Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c53: Chapter XLIII. Lakhwā Dādā’s Governorship in Hindustan

Fall of the Mughal Empire v4.c53

Language
English

Contents

Chapter XLIII. Lakhwā Dādā’s Governorship in Hindustan

§ 1. The Shenvi Brahmans and their rivals the Chitnis family in Mahādji Sindhia’s government

v4.c53.s1.1

Mahādji Sindhiā, as a shrewd judge of men, had maintained an admirable balance in his ministry by placing the civil administration in the hands of Deshastha Brāhmans and his army under Shenvi Brāhmans; these two groups, though theoretically branches of the same Brāhman caste, lived apart in their social relations, beyond the possibility of uniting or even fraternising. The leaders of the Deshastha party were the three sons of Raghunāth Malhār Kulkarni of Nigodi, known as Ābā Chitnis, Krishnobā Chitnis, and Gopāl Bhāu. Ābā was a civil administrator and financial manager of extraordinary capacity, Krishnobā also was a good secretary and accountant, while Gopāl Bhāu was Mahādji’s dignified deputy in Hindustan and controlled the civil and military affairs of his absent master, but more as a viceroy than as a commander in the field, though all the generals were subordinate to him.

v4.c53.s1.2

Mahādji’s army chiefs were all Shenvis, namely Jivāji Ballāl Kerkar (popularly known as Jivā Dādā Bakhshi), his son Nārāyan Jivāji, and first cousin Jagannāth Rām Krishna (popularly Jagu Bāpu), Lakshman Anant Lād (popularly known as Lakhwā Dādā) and Bālāji Anant Pingé (popularly Bālobā Tātyā Pāgnis),—the last being a minister in charge of army accounts and the patron of Lakhwā Dādā. With them was associated another Shenvi Sadāshiv Malhār Bavlé (popularly Bhāu Bakhshi), nominally called the diwān, who acted as Sindhiā’s foreign secretary in his dealings with the English.

v4.c53.s1.3

As long as Mahādji lived, his strong hand prevented these two caste-groups from quarrelling, and the administration was run with smooth efficiency. But immediately after his death, the balance was upset and a crisis precipitated in the Sindhian administration by Nānā Fadnis. Now was Nānā's chance for removing the last threat to his domination over the Peshwā's mind and making the house of Sindhiā as subordinate to him as any petty sardār of the Deccan. Abā Chitnis, hitherto Mahādji's chief minister, courted Nānā's support against his Shenvi rivals and promised subservience to his policy of making the Sindhias know their own place.

v4.c53.s1.4

This alliance between Nānā and Abā was so notorious that the British Resident noticed it. But the result was just the opposite of what they had expected. It wounded the pride and self-interest of the house of Sindhiā. They could never forget that throughout Mahādji's career Nānā Fadnis had tried to thwart and humiliate him; he had not moved a finger to aid Mahādji during his life and death struggle with Ghulām Qādir, and when Mahādji had at last emerged victorious, Nānā had planted Holkar and Ali Bahādur as thorns in his sides to spoil his policy in the North. The mere fact of Abā Chitnis's friendship with Nānā Fadnis damned him effectually in the eyes of the Sindhian ladies. They persuaded Daulat Rao to safeguard his power and honour by placing his administration in the hands of the Shenvi officers who had for many years served Mahādji in the field and the cabinet so loyally. Therefore, about two months after Mahādji's death, Daulat Rao recalled to his cabinet Bhāu Bakhshi and Bālobā Pāgnis, both of whom were then in political exile. Bhāu Bakhshi joined Daulat Rao's cabinet as diwān in Punā on 10th May. Abā Chitnis immediately took the alarm, resigned his post, and would listen to no persuasion to return. [PRC. ii. 234, 238. Kharé, ix. p. 4814.]

v4.c53.s1.5

The next step was to remove Chitnis's brother Gopāl Bhāu from the supreme command in Northern India and appoint the Shenvi generals, Lakhwā Dādā and Jagu Bāpu to that charge. The news of the intended change reached the Marātha camps in Hindustan, and then began almost daily rows by the soldiers for their arrears of pay, while lawless men raised their heads on all sides and plundering bands began to roam through the country without fear. Both the factions courted De Boigne, the master of Sindhia’s invincible brigades. Lakhwā Dādā’s agent Imām Bakhsh waited on De Boigne for a month, soliciting him to join the Pāgnis party, but the General frankly told him, “Daulat Rao is our master. I shall obey any one whom he appoints as his prime minister.” So the envoy returned with failure.

v4.c53.s1.6

But at the same time, De Boigne considered it his duty to warn Daulat Rao that the removal of an exceptionally able and experienced governor like Gopāl Bhāu would throw his entire North Indian administration into confusion and De Boigne himself would not be able to maintain order there. Shah Alam also, sent a secret message to the Peshwā, through the Maratha Resident in Delhi, pointing out that Bālobā Pāgnis had been once dismissed by Mahādji as a failure and Abā Chitnis had been solicited by him to resume the premier’s office which he had filled to the Emperor’s entire satisfaction ever since. It was, as Shah Alam argued, a ruinous mistake to replace such a tried minister as Abā by a man of proved incompetence like Bālobā. But all these arguments proved useless when weighed against the threat of Nānā Fadnis’s hidden hand working against Sindhia’s prestige and wealth. [DY. ii. 120, 133, 119, 121. Hingné D. ii. 97.]

