The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c14: 8. Muhammad of Ghur

The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c14

Language: English

c14.s1 Early history of Ghur — 1 part
c14.s2 Causes of Muhammad's invasions — 1 part
c14.s3 Conquest of Multan and Sindh — 1 part
c14.s4 Muhammad defeated at Anhilwara — 1 part
c14.s5 Acquisition of the Panjab : end of the Ghaznavide rule — 1 part
c14.s6 His contact with Hindustan — 1 part
c14.s7 Muhammad's defeat at Tarain — 1 part
c14.s8 Prithviraj defeated at Tarain — 2 parts
c14.s9 Results of the second battle of Tarain — 1 part
c14.s10 Defeat of Jai Chand of Kanauj — 1 part
c14.s11 Third rising in Ajmer — 1 part
c14.s12 Capture of the Gwalior fortress — 1 part
c14.s13 Fourth rising of Rajasthan — 1 part
c14.s14 Conquest of Bundelkhand — 1 part
c14.s15 Conquest of Bihar — 1 part
c14.s16 Conquest of Bangal — 3 parts
c14.s17 Muhammad of Ghur’s death : his achievements — 3 parts
c14.s18 Causes of our defeat — 3 parts
c14.s19 The Shansbani Dynasty — 10 parts

8. Muhammad of Ghur

Early history of Ghur

c14.s1.1

The mountainous district of Ghur is situated in the hills between Ghazni and Herat. In the tenth century A.D. it was an independent principality and was ruled by a Tajik family of Persian origin, known to history as the Shansbani dynasty. Its ruler, Muhammad bin Suri, was defeated by Mahmud of Ghazni in or about 1009 A.D., and was reduced to the position of a vassal. Since that date the ruler of Ghur became a feudatory of Ghazni. The principality of Ghur, however, took full advantage of the decline of Ghazni after the death of Mahmud in 1030 A.D. This was made possible by a quarrel between the ruling houses of the two kingdoms. Bahram of Ghazni murdered a prince of Ghur, named Malik Qutub-ud-din Hasan. This roused the wrath of Saif-ud-din Suri, the brother of the deceased, who invaded Ghazni and defeated Bahram. A little later, Bahram retaliated and put Saif-ud-din to death. The quarrel now developed into a family feud, and Ala-ud-din Husain, Saif-ud-din's younger brother, completely devastated and burnt the city of Ghazni, as we have already seen, and earned the nickname of *Jahan Soz*. Ala-ud-din came into clash with Sanjar, the last of the imperial Seljuqs. But he escaped his doom owing to the difficulties the latter was in. Ala-ud-din conquered Bamian, Turkistan, Jerun and Bast and even Gharjistan, in the Valley of the Murghab river. He conquered the city of Herat also. Towards the end of his reign he lost Balkh, Turkistan and Herat, but retained his hold over other parts of his dominions. He died in 1161. He was succeeded by his son, named Saif-ud-din. On his death the principality of Ghur passed to his cousin Ghiyas-ud-din. He recovered Ghazni, which had been lost by his predecessors, and added a number of districts to his dominion. His ambition brought him into conflict with the Khwarizm Shah. Ghiyas-ud-din acquired some initial success over his rival and conquered several districts in the neighbourhood of Khurasan; but, ultimately, the Ghuride ruler was decisively beaten at Andhkhud. He was allowed to retain possession of Herat and Balkh, only two provinces of his extensive conquest in the north-west. Thus the Ghuride activity in the north-west brought little advantage and the ruler of this dynasty had to turn towards India. Ghiyas-ud-din Muhammad, king of Ghur, appointed his younger brother Shahab-ud-din Alias Muiz-ud-din Muhammad to the government of Ghazni in 1173 A.D., when that city was recovered from the Ghuzz Turkomans of Central Asia. The latter was on very friendly terms with his elder brother and gave him complete loyalty and allegiance. Muhammad was an active and enterprising ruler and, although he ruled at Ghazni as almost an independent ruler, he inscribed the name of his brother on his coins and treated him as his suzerain. It is this man, known to us as Muhammad Ghuri, who became the third important Muslim invader of Hindustan.

