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Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c47: Chapter XXXIX. Rajputana in 1791-1793

Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c47

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Chapter XXXIX. Rajputana in 1791-1793

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§ 1. Ismail Beg's adventures in Western Rajputana and Gujrāt, April-August 1791.

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As Ismail Beg was the strongest and ablest enemy of Sindhia, and his support alone could make the Rajput States a source of danger to the Marathas, we shall first follow his career to its tragic end, before turning to the later history of Jaipur and Jodhpur.

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From the lost field of Patan (20th June 1790), Mirzā Ismail Beg fled away to Jaipur, whose Rajah gave him shelter and lodged his wife and children in the Kachhwā capital for safety. Gradually some eight or nine thousand of his retainers rallied round him. Joined by four thousand local levies under the minister Daulat Rām Haldiā, he for some time guarded the approaches to Jaipur against a threatened Maratha advance. But Mahādji's generals bypassed Jaipur and went on to invade Marwār. The insolvent Jaipur Government* failed to pay the promised subsidy of one lakh of Rupees to Ismail and he was forced to look out for some other patron.

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Just at this time, the Maratha siege of Ajmer (a fort in Jodhpur hands) drove Rajah Bijay Singh to enlist the services of Ismail Beg by promising to bear all the expenses of his army. So, Ismail left Jaipur and joined the Marwār army gathering at Nāgor, intending to complete his preparations there, reinforce the main Jodhpur army then guarding Mertā, "the Gateway to Marwār", and advance in full strength to raise the siege of Ajmer. But Gopāl Bhāu and De Boigne anticipated him, and crushed the Rāthor army at Mertā (10th September) without giving the troops at Nāgor time to come to its aid.

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∗ A Maratha diplomatist reported on 3rd August 1790, "The Jaipur Rajah is sitting down quietly. His ancestors left treasures. Many of their vaults were opened, but no money has been found in any of them." D.Y. ii. 393.

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As the result of his defeat at Mertā, the Jodhpur Rajah was driven to solicit terms of peace from Mahādji. One of the conditions laid down by Sindhia was that Ismail Beg should no longer be harboured in Marwār. Rajah Bijay Singh was in no position to refuse; so, on 7th March 1791 he delivered Ajmer fort to Sindhia, and a few days later sent away Ismail Beg, accompanied by the Jodhpur minister Shivchand Singhavi and a Rāthor contingent to levy contribution from Sirohi, Pālanpur, Rādhanpur, Thārad and other States on the border between the kingdom of Marwār and the province of Barodā governed by the Gaekwār for the Peshwā.* As he approached Sirohi, its Rajah fled away to Mount Abu, but his capital held out for four days, after which it capitulated and agreed to pay a ransom of four lakhs. While this money was being collected, Ismail Beg encamped near the city and sent out detachments to raid far in advance. The Nawābs of Pālanpur and Rādhanpur, who lay next in his way, looked to their defences and at the same time tried to placate Ismail Beg by sending their agents secretly to him; the diwān of Pālanpur offered his sister to the Mirzā in marriage. The invaders spent over four months (April to 12 August 1791) in this region, and their furthest advance reached 16 miles beyond Thārad and some forty miles north of Patan (Anhilwara).

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The fame of Ismail Beg drew to his standard crowds of needy adventurers and rebels against the lawful Government in that country and unemployed soldiers of fortune from Kābul and Qandahār then roving in India. He thus grew into a threat to all lawful Governments and the safety of the population. But the Gaekwār’s Government took strong measures of defence, mobilised its forces on the frontier, and wrote to the Peshwā to move Sindhiā to put pressure on the Jodhpur Rajah for the recall of Ismail Beg. The news of these preparations alarmed Ismail Beg and he turned north-west towards Cutch, in order to respect the Gaekwār’s territories. Some battles were fought by him with the local chiefs, especially at Thārad. But his army was about to break up for want of money. Moreover, the Jodhpur minister in his camp threatened to withdraw with his contingent if Ismail violated the territory of the Gaekwār, which the Jodhpur Rajah was determined to respect. The invasion came to an end in the middle of August, when news arrived that the Marwār prime minister Khubchand Singhavi had been murdered at the capital with his son and two nephews and his entire family thrown into prison. Khubchand’s brother Shivchand, who commanded the Marwār contingent with Ismail, immediately retreated homewards with his men, and Ismail followed him to Sānchor. (Baroda Records, III. No. 44 and 46.) Mahādji Sindhia, acting under orders from Punā, wrote to Rajah Bijay Singh (early in September) to recall Ismail Beg from the Gujrāt frontier to his own country and keep him under watch.

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∗ *Hist. Selec. Baroda*, iii. No. 23 (dated 16 June 1791). It is suspected that when making the treaty with Jodhpur Mahādji Sindhia may have dropped hints that the Peshwa would have no objection if the Raja tried to recover possession of such of his territory as had been seized by rebels, or levied contribution there.

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§ 2. Ismail Beg’s last struggles, fall of Kānud.

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In the meantime, Ismail Beg had lost all his allies in Hindustan. His father Munim Beg had surrendered his stronghold of Gokulgarh, on 16th July 1791, and was being kept as a prisoner in chains in Agra fort. His only possible helper Najaf Quli Khan, had died on 23rd August. Thus, when Ismail came back to Jodhpur at the end of September, he found himself alone in the wide world. His army had sunk to four thousand men, he had no hope of realising the pay of his troops either from Jodhpur or Jaipur.

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While he was in this state of despair a new prospect opened before him. The widow of Najaf Quli Khan wrote to him to come and take possession of Kānud fort and all its accumulated treasures,—even her own hand in marriage, —and defend it against the Marathas.

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Leaving Jodhpur he marched to Mārot, where he looted two small forts for feeding his soldiers. This roused the wrath of Bijay Singh who conducted the Mirzā out of his territories under an escort of Marwār troops, to Jaipur. In the Kachhwā State the Mirzā was encouraged by the minister Daulat Rām Haldiā (who was anti-Maratha, in contrast with his rival Rodoji Khawās, the friend of Sindhia). He tried to come to terms with Tukoji Holkar, as he knew Mahādji Sindhia to be his inveterate enemy. But no money could be had from the Jaipur State, and Ismail’s present forces were quite unequal to the task of confronting Mahādji’s ever-victorious troops. Thus the months of October and November were spent in idleness and futile planning. The country had been desolated by a famine, and Ismail’s force was being daily thinned by desertion on account of his failure to find money for them anywhere.