§ 2. Lakhwā Dādā is appointed Sindhia’s viceroy in Hindustan, (Nov. 1794), his difficulties

v4.c53.s2.1

Lakhwā Dādā in concert with Jagu Bāpu, took charge of his office as Sindhia’s viceroy in Northern India, on 1st November 1794. His dismissed predecessor Gopāl Bhāu accompanied by his family took refuge in De Boigne’s camp, seeking protection from the violence of his long unpaid soldiery.

v4.c53.s2.2

Lakshman Anant Lād, popularly called Lakhwā Dādā, was an officer of outstanding ability and character. During the eclipse of Mahādji Sindhiā after Lālsot, he had defended Agra fort against the combined forces of Ghulām Qādir and Ismail Beg for nine months, with matchless courage, tenacity and alertness. (Ch. 36 § 3.) Later he had distinguished himself in some other campaigns. His political sagacity equalled his generalship. Like his master Mahādji, he had the wisdom to treat the English Power with courtesy and friendliness. The British Resident, Colonel Palmer, “lamented the fall of Lakhwā Dādā (in November 1796) on account of his personal character, which for mildness and moderation exceeds that of any Maratha I know.” (*PRC.* viii. 42, 217.)

v4.c53.s2.3

It was to no bed of roses that Lakhwā Dādā succeeded when he became Sindhiā’s viceroy of North India. During the month before, De Boigne had realised some lakhs as tribute from Jaipur and Mācheri, but he had spent this money in paying the salaries of the regular corps (*paltan*) under himself only, while the indigenous Deccani cavalry and the North Indian irregulars (*fauj*) received no part of their long standing dues. A bitter quarrel broke out between the two sections of Sindhia’s army in the North, and it led to rioting, in the course of which the Regulars wounded eight men of the Silahdār cavalry. The indigenous troops vowed vengeance, but Bālobā Pāgnis’s agent pacified them by promising that Lakhwā Dādā would satisfy their claims on returning to his head quarters in Mathurā,—as if the new viceroy could coin money (*DY.* ii. 138, 139).

v4.c53.s2.4

The financial mismanagement of the Marātha administrators in the North and South alike, foredoomed their dream of *Hindupat Pādshāhi* (paramountcy over all India) to utter futility. As the British Resident, Colonel William Palmer, wrote during a visit to Lakhwā’s camp in Mathurā in April 1795,—

v4.c53.s2.5

"The officers who have lately succeeded to the administration of the Maratha affairs in Hindustan found them in a state of very alarming disorder; the revenues grossly mismanaged or embezzled and the collections so reduced as to be very inadequate to the expenses of Government. The Deccan troops and Hindustani Irregulars mutinous and disaffected for want of pay, and with difficulty restrained from the greatest outrages by the corps under Mons. De Boigne; the tributary Rajahs retaining their respective contributions and preparing to resist the future exaction of them; the Sikhs ready to invade and ravage the western provinces. . .

v4.c53.s2.6

"The Maratha State . . . is but ill-qualified for permanent conquest or civil government, however formidable may be the means which it possesses of ravage and devastation. The whole country under its subjection from the Chambal to the Ganges is in the most miserable state of neglect and disorder, the lands deserted and the cultivation so scanty as scarcely to supply subsistence to the remaining inhabitants, the roads infested with numerous bands of robbers, . . . particularly in the neighbourhood of Delhi, where they are so formidable as to set the forces of the Government at defiance.

v4.c53.s2.7

"In this disgraceful and ruinous condition of the country and Government, a large army is employed in seeking its own subsistence by exacting unjust contributions from the defenceless Rajahs of Hindustan, instead of repressing the violences and depredations committed in their own territories and protecting their own subjects and revenue." [PRC. viii. No. 11.]

v4.c53.s2.8

But administrative disorder and vanished revenue were not the only drag on Lakhwā Dādā's activity. During the months immediately following his coming to power, the thoughts of all Marātha leaders were absorbed by the problem of forcing the Nizām to fulfil his treaty obligations. The decision of arms took place at Khardā on 11th March 1795, but before the terms of the treaty forced on the Nizām there were executed, came the catastrophe of the young Peshwā's death (27th Oct.), followed by an interregnum of 13 months when Mahārāshtra became a scene of hopeless intrigue and party strife, till the recognition of Bāji Rao II as Peshwā (5 Dec. 1796.) During this interval the Central power of the Marātha State was entirely paralysed and its recently humbled enemies recovered their old position. No military help could be expected by the viceroy of Hindustan from his master in Punā, and therefore he could take no strong action.

v4.c53.s2.9

§ 3. Threatened invasion by the Abdāli Shāh—its reaction on Indian politics

v4.c53.s2.10

At the same time the death of Mahādji Sindhiā encouraged all the anti-Marātha elements in Northern India, and even the faithless Shah Alam to invite the Durrāni king Zamān Shāh to invade India and repeat his grand-father's feat by expelling the Marāthas and restoring Muslim domination in Hindustan. Every winter that the Shah crossed the Khyber and came to Peshāwar, a thrill of fear passed through the Panjab, Delhi and Oudh. In 1794 (January), 1795 (Nov.), 1796 (Nov.), 1797 (Oct.), and 1798 (Oct.) Zamān Shāh visited Peshāwar, and in 1797 and 1798 occupied Lāhor itself. The report of his movements sent the rich fleeing from Lāhor, Amritsar and even Delhi to safer places, and made the Marātha generals in the north "tremble like a cane branch under the wind" and cling helplessly to the English for armed support. From our fuller knowledge of the facts we can now see that the Afghan menace was really not so great as the men of the time feared. In fact, the Durrāni king's power was hopelessly weakened by his empty treasury and the incurable disputes in his family, while the Sikhs gradually set as a concrete wall guarding the land of the five rivers, and young Ranjit Singh made himself master of Lāhor.*

