. 1780 to 1782.) Both of these will be described later.

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About Najaf Khan's internal administration and the condition of the Court the capital and the districts still under the sway of the Crown, we possess daily bulletins for 8½ months, supplying information with a degree of detail and authenticity unequalled by any other period of Mughal history. They cover more than a thousand pages of the Persian manuscripts transcribed for Claud Martin at Lucknow and now preserved in the British Museum (Or. 25,020 and 25,021.) These months are so fully typical of his administration that the absence of newsletters for the other months hardly affects our judgment. They throw a lurid light on the character of Najaf Khan, the misery endured by the helpless Emperor and his household, the sufferings of the subject population and the disintegration of the army, and they prove the regent's utter incapacity as a civil administrator.

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A poor solitary adventurer from Persia, who had not a single relative or patron among the Delhi nobility, a Shia soldier whose only kinsman in India, the Nawab of Oudh, long pursued him with deadly malignity, had now become the supreme director of the empire of India at the early age of forty-two. He had achieved this feat by sheer merit, which shone in unmistakable light by contrast with the worthless peerage and effete royalty of the later Mughals. But if Mirzā Najaf's rise was astounding, the end of his career was no less meteoric.

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As the first officer of the administration, Najaf had henceforth to reside at Delhi, and Delhi proved the grave of his body and of his reputation in two years. The hardy abstemious soldier who had never tasted forbidden drink or unhallowed love before, soon turned into a typical Nawab in his private life. The diplomat whose coolness calculating power and strenuous activity had won the admiration of the Europeans who had seen him, now became a sluggard with a fuddled brain, whose highest skill was displayed in putting decisions off from day to day and evading difficulties by making smooth promises. The serpent that caused his fall was Latāfat Ali Khan, an eunuch general formerly in Oudh service and a brother Shia. This man introduced to Najaf Khan's notice a woman of bewitching fascination but abandoned character whom Latāfat had wedded; and she, entering Najaf Khan's private wine parties as a hand-maid in attendance, soon made herself his mistress and the minister of his pleasure in respect of other women. The regent began to spend his days and nights in attending singing and dancing by professional women. He frequently dined out with Latāfat or his friends and every dinner was followed till late at night by carousal and dancing in the harem. Of this we have mention with tiresome frequency in the daily reports of his doings that went to Lucknow.∗

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∗ Br. Mus. Or. 25,020 and 25,021 (chief source.) Ibrat, ii. 25. Zikr-i-Mir, (printed), p. 138.

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Excess in wine and women quickly sapped Najaf Khan's vitality. Delhi was an exceptionally unhealthy city in 1780, 1781 and 1782 and we read of repeated illness and child mortality in the royal family throughout this period. Najaf's friends complained that his constitution could not bear the change from his former active open-air life in camps and fields to the enforced inactivity of the close insanitary capital. He began to be troubled by long fits of sickness as early as October 1780, and though the doctors pulled him through, he would not listen to their advice to practise temperance, and after a year of such excess a slow secret fever seized him in August 1781 which ultimately developed into consumption and conducted him to a premature grave in 1782.

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To any one who has followed Najaf Khan's campaigns against the Jats or Ruhclas, it would be incredible, but for the most authentic contemporary evidence in our possession, that this great general could now indulge in freaks of insane frivolity worthy of imbecile voluptuaries like Abdullah Qutb Shah of Golkonda or Wājid Ali Shah of Lucknow, as the following incident illustrates:—"On 4th and 5th June 1781, the Amir-ul-umara taking his entire harem with himself, in the company of Latāfat Ali Khan made an excursion to Wazirabad [i.e., Wazirpur, north of Delhi fort.] At four gharis of the night he ordered the women of his zanāna to loot the melon-beds on the bank of the river near which his tents were pitched. Then he attended dancing till midnight; also next morning till one quarter of the day. The baskets filled with these melons were ordered to be sent to his mansion in Delhi." [Or. 25,020, f. 312.]

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§ 2. Misrule and administrative breakdown, State bankruptcy and universal suffering.

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Latafat Ali, as the minister of the regent's pleasure, practically ruled the State. His servants did as they liked to the people of Delhi and no redress could be had from their oppression by appealing to Najaf Khan or to the helpless sovereign. His Mughalia troopers, who had a suburb (called Mughalpura) north-west of the walled city to themselves, defied the custom officers and police and beat them with impunity. Even the Emperor's retainers living in the city were robbed and insulted by Najaf's servants, and Shah Alam's indignant complaining produced no effect.

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In fact, while the regent revelled in pleasure, the administration of the realm broke down. As Shah Alam complained, “Owing to Mirzā Najaf’s neglect of the administration, the empire is falling to pieces ; the soldiers, receiving no pay, are dispersing in bitterness of mind.” And again, “There is maladministration in all the territories under Najaf Khan, and yet he is sunk in pleasure and repose in the company of Latāfat Ali Khan, and takes no step to remedy this sorry state of affairs. Latāfat has gained such a hold on his mind that he agrees to everything that this man tells him.” [*Ibid.*, f. 260 & 302.]