Causes of Muhammad's invasions

c14.s2.1

Muhammad of Ghur, ruler of Ghazni, was an ambitious and enterprising prince. He looked upon himself as the heir to the Panjab which had belonged to the empire of Ghazni. A quarrel between his house and that of Ghazni must have prompted him to invade the Panjab, then under a prince of the house of Mahmud, named Khusrav Shah or Khusrav Malik. Moreover, it was necessary to obtain possession of the Panjab in order to fight successfully his chief enemy, the ruler of Khwarizm, with whom, too, the Ghurides had a long-standing conflict. It was not only desirable but necessary to eliminate the enemy in the rear, that is, the Ghaznavide ruler of Lahore and the Karmathians of Multan. That was an age of military glory, and Muhammad of Ghur was fired with the love of conquest and power. Like all able and ambitious men, he wanted to establish a big empire and to acquire wealth and prestige. He was also a pious Muslim and, as such, he considered it to be his duty to bring the message of Muhammad to the Hindus of India and to put an end to idolatry. It must, however, be mentioned that Muhammad of Ghur was more political than religious. His primary aim, therefore, was conquest and not the propagation of Islam, though that was desirable and was to follow as a matter of course.

Conquest of Multan and Sindh

c14.s3.1

His first invasion was directed against Multan in 1175 A.D. That province was ruled over by Ismailian heretics who were popularly known as Karmathians. Muhammad captured the city and appointed his own governor. He then pushed on to Uch in Upper Sindh. The story that it was under a Bhatti Rajput, whose queen fell victim to Muhammad of Ghur’s intrigue, poisoned her husband and delivered the place to the invader, is disproved by modern research. It is clear that Bhatti Rajputs had never held any part of Sindh and that the ruler of Uch at this time was most probably a Qaramitah Muslim. Uch fell in the same year at Multan, that is, in 1175 A.D., and most probably by stratagem. Desirous of completing the subjugation of the whole of Sindh and annexing it, Muhammad invaded Lower Sindh in 1182 A.D. and compelled its Sumra ruler to acknowledge his suzerainty.

Muhammad defeated at Anhilwara

c14.s4.1

Muhammad’s next expedition was directed against Anhilwara or Patan, the capital of Bhima II, the Vaghela ruler of Gujarat. The chief of Anhilwara was then young in years, but he was brave and dashing and was the master of a big force. He inflicted, in 1178 A.D., a terrible defeat upon Muhammad and drove him away from his country. This produced such an impression upon the invader that he did not threaten Gujarat for twenty years to come.

Acquisition of the Panjab : end of the Ghaznavide rule

c14.s5.1

Muhammad now realised that it was a mistake to attempt to conquer India through Sindh and Multan. The key to Hindustan lay through the Panjab, and so he changed his tactics and decided to proceed through the Panjab into the heart of our country. He attacked and captured Peshawar from the Ghaznavide ruler of the Panjab in 1179 A.D. Two years later he proceeded against Lahore itself. Khusrav Malik sent the invader costly presents and his own son as a hostage. This easy success must have encouraged Muhammad in his aggression. In 1185 A.D. he again invaded the Panjab and plundered the countryside and occupied the fortress of Sialkot. He repaired this fortress and garrisoned it with his own troops. Khusrav Malik at last realised that the invader was bent upon wresting the whole of the Panjab from his feeble grips and so he exerted himself in self-defence. He made an alliance with the Khokhars, a Hindu tribe of the Salt Range region, who were on bad terms with Chakra Deva, the ruler of Jammu. With their help Khusrav Malik besieged Sialkot, but was driven back by Muhammad’s garrison. In 1186 A.D. Muhammad returned to the Panjab and laid siege to Lahore. He had already made an alliance with Chakra Deva, and he is said to have invaded the Panjab and garrisoned Sialkot in response to an invitation from that Hindu raja. Inspite of the assistance from Jammu under its new ruler, Vijaya Deva, Muhammad did not feel himself powerful enough to take Lahore by force. So he resorted to diplomacy and cunning. He persuaded Khusrav to pay him a visit and guaranteed him safe conduct. In flagrant violation of his plighted word, he seized Khusrav and sent him a prisoner to Gharjistan, where he was put to death by his orders in 1192 A.D. Thus Multan, Sindh and Lahore became parts of the empire of Ghur, and the Ghaznavide rule disappeared from the Panjab. Muhammad's occupation of this province opened the way for further conquests in India.