v4.c53.s2.11

∗ Zamān Shāh left Lāhor on 4th January 1799. "This was the last Muslim invasion of India. The Khālsa though disunited, had erected a wall of concrete against the north-western flood which had carried

v4.c53.s2.12

Therefore, the Marātha generals in Hindustan remained on the defensive every winter from 1795 to 1798-99, and no ambitious or long-extending project could be undertaken by Lakhwā Dādā or his successor during these years. The departure of De Boigne from India at the end of 1795 robbed the Marāthas of a strong and reliable defender, and henceforth they could only make pathetic appeals to the English for a defensive coalition. But the British Indian authorities more accurately gauged the Durrāni power for offence and gave only a lukewarm response to the Marātha proposals.

v4.c53.s2.13

We shall now briefly narrate what Lakhwā Dādā could do during his viceroyalty. In August 1795, he forced the fort of Sābalgarh, in the Karāuli State, south-east of the Chambal, to capitulate and then laid siege to Bijaypur (south of Sābalgarh). In October he stormed the city of Narwar from the Kachhwā Raja of Shivpuri, and next invested the fort which protected the city, but it held out till March next year. In June 1796, we find Lakhwā attacking Datiā, the Bundelā Raja of which defied the Marathas for many years. [PRC. viii. 24.]

v4.c53.s2.14

But Lakhwā Dādā had not enjoyed his high office for full two years when a revolution in his master's Court in Punā overthrew him.

§ 4. Daulat Rao Sindhiā falls under the evil influence of Sharzā Rao Ghātgé, but Lakhwā is continued in office

v4.c53.s3.1

So judicious was Mahādji Sindhiā's planning and so highly competent were his chosen agents, that after his death his government was carried on for four years by its own momentum. But the absence of a capable master was bound to make itself felt in the long run. His heir, Daulat Rao was an immature lad of thirteen, dull of intellect, with-

v4.c53.s3.2

everything before it during the past eight hundred years." Ranjit Singh gained Lāhor in July 1799. H. Gupta, History of the Sikhs, iii. 120. "Cane branch" in Hingné D. ii. 42.

v4.c53.s3.3

out education, and so prone to self-indulgence that he soon became infected by the painful disease with which nature punishes promiscuous sensuality. To his lack of the power of choosing worthy servants, he added an obstinate persistence in one course and the truly oriental habit of letting matters drift without coming to any decision. For the first few years he was saved from the influence of wicked favourites by his reliance on the ladies of the house, —Mahādji's widows—Bhāgirathi Bāi, Yamunā Bāi, and Lakshmi Bāi (*neé* Kadam), and above all Kesari Bāi, a morganatic wife of the late Sindhiā remarkable for her intelligence and good sense. They constantly urged him to keep to the right path and conduct himself in a manner worthy of his ancestry.* It was only in 1798 when Daulat Rao discarded these well-wishers under the wicked advice of Sharzā Rao Ghātgé, that a breach began in his fortunes.

v4.c53.s3.4

At Punā Daulat Rao Sindhiā was very hard pressed for money. His vast army and extravagant Court required a large flow of income. Mahādji had left him only a legacy of debt as the result of his glorious campaigns in the North. But not one pice of the five *krores* adjudged to be due to him from the Peshwā in the settlement of September 1793 had been paid. The war indemnity promised by the Nizām at Khardā could not be realised except by another invasion of his territory. Any tributes paid by the Rajput princes were eaten up by the army stationed in their country. Daulat Rao, therefore, had to find money if he was not to starve, or to be mobbed to death by his starving soldiery. His chosen minister Bālobā Tātyā had failed to provide the necessary funds during his two years of office. In this situation, Nānā Fadnis, through his old follower Sharzā Rao Ghātgé, secretly assured Daulat Rao that large sums could be easily collected if he only changed his ministers. The weakminded young prince swallowed the bait. On 26th October 1796, he suddenly arrested Bālobā Tātyā and Bhāu Bakhshi, who were Nānā's enemies, and recalled Abā Chitnis, a partisan of Nānā.

v4.c53.s3.5

∗ The Persian news-letters (Br. Mus. Or. 4608, 4609, Add. 24,036) give many instances of Daulat Rao taking counsel with these ladies and their urging him to give up low and frivolous amusements like kite-flying, jackal-hunting in the jungle outside Puna, &c., to which he had been lured by a licentious Muslim youth, the son of Shah Habib.

v4.c53.s3.6

Bālobā was Lakhwā's patron and constant supporter in Sindhiā's council. The news of his fall reached Lakhwā's camp on 6th November, along with orders for his own arrest. Lakhwā immediately sent his family for safety to Bithur in Oudh territory and himself marched to Gopālgarh (7th Nov.), at first intending to go to Benares and take asylum in British territory. He was too loyal to defy his master's authority, though the soldiers loved and clung to him.