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In the ceaseless pursuit of pleasure, Mirzā Najaf neglected the business of the State and left the administration in the hands of his Kashmiri diwans and Shia eunuchs, who acted as they pleased. The result of this rottenness in the head of the Government was the suffering of the people, even in the capital itself, and the failure of revenue collection. The oppressed peasantry in the masterless realm rose in despair and fought the local collectors ; then an armed force had to be sent to crush them and sack their villages, which meant that this source of revenue was ruined for years to come. The highest statesmanship and unremitting attention to detail alone could have remedied this evil ; but these virtues were nowhere to be found in the kingdom of Delhi then. The mischief was aggravated by a prolonged drought and failure of crops which began to rage throughout upper India from 1780. While the price of grain and fodder kept the famine level, the State could get no money for paying its servants or feeding its troops and their mounts. Every one starved—the Emperor, his vast harem, the numerous salātin (or former Emperors' grandsons and great grandsons) in their fort-prison, even the menials and guards of the royal household,—and the blame for it was laid on Mirzā Najaf. And rightly, because he had gained the regency in the place of Abdul Ahad by swearing before Shah Alam and putting his seal on a Qurān, which the Emperor held as a pledge of his fidelity, that he would supply the Emperor's monthly subsistence money more punctually than his Kashmiri rival had done. And now when Najāf proved even more in default of payment than ever before, an intolerable situation was created.

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In his financial distress, Mirza Najaf at one time thought of releasing Abdul Ahad from captivity and restoring his mansion and property to him in return for a ransom. He made Najaf Quli Khan his intermediary in these negotiations and a payment of four lakhs was mutually agreed upon. But the Kashmiri diwans set the Mirzā against the liberation of his rival as dangerous, and Najaf then changed his mind, thus putting Najaf Quli Khan in a false position. He showed a similar lack of firmness and sagacity in respect of the Jaipur tribute, by constantly swaying to and fro between different and mutually jealous counsellors, so that in the end he actually received little, whereas by following a moderate but consistent line from the outset he could have given an early peace satisfactory to the Jaipur Rajah and promptly secured a reasonable but much larger sum. In the matter of the demand on Bhai Desu Singh’s heir Lāl Singh, we see the same vacillation and folly on his part. Evidently he had ceased to be his own master.

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When driven into a corner, he tried to escape by giving bills on his bankers, especially Lālji Mal, but these were returned dishonoured as he had long before exhausted his funds with them and even the advances that could be taken by hypothecating the next season’s revenue. The unhappy regent sought to put off a declaration of his bankruptcy by every imaginable trick of evasion and false promise, till at last his countless creditors lost all faith in his words. His one remedy was persuasion (*fahmānidan*), and this he sent with his agents who were bidden to run after disgusted and mutinous captains and other creditors of the State and try to pacify them with words. But this magic pill by a too frequent use had lost all its efficacy. They would not take his words, they insisted on something more substantial. Almost every day there was an angry scene in his office made by his starving captains and the agents sent by the starving Emperor to dun him. They openly taxed him with evasion and cried out, "We cannot any longer accept your promises to pay us tomorrow. Give us a plain refusal and dismiss us, if you like, but do not try to befool us like children."

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The Emperor called him a hardened liar, a man of deceit, and in the bitterness of his soul cried out, "Abdul Ahad was a hundred thousand times better than you. I have no faith in you, nor ever had." The ladies of the imperial harem, equally exasperated by the withholding of their allowances, vowed to link their arms together and drown themselves in the Jamuna rather than constantly whine for their subsistence money and yet not get it for months together, while their credit with the shop keepers was exhausted. They even went into a hunger strike for some days. To the emissaries who came to offer Najaf Khan's excuses for his default of payment, "His Majesty said things which were not fit to be spoken." One day, driven to extremity by his distress, he told his slave Qambar, "If you eat any meal today, it will be drinking swine's blood. Go to Najaf Khan's house and sit down before him [in dharna.] Don't eat anything but prevent him too from eating, till the allowance of the harem is realised in full." Another day he told Maulavi Atāullah, "My condition has come to this that I have no second coat in my wardrobe." Then, before his sons and nephews he wrote the verses: —

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“The master of the world is ruining the world
Through Najaf Khan and Afrāsiyāb.”*

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Another day he cried out, “I am sick of this life, —no subsistence money, overwhelming debt to the bankers and traders of Delhi. I cannot bear the shame of it any longer. O God! quickly mingle me with the earth!”

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Mirzā Najaf at last realised that in grasping at the supreme office in such a State he had only gathered a Dead Sea apple as the fruit of his life’s endeavour. One day, when weakened by illness he came to Court, he laid his head down on the Emperor’s feet, and wept in shame. Not only did he fail to show the least spark of statesmanship and administrative genius during these two years, but he had not even the business instinct of discovering able and honest instruments and trusting them with power and his confidence in their work. He lived and died a mere soldier, though a fine soldier for that age, no doubt.

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This single redeeming feature of Najaf’s character as regent comes out most clearly in the daily news-letters which tell us of his passion for getting new and better guns cast (especially by European experts like Mons. Levassoult), his frequent testing of the guns old and new, his personal inspection of artillery practice and the parade of sepoy battalions, and his eagerness to raise disciplined battalions in the place of the rabble of indigenous troopers. Even amidst strangling financial distress, he could not resist the temptation of engaging a renowned and experienced captain like Shaikh Kabir and setting him to raise battalions of sepoys drilled in the European fashion, though he had nothing but promises of jagir to offer in payment.

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∗ Jahān-rā Jahān-dār dārad kharāb, Ze dast-i-Najaf Khān wa Afrāsiyāb. [Or. 25,020 f. 92 a.]

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As the historian plods his painful way through these thousand and more pages of daily reports of Najaf Khan's regency, he feels that he is visiting the world of shades, by a dolorous path, through a murky air, with the hopeless shricks and agonised groans of the living who are calling for death ever ringing in his ears. He wonders not why the Delhi empire fell but how it could continue even after this. He understands the nature of the burden which Mahadji Sindhia took upon his shoulders and which all but crushed him.