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Thus, at the beginning of December, Ismail Beg at last set out for Kānud. From the north-eastern corner of the Jaipur State, marching rapidly and in secrecy, by way of Fathpur and Pinghorā (south of Bharatpur), he arrived within eight miles of Kānud fort, with less than 4,000 men in all. But Khandé Rao Hari barred his path. In a battle fought on the 4th of December, Ismail Beg was utterly routed, because most of his long-unpaid Badakhshi troops went over to the Marātha side on being promised their salary. He had to abandon all his guns, baggage, transport animals and camp to the victors, and cut his way out of the enemy’s cordon with only four hundred men, and arrived before the walls of Kānud fort.

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But he failed to get the expected welcome here, for in the meantime the widow of Najaf Quli had changed her mind with the change in the political situation. Mahādji Sindhia having departed for the Deccan, the Marathas had no leader left in Northern India whom their enemies feared, while Ismail Beg’s known harshness and selfish greed meant that if Kānud fort was handed over to him, he would personally seize all the wealth in it and turn Najaf Quli’s widow and captains into his slaves. Therefore, the senior widow of Najaf Quli, who ruled the fort with masculine spirit, had in concert with her captains Madāri Khan Mewāti, Gulāb Singh and others, set up Najaf Quli’s adopted son, named Ismail Khan (not to be confounded with Ismail Beg) as master of Kānud and held that fort in his name. The Mirzā’s troops were not admitted to Kānud, but halted in fort Mādhogarh, a hill post near it, and both places were subjected to a distant blockade by Mahādji’s troops under Khāndé Rao. This static warfare continued for nearly three months, when, about the 16th of February 1792, Khāndé Rao gained possession of Mādhogarh fort by paying its starving garrison Rs. 2,200, the salary due to them. Ismail Beg, to avoid capture, fled from the fort to Kānud, but his path of help was now closed. Khāndé Rao also erected raised batteries closer to Kānud and began to throw shells into that fort.

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Disasters fell on the defenders of Kānud in quick succession. First, in the beginning of March, Ismail Beg’s mother Khānum Begam died of old age, and four days later Najaf Quli’s heroic senior wife was killed by a cannon-ball while playing chess with her slave on an open terrace. The garrison were filled with despair, and they had no leader left, except Ismail Khan the adopted son of Najaf Quli, who had no ability. No help was to be expected from Jodhpur, where Muhammad Beg Hamadāni’s son Mirzā Najaf Ali* had gone on a mission but reported his failure. In despair numbers of the mercenaries in the fort began to go over to the Marathas, as the garrison was suffering from a great scarcity of grain, salt, ghee, and even gunpowder. So, the captains Madāri Khan Mewāti and Gulāb Singh offered submission to the Marathas, through the mediation of the Rajah of Bharatpur, if they were paid Rs. 50,000 as their arrears of pay, provided with *jāgirs*, and allowed to remove their belongings. But the Marātha general insisted on Mirzā Ismail Beg being seized and delivered to him as a prisoner, because the Emperor had sternly commanded Mahādji Sindhia to capture the Mirzā and punish him as severely as Ghulām Qādir, who was his ally in the sack of the Delhi palace in 1788. To this Madāri Khan would not or could not agree, and some four weeks were lost in consequence.

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∗ Usually confounded with Najaf Quli in Persian MSS.

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But Madāri’s retainers had now sunk to four hundred men, and Ismail Beg’s to a tenth of that number. In addition a large detachment of De Boigne’s famous army under Col. Perron arrived in Khāndé Rao’s camp, and an assault by them would have been irresistible. Mirzā Ismail Beg, knowing that he had nothing to hope for from the Marāthas, issued from the fort of Kānud on 15th April, with his wife, Ismail Khan (the adopted son of Najaf Quli) and thirty horsemen, three elephants and eight bullock-carriages (*rath*), and took refuge in Perron’s camp, who placed a guard round the party and reported the case to his general De Boigne.

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Four days later De Boigne himself arrived in the camp before Kānud, and induced his chief Khāndé Rao to write to Mahādji for his orders about Mirzā Ismail Beg. In the meantime the Mirzā was confined in Agra fort with his family and servants comfortably in Dānā Shah Jat’s house, with two companies of De Boigne’s sepoys to protect him. His property in Kānud fort was taken out and delivered to him; his horses, elephants and tents &c. were sold and the price paid to him through De Boigne.

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Next De Boigne stood security for the payment of the salaries due to Madāri Khan and other captains who still remained in the fort with four hundred men, and made them vacate Kānud, which was then occupied by Sindhia’s men. Najaf Quli’s junior widow now appealed to De Boigne to become the protector of Mirzā Ismail Beg and of Najaf Quli’s family, and offered him her foster-child Moti Begam, who had been brought up in music and dancing. The Savoyard general accepted the virgin tribute and Moti Begam was betrothed to him on 20th April. He later settled three villages near Palwal out of his jāgir, on the widow for her support, besides giving money to the Mirzā when he happened to pass through Agra next time.

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We may conclude the history of Mirzā Ismail Beg here. After a year, his captivity was made stricter, his retainers were sent away from him, and he was removed from Dānā Shah's spacious mansion. When the news arrived of the death of Mahādji Sindhia at Punā (on 12th February 1794), the vindictive Emperor wrote to the Maratha qiladār of Agra fort to put Mirzā Ismail to death, because if he contrived to escape he would create no end of trouble for the Government. The qiladār on receiving this order, turned De Boigne's watchmen out of the fort, and put Ismail Beg to death some time later.