v4.c53.s3.7

But early next month (December) he received letters from Daulat Rao pressing him to resume his command. The reason was that Zamān Shāh had in the meantime reached Peshāwar and was daily expected to march upon Lāhor and Delhi. In the face of such a danger, an able and popular General like Lakhwā could not be antagonised without risking the loss of the Marātha dominions in North India to the Durrānis and the former Muslim dynasties. A number of Marātha sardārs in the North were ordered to go to Lakhwā Dādā in a deputation and conduct him from his asylum back to office. But Lakhwā stood aloof and on his guard for some time, during which Jagu Bāpu exercised the supreme power in Hindustan.

v4.c53.s3.8

Next year again, in October (1797) the report of Zamān Shah's march from Kābul towards India* thoroughly alarmed Daulat Rao, especially as the Rajput Rajas had now become restive and were actively planning to throw off the Marātha yoke, and expel Ambāji Inglé. So, Daulat Rao (about 8th November) sent directions to General Perron and to each of the officers commanding the detached corps, directing them to consider themselves under the orders of Jagu Bāpu and Lakhwā Dādā. At the same time he ordered these two supreme chiefs to assemble all their troops and march to Mewār and Jodhpur, leaving Khāndoji Inglé to continue the languid siege of Datiā.

v4.c53.s3.9

∗ Zamān Shah's vanguard crossed the Indus at Attock on 19th Oct. 1797, and occupied Lāhor on 3 Nov.

v4.c53.s3.10

But the Durrāni menace, as usual, blew over, and in February next (1798) we find a reign of terror for extortion and personal vengeance let loose on Punā by Sharzā Rao Ghātgé, who was now supreme in Daulat Rao’s Court by reason of the marriage of his daughter Baizā Bāi to that prince (on 25th February). At the instance of his evil genius, Sindhiā wrote to Lakhwā and Ambāji to attend him at Punā in person, really to squeeze out of them the millions they were supposed to have amassed during their viceroyalty in Hindustan. Lakhwā evaded compliance on the plea that the current hostilities with the Sikhs and the Jaipur Raja did not permit him to leave his province.

v4.c53.s3.11

Next Lakhwā and Jagu Bāpu marched towards Bhopāl, where the Marāthas had been hired to assist in a disputed succession to the Nawāb-ship. They had reached Sāgar when they were cleverly arrested by Harji Sindhiā (c. 10 March 1798), and the government of Hindustan was temporarily placed by Daulat Rao under Ambāji Inglé, who had promised a larger remittance of revenue from the northern viceroyalty. Gopāl Bhāu was restored to Sindhiā’s confidence, Nārāyan Bakhshi was thrown into prison, and the downfall of the Shenvi party seemed to be complete.

v4.c53.s3.12

§ 5. *Mahādji’s widows begin war against Daulat Rao—Lakhwa Dada takes up their cause in North India (January 1799)*

v4.c53.s3.13

In Punā the universal dissatisfaction with Daulat Rao’s government drove his troops to mutiny for their pay and demand the removal of the new ministers. But retribution was to descend on Sharzā Rāo and his infatuated master from another quarter. On 15th May, 1798 Sharzā Rao personally ill-treated the widows of Mahādji Sindhiā who then raised the banner of revolt against Daulat Rao; after defeat in a battle at Bhāmburdā (25th June), they escaped to the South Maratha country and gathered armed support there, while they issued an appeal to the army in North India to espouse their cause. Thus an even worse confusion than before fell on the Sindhian administration in the North and South alike, and its utter dissolution seemed imminent.

v4.c53.s3.14

The widows on 17th June wrote to Harji Sindhiā, then holding Lakhwā and Jagu Bāpu in detention, appealing to him in the name of his late master Mahādji to release these two Generals, so that the latter might take up their cause and save them from oppression by depriving Daulat Rao of power. These letters caused a great ferment in the Marātha army of the North, where Lakhwā was very popular; many of the captains sided with the widows* and only a few remained true to Daulat Rao. In the end, Jagu Bāpu escaped from confinement by collusion with his keeper on 5th August, and Lakhwā Dādā was released three days later. They formally resumed their offices in the names of the widows on the 14th and 16th of that month respectively.

v4.c53.s3.15

Against the rebels, an effective barrier was built by the coalition of Perron (De Boigne's successor as Sindhia's supreme commander of the New Model army) with Ambāji Inglé, whom Daulat Rao invested with the viceroyalty of the North. At first the partisans of the widows gained the city of Ujjain, Sindhia's capital, without striking a blow, c. 15 Sept. But three months later (c. 15 Dec. 1798), Ambāji's brother Bālā Rao Inglé recovered that capital, as Jagu Bāpu fled away from it at his approach.

v4.c53.s3.16

∗ "The long arrears of pay due to the army and no prospect of a speedy relief from the present leading sardārs, together with a personal regard for the late commander, are beginning to work a disposition in the soldiers (of the Jhari fauj) to baffle the loyal endeavours of Harji Sindhia." "Distrust and dislike of (Daulat Rao) Sindhia so generally prevail among his subjects in Hindustan that he is now left with scarce one attached leader of distinction in either of his Marātha armies in his northern dominions." Resident to Governor-General, 3 Aug. and 14 Aug. 1798. (P.R.C. viii. 74 & 75.) The release of the two Generals was "effected by means of the commandants of three corps of infantry and of the artillery department." Ibid. 76.

v4.c53.s3.17

The usual Durrānī threat in winter ended, for the last time, at the beginning of January 1799, and Lakhwā Dādā began his campaign in Mālwā to establish the Widows’ government there.