§ 3. Financial difficulties of Mirza Najaf as regent. Capture of Kanud fort

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The new regent's one engrossing need was that of money. In order to overawe the opposition of Abdul Ahad's party, he had enlisted an army of 30,000 men. The backbone of this force was a well-found artillery and battalions of trained sepoys who could not fend for themselves by loot like the indigenous troopers and rabble infantry, but had to be paid regularly and in cash. And now in the hour of his final triumph he found his treasure-chest empty. The Emperor was starving; the recent ill-fated Patiala expedition of the Kashmiri favourite had emptied the public treasury of what little money there was in it. Najaf had secured the supreme post in the Government by swearing to the Emperor and sealing the oath with his own seal on a copy of the Quran which he handed to Shah Alam, that he would pay the subsistence money of the Emperor and his household move punctually than Abdul Ahad had done. Whence was he to get this money, nearly 1½ lakhs of Rupees a month, besides the pay of the imperial army now entirely in Najaf’s charge—amounting to over three lakhs more? His late victories in many regions,—Jaipur and Macheri, the Jat-land and the Doab,—had gained for him promises of tribute instead of cash, and these promises could be fulfilled only by the pressure of arms.

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Having to attend Court as the head of the entire administration, Mirzā Najaf could not himself go out on tribute-collecting expeditions, nor safely send out his best troops from Delhi for the purpose, as the Sikh danger hung over the north like a constant cloud and the Sikhs had once been Abdul Ahad’s allies. Of his four lieutenants, Afrāsiyāb occupied the middle Doab (Aligarh), Md. Shafi the upper Doab (Mirat), Najaf Quli Mewāt and Rewāri, and Md. Beg Hamadāni was engaged in dealing with Rao Pratap Singh Narokā and the Jat Rajah and subduing the Dholpur-Bari region westwards to the as-yet-unsettled Bharatpur-Alwar-Jaipur frontier. None of them could be withdrawn from his post without running risks. Mirzā Najaf was, therefore, compelled to seek out some other instrument for achieving any new enterprise.

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And one such enterprise of the greatest magnitude and urgency was soon to engross his attention. The Jaipur Rajah was the largest and richest debtor of the imperial Government. We have seen how he had promised a succession fine of 20 lakhs of Rupees and thus obtained investiture (tikā) from the Emperor's own hands on 19th February 1779, and how Himmat Bahadur Gosain had been left at his capital to collect this tribute. But soon afterwards came the monsoon interruption, the Patiala expedition and finally Najaf Khan's march on Delhi with all his forces for seizing the supreme power. The field thus left vacant had been promptly seized by the Jats and the Rajputs. Another invasion of Jaipur had now beccome necessary. But the road to the Kachhwa capital had first to be opened anew. That task was taken in hand in the middle of the year 1780, and its success was rendered easier by Najaf Quli Khan's campaign in the Narnaul-Kanud district earlier in that year.

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Najaf Quli, leaving Delhi at the end of November 1779, marched against Balwant Singh the Rajah of Kanud*, who had usurped many villages in the Hānsi-Hisār district during the late eclipse of government. These belonged to Najaf Quli's jagir. The Khan, on arriving on the spot, found it beyond his power to attack the fort of Kanud, because of the lack of water for many miles around it. So, he resorted to treachery. Pretending friendship, he released the Rajah's villages recently occupied by the invaders, sent him gifts, and invited him to a friendly meeting. The Rajah's son came in response to the invitation and the Mughal general assassinated him with the thirty Rajput nobles in attendance on him. (C. 4 Dec. 1779. DC.) Najaf Quli now promptly advanced to Kanud and laid siege to the fort, after arranging for the transport of water by camels. Trained sepoys under European officers and artillery, from Begam Samru's force, joined the besiegers. Considering that most of the nobles of the State had been massacred with their prince, the fall of the place was inevitable. The Rajputs, however, made a long and desperate defence. Narnaul, from which help was expected, was looted by a detachment from the Mughal army on 5th February, and by the end of that month the besiegers had carried the sap to the edge of the moat of Kanud. On 14th February, four hundred men of the garrison made a sortie and attacked the trenches of Mitrasen Ahir the Rajah of Rewari, inflicting a hundred casualties. A week earlier, seventeen desperadoes had issued from the fort separately, vowing to slay Najaf Quli and perish in the attempt; but the first to rush upon him was arrested. Nawal Singh Shekhawat, who was severely ill within the fort, was sent out in a *pālki* to Singhāna by mutual consent, and there died (*c.* 24 Feb.) The Rāni who was holding the fort in the absence of her husband, at last capitulated on 17th March and was given a few villages for her support.

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∗ Najaf Quli's campaign.—Ibrat. ii. 23-24. DC. Br. Mus. Or. 25,020, ff. 7a-44b. Date of fall of Kanud, CPC. v. 1843.

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§ 4. *Invasion of Shekhawati by Murtaza Khan Barech and of Jaipur by Mahbub Ali Khan, 1780.*

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Immediately after the fall of Kanud, Mirzā Najaf gained a great accession of strength for his Jaipur enterprise. We have already met with Mahbub Ali Khan, the Oudh general, who had acted with the English brigade in repelling the Marathas at Rāmghāt in 1773. During the imbecile rule of Asafuddaulah he left Lucknow in disgust and came to Agra (4th March 1780) with his family and a train of six hundred soldiers, intending to go to Mecca. Such a renowned warrior was not to be thrown away. Immediately on hearing of his arrival, Najaf Khan sent him high offers for luring him into his service, with his seal stamped on a Qurān as witness to his fidelity. Mahbub agreed; he was told to raise an army on his own account and pay it afterwards out of the tribute collected and spoils taken in the campaign. His name drew large crowds of military adventurers and his quota was soon completed.