His contact with Hindustan

c14.s6.1

Muhammad of Ghur's territory now touched the boundary of the kingdom of Prithviraj, the valiant ruler of Ajmer and Delhi. The Rajputs had some experience of the Muslim Turks since the days of Sabuktigin and Mahmud of Ghazni and seemed to have had a better appreciation than their ancestors of the eleventh century of the aggressive tendencies of their new neighbours, though it will be incorrect to say that they had grown wiser by this contact. They had experience of occasional thrusts by an enterprising commander of the decadent house of Ghazni at Lahore. These thrusts had made the Rajputs alive to the Turkish menace. Some of the Rajput rulers, notably those of Kanauj and Ajmer, had put their armies in proper trim and invaded the outlying districts of the Ghaznavide province of the Panjab. Mention has already been made of the capture of Hansi and of Bhatinda by the Chauhans. In view of this experience, the Rajput rulers of Hindustan could not have been taken by surprise as they were, two centuries before, by the plundering hordes of Mahmud of Ghazni.

Muhammad's defeat at Tarain

c14.s7.1

The first Rajput ruler who felt the pressure from the invading hordes from Ghur was the Chauhan prince of Ajmer who ruled the territory from Ajmer to Delhi and was, therefore, responsible for the defence of our north-western frontier. The Chauhans had fortified important towns on this frontier right up to Bhatinda in order to be able to gaurd the entrance into Hindustan against any possible invasion from the north-west. Muhammad of Ghur made his first attack on the fortress of Bhatinda and besieged it in 1189 A.D. Prithviraj did not seem to have been ready, and the attack probably was a surprise attack. The garrison was defeated and had to surrender, Muhammad stationed his own men in the fortress under a commander, named Zia-ud-din, and, when the sultan was about to return, Prithviraj appeared in the vicinity of the fortress to recover it. Prithviraj’s army is said to have comprised two lakhs of cavalry and thirty thousand elephants, which is clearly an exaggeration. Muhammad had to turn round to face the valiant Chauhan and a battle was fought near the village of Tarain, situated near Bhatinda, in 1191 A.D. Prithviraj’s troops attacked the sultan with vigour and inflicted upon him a terrible defeat. Muhammad himself was wounded seriously. He was helped to ride his horse by one of his Khalji officers and was taken away from the field. Prithviraj besieged the fortress of Bhatinda, but it took him thirteen months to recover it from Zia-ud-din, its commandant.

Prithviraj defeated at Tarain

c14.s8.1

This was Muhammad of Ghur’s second defeat at the hands of the Hindu rulers of Hindustan. It caused him greater humiliation than the one he had suffered at the hands of Bhima Deo II of Anhilwara. On return to Ghazni, he “never slumbered in ease, nor walked but in sorrow and anxiety.” He made furious preparations for avenging the defeat and, when these were complete, he started again for Hindustan at the head of a select force which consisted of one lakh and twenty thousand picked cavalry. On reaching Lahore, he sent an envoy, named Qiwam-ul-mulk, to Prithviraj, asking for his submission. This was done in order to gain time for completing his preparations, to cajole Prithviraj and to keep him off his guard. Muhammad gained his first objective. The brave ruler of the Chauhans could not, however, be easily befooled. He rushed towards Bhatinda and appealed to some of his brother Rajput rulers to hurry up to his assistance. With a combined force numbering, according to Farishta, five lakhs of horse and three thousand elephants (which must be greatly exaggerated), Prithviraj met the invader on the same field (Tarain). Muhammad divided his army into five divisions, four of which were sent to attack the Rajput army on all sides, while the fifth was kept in reserve. “The Sultan,” writes Minhaj-us-Siraj, “drew up in battle array, leaving his main body in the rear, with the banners, canopies and elephants, to the number of several divisions. His plan of attack being formed, he advanced quietly. The light-armed horsemen were made into four divisions of ten thousand and were directed to advance and harass the enemy on all sides, on the right and on the left, in the front and in the rear, with their arrows. When the enemy collected his forces to attack, they were to support each other, and to charge at full speed. By these tactics the infidels were worsted, the Almighty gave us the victory over them, and they fled.” The Rajputs fought with great gallantry, but Muhammad of Ghur’s tactics proved to be too great for them when they were tired as the result of an offensive directed on them from all sides. Muhammad despatched his reserve at the end of the day to launch a vigorous attack on our exhausted troops. This proved to be too much even for the Rajputs who gave way. Prithviraj’s chief lieutenant, Khande Rai, who had been responsible for defeating and wounding Muhammad of Ghur in 1191 A.D., was killed. Prithviraj became dejected. He alighted from his elephant and mounted a horse and made an attempt to escape from the field, but was captured near the town of Sarasuti, and Muhammad of Ghur achieved victory.