§ 3. The end of Munim Beg and Najaf Quli Khan

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Ismail Beg had put his father Munim Beg in charge of Gokulgarh fort near Rewāri in November 1788, when he was working under Sindhia's orders. Early in 1790, Ismail quarrelled with Sindhia, and Munim Beg began to carve out an independent estate for himself round Rewāri. Joined by Gulāb Singh, the son of Mitrasen Ahir (the dispossessed zamindār of Rewāri), he began to plunder the wayfarers and tax-collectors and invade Kot Putli and other mahals where he levied contributions. At this time Sindhia was too busy fighting the Jaipur and Jodhpur Rajahs to send an adequate force against Munim Beg. Two battalions under a clerk of his service occupied Rewāri, but they were defeated and captured by Munim Beg and deprived of all their weapons and guns. This victory emboldened him to increase his force by enlisting the adventurers who flocked to his side. Like the robber-barons of Mediaeval Italy, he made his castle a centre of lawlessness in the country round and insecurity to traders on the highways.

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Towards the close of the year 1790, Patan and Mertā had been won and Mahādji was master again. Being himself engaged in the campaign in Rajputana, he arranged that Najaf Quli Khan and the Rajah of Alwar should undertake the suppression of Munim Beg with their own contingents. Najaf Quli who was now anxious to conciliate Sindhia, arrived at Bhārawās, 10 miles from Rewāri, with a contingent of 4,000 men under the Alwar diwān Rāmsevak, about the middle of December. Gulāb Singh who offered them battle was defeated and driven back into Gokulgarh. The siege of this fort, however, was protracted for more than six months, partly because a personal quarrel between the Alwar diwān Rāmsevak and commander-in-chief Hushdār Khan paralysed the forces of that State, but mainly by reason of Najaf Quli not really wishing to see Gokulgarh taken by Sindhia. At the end of February 1791 it was reported that the siege was going on, but there was no food in the fort and parties of its defenders were coming out in despair; the garrison had sunk to a thousand Mughalia and five hundred men of Gulāb Singh, but "the roads were unsafe, as the peasants were up in arms on all sides."

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Soon after this date, reinforcements arrived from Alwar and the siege trenches were advanced to the wall of the fort. But Najaf Quli used secretly to send provisions to Ismail Beg's father and thus put off its fall, though increasing numbers of the defenders deserted to Sindhia's side. Early in July the garrison had sunk to five hundred men, and Mahādji wrote to Najaf Quli Khan warning him against his double dealing. This letter and the approach of Sindhia's own army forced the hand of Najaf Quli. On 16th July 1791 he secured the capitulation of the fort. By Sindhia's orders, Munim Beg was confined in Agra fort.

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Then Najaf Quli in fear of punishment for his treachery fled away from Rewāri. Illness overtook him; and after a halt for treatment at Kot Qāsim (end of July), he reached his refuge in Kānud, where he died of the same disease on 23rd August, 1791.

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§ 4. Long wrangling about the Jaipur tribute after the battle of Mertā.

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The battle of Mertā (fought on 10th September 1790), though decisive as a military victory, at first made Sindhia’s position worse than before and robbed him of its expected fruits. Holkar’s simmering quarrel with him for an equal partition of his north Indian conquests and spoils of war, at once burst into flame, and the Holkar contingent (in concert with Ali Bahādur’s) left Sindhia’s army by way of protest. This open split between the two Maratha chiefs neutralised the effect of their recent victories; the Rajputs stiffened in their resistance, and Mahādji’s hope of obtaining the due contributions by negotiation faded into the horizon. Everywhere the peasantry rose in arms against the Deccanis. Ismail Beg’s father Munim Beg took possession of Gokulgarh (the fort of Rewāri) and raided up to Kot-Putli and other places under Maratha control. Rao Rajah Pratāp Singh of Alwar, the steadfast ally of Sindhia, died on 24th November 1790, and a civil war broke out among the ministers of his successor which paralysed that kingdom. De Boigne was finding great difficulty in maintaining his brigade owing to Sindhia’s failure to pay their salary for want of money. At the same time a severe famine due to the failure of rains raged in Rajputana, and grain and fodder reached the extreme of scarcity.

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The gathering danger called Mahādji from Mathurā to the scene. He arrived at Sambhar about 7th December 1790, and here the agents of Jaipur met him to negotiate for peace by the payment of contribution. The old minister Khush-hāli Rām Bohrā (friendly to Sindhia) had been degraded a year before.* The new favourite Rodoji Khawās waited on Mahādji on 8th February 1791, and agreed to pay a total of 17 lakhs,—namely 15 lakhs for Sindhia and two lakhs for his ministers. One lakh was paid in banker's bills, and for providing the balance the envoy left for Jaipur on the 16th.

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∗ In May 1789, when Tukoji Holkar invaded Jaipur, its Rajah threw Daulat Rām Haldiā into prison, because that minister had previously assured him that he would induce Holkar to avoid Jaipur territory and march through some other State; but Tukoji had actually entered Jaipur and his Pindharis had robbed the country. (M.D. ii. 139). Rodoji’s embassy, D.Y. Sup. 17, ii. 86.

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Before this the Jaipur Rajah had tried to make a settlement with the Maratha Government through Holkar (to the exclusion of Sindhia). As the Rajah told Holkar's vakil, "Tukoji's father (Malhar) took up the cause of my father (Mādho Singh) and placed him on the throne (in 1750). Similarly, Tukoji should become my patron and settle my dispute with Patil Bābā." (M.D. ii. 139.) Therefore, Holkar, on hearing of this Jaipur agreement with Sindhia, in jealous rage, sent his Pindharis to raid the Kachhwā territory, in April 1791. The Rajah had no help but to send Rodoji to Tukoji to make a monetary settlement. The envoy promised to pay 17 lakhs to Holkar (to make him even with Sindhia). It was impossible for that impoverished State to raise this money, and therefore Holkar encamped in its bosom at Daosā for many months, retaining his hold over Kachhwā mahals like Hindaun etc., which he had attached, and holding Rodoji in confinement. At last the only solution that the Rajah could find was to cede the district of Rāmpurā to Holkar in lieu of a money contribution. But the Bairāgi captain holding the fort of Rāmpurā refused to cede it. After some delay and desolation of the country, Rāmpurā was actually placed in Holkar's possession (in August) and Rodoji was set free. (Chandra. ii. 74.)