v4.c53.s3.18

With his force swollen to about 20,000 men (mostly cavalry), Lakhwā Dādā began the war in the true Marātha style, moving rapidly over the districts of Mālwā and levying contributions from the towns and plundering the villages in Daulat Rao’s dominions. Bālā Rao Inglé was hopelessly outnumbered and outmatched, as he had only two infantry battalions and guns but no cavalry; he could only keep himself on the defensive, and run the risk of being starved. In the Rāghogarh country two detachments sent by Ambāji, one under his brother Bālā Rāo and the other under his son Bhāu, were defeated and scattered by Jagu Bāpu (middle of January.) Ambāji poured more troops into Mālwā to save the situation, but his forces were unprofitably dispersed, and his main army was involved in the siege of Datiā.

v4.c53.s3.19

Bālā Rao then promised to Lakhwā to cease hostilities, evacuate Mālwā to his rival, and fall back on Gwalior (end of February). But Lakhwā knew the proposal to be a mere ruse for gaining time to let reinforcements reach him. On 8th March, Lakhwā defeated and broke up the troops of Bāpu Sindhiā and Satvāji Patil, who were advancing to join Bālā Rao. When Lakhwā turned aside to attack Bālā Rao himself, the latter took up a strong position at Bārāpanti in a hilly terrain where his enemy’s cavalry could not operate. Thus all Mālwā lay open to Lakhwā’s pillage. In the third week of March he was forty *kos* north of Ujjain, and his light horsemen had been strengthened with “a good train of artillery.” The defeated Bālā Rao Inglé fell back from Mālwā to Kotā, giving up his camp to pillage by the Grāsiās in the pay of Lakhwā, who next moved to Mandesor to levy contribution on that rich trade centre.

v4.c53.s3.20

§ 6. Lakhwā Dādā's campaigns in Mewār, 1799

v4.c53.s3.21

But he was soon drawn to another field. The Rānā of Udaipur, profiting by Daulat Rao's distress, made an attack upon those places in the Ajmer subah which he had been forced to cede to Mahādji Sindhiā's local agent Gulābji Kadam. At the end of March, Lakhwā detached a force of three thousand to help the Rānā, who then renewed his attack and defeated Gulābji with great slaughter (c. 5 April, 1799). On 9th April, Lakhwā Dādā himself entered Mewār with his whole force (from Mandesor) and attacked Hāmirgarh, to which Gulābji had fled for refuge after his disastrous defeat.

v4.c53.s3.22

Ambāji Inglé was at his wits' end how to keep hold of Mewār. As soon as Lakhwā Dādā's rebellion became known to Daulat Rao that prince ordered the qiladārs of Agra, Aligarh and Delhi to deliver these forts to Perron, but those officers being Lakhwā's agents refused to obey, and Perron had to lay siege to each of these almost impregnable fortresses. Perron therefore could spare no portion of De Boigne's famous brigades for the relief of Ambāji. Inglé then hired George Thomas for half a lakh of rupees a month. The Irish mercenary advanced from Kānud (c. 15 April) towards Chitor. The troops of Balā Rao and Bāpu Sindhiā, too, arrived from Mālwā towards Hāmirgarh and reached Chitor (c. 20 April), while the besieged officers of Ambāji issued from their fort of refuge and joined Bālā Rao.

v4.c53.s3.23

Lakhwā's swarms of Deccan light horse enveloped the stationary camp of Bālā Rao and cut off its supply of grain, fire-wood and water; in several skirmishes during foraging also, his men were successful.

v4.c53.s3.24

Then the pendulum of Daulat Rao's mind swung in the opposite direction once more. The Widows' War was only increasing his debt and distraction, and he must seek relief by a change of ministers. About 11th April, he ordered Bālobā Tātyā to be brought out of confinement with the idea of making him his prime minister again and thus facilitating the return of Lakhwā Dādā to his service and reconciliation with the royal Widows. The rise of Jaswant Rao Holkar and his resistless progress through Sindhiā's Mālwā territory, showed Daulat Rao how very weak in defence he now was. Lakhwā had become the ally of Jaswant in a common hostility to his former master.

v4.c53.s3.25

The incredibly rapid success of the British arms in driving Tipu Sultān into his capital and there annihilating him (4th May 1799), coming after their enslavement of the Nizām eight months earlier, fell like a thunder-clap on the Indians princes that still remained independent. Henceforth, the Peshwā and Sindhiā seemed to act like birds fascinated by the blazing eyes of a python and walking unresisting into its open jaws.*

v4.c53.s3.26

Bālā Rao Inglé, who had made an armistice with Lakhwā Dādā on 10th May, held several interviews with him during that month for effecting a reconciliation. In the end, Bālā Rao marched towards Mālwā and Lakhwā Dādā from Chitor to Udaipur. Before the month was over, formal letters were received from Daulat Rao Sindhiā, appointing Lakhwā as his viceroy in Hindustan again. But Ambāji would not part with his viceroyalty over Mewār, by which he had amassed a fortune for eight years; he began to coerce the Mewār barons who had sided with Lakhwā in the late contest. His son, Bhāu Inglé, joined by George Thomas's disciplined corps reduced several baronial forts near Shāhpurā city. This move called up Lakhwā from Udaipur to the scene in support of his partisans. He called in his detachments and allies and by an attack seized six guns from Ambāji's diwān Nānā Ganesh. And yet peace parleys and skirmishes between the two sides went on together for many weeks.