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Meantime, Himmat Bahadur had not been able to realise the promised tribute at Jaipur even after a year's stay. The Jaipur Government, with a half-witted boy of fifteen on the throne, unchecked by any strong and wise minister, was pursuing a senseless capricious course.* The old diwān Khush-hālī Rām Bohrā by his shrewd diplomacy had turned aside the attack of the Rao Rajah and later that of the Mir Bakhshi. After the settlement made with the Emperor in February 1779, this minister, who had often to be absent from Jaipur on diplomatic missions, appointed Daulat Rām Haldiā (the fugitive ex-minister of Macheri) as his deputy at his master's

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∗ Mughal invasion of Jaipur, 1780-81.—Br. Mus. Or. 25,020, ff. 35-50, 54-345. Or. 25,021, ff. 1-25, 271-284. (best) Raj. xii. 8. DY. i. 20, 31. Gw. i. 94. Mahes. Darbar, i. 7, 9, 10, 12, 19, 51 (important.) Ibrat. ii. 17-23. DC. (only the date of Murtaza's victory.)

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CPC. v. 1843.—It was at first proposed that Najaf should himself lead this campaign, taking the Emperor with himself. Then Prince Akbar Shah was to take his father's place in this army, and the marching tents of the prince and the regent were pitched at Tāl Katora en route for Jaipur on 22 March 1780. The scheme was then abandoned, probably owing to Akbar's illness.

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Court. The ungrateful Haldia quickly made his way into the imbecile young Rajah's heart and gained the regency for himself by ousting his patron, whom he accused of embezzlement. The Bohrā, on his return to Court, was called to a harsh audit and confined in Amber fort to answer a demand for lakhs of Rupees. But Daulat Rām's glory was short-lived; early in 1780 he had to flee for his life and seek asylum with Najaf Khan in Delhi,—a tailor named Rodā-rām taking his place as the Kachhwa Rajah's guiding angel. Just then Mirzā Najaf received Himmat Bahadur's report that the Jaipur Government was hopelessly in default of payment.

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A double invasion of the Jaipur kingdom in over-whelming force was now organised. Murtaza Khan Barech with his Afghan and Baluch followers was to force the northern route through the Shekhāwati country and descend on Jaipur from its north, while at the same time Mahbub Ali Khan was to follow the southern road to Jaipur, marching westwards from Agra viâ Hindaun and Lalsont, and strike at the Kachhwa capital from its south side. Mahbub left Delhi early in May, the traitor Daulat Rām Haldiā guiding him with his local knowledge. A strong imperial division of five battalions of trained sepoys (some under European commandants) and a thousand horse with artillery, besides his own new levies, accompanied the general. When he met Himmat Bahadur at Bayānā, a quarrel about precedence broke out between the two. The soldiers, one and all, voted for Mahbub, and he resumed the march on Jaipur leaving his angry coadjutor behind. His advance was rapid and successful; in the then disrupted condition of the Jaipur State no place resisted him or could resist him long. By making rapid marches he advanced looting the cities in the eastern and southern regions of the Jaipur State and taking many fortalices. Jhalai, Bhandarej, Basi-Toda, Lālbāri, Chatsu and Watka were among his victims, till on 20th October he arrived at the gate of the Kachhwa capital, in which the Rajah had shut himself up. At exactly the same time, his colleague Murtaza Khan had worked his way through the Shekhāwati country to Sri Madhopur, forty miles north of Jaipur.

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Meantime Rajah Sawai Pratap Singh in utter helplessness had set Khushhāli Rām free and appointed him regent with supreme authority (18th October) and sent him to make peace with the Mughal Government at any cost. Mahbub Ali had quarrelled with Daulat Rām Haldiā, in spite of Najaf Khan's reprimand. On 2nd November Khushhali Ram interviewed Mahbub Ali in his tents outside Jaipur, but his offer of tribute was rejected as inadequate and delusive. The Jaipur regent even proposed to hire 6,500 of Mahbub's troops for a daily subsidy and employ them in recovering certain mahals from the Macheri chief. The Delhi general disbelieved his sincerity as he had received information of Khush-hali being in secret league with the Rao Rajah and of his having invited that chief to join in the defence of Jaipur. Mahbub Ali had been living all this time on plunder, constantly moving to new pastures. He next marched east from Tonk (50 miles south of Jaipur) towards Malarna (18 miles north of Ranthambhor fort) where he captured the *garhi* (probably Kirni) of Thakur Shambhu Singh (7th Nov.) and then laid siege to Malarna. His troops captured Barwada (20 m. west of Ranthambhor) on the 9th. The woful situation of the splendid heritage of Man Singh and Mirzā Rajah Jai Singh at this time is thus described in a Marathi despatch of 10th October 1780: "The Turks have seized 32 parganahs of Jaipur and set up their outpost 12 kos from Jaipur city. Fourteen parganahs of the jagirdars (feudal vassals) and two of the ghanims, [together with the 32 above] make a total of 48 parganahs lost by the Jaipur Rajah. Only four parganahs remain under him." [Mah. Dar. i. 19.]