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When Rodoji at last returned to Jaipur, his reward was his downfall. Rajah Pratāp Singh was appalled by the obligation thrust upon him to provide such a huge sum to each of the two Maratha invaders.

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Daulat Rām Haldiā and Khush-hāli Rām Bohrā were again made ministers and Rodoji was dismissed (27th Aug.) and thrown into prison, from which he effected his release, but without restoration to office, by paying a fine of seven lakhs.

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§ 5. Jaipur finally makes terms with Sindhia, 1793.

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With the commencement of the year 1792, great changes took place in the political situation of Rajputana. Mewār definitely became a protectorate of Sindhia. Mahādji was created by the Mahārānā his Regent—as he was already that of the Delhi Emperor. Ambāji Inglé was appointed his deputy in the Mewār kingdom and De Boigne was left to collect the moneys due from Jaipur and Jodhpur. Even Ismail Beg—the last remaining enemy of Sindhia, was forced to surrender at Kānud on 16th April and sent into lifelong captivity.

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About 18th January 1792, the Jaipur Rajah met Tukoji Holkar at Daosā and made an agreement for hiring a brigade under Bāpu Rao Holkar for wresting his lost territories from the Rajah of Alwar, on condition of half the conquests being given to Holkar. (D.Y. ii. 9.) Peace having been thus made with the Marathas, and both their great leaders having at last vacated Rajputana, the Jaipur ministers entered on a vigorous campaign for bringing their refractory vassals to submission. In Alwar, Khush-hāl-garh and several other fortalices were recovered; and Holkar's administration was set up in Kāmā, which had originally belonged to the house of Jaipur. (Chandra. ii. 91. D.Y. S. 60, ii. 9. M.D. ii. 235.) A Jaipur force under Chaturbhuj Haldiā and Nanhé Khan Arab, took the rebel stronghold of Jhilāi.

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But by the middle of 1793, Holkar had been knocked out of the Rajput ring, in consequence of Sindhia's victory at Lakheri (1st June) and the Jaipur State came under Sindhia's control. Daulat Rām Haldiā assisted by De Boigne's Third Brigade (under Perron) attacked the Rajah's refractory vassals to realise their long-withheld tributes. In this fighting the aged minister was shot dead at Kalegh-garh (eight miles east of Jobner) about 8th January 1794. (D.Y. ii. 66, 116, 86, 4.)

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The leading actors now left the political stage in rapid succession: Bijay Singh on 8th July 1793, and the long-dreaded Durrāni king Timur Shah on 19th May before it. Next year (1794) Mahādji Sindhia died on 12th February, and his son-in-law Lādoji Deshmukh (Governor of Delhi) on 15th April, and the Bikāner Rajah in the same month as Mahādji. Ahalya Bāi, the most sober and capable ruler that the house of Holkar has ever produced, passed away on 13th August 1795; and Tukoji Holkar ended his invalid existence two years later (15th Aug. 1797),—his death being followed by a war of succession which ruined his house. The Peshwā Mādav Rao II died on 27th October 1795, and Bāji Rao II, the destined destroyer of Maratha independence, came to the Punā throne after a year’s troubled interval. The great Captain De Boigne retired from Sindhia’s service in January 1796, leaving his fine army in the much less competent hands of Perron.

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Jaipur history now entered on a placid uneventful course, which continued till the death of Raja Pratāp Singh in April 1803.

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Mahādji Sindhia before his death had left two armies of his own in Jaipur to assist its Raja in asserting his authority over his vassals; one under Jivā Dādā Bakhshi assisted by De Boigne’s Third Brigade, to recover the lost villages and forts from the usurping Rao Rajah of Alwar (Macheri), and the other army under Apa Khāndé Rao to keep order in Mewāt and collect revenue from the Shekhāwati vassals of Jaipur, half of the royal dues from them having been assigned to Sindhia by the last treaty.

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Though there were frequent conflicts between the Maratha forces and the Jaipur vassals—notably the thākurs of Shekhāwati—the Rajah himself was well-treated by the Marathas. De Boigne and Perron were particularly respectful to him, declaring themselves his friends in their letters, and paying him many social courtesies. The aim of these two French officers was to do their duty of collecting money smoothly, and they took care to save the peasantry from plunder or molestation by their soldiery. We possess a Persian letter in which Perron takes legitimate pride in the discipline of his troops, and assures the addressee, "Dear Rao Sahib, these are *campoo* troops, not Marātha light horse (*fauj*). If my men extort one rupee from your kingdom, I shall pay you two rupees as compensation." (Gulgulé records.)

§ 6. Factious nobles overthrow the Raja's government in Mārwār

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During the second half of the eighteenth century the kingdom of Mārwār was in as unhappy a condition as that of Udaipur, or rather worse. In both the countries the royal government was paralyzed and the sovereign became powerless to control his nobles and enforce his authority. And yet these two rajahs were not cruel or licentious, their only vice was that they were too soft, almost imbecile in a stormy world that called for strong and decisive leadership in the head of the State. Each of them had come to the throne when very young,—the Udaipur Mahārānā in 1778 at the age of eight, and the Jodhpur Maharajah in 1752 when 22 years old; and each was burdened by the load of a disputed succession which called in the mercenary aid of the Marāthas and by destroying the royal power enabled their vassals to become independent. Each of these two kings had a long reign,—Bhim Singh of Udaipur for 50 years and Bijay Singh of Jodhpur for 41 years, but it only meant the prolongation of their people's misery.

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We have seen (Ch. 7 § 12) how Bakht Singh had seized the throne of Jodhpur in 1751 by ousting the lawful heir Rām Singh. His own death came about a year later, after which his son Bijay Singh succeeded and had to fight to keep his uncle Rām Singh out. In the phrenzy of domestic feud each side made reckless bids for the armed aid of the Peshwā by promising impossible subsidies. In the end, Bakht Singh's heir maintained himself on the throne with Holkar's support, and Rām Singh after fighting twenty-two battles for his heritage, ended his days in exile, in 1772. But this quarter century of civil war (1750-1772) made the nobles who had sided with Bijay Singh independent in all but the name.