c14.s8.2

There is more than one version about the time and manner of Prithviraj’s death. According to Minhaj-us-Siraj, he was captured and ‘sent to Hell’. Hasan Nizami, however, tells us that he was taken to Ajmer where he was put to death sometime after, as he was found guilty of treason. This view seems to be correct. There are in existence some of the coins of Prithviraj which bear the Sanskrit superscription ‘Hammira’, indicating that he had accepted Muhammad’s suzerainty and had lived for some time after the second battle of Tarain. Chand Bardai’s version that he was taken to Ghazni and put to death for having slain Muhammad of Ghur himself has no foundation in fact.

Results of the second battle of Tarain

c14.s9.1

The second battle of Tarain is a landmark in the history of India. It proved to be a very decisive contest and ensured the ultimate success of Muhammad of Ghur against Hindustan. The Chauhan military power was completely broken. Immediately after his success at Tarain, the Ghur captured Hansi, Kuhram and Sarasuti, which were places of military importance. They were now garrisoned by the Turks. Muhammad of Ghur planted a foreign Turkish kingdom in the heart of Hindustan for the first time in our history. He, however, realized that, for various reasons, it was not possible to take direct charge of the administration of Prithviraj's dominions. Therefore, he recognised Prithviraj's son on condition of his accepting the position of a vassal. Similarly the Tomara prince, who was Khande Rai's successor, was allowed to remain in charge of Delhi in relieving both Ranthambhor and Ajmer and restoring his master’s Chauhan vassal to the throne of Ajmer. The valiant Hari Raja, however, could not be defeated. At this very time occurred another rising of the Dor Rajputs and it obliged Aibak to cross the Yamuna a second time and capture Koil (Aligarh) in 1194 A.D.

Defeat of Jai Chand of Kanauj

c14.s10.1

When Aibak was busy in quelling Rajput rebellions, Muhammad of Ghur once again marched his army into Hindustan. This time his object was to fight Jai Chand, the ruler of Kanauj and Banaras who has been described by the Muslim writers to have been the greatest Hindu king of that time. On his near approach Qutub-ud-din joined him with the Delhi troops and, at the head of the united force, Muhammad proceeded towards Banaras. Jai Chand, the Gahadwara king, who had disputed with Prithviraj the overlordship of northern India and had not assisted the latter against the Turkish invader from Ghur, was compelled to fight single-handed. His scouts had a skirmish with the enemy, but were defeated. Then Jai Chand himself moved forward and met the invader near Chandawar on the Yamuna between Kanauj and Etawah. He launched a very vigorous attack on the enemy who was perplexed and was about to break down when the Raja was struck in the eye by a fatal arrow and killed. This threw his army into confusion and Muhammad of Gur was lucky enough to gain victory. He took immediate advantage of the confusion in the rank of our army caused by Jai Chand’s death, rallied his men and turned the confusion into a rout. This occurred in 1194 A.D. The victory of Chandawar, like that of Tarain, added a great kingdom to Muhammad of Ghur’s empire. The victor immediately proceeded to Banaras and occupied it. This place was Jai Chand’s favourite residence and here Muhammad acquired a huge treasure which he carried on 1,400 camels. Some other important towns in the Raja’s dominions were also captured without delay, as they contained the Gahadwara treasures. The capital city of Kanauj, however, could not be taken till 1198 A.D. The descendants of Jai Chand continued to rule over a fraction of their kingdom which Muhammad did not consider himself powerful enough to occupy at this time. It seems that even Kanauj was recovered by the Gahadwaras a few years after its conquest.