v4.c53.s3.27

On 15th July Lakhwā Dādā gained some degree of success in a sudden attack on Nānā Ganesh's troops. On 9th August, five thousand men from his army carried by assault one of the batteries of Nānā Ganesh, killing and wounding eight hundred of his men, and capturing the commandants of the two defending battalions (Buniād Singh and Bakhtāwar Singh) and five pieces of cannon with their munition carts and much baggage. George Thomas was separated from this battery by a flooded nālā and could give no support to the defence. After this disaster, the two agents of Ambāji retreated twenty miles.

v4.c53.s3.28

∗ PRC. viii. 159, 163.

v4.c53.s3.29

Ambāji Inglé made frantic efforts to hire four battalions of Perron’s infantry for service in Mewār, and even advanced four lakhs of rupees as subsidy. But nothing was done by the French general, and Ambāji himself was beleaguered by his long unpaid and mutinous soldiers of the Jhari fauj, (end of August).

v4.c53.s3.30

Early in September, Lakhwā left Mewār and arrived near Kishangarh (64 miles south-west of Jaipur city) on the 18th. At this time letters were received from Daulat Rao appointing Lakhwā and Jagu Bāpu as his deputies in Hindustan and depriving Ambāji of authority over Mewār. About 15th October, Lakhwā raised the siege of Kishangarh, on being paid two lakhs by its Rajah. Mutual friends now brought about an interview between him and Perron at Muazzamābād (midway between Kishangarh and Jaipur) on the 27th of that month. A peaceful settlement was made between them on the following terms:—

v4.c53.s3.31

1. Lakhwā Dādā is acknowledged by all parties, to be Sindhiā’s deputy in Hindustan and the detachment of Perron’s army commanded by Sutherland (two battalions) is to remain under Lakhwā’s orders.

v4.c53.s3.32

2. Perron retains command of the forts of Delhi, Aligarh and Agra, until Daulat Rao’s final decision of their possession be known.

v4.c53.s3.33

³ Ambāji Inglé is to remain in undisputed possession of all his former districts (Gwalior, &c.), but relinquishes Mewār and every pargana taken from the party of the Widows. (P.R.C. viii. 185.)

v4.c53.s3.34

Ambaji at last admitted defeat and terminated his engagement of George Thomas from 2nd November 1799.

v4.c53.s3.35

In the last week of this year, Lakhwā prevailed on Ambājī to make peace with the Rajah of Datiā on the following conditions:—

v4.c53.s3.36

The Rajah is to pay one lakh immediately to Ambājī's army, and to cede districts yielding a revenue of four lakhs of rupees. Ambājī in return will raise the siege of Seondhā and withdraw from Datiā territory as soon as the above terms are fulfilled. (P.R.C. viii. 198.)

v4.c53.s3.37

§ 7. Lakhwā Dādā reappointed Sindhia's viceroy of the North, Nov. 1799

v4.c53.s3.38

Lakhwā Dādā's second term of viceroyalty which began in November 1799, gave some months of peace and order to Sindhiā's North Indian dominions. The Widows had been pacified by mutual friends and were now living at peace in Tuljāpur. Jaswant Rao Holkar's mischievous activity had been arrested for a time by his loss of supporters. "With the appointment of Bālobā Tātyā as the Dīwān of Sindhiā, Lakhwā Dādā's position was strengthened and he ruled over Hindusthan with vigour, putting down disturbances and restoring peace by settling private quarrels." (P.R.C. ix. p. viii.)

v4.c53.s3.39

During the first four months of 1800, Lakhwā carried on a most successful campaign in Rajputana. With the help of Pohlmann's brigade of De Boigne's army, he besieged and reduced the strong fortress of Jahāzpur belonging to the baron of Shāhpurā in Mewār; his loss was two European officers and five hundred sepoys killed and wounded. The Mahārānā paid him five lakhs out of the contribution due. Lakhwā then entered Jaipur territory to extort the arrears of tribute. Rajah Pratāp Singh of Jaipur had taken advantage of the Widows' War and the departure of De Boigne to stop the payment of his dues and to make preparations for expelling the Marāthas. He persistently demanded the return of Tonk Rāmpurā, which had been ceded long ago to the Holkar family. About the 13th of March, Lakhwā took this fort from its Sikh collector Kirpāl Singh and handed it over to Chevalier Dudrenec, the agent of Kāshi Rao Holkar. At this stage, Daulat Rao Sindhiā fearing that the death of Nānā Fadnis (at Punā on 12th March) would involve him in serious disputes with the Peshwā's new ministers, wrote to his officers in North India to refrain from all aggressions against his tributaries there. But they did not mind his letters; Ambāji renewed hostilities against the Rajah of Datiā and Lakhwā struck a decisive blow at the Jaipur army.