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The Chāmpā-ot clan of Rāthores, at whose head stood the chieftain of Pokaran, with their allies seized the capital and its palace-citadel and conducted the government themselves, reducing the king to a puppet. But Bijay Singh’s nurse’s son Jagoo and spiritual director Atmārām, under the sage counsel of Govardhan Khichi, contrived to hire a band of 700 mercenaries from Sindh and thus form a royal bodyguard independent of the baronial levies, who used to obey their own lords even against the king. In February 1760, these “king’s friends” contrived the treacherous murder of most of the usurping barons. “This was a tremendous sacrifice, for the maintenance of authority, of men who had often emptied their veins in defence of their country ;” but the crime had immediate success: “for a time, the feudal interest was restrained, anarchy was allayed, commerce again flourished, and general prosperity revived.... Bijay Singh took the best means to secure the fidelity of his chiefs by finding them occupation. He carried his arms against the desultory hordes of the desert, the Khosās and the Sahrās, .... which ended in the conquest of Amarkot. He also curtailed the territories of Jesālmir on his north-west frontier.” (Tod, ii. Marwar, ch. XIII.)

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§ 7. Jodhpur Rajah’s female favourite dominates his government and humiliates the nobles.

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But the Rajah’s character was his greatest enemy. He was a harmless weak man, and as such naturally fell under the domination of some stronger-willed favourite. When just past his youth, Bijay Singh in 1765 initiated himself as a Vaishnav of the Epicurean Vallabhāchāri sect, took Gosain Gokulastha of Nāthdwārā as his spiritual director (guru), gave up animal food and wine, and passed most of his time in religious devotion. The Marātha envoy at his court aptly likens him to a *nirmālya* or a flower-garland offered to a god but thrown away as worthless on becoming stale.

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The Vaishnav's creed (like the Shākta's) enjoins the duty of having a female companion in practising devotions. She represents Rādhā, while he is the counterpart of Krishna, and these two combined typify the Primeval Parents—called Purusha and Prakriti, whose union, according to Hindu philosophy, has created the Universe. Bijay Singh's mate was a girl of the Oswāl caste, evidently procured by the high priest of Nāthdwārā, and their union may fairly be called a morganatic marriage; it was in no sense an illicit amour, scorned by society and denounced by religion, though the offsprings of such unions are not entitled to the throne nor counted as of pure caste.* The imperious spirit of this female favourite made her take advantage of the Rajah's infatuation and control the government through her faithful man of business Bhairo Sāni, a horse-tamer (chābuk sawār), who acted in concert with Sawāi Singh, the chief of Pokaran. The barons of Marwar resented her domination, as she took away the estates that many of them had transferred to themselves by force or fraud during the long years of anarchy. Worst of all, she was planning to perpetuate her own power after the death of the king, by taking a step which would put a stigma upon the Kshatriya race. She had borne her royal lover a son, named Tej Singh, to whom the king agreed to grant the fief of Mertā and thus make him a baron almost next to the sovereign. But the boy died (late in 1785) and his mother turned to the plan of ruling the State through an adopted son.

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∗ Such morganatic wives are known by the Persian title of Pāsbān (popularly, Pāsbāni or Pāsbānin) and were found in every class of Rajput society which had the money to keep one. Anand Rao Gangadhar, [18 April 1792, Satara H.P. i. 341] gives her the name of Gulāb Rāi (Flower Queen); but Gulāb Rāi, as we know from the Maratha envoy's despatch (p. 8) was also the name of the Jodhpur vakil in Sindhia's camp, and his son Nawal Rāi offered to secure from that Maratha chief a confirmation of the fief of Nāgor to her son Tej Singh. Pandit Reu calls her a Jāt, Tod an Oswāl by caste.

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By the year 1791, Bijay Singh had grown very old and was visibly breaking up, and it was necessary to declare his heir. The choice of the discontented barons was Bhim Singh (the son of the Rajah's fifth son), but his fierceness and proud spirit made him unfit to play a secondary part. The Pāsbāni found a tamer instrument in a younger grandson of the king, named Mān Singh,* the son of the sixth son of the Rajah. Her plan was to formally adopt Mān Singh as her son, and then make the king summon all the barons to do homage to him as their future sovereign, so that she might rule the State as his adoptive mother after Bijay Singh's death,—"exactly like what Ahalyā Bāi was doing in the Holkar State."

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The ceremony of the public recognition of the heir to the throne was timed for 7th November 1791, after several previous changes of date. As soon as the doting king called upon his nobles to attend, there was a mutiny among them; the barons who were the king's kith and kin however distant, refused to stultify themselves by saluting as their sovereign "the son of a slave-girl, the son of a demi-wife"—for that was Mān Singh's legal position after he had accepted the Pāsbāni as his "mother by adoption." The nobles left the city in a body and formed a rebel camp in another town.

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The former anarchy broke out again and was accompanied by a rapid succession of murders. The Mārwār royalty and nobles had specialised in assassination as a short cut to their personal objects. Already, about 10th August 1791, the aged and devoted minister Khub-chand Singhavi had been murdered by the Pāsbāni when attending her darbar†, and Khub-chand's brother Bije-chand and eldest son were killed and their women and children imprisoned and beaten. Gumān Singh (a younger son of the king) was poisoned by the same woman. (Sep. 1791, J.Y. p. 63.)

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∗ The Marātha envoy's despatches carelessly name Sher S. as her choice, but Tod is right in saying that she wanted to adopt Mān Singh (the son of Gumān S.) whom his uncle Sher S. had adopted. The letter from Holkar's camp in Jaipur (4 May 1792) clearly says that the king's grandson (and not son) was proposed to be declared his heir. (Chandrachud D. ii. 91.)

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† And his body thrown to the dogs,—such was Rajput chivalry in 1791. (Jodh. Y. p. 63.)