Third rising in Ajmer

c14.s11.1

Muhammad now returned to Ghazni. During his absence there were many rebellions which Qutub-ud-din was required to quell. The first of them occurred in the vicinity of Koil (Aligarh). It was due, probably, to the independent spirit of the Dor Rajputs. Qutub-ud-din had to proceed from Delhi to the relief of the garrison there, which work he accomplished with success. The next rebellion occurred in and around Ajmer. This was the third attempt of the Rajputs, particularly the Chauhans, to put an end to their slavery and to drive away the Turks from Rajasthan. The soul of the rebellion was the redoubtable Hari Raja, the hero of the two previous exploits, who drove out his nephew from Ajmer and made preparations to attack Delhi. Aibak was obliged to move quickly towards Ajmer so as to intercept the Rajputs who were on their march towards Delhi. Jhat Rai, the commander of this army, afraid of being overtaken by Aibak, retreated and took shelter in the strong fort of Ajmer where he was joined by Hari Raja. Aibak besieged the place and Hari Raja, owing to fear of eventual starvation, burnt himself on a funeral pyre. Aibak re-entered Ajmer, removed Prithviraj's son and appointed a Turkish governor in his place. Prithviraj's son was given Ranthambhor.

Capture of the Gwalior fortress

c14.s12.1

In 1195-96 A.D. Muhammad undertook another expedition and directed his energy against Bayana which was then the capital of the Jadon Bhatti Rajputs. The ruler, Kumarapala, entrenched himself in the fort of Thangir, but was obliged to surrender. The forts of Thangir and Vijayamandirgarh were then occupied by the invader, garrisoned with Turkish troops and placed in the command of Baha-ud-din Tughril. Tughril established a military station at Sultankote in order to use it as the base of operations in the plains. Having accomplished this work, Muhammad besieged Gwalior which, however, was so formidable a fortress that it could not have been taken without a prolonged siege. Not prepared to compromise his reputation, Muhammad withdrew from Gwalior on the promise of its ruler, Sulakshanapala, to acknowledge his suzerainty. But Muhammad violated this agreement and within a short time sent Tughril of Bayana to capture the impregnable fortress. This Turkish adventurer cut off Gwalior's communications all round and completely isolated it from the plains so that hardly any provisions could reach the garrison. The Rajputs fought for a year and a half, but eventually agreed to evacuate the fort which was occupied by Tughril.

Fourth rising of Rajasthan

c14.s13.1

The Rajputs had not reconciled themselves to the foreign rule. In 1196 A.D. they made the fourth attempt to throw off the Turkish yoke. The initiative was taken by the Mers who, together with the Chauhans, invited the Chalukya ruler of Anhilwara to make a concerted effort to expel the Turks. They besieged the Turkish garrison at Ajmer which issued frantic appeals to Aibak for help. Aibak rushed to the place, but was defeated by the Rajputs and compelled to take shelter inside the walls of Ajmer where he was besieged by the allies. Luckily for him, however, a contingent of troops arrived from Ghazni which obliged the Rajputs to raise the siege. Now it was Aibak's turn to retaliate. He planned an invasion of Anhilwara, the capital city of the Chalukya Rajputs of Gujarat. The Chalukyas prepared to receive Aibak at the foot of the Abu mountain. They were cleverly drawn by Aibak from the strategic place at which they had entrenched themselves to the plain below where a battle was fought. Aibak won the day, due primarily to the superior mobility of his troops and the shock-tactics that he employed in the course of the conflict. He followed up his success by plundering Anhilwara which was evacuated by the Chalukya king, Bhim II. Farishta says that he appointed a Turkish officer as governor of Anhilwara which must be incorrect; but even if he appointed any, the man was obliged to flee, for we find the entire Chalukya kingdom, including Abu, in the hands of its legitimate ruler till as late as the year 1240.