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But the attempt to exact the Jaipur tribute by coercion through Mahbub Ali failed. The Rajah held out within his impregnable fortress, and the invader soon exhausted the resources of the open country, and as he could not pay his troops they began to leave him rather than die of famine in that desert land. To add to Mahbub Ali's disgrace, the negotiations for the Jaipur tribute were taken out of his hands and entrusted to Himmat Bahadur once again. Najaf Khan had been disappointed with Mahbub for his failure to secure any payment in spite of his success in the field. Jaipur agents met Himmat Bahadur, then sulking in his jagir at Vrindavan, bribed him heavily to save their Rajah and sent him off to Delhi where the Gosain gave a fee of Rs. 25,000 to Shivarām Kashmiri, the guiding angel of Najaf Khan, and through him secured an order on Mahbub to make peace with the Rajah of Jaipur, in return for a promise of 21 lakhs of Rupees. The Jaipur envoys offered two lakhs down and the balance by monthly instalments of Rs. 75,000 in future, on condition that the armies under Mahbub Ali and Murtaza Khan should be recalled and all the Jaipur territory seized by them should be relinquished. Najaf agreed except for Narnaul and Hindaun which he wanted to annex.

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Mahbub Ali had been planning to force a decision by storming the fortified city of Jaipur so as to bring the defiant Rajah down on his knees, and for this purpose he asked for more troops and guns from Delhi. Mirzā Najaf knew the impossibility of the attempt and wisely forbade it. At last in February 1781, Mahbub Ali, finding it beyond his power to maintain himself longer there and being daily threatened by the mutiny of his unpaid soldiery, marched back to Dig, and leaving most of his troops in camp there, himself went to Delhi to demand payment from Najaf Khan. The regent, as usual, was ready with promises; but Mahbub Ali bluntly told him, "My unpaid soldiers are dispersing from their camp. If such be your wish, say so plainly, in order that these men may not perish uselessly" (3rd May.) Ten thousand Rupees were paid him next day, but it was a mere drop in the ocean of his debt to his army, for whom he had already advanced five or six lakhs from his own pocket and who had now already served for fourteen months. He again and again threatened to go away to Mecca, as he could see no possible work that he might do for Najaf in such circumstances. His soldiers used to throng at the gate of his Delhi residence and make rows for their dues. The regent by repeated entreaties promises and evasions gained time; but the evil day could not be put off beyond 22nd June, when Mahbub finally took his congee for his pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of Arabia. Even then Najaf Khan told him, "Wait at Agra with my sister. I too am coming." His troops were offered employment in Murtaza Khan’s contingent, but as they were no better paid than before they dispersed. Thus a fine army was broken up and a great general ruined for ever. "His levies mutinying for their arrears of pay, looted all his property, and at last Mahbub set out for Mecca as a faqir." [Ibrat. ii. 23.]

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We shall now turn to Murtaza Khan Barech’s part in this invasion of Jaipur. Early in March 1780, his nephew in coming from Narnaul was slain by the Rajputs on the way and his property looted. Mirzā Najaf ordered him to raise a force of his own on the same terms and promises as Mahbub Ali’s, and sent him to penetrate into Jaipur from the north, simultaneously with the latter general’s march by the south-west. Murtaza’s route brought him into conflict with the Shekhawats, the bravest among the clans of Jaipur. They barred his path at a place beyond Narnaul, but after a six hours’ fight with heavy slaughter on both sides, he defeated them (c. 20th July.) Advancing further west and south, he roved about in the region round Udepur (20 miles north of Sri Madhopur), in the very heart of the Shekhawat country, and tried to secure tribute from Sikar, Nawalgarh, Khetri, Singhāna and other baronies by negotiation or threat of arms. On 20th October when Mahbub Ali reached the gate of Jaipur city from the south, Murtaza Khan had made his way to Sri Madhopur, 8 miles north of Ringas railway junction and only forty miles north of Jaipur. But these forty miles he was not destined to cross, and finally he too returned to Delhi covered with debt and failure, early in March 1781. Mirzā Najaf’s finely conceived strategy, though punctually carried out by these two able subordinates, in the end broke down on the rock of finance. The delaying tactics of the Jaipur ministers succeeded, as the craven Rajah shut himself up in his capital leaving all his realm outside open to Mughal spoliation. The capture of Jaipur fort alone would have put the seal and crown on the imperial victory, but that feat was impossible as Malhar Rao Holkar had found out in January 1751.

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Murtaza Khan owed Rs. 1,80,000 to his soldiers, besides having spent a large sum of his own on this expedition. Najaf Khan could now offer him only Rs. 20,000 in cash payable ten days later and the balance at the rate of Rs. 30,000 a month from the Jaipur tribute when (and if) realised. The general was sent off in April to the upper Doab to operate against the Sikhs, and two months later to the Panipat district, but here too he was no better supplied with money, and his soldiers starved as in Jaipur. "They took by force whatever they could from him, and then disbanded." [Ibr. ii. 23.] The history of the Jaipur tribute will be told fully in a later chapter.

§ 5. Muhammad Shafi's campaigns against the Sikhs, 1780-1781

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The utter discomfiture of the imperialists in the Patiala campaign of October 1779 was followed by an onrush of the exultant Sikhs into the upper Doab, where there was none to resist them. The imperial Government was paralysed for a time by the Court revolution which raised Mirzā Najaf to the regency and naturally led to a concentration of his forces in the capital (November.) But by the end of the year things had settled down, and in January next his grand-nephew Mirzā Muhammad Shafi was sent to the Doab with a choice force of 10,000 men and a powerful artillery to guard that province and protect the crops. This general's first task was to subdue the local landlords who had used the Sikh incursion to throw off the authority of Government from within the shelter of their mudforts. Shafi advanced from his base at Mirat, *via* Barnawa, and sacked the rebel village of Sup (12 miles north-west of Barnawa) after a stiff fight, on 10th February 1780. He then held his ground, guarding the Mirat district.