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§ 8. Death of Bijay Singh of Mārwār, 1793

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Retribution soon overtook her. Her royal partner being old and infirm, she consoled herself with a Chāmpā-ot noble who bore the same name as the Rajah and exercised his privilege of visiting her at night. She had recently made him the chief minister. At this the Rathor nobles' indignation burst forth; they complained, "Our master's wife, even when she is a slave-girl, is like a mother to us. This (minister) Bijay Singh has laid a stigma on us all. The shameless woman must be given a fright." So, they sent to the minister one of his kinsmen who stabbed him to death on 4th January 1792 and escaped in safety to the rebel camp.* The Rajah was shut out of the capital on 13th April 1792; but after wandering about for some months he returned to the Jodhpur palace on 20th March 1793, and there died from natural decay on the 8th July following.

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Meantime, his Pāsbāni had been murdered by the nobles, on 16th April, 1792, but the fact was kept from him till a week before his own death. The account of the crime that reached the camp of Holkar at Tonk in the Jaipur State runs thus: "Raja Bijay Singh was entirely under the influence of his kept woman and at her request seated his grandson in her lap and declared him (the future) king. So all the Rajputs united and decided not to salute one who had been adopted as a son by a concubine. They gave the throne to another grandson of the king, named Bhim Singh, who had been confined in Jodhpur citadel. Bhim Singh's rule was proclaimed through the capital. The king's concubine, there called the Pāsbānin, was living in a garden outside the city with her own body-guard of a thousand or twelve hundred soldiers. The Rajputs asked them to take their due pay (from the barons) and leave her. They refused. So there was a fight between them, some ten or twelve men fell on the two sides taken together, and at last the soldiers agreed to go away if their salary was paid. They got it and left her. On hearing of it, the Pāsbānin took poison and died.” (*Chandra*, ii. 91). In the story that Tod was told about twenty-five years after the event, she is said to have been living in the citadel during the Raja’s absence and to have been induced to come out by a false message that he wanted her company, but that “at the moment she entered her litter, a blow from an unseen hand ended her existence.” (*Annals*, Marwar, ch. XIII). This is the true account, because the Maratha envoy in Jodhpur wrote on the day after the King’s death, “On 3rd July, the Raja returned to the fort-palace after visiting the Bālkrishna temple in the city. . . . At a quarter and a half of the night, he called the two female attendants of his favourite (Pāsbānin), and heard from them the story of how the sardārs had killed her. The narration went on till midnight, all the three weeping, when the Raja began to gasp and fainted.” (*JY*. 24).

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∗ Murder of Khub-Chand and family, JY. p.

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⁶³ Bijay Singh Chāmpā-ot's acts and death, JY. p. 60 and 64.

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§ 9. *Sindhia’s relations with Mārwār after Patan, 1790-1793.*

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Such was the domestic history of Mārwār on the background of which we must study the course of that State’s dealings with the Marathas and the payment of the subsidy promised by its Government to the Peshwā after the murder of Jayāpā Sindhiā in 1755 (Ch. 18 § 7.) To the unpaid balance of that subsidy and compensation other grievances had been added. Ajmer fort which the Marathas had taken on 21 February 1755, had been recovered by the Rajah of Jodhpur on 24th December 1787,—the city below it having been occupied by him on the 27th August before.

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The immediate effect of the annihilating defeat at Mertā (10th Sept. 1790) was to throw the Rajah and people of Jodhpur into despair and alarm. Envoys were at once sent to Mahādji’s generals offering to pay the arrears of subsidy and to restore Ajmer fort, provided that they did not penetrate further into Mārwār territory. But Sindhia’s power was soon afterwards paralysed by the open defection of Tukoji Holkar’s contingent and that of the Punā Government’s direct agent Ali Bahādur from Sindhia’s side. Mirzā Ismail Beg, whose contingent had escaped destruction by reason of its absence from Mertā, was now welcomed and equipped by the Jodhpur Government, which thus regained heart and evaded payment. (*Chandrachur*, ii. 82. *DY*. S. 47.)

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When Mahādji reached Sambhar (c. 20 December 1790), a Jodhpur envoy waited on him, offering to pay 50 lakhs (minus the value of the crops damaged in the war, the spoils taken from Mertā town, and the plunder made by Sindhia’s troops on the way), and to restore Ajmer fort. When this envoy came back to Jodhpur with permission for clearing certain points, the Rajah called up Ismail Beg from Nāgor to his side and got ready for fighting. But the Rathors were very much afraid of artillery fire,—as the Maratha envoy reported,—this lesson having been burnt into their memory by the slaughter at Mertā. At the same time a long continued drought and severe famine was desolating Marwar and the people were migrating elsewhere to escape starvation. It became impossible to provision Mahādji’s armies in Rajputana (*DY*. S.I.)

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After their victory at Patan (20th June 1790), Sindhia’s generals had by-passed Jaipur city, entered Kishangarh territory and taken Parbatsar, Sambhar and some other places on the Jaipur-Mārwār border, where they set up their own posts. Thence they proceeded to Ajmer, took the city (below the fort) at the gallop, dominated the Ānāsāgar lake and began to exchange fire with fort overlooking it. (August. *DY*. S. 37). The battle of Mertā, fought less than a month after this, destroyed all Rathor hopes of raising the siege of Ajmer, and so, at last, on 3rd January 1791, Budh Singh, the Jodhpur envoy in Mahādji’s camp made the following settlement through Sindhia’s minister Ābā Chitnis: The Maratha dues were fixed at sixty lakhs of Rupees, and a memorandum admitting this claim was signed by the envoy. Out of this sum, 7½ lakhs were to be paid at once; for 20 lakhs Sambhar, Parbatsar and two other mahals were mortgaged, but their revenue was to be collected by the Rajah’s men and paid to the Marathas, and the full amount was to be cleared in four years; 22½ lakhs were to be provided in kind, i.e., in jewels, clothing, horses, elephants &c. to be delivered by instalments in four months. The remaining ten lakhs were written off as compensation for the trampling down of crops by the invading army. In addition, Ajmer fort was to be restored to the Marathas, who would then hand Mertā back to the Rajah. (DY. S. 4.)