Conquest of Bundelkhand

c14.s14.1

The next three or four years were utilised by Aibak in planning and undertaking a number of petty expeditions. In 1197-98 A.D. Aibak captured Badaun from a Rashtrakuta Rajput. Then he re-occupied Banaras which had been lost after its first conquest. In 1197 A.D. he re-occupied Chandawar and Kanauj. Next year, Aibak is said to have over-run a part of Malwa. His work, however, in that part of Rajputana and Malwa proved to be of no lasting value. By this time most of central Hindustan had passed into the hands of the Turks. There, however, remained one important imperial Rajput ruling family still at large and independent. This was the Chandela family of Bundelkhand. Its northern boundary had touched the Turkish dominion and Turkish adventurers were carrying out frontier raids ever since the occupation of Banaras and other parts of the Gahadwara territory. In 1202-3 A.D. Qutub-ud-din Aibak invaded Kalinjar which was the military capital of the Chandela king, Paramardi Deva. The Chandelas fought with great courage and gallantry; but, owing to the numerical superiority of the enemy, were obliged to take refuge in the fort. The siege lasted for a long time and so wearied Paramardi Deva that he was found willing to accept the Turkish suzerainty, but he died before the agreement could be signed. Ajaya Deva, his chief minister, withdrew the offer and continued resistance. He had enough of provisions inside the fort and was assured of abundant water from a hillside spring. The Turks, realising the strength of the Chandelas, probably from local spies, cunningly diverted the course of the spring. Ajaya Deva suddenly found the garrison in the fort short of water. So he begged for terms and was allowed to evacuate Kalinjar. Thus Kalinjar, Mahoba and Khajuraho were occupied and constituted into a military division.

Conquest of Bihar

c14.s15.1

At this very time when stray places in central Hindustan were gradually being subdued by Qutub-ud-din Aibak, one of his ordinary commanders named Ikhtiyar-ud-din Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khalji, was planning the conquest of the eastern provinces of our country. This commander was of ungainly build and ugly looks and had not been able to secure an employment commensurate with his ability and ambition. In fact, he was refused service at Ghazni and Delhi owing to his forbidding looks. So he enrolled himself in the service of Malik Hisam-ud-din Aghul-Bak who was in charge of Awadh. Here he showed ability, daring and resourcefulness and was, consequently, rewarded with an assignment of the villages of Bhagwat and Bhiuli. This furnished him with the means of enlisting a force of adventures who were mostly Khaljis like himself from the eastern border of Afghanistan. At the head of these reckless bands he would carry on frequent raids in the province of Bihar, east of the river Karmanasa. The region had been weakened and its administration completely disorganised after the fall of the Gahadwaras of Kanauj and Banaras. It, therefore, offered an alluring temptation to Ikhtiyar-ud-din who earned fame and wealth by his repeated incursions into the country. In one of these expeditions, he pushed on as far as Uddandapur Vihara which he plundered and destroyed. This place was a university town and was guarded by but a few armed men who were hustled out of his way. The inhabitants, most of whom were Buddhist monks, were now put to the sword and the town occupied, and a great library taken possession of. Historians differ regarding the fate of this library. There is no definite record to show that it was burnt. But books were of no value to the Turkish adventurers who had no respect for an alien literature. It is probable that they were destroyed. Ikhtiyar-ud-din followed up his success by capturing Vikramasila and Nalanda, two other university towns, and by building a fortress at Uddandapur. This took place in 1202-3 A.D.