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At the end of the rainy season, Zābita Khan was given his *congee* from Delhi (12th October) with pressing orders to assist Shafi in the war with the Sikhs. The two generals united their forces on the 28th of the month, at Tānda, on the eastern bank of the Jamuna, 14 miles south-east of Panipat. The Cis-Satlaj Sikh sardars were constantly engaged in their mutual contests for land and supremacy,—Amar Singh of Patiala fighting Bhai Desu Singh of Kaithal, whose cause Sāhib Singh Khonda supported,—or Sāhib Singh with Duljā Singh and Bhāg Singh attacking Bhangā Singh of Thaneshwar and trying to wrest that fort from him (Nov. 1780.) Both sides had appealed to the imperial general for aid, and Najaf Khan had left it to Shafi to ally himself with one of the parties and fight the other as he deemed it more profitable to the Delhi Government. On 9th November Shafi and Zābita reached Bidauli, 10 miles south-east of Karnal. Here the Sikh sardars, Sāhib Singh and his confederates, met the two generals and discussed terms for their engagement.*

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The allies crossed over to the western bank of the Jamuna and halted at Kunjpura near Karnal. Here the short-tempered Shafi "behaved like a child" (as Najaf Khan told the Maratha ambassador) and imprisoned Gajpat Singh and three other Sikh chiefs in order to squeeze money out of them (c. 8 Dec.) Zābita Khan objected to this policy of coercion towards his hereditary supporters, and, angry with his colleague for his obstinacy, returned to Delhi with his own contingent (10 Dec.) Shafi was thus left alone, and taking advantage of his depleted strength, the Sikhs made an incursion into the Saharanpur district, now vacated by both the Mughal generals. Shafi made a forced march from Kunjpura into the Doab. The Sikh raiding bands joined together near the city of Saharanpur and offered battle in the full confidence of victory and contempt for the imperial forces. But Shafi was not Abdul Ahad; his well-served artillery and trained sepoy musketeers carried destruction into the Sikh ranks. At last the enemy broke and fled back to their homes across the Jamuna. Shafi pursued them so close that in their precipitate flight many of the Sikhs were drowned in the river. Their greatest leader Sāhib Singh Khonda was among the slain.*

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∗ The whole of this narrative of Shafi's Sikh expeditions has been constructed by piecing together the minute information supplied by Br. Mus. Or. 25,020 and 25,021 (Akhbar) with some small additions from DC, Ibrat. ii. 16-17, Muna Lal 227, DY. i. 20, 23, 28, 35, and MD. i. 45, 53. Williams, in Calcutta Review (1870), needs correction. Akh. 20b, "severe battle between Desu S. and Amar S., the latter driven into Patiala fort (c. 14 Feb. 1780.)" 389a.—Internecine fighting among the Sikhs, some have seized much of Kaithal Estate, others are levying contribution in Patiala territory (c. 10 Nov. 1780.) 3a, rival sardars fight for Thaneshwar (c. 15 Sep. 1780).

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On the heels of the vanquished, Shafi returned to the Karnal district. On 6th April his lieutenant Mir Mansur fought a severe battle near Indri (15 miles north of Karnal) and defeated a Sikh host, slaying 150 of their men, including their commander Ratan Singh. They fell back to near Radaur (12 miles north of Indri), while the imperialists planted their outposts at Indri and Husainpur. Lesser encounters frequently took place. Shafi finally pushed on to Sadhaura, 23 miles east of Ambala, in the fork between the Chautang and Mārkanda rivers at the foot of the hills. Here he encamped for some time. His position soon became untenable. While the Sikhs were gathering strength, his appeals to Delhi for men money and munitions remained unheeded. Najaf Khan was a bankrupt and could not meet punctually even the monthly subsistence of the Emperor's household which was the first charge upon the Treasury. Every officer who was asked to go to Shafi's relief demanded money for equipping and feeding his troops before he would move one step. Some forces were, however, sent to guard the Doab in May. Shafi's powder and shot had been exhausted in the recent encounters and yet his supply was not replenished from Delhi except with mere promises. Similar wordy answers met his repeated demands for money to pay his starving soldiers with, till at last they began to make rows in his camp and leave it in hundreds. In fact, Shafi's force was disrupted and he had to look on in utter helplessness. The commander wrote to his chief in bitterness of spirit, "You have spoilt the business of realising money. It is therefore better to disband my force."

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∗ The only authority for this battle is Muna Lal, 277. Williams, in *Calcutta Review*, Vol. 60, p. 35, tells the same story, but among other errors and exaggerated figures (such as that the Sikhs lost upwards of 5,000 men), he gives the date as 15 Aug. and the place as Mirat. It is a recorded fact that shortly after 15 Aug. the Emperor rewarded Shafi with a robe of honour, which reached him on 3rd Sep. For what service was it? Mid-August is not the time for the march of large armies.