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Mahādji sent a message through this vakil to the Jodhpur Rajah, warning him against entertaining Ismail Beg in his dominions, interfering with the Maratha policy in Jaipur, and disturbing the Kishangarh territory.

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The Jodhpur Government paid only four lakhs out of the first instalment of 7½ lakhs, and “there was no chance of their paying the balance of 3½ lakhs.” Sindhia was at last put in possession of Ajmer fort on 7th March 1791. (H.P. 592.)

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The first capture of Ajmer by the Marathas (in February 1755) had been accompanied by a tragedy: the wife and children of the commandant (qiladār) slew themselves in fear of disgrace. A second tragedy attended the second transfer of this historical fort to Maratha hands (in March 1791): Rajah Bijay Singh had entrusted Ajmer to Dumrāj, a Rajput Jain (Oswāl), who had vowed at the time never to yield his charge to an enemy so long as he lived. When, therefore, the Rajah’s order for the surrender of Ajmer to Sindhia arrived, Dumrāj chose the only possible way of resolving the conflict between his duty as a servant and his duty as a man of honour, and it was over his self-slain body that the Marathas entered the gate of Ajmer. (Tod, ii. Marwar, ch. 13. R. Tagore’s exquisite ballad.)

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Mahādji Sindhia paid a visit to Ajmer (about 21st March 1791) and made his own arrangements for the administration of the fort and district. Then he moved on to Pushkar, where he spent some days in celebrating the Holi festival (27th March). (DY. S. 19 and 18.) Next, after marching through Kishangarh territory and dictating peace to that small kingdom which was being torn by a war of succession, he was personally called to Mewār to save it from the utter collapse of its lawful Government. At the same time, urged by the Peshwā, he put pressure on Bijay Singh to wind up his Gujrat adventure by recalling his own contingent under Shovā-chand and the mercenary captain Ismail Beg, who had been threatening the north-eastern frontier of the Maratha dependency of Barodā. The trouble ended of itself, when, about 12th August, Shovā-chand, on learning of the murder of his brother, the minister Khub-chand Singhavi, at the royal Court, hurried back to Mārwār and Ismail Beg had to follow him, (H. P. 597.) A little later the Mughalia leader was finally evicted from Mārwār.

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In September a Jodhpur vakil visited Mahādji with 1½ lakhs worth of jewels as part of the payment in kind (DY. ii. 9.) Thereafter baronial revolt entirely broke up the Mārwār Government, as we have seen already. The civil war was aggravated by the succession disputes which broke out even before the death (on 8th July 1793) of Bijay Singh and rendered the realisation of the Maratha dues absolutely impossible.

§ 10. Miserable condition of Mewār under Rana Bhim Singh; baronial anarchy

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We have seen (Ch. 24 § 15) that in July 1769, the Marathas had made a settlement with the Mahārānā of Udaipur by which he agreed to pay them 63½ lakhs of Rupees as contribution, only one-half of which could be then paid in cash and kind, and for the balance (30½ lakhs) the parganas of Jāwad, Jiran, Nimach and Morwān were mortgaged, but they were to be jointly administered by the officers of the Mahārānā and the Peshwā. The Marātha forces then left Mewār. A few years later, Ahalya Bāi, the widowed queen of Indore, took advantage of the utter weakness and confusion of the Mewār Government to annex its pargana of Nimbāhedā, in order to be equal with Sindhia. (Ojha, ii. 655, 670.)

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Bhim Singh, who succeeded as Mahārānā (7th January 1778), at the age of eight, was weak in spirit and dull of intellect. His unhappy reign extended over half a century till 30th March, 1828, and the agony of his country during this long period can be best described in the words of a sympathetic eye-witness, Col. James Tod. He writes:—

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“The Rānā continued to be swayed by faction and intrigue. . . . Every triumph (of the ruling party) was attended with ruin to the country. The agriculturist abandoned his fields, and at length his country; mechanical industry found no recompense, and commerce was at the mercy of unlicensed spoliation. In a very few years Mewār lost half her population; her lands lay waste, her mines were unworked, and her looms forsaken. The prince instead of protecting required protection; each individual or community provided for itself that defence which he could not give. Hence arose a train of evils: every cultivator sought out a patron, and entered into engagements as the price of protection. Hence every Rajput who had a horse and lance, had his clients; and not a camel-load of merchandise could pass the abode of one of these cavaliers without paying fees. . . . Here were displayed the effects of a feudal association, where the powers of government were enfeebled. These feuds alone were sufficient to ruin the country; but when to such internal ills shoals of Maratha plunderers were added, no art is required to describe the consequences.” (*Rajasthan*, i. Mewar. Ch. XVII. Ojha, ii. 702.)

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In 1786, the patriotic minister Somchand Gandhi tried to organise a coalition of the Rajput kingdoms for expelling the Marathas from Rajasthan. Next year came Mahādji Sindhia’s retreat from Lalsot (Aug. 1787), and then the combined Mewār and Kotā forces attacked and recovered Nimbāhedā, Nakump, Jiran, and Jāwad, while other bands drove out the Maratha garrisons from Singoli and Rāmpurā. But the tide turned when Ahalyā Bāi sent a strong army which defeated the Mewār troops with heavy slaughter at Had-Kyā-Khāl (in February 1788), and the Marathas next recovered all their recently lost parganas and forts in that State.

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Fresh misfortunes now descended upon the unhappy land of Pratāp and Rāj Singh. The Chundā-ot and Shaktā-ot branches of the parent Sisodiā clan, of which the Mahārānā was the patriarchal head, fought against each other to seize the regency of the State, and when they got power, they alienated more and more of the Crownlands to their own members. The Chundā-ot Rāwat Arjun Singh of Kurāwad murdered the upright and able minister Somchand Gandhi (24th Oct. 1789) in the palace; but he had to flee the capital in shame and took refuge in Chitor fort with the head of his sub-clan, Rāwat Bhim Singh of Sālumbar. [Ojha, 676-679.]

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§ 11. Mahādji Sindhia invited to save Mewār, 1791.