v4.c53.s3.40

§ 8. Battle of Mālpurā, 16 April 1800

v4.c53.s3.41

On 15th March the Jaipur Rajah had entered his tents at Sāngāner, while twelve days earlier the Rajah of Jodhpur had proclaimed war against the Marāthas and sent a cavalry corps to the assistance of Jaipur. General Perron, who was jealous of Lakhwā's authority, set out from Aligarh to interpose in the quarrel with Pratāp Singh, ostensibly as a mutual friend. Lakhwā's decision was quick. Hearing of the war preparations and advance of the Jaipur Rajah from his capital, he assembled his own troops and took post four miles south of Mālpurā, a town about 55 miles south-west of Jaipur. His army consisted of De Boigne's second brigade (of 6 battalions commanded by Pohlmann, a Hanoverian), Chevalier Dudrenec's brigade (of 6 battalions, supplied by Holkar), two battalions of Lakhwā's own contingent, a battalion furnished by the Kotā regent Zālim Singh, and a body of inefficient Marātha light horse, a total of about 16,000 men. The Jaipur army was formed by 18 battalions of musketeers, 1,000 Ruhelas, 2,000 Nāgā Gosāins, and upwards of 15,000 Rajput cavalry (including 5,000 Rāthor horsemen from Jodhpur led by Sawāi Singh),—a total of 27,000 men, besides 54 pieces of artillery, ranging from 24 pounders to six pounders.* The Rajah of Jaipur commanded in person.

v4.c53.s3.42

One arm of the Sohadrā river (a feeder of the Banās) after flowing southwards by the walls of the city of Mālpurā for three miles, meets, almost at right angles another arm which runs due west to east in a narrow but deep channel. South of this channel the Marātha army lay encamped near the village of Hindoli, their front to the river. The Jaipur army came up and encamped north of this channel, with the town of Mālpurā on their left rear.

v4.c53.s3.43

Planning to surprise the Jaipur army, Lakhwā Dādā set his troops in motion at four o'clock early in the morning of 16th April. His army was drawn up in two lines, the first being formed by Pohlmann's brigade (Right) and Dudrenec's (Left), while the second, marching a thousand paces behind the first line, was composed of the Marātha cavalry (under Bāpu Sindhiā), these pushing forward some squadrons to the two sides of the first line to guard their flanks. The light field pieces of each brigade moved before it. The Rajput right was composed of the Rāthors and left of the Kachhwā troops.

v4.c53.s3.44

The attempt at surprise failed, as the Jaipur troops got the alarm, through the recklessness of the advanced cavalry patrols of the Marāthas before the infantry had forded the river. A heavy cannonade was opened from all their line. Major Pohlmann, on this, ordered the second brigade to advance with its guns, but to reserve its fire till it was close to the enemy. These orders were punctually obeyed and his artillery did great execution. Sweeping over the five hundred yards of open space from the river bank to the line of Jaipur guns, Pohlmann’s infantry took forty of the pieces, though at some sacrifice of their own men.

v4.c53.s3.45

∗ The detailed figures are taken from a letter written by an English officer of Pohlmann only four days after the battle; but they do not make up this writer's total of 65,000 men on the Jaipur side and half that number in the Marātha army. A battalion in the Indian princes' service in those days ranged from 400 to 500 men only,—the lower of these two figures being the known strength of Dudrenec's batte-ions. I have corrected the total in the light of this fact. The absurd exaggerations of James Skinner that the Jaipur army numbered 1 lakh and 10 thousand men with 150 guns and that the Marātha army lost 20,000 men in killed and wounded and the Rajput "probably double that number," have only to be stated to be rejected.

v4.c53.s3.46

But the toughest part of the battle now began. During this close engagement on the right, Dudrenec’s brigade (the left of their front line) was charged by the Rāthor cavalry. James Skinner, who fought in this battle in Pohlmann’s wing, gives the following spirited description of the scene that ensued: “The Rāthors were seen approaching from a distance; the tramp of their immense and compact body rising like thunder above the roar of battle. They came on first at a slow hand gallop, which increased in speed as they approached: the well-served guns of the brigade showered grape upon their dense mass, cutting down hundreds at each discharge; but this had no effect in arresting their progress;—on they came, like a whirlwind, trampling over fifteen hundred of their own body, destroyed by the cannon of the brigade; neither the murderous volleys from the muskets, nor the serried hedge of bayonets could check or shake them: they poured, like a torrent, on and over the brigade, and rode it fairly down, leaving scarce a vestige of it remaining.”

v4.c53.s3.47

Holkar’s infantry is described by a European general of the time (George Thomas) as “illpaid, badly officered, and without subordination, indisciplined, nor can they make use of their arms.” Besides, this was a new brigade recently raised by Dudrenec and not yet sufficiently trained. The result was that the left wing of the Deccan army was crumpled up in one short onset, 320 men being slain or wounded out of a total strength of about 2,400. “Captain Paish and several other officers were killed, and Dudrenec only escaped by throwing himself down amongst the dead.”

v4.c53.s3.48

The victorious Rāthors, never looking behind them or thinking of their Kachhwā comrades, swept onward in the excitement of success, and crossed the thousand paces interval up to the second line in a twinkle. Here the Marātha cavaliers did not wait to meet the shock, but “ran away like sheep," the Rāthors pursuing them for two miles to the rear. (Skinner.)

v4.c53.s3.49

This gallant but reckless charge, exactly like that of Prince Rupert’s cavalry during the Civil War in England, had a disastrous effect on their side. Pohlmann’s brigade after defeating the van of the Jaipur army, was surprised to see its own left totally uncovered by the destruction of Dudrenec’s wing and its rear exposed by the flight of the cavalry behind it. This was the crisis of the battle: but Pohlmann’s skill and coolness and the discipline of his sepoys saved the day for him. He formed his six battalions into a square, the bristling line of bayonets and file-firing from the four faces of which prevented the enemy’s cavalry from breaking in, though the Kachhwās made onset after onset upon them. The Rajput Centre had now come into the firing line, with their Rajah on a huge ambāri elephant, at the head of 5,000 choice horse.