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Many imperial captains were paid by assignments on the revenue of the upper Doab; the Sikh raids dried up this source of their income and made it impossible for them to feed and maintain their contingents. It was, therefore, necessary to police this region effectively against the raiders. But that task could be accomplished only with the cooperation of Zabita Khan who had large landed interests there and the addition of whose family forces would give any imperial general detached to the Doab a decisive superiority over the Sikhs. Najaf Khan therefore did his best to court Zabita and send him to the upper Doab to join Shafi and promote the Emperor's cause in unison. But the concert between the two generals on which the success of the enterprise depended, was impossible. The Persian and the Ruhela were too young and too haughty to work in harness together. In addition to this temperamental obstacle, Zabita demanded money for supporting his troops, which the Delhi Government could not pay, and he was not at heart willing to crush the Sikhs who had been his sole allies in the past and might be so again in his hour of need. These internal causes ensured the failure of Najaf Khan's Sikh expedition and he had ultimately to take recourse to a compromise with them.

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By the end of May 1781 Mirzā Najaf had realised the wisdom of making terms with the Sikhs through Zābita, as Shafi had proved himself an impossible agent for dealing with them. In order to release the large imperial army under Shafi for operations in another quarter and to be free from fear about Sikh invasions in the north Delhi region and the Doab, he decided to make money concessions to the Sikhs and turn them into paid servants in the Empire's wars. He therefore released Gajpat Singh, after settling his tribute at six lakhs of Rupees. Gajpat was given his congee at the Delhi Court with a robe of honour and other costly gifts and the title of Maharajah (12th July 1781),—thus founding the house of Jhind. Najaf's parting words to him were, "Let the lands in Sikh possession remain with the Sikhs. Do you and they come and join our army." [*DY.* i. 35. *DC.*] The terms of this pact were that the Sikhs would not raid the imperial territory any more but serve in the Delhi army for pay when called upon, in return for their being now formally confirmed in the possession of their estates, roughly the region north of Panipat, and granted the right of levying blackmail (called *rakhi*, about two annas for every Rupee of the standard land revenue due to the State) in the region from Panipat to the walls of Delhi and the upper Doab. Najaf Khan only repeated what the Sayyid brothers had done 62 years earlier in respect of the Maratha claim to blackmail in Mughal Deccan.

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In June Shafi was ordered to canton for the rainy season at Radaur. But he took post at the ford between Nakum and Tābar on the Jamuna, 8 miles south-east of that place, and finally fell back on his base at Kunjpurā, 21 miles further south. Here he remained in a state of suspended activity till the death of Najaf Khan.

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§ 6. Revolution in Delhi Government's diplomatic policy; anti-English coalition sought to be built up by the Peshwa.

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This reversal of alliances needs explanation. Ever since his undesired seclusion in Allahabad fort, Shah Alam's heart had been growing sorer and sorer against the English. After their treaty with him in 1765 they had promised to escort him to his capital. To his demands for the fulfilment of this promise, the English generals had again and again replied that they would do so when the rainy season was over. Year followed year, but those rains seemed never to come to an end. At last the recluse of Allahabad had taken fortune into his own lands and made his way to his fathers' capital with Maratha help, unaided by a single British officer. Even the districts of Allahabad and Kora,—his own ancient and legitimate territory, which they had left to him in 1765, had been afterwards unceremoniously taken away by them and sold to the Wazir of Oudh. This Wazir, though a servant of his Government and a vassal of his empire, had been protected by British arms in defying his sovereign by refusing to pay the customary fine on succession and the annual surplus revenue of his fertile subahs, and even to share with him the imperial jagirs in Rohilkhand which he had usurped with British aid; and he had persistently defaulted in his duty of attending his lawful sovereign's levee as a functionary bound by his office tenure.

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The English Company had secured from him a grant of the diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, which legitimatized their enjoyment of the revenue of the richest provinces in India; but they had stopped paying him the tribute of 26 lakhs of Rupees a year which was the condition of that grant. At first they accounted for the default by the great famine in Bengal, and afterwards by the troubled condition of English affairs due to the wars in the Deccan. In every letter of excuse written by the English Governor, profuse protestations of loyalty to the Emperor and readiness to please him were made, but not a pice of that tribute was offered. Warren Hastings gave the soothing assurance that he had made a representation about this tribute to his masters in London, and was only waiting for their commands. The poor deluded Shah Alam did not know that the representation was for stopping the tribute altogether, but he felt all the same that he would never see English money again.

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These grievous wrongs could be righted only by force, but where was that force to be found? The sovereign's one hope lay in a loyal and enterprising Peshwa, because no other Power in India could face the English with any chance of success; and therefore the Delhi Court turned to the Peshwa with growing wistfulness but deepening doubt. We see the movements on this diplomatic chess-board almost day to day in the despatches of the Peshwa's envoy (Hinganē) at Delhi and the repetitions of them in Mahadji Sindhia's letters to the Puna Court, throughout 1780 and 1781. But immediately after the Delhi Government had attained to unity of control and accession of strength through Najaf Khan's triumph over Abdul Ahad at the close of 1779, began a period in which the star of Britain rose in unclouded majesty to the ascendant in the Indian firmament. The reverse to Cockburn at Talegaon (January 1779) was wiped off; Goddard captured Ahmadabad on 15th Feb. 1780, Popham scaled the hitherto impregnable fortress of Gwalior on 3rd August, Goddard took Bassein on 11th December, and Camac defeated the last Maratha hope, Mahadji Sindhia, at Sipri on 16th February 1781.

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These far-resounding victories destroyed the chance of every anti-English coalition in India and cowed every Indian Power hostile, in act or feeling, towards them. Mirzā Najaf Khan was not the man to underrate the military strength of the men from beyond the seas; he had faced their bayonets at Undhuā Nālā in 1763 and he had brigaded his horse with their infantry in 1764; he would not drag the Emperor into a war with such a race unless it was undertaken by an allied force so overwhelmingly strong as to make assurance of victory doubly sure.