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The murdered minister’s brother Satidās was given his post. He formed a concert with the Shaktā-ots who were out of power, and their allied forces marched to Chitor to expel the Chundā-ots. The battles that took place in this fratricidal war had no other result than to desolate the country and ruin the peasants and artisans. The Mahārānā at last appealed to Mahādji Sindhia to become his protector as he had already become the saviour of the Delhi Emperor. Zālim Singh Jhālā was made his chief envoy, and he by his statesmanly tact and reasoning persuaded Sindhia to undertake the protection of Mewār. The terms were settled at Pushkar where Mahādji was passing the month of March 1791, one of the conditions being that a fine of 64 lakhs was to be imposed on the Chundā-ot sardārs, out of which three-fourths would go to Sindhia and one quarter to the Mahārānā.

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One army of Sindhia under Ambāji Inglé, accompanied by Zālim Singh, was sent against Chitor. They captured Hāmirgarh* from a Chundā-ot partisan, on their way, and advancing further south reached the environs of Chitor, where they took post, threatening the fort, as a siege of that vast hill with their present strength was impossible.

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The task that Mahādji Sindhia undertook when he agreed at Pushkar to be the Mahārānā’s protector was one of uncommon difficulty. It was nothing less than that of administering the vast kingdom of Mewār as the guardian of a perpetually minor owner. The country was torn by baronial factions that had destroyed the regular government. The Mahārānā was a harmless imbecile, and yet if either faction could get hold of him it could use his name to legalise its tyranny and usurpations. Hence, some outside authority superior to the national administration had to be imposed on the country to ensure internal peace, the enforcement of law, and the collection of revenue. In short, Mahādji Sindhia found that he was called upon to play the part of a modern British Resident governing a protected Native State during the long minority or incompetence of its ruler. But unlike the British in the days of their paramountcy, Sindhia had neither the civil service nor the “subsidiary force”, nor even a capable agent from outside at his disposal for getting this work done.

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It was only after Mahādji had arrived in Mewār and met various grades of the local people that he realised the full gravity of his task. He therefore wavered as he tried to find out what local party would be best able to administer Mewār in his absence. The choice lay between Zālim Singh Jhālā (the ally of the Shaktā-ot clan) and the Chundā-ot chief of Sālumbar who held Chitor.

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∗ Hamirgarh, 21 miles due north of Chitor and 11 miles south of Bhilwāra. “Sindhia has taken Hāmirgarh by siege. Rāwat Bhim’s illegitimate son (Kumbar) was there, he has been placed in fetters. Much booty in grain, 400 horses, powder and shot and other goods, have been taken.” (MD. ii. 206).

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The most pressing need was to ensure the collection of land-revenue and baronial tribute in a land ravaged by civil war, and thus provide the cost of the administration and the contribution promised to the Marātha Government. At first a division of Sindhia’s army under Ambāji Inglé was sent against Chitor, but this general wrote to say that unless Mahādji went there nothing would be collected. So, at the end of June 1791, Mahādji entered Mewār and halted near Devgarh, 35 miles north of Nāthdwārā, the friendly chieftain of which place (Gokuldās) had gone with Zālim Singh to Pushkar to invite him. To the demand for tribute the Chundā-ot chief then holding Chitor replied, “I have only powder and shot. What money could be had in this district you have already collected. Be good enough now to go back by the way you came. How can I pay when I have no money left?” (MD. ii. 221.)

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Mahādji was, therefore, compelled to give up his original plan of leaving Rajputana on 4th August and going to Punā as asked by the Peshwā. He next moved to the neighbourhood of Nāthdwārā, and in that holy city and its environs he passed the month of August.*

§ 12. Sindhia and Mahārānā subdue rebel noble of Chitor

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Zālim Singh visited Sindhia in his camp near Nāthdwārā, along with the Mahārānā’s envoys. After long discussions it was agreed that a tribute of 60 lakhs of rupees was to be paid by Mewār, from which 10 lakhs was deducted as compensation for the damage caused by the marching army. Zālim Singh undertook to collect this amount on condition that a part of Mahādji's army under Ambāji Inglé was to be permanently stationed in the country. A further sum of ten lakhs was laid on the chieftain of Devgarh and one lakh on the district of Banhedā. (*DY.* ii. 30 and 31, misprinted as *Barhad.*)

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∗ Ambaji’s letter DY. ii. 59. Mahādji at Devgarh, ibid. 21. On 20th July Mahādji was at Bhilwārā, 31 miles north of Chitor. (HP. 593-'4). In August he was near Nathdwara at a place printed as Newāl (probably a mistake for Moi, 12 m. n.e. of Nāthdwārā and south of lake Rāj-samudra). DY. ii 30-31. His wife Gangā Bāi died here on 11 Aug. and he had to make a long halt at or near that great Vaishnav city. The fullest details in Kālē Akhbārāt.

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Then Zālim Singh and Sindhia's minister Sadāshiv Malhār visited the Mahārānā at Udaipur to arrange for an interview between these two chiefs. Mahādji was very keen on such a meeting, as it would exalt him among the Rajahs of Rajasthan, exactly as his regency of Shah Alam had elevated him in the eyes of the princes and people of the Mughal Empire. No other Marātha chief except the Peshwā Bāji Rao I. had been honoured with an interview on terms of such intimacy by the highest Kshatriya sovereign, the eldest descendant of the Sun. As arranged, Mahādji advanced ten miles from his camp to welcome the Mahārānā. Their interview took place on 4th September, at Naharā Magrā, 16 miles north-east of Udaipur, where the Mahārānā had a hunting-lodge in the wooded hill. The Rānā's ministers assured Sindhia that the fifty lakhs would be easily collected if he encamped with his army in that kingdom for two months and coerced the rebel vassals. It was agreed that in future the civil and military administration of Mewār would be conducted by Zālim Singh Jhālā and Lālji Ballāl Lād (Sindhia's tribute-collector posted at Kotā) in the name of the Mahārānā, and that that sovereign must act according to their guidance. (*MD.* ii. 226-227. *DY.* ii. 33.)

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