v4.c53.s3.50

Pohlmann’s dense column, "by an incessant and well-directed fire of the artillery, finally succeeded in coming to close action with the enemy, of whom great numbers immediately gave way; the main body however kept their ground for an hour and a half longer, during which the action is said to have been very severe on both sides." (English letter of 20 April.)

v4.c53.s3.51

Sawāi Pratāp Singh retired to Jaipur, with his army, but all his camp and baggage and guns were captured. Pohlmann’s brigade had 75 casualties and Dudrenec’s 320, but these were only the first rough estimates. (Asiatic Annual Register for 1800. Sup. to Chronicle, pp. 127-128).

v4.c53.s3.52

∗ Col. Collins reported to the Governor General from Fathgarh, on 21st April, 1800, "Previous to the total defeat of the Rajput army, and whilst a possibility of restoring the battle still remained, Pratāp Singh formed the resolution of making a vigorous charge on Mr. Pohlmann’s brigade with a thousand select cavalry, but he was dissuaded from carrying this spirited design into execution by his Diwān Rāi Chand." Lakhwā in a letter to Collins put his own loss at 700 men and that of the enemy at "probably above 2000" (P.R.C. ix. pp. 10-14). I disbelieve Skinner, who told the story of the fighting to his friend and biographer, J. B. Fraser, 35 years after the event. (Military Memoirs of Lt. Col. James Skinner, i. 149.)

v4.c53.s3.53

§ 9. Lakhwā Dādā dismissed—the Widows' War renewed, May 1800

v4.c53.s3.54

Lakhwā Dādā had gained for Sindhiā a splendid victory rivalling that of Mertā ten years earlier, and his reward was—dismissal. On 25th April when the news of this glorious achievement reached Daulat Rao's camp near Punā, a darbār was held to celebrate it, at which the prime minister Bālobā Tātyā was treacherously arrested. This was the contrivance of Sharzā Rao Ghātgé, who had been released from confinement in January and had now won Daulat Rao over by promising him 25 lakhs of rupees to be advanced by himself with Ambāji Inglé and Abā Chitnis (P.R.C. vi. No. 339.) Orders were also issued for the arrest of Lakhwā.

v4.c53.s3.55

On hearing of this revolution in their master's court, Lakhwā, Jagu and several sardārs of their party quitted the Marātha camp in Jaipur suddenly on the morning of 5th May 1800 and fled away towards Ajmere and Mewār. Ambāji Inglé was reappointed Sindhiā's viceroy in Hindustan and directed to act in concert with Perron and prevent Lakhwā from joining the Widows. Lakhwā entered into an agreement with Bhim Singh the Rajah of Marwār to defend him against any attack by Perron, and sent his family and effects to Jodhpur for safety. He himself stayed near Udaipur till the middle of July, for obtaining money.

v4.c53.s3.56

Perron reaped where Lakhwā Dādā had sown. After Lakhwā's flight, Perron arrived near Jaipur, and about 10th May made a settlement with the Jaipur Government. The Rajah agreed to pay to Sindhiā nine lakhs of rupees—namely, six lakhs within one month and three lakhs after six months. In return the Marātha troops were to vacate Jaipur territory. Perron also promised to restore Tonk-Rāmpurā to their original owner the Rajah of Jaipur, but this led to a breach with Holkar, to whom that tract belonged by right; and at last in July, Perron was forced by circumstances to conciliate Holkar's agent Dudrenec by relinquishing Tonk-Rāmpurā to him.

v4.c53.s3.57

When Lakhwā Dādā made his pact with Rajah Bhim Singh, Perron marched towards Jodhpur (end of May) to coerce the Rajah, but he was compelled in a fortnight to return without doing anything as his presence was required to quell Shambhu-nath, the diwān of Imām Bakhsh, a partisan of Lakhwā, who had risen in Saharanpur in concert with a horde of Ruhelā robbers from Rohilkhand.

v4.c53.s3.58

The Widows after a long stay at Burhānpur, had to flee northwards to escape the trained battalions sent against them by Daulat Rao from Punā. They arrived near Maheshwar on the Narmadā about the 1st of August. From here they sent an appeal for money aid and alliance to Jaswant Rao Holkar, who was up opposing Daulat Rao Sindhia for recovering his family possessions. Jaswant advanced two lakhs of rupees to them and conducted them in all honour to Ujjain at the end of September.

v4.c53.s3.59

Meantime, Lakhwā Dādā who had been living on the plunder of Jaipur territory moved from the Ajmer frontier to Sambhar (c. 10 August), and at the end of September detached two thousand horse from his corps under Jagu Bāpu to join the Bāis in Mālwā. But the situation steadily turned against him; the Bāis could not raise funds in Ujjain, Jaswant Holkar threatened to desert their cause unless he was paid four lakhs for his expenses; three regular battalions of Sindhia from the Deccan crossed the Narmadā and moved upon Ujjain with none to oppose them, and in Rajputana, Perron’s lieutenant Louis Bourquien captured the city of Ajmer and invested its famous fortress. So, in October, Lakhwā hastened to Udaipur, and after extracting two lakhs from the Mahārānā, set off on the 16th to join Jagu Bāpu in Mālwā with the remnant of his army. The Widows’ War now ended in Rajputana and was transferred to Mālwā. Its course there can be understood only by following the history of Jaswant Rao Holkar with which it was inextricably mixed. Here it is necessary to begin a new chapter.