§ 7. Futility of the Maratha plots in the North

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Throughout the years 1780 and 1781, down to the very signing of a treaty of peace by Mahadji Sindhia with the English (October 1781), we witness a scene of futile plotting at Delhi* which would be exquisitely comic were it not unspeakably sad to every reflective Indian. The Peshwa, hard pressed by the enemy in the Deccan, was, for his own safety, urging the Emperor to take the plunge and openly join him in the war then raging with the English,—who had swallowed Bengal and Oudh, and now taken Bundelkhand, Gwalior and the Carnatic, and were intriguing with the Rajput Rajahs for a joint drive to conquer the Jat country and Malwa, so that the capture of Delhi would be most easy to them. [Raj. xii. 5.] The Emperor, through Najaf Khan, gave repeated assurances to the Maratha envoy and promised to set out at the head of his army openly against the English "after the rainy season"; but he rightly stipulated that before he could do so the Peshwa himself or his best generals must come to Northern India with a vast army, lest the English should anticipate them by making a forced march from Oudh territory and capturing defenceless Delhi! [Raj. xii. 7, 55, 56. DY. i. 14, 34, 37.]

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∗ Dilli-yethil M. Rajkaranen, i. (partly repeats and mostly supplements Rajwade, xii.) Also (echoes) in Gwalior Papers, 5 vols.

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It was a case of one drowning man clutching the neck of a still more helpless swimmer in the expectation that both would be saved thereby. Neither ally could really trust the other. Hingané very early discovered, what required no great acumen to guess, that Najaf Khan did not mean business and was only putting him off with smooth words; "he is really waiting to see which side proves stronger." [DY. 35.] He noticed how the imperial Court was mortally afraid of the English, especially after the capture of Gwalior, —a feat hitherto believed to be impossible and for which Najaf Khan rightly condemned the Maratha generals, asking "How could you lose such a fort?" The Maratha ambassador at Delhi, as a gentleman sent to lie abroad for the benefit of his country, had been trying to suppress every news of Maratha defeat at the hands of the English; but alas, a sort of freelance news-writer at Puna by his secret letters betrayed everything to the Delhi Court. [DY. i. 31 and 43.] The Mughal Government was also startled at every rumour of peace feelers having been sent out by the Peshwa to the English and roundly taxed Hingané with his master's planning to lure the Emperor into the anti-English coalition and then to leave him in the lurch. [Raj. xii. 8. *DY.* i. 34.]

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Mahadji Sindhia was for some time confident of the success of such a coalition,—with a confidence born of ignorance. He asserted again and again that the pressure on Western India by Colonel Goddard,, and later on Malwa by Camac, could be relieved and the English driven into a corner by Holkar and Sindhia from Central India and Bhonsla from Nagpur sweeping into Bengal with their countless horse and practising their light foray tactics (*qazzaqi*), which were sure of success. "The Emperor's artillery fires slowly, the English guns fire more quickly; but this advantage of the latter would be neutralized by *qazzaqi* and even their guns would be captured"! [*DY.* i. 6 & 9.] What the Maratha moss-troopers could do by the raiding tactics so dear to the hearts of their old-style leaders was found out by the best exponent of that school of warfare, Malhar Rao Holkar, once against the Abdali and twice when opposed to English discipline. Mahadji had not yet seen the work of De Boigne and his disciplined organisation, and he naturally shared the same illusion. A vast Maratha army for this North Indian campaign was expected to be fitted out by that hereditary insolvent the Peshwa, who could not even pay his Delhi envoy's salary, so that Hingané was driven to live in a beggarly style shameful to the foreign representative of a great Power and even to starve; as a fellow-sufferer bitterly put it, "Owing to my indebtedness every day is an *ekādashi* or *Shiva-rātri* to me!" [*DY.* i. 10, 81.]

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The confabulations at Delhi ultimately ended in nothing. But at one stage of them, in June 1781, Mirza Najaf very wisely decided on preparing for the great enterprise by reducing the number of his enemies; he chose to make friends with the Sikhs by recognising their possession of the lands in the Cis-Satlaj tract. By ending the state of war in that country the large imperial division under Shafi quartered near Karnal could be released and transferred to the upper Doab (at Saharanpur) and maintained there with a body of Sikh auxiliaries and the retainers of Zābita Khan, in order to suppress the local rebels and restore the imperial administration. [*DY.* i. 35.]

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But the grand plan died of itself when the First Maratha War was practically concluded by Sindhia’s making peace with the English (13th October 1781.) The result of the plotting, however, was that the two years before this peace were spent by the Delhi Government in suspense and inactivity, except for the two campaigns against Jaipur and Sarhind which we have already described.

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The respite was used in marrying the Emperor’s favourite son, Prince Akbar Shah, (on 2nd May 1781) with the most lavish pomp and ceremony, which involved months of preparation. Only four days later, a severe blow fell on the royal family, Prince Farkhunda Bakht (Mirzā Jahān Shah), a quiet lover of books, died after a short illness, and his baby daughter followed him the same night. Great natural calamities darkened men's look into the future: on 11th June 1781 the capital was swept by an abnormally violent dust-storm; later in the year came a severe earth-quake and a meteor fall near Jhajhar. [Muna Lal 233. DC.] Before the end of the year the cause of the imperial Government became hopeless: Najaf Khan was stricken down by a disease which no doctor could cure, and after lingering in bed for months the regent passed away on 6th April. With him departed the last hope of the Mughals in India.

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