Conquest of Bangal

c14.s16.1

Ikhtiyar-ud-din was so emboldened by this success that he planned the conquest of Bangal which was ruled by Lakshmana Sena of the Sena dynasty. The ruler of Bangal was not only an old man, but also absolutely lethargic and negligent of his duties. Inspite of the repeated raids of Turkish adventurers on his western frontier, he had failed to take even ordinary precaution to safeguard his territory. He had done absolutely nothing to defend his vulnerable frontier in the west against the aggressive Turks. Ikhtiyar-ud-din was fully aware of the imbecility of king Lakshmana Sena and his utter neglect of military administration. He, therefore, decided to try his luck in that region. Sometime in 1204-5 A.D., he started at the head of his army and, passing swiftly through the jungles of Jharkhand in South Bihar, he appeared suddenly at Nadia which was one of the two capitals of Bangal and the place of residence of its king. Ikhtiyar-ud-din's march was so rapid that his army was left behind and, it is said, only eighteen troopers could keep pace with him (to Nadia). The adventurers cut down the guards at the gate of the palace and made a forcible entry inside the gate. Lakshmana Sena had just sat down to his mid-day meal. The uproar at the gate confused him beyond measure and he fled by the back door of the palace. His flight decided the issue. The Raja's troops could not assemble in time and make an attempt to defend the palace. Meanwhile, Ikhtiyar-ud-din's army had arrived and taken possession of the town without any opposition. As usual, the Turks indulged in indiscriminate slaughter and plundering and acquired immense riches. Then he moved towards north and established himself at Lakhanauti near Gaur. Lakshmana Sena took shelter in eastern Bangal where he continued to rule for some time.

c14.s16.2

INDIA IN 1206, A.D. Muhammad of Ghur. Boundary of the Ghuri Empire. - - - Extent of Conquests Over-run by Aibak Copyright DHARMA BHANU

c14.s16.3

Ikhtiyar-ud-din made no attempt to conquer and occupy the whole of Bangal. He decided to conquer Tibet and China instead, which, however, was not within the bounds of possibility. He suffered greatly in this enterprise in March, 1206. His army was also completely destroyed. He was brought back to Devakot almost a half-dead man and was treacherously slain by one of his own lieutenants, named Ali Mardan Khalji.

Muhammad of Ghur’s death : his achievements

c14.s17.1

Muhammad of Ghur was called back to his country (Ghazni) in order to meet his Central Asian enemies, leaving Qutub-ud-din Aibak in charge of his conquest in India. He gained some success against the encroachment of the Khwarizm Shah who was his chief rival in Central Asia. But it was short-lived. The Khwarizmi army, supported by Qara-Khitais, inflicted a crushing defeat on Muhammad at Andhkhud in 1204. It was with great difficulty that he could save himself and retreat to his capital of Ghur. He was obliged to conclude a defensive alliance with Ala-ud-din Khwarizm Shah whereby he resigned his claim to all his conquests in Central Asia, except Herat and Balkh. The news of Muhammad’s defeat at Andhkhud spread like wild fire and it was rumoured that he himself had been killed in the battle. This led to a general rising among the turbulent people of the Panjab. The situation was worsened by the defection and disloyalty of one of the officers of Muhammad, named Aibak-bak, who killed the governor of Multan and established himself as an independent ruler of the place. The Khokhars and other turbulent tribes, who resided in the country between Lahore and Ghazni, broke into an open rebellion and began plundering the districts between the Chenab and the Jhelam. They made an attempt to capture Lahore. The roads became infested with rebels and the revenues from the Panjab could not be sent to Ghazni. Muhammad of Ghur was obliged to proceed to the Panjab in order to chastise the rebels. He sent urgent instructions to Qutub-ud-din Aibak to join him at the Jhelam. Aibak was besieged by the rebels on the way, but he succeeded in defeating and dispersing them and joining his master. Muhammad, accompanied by Aibak, came to Lahore and after setting its affairs began his return march to Ghazni. While he was encamped at a place called Damayak and engaged in evening prayers, he was assassinated on 15th March, 1206, by some Shia rebels and Hindu Khokhars.

c14.s17.2

Muhammad of Ghur was, without doubt, inferior in military ability to Mahmud of Ghazni. Unlike the latter, he suffered a number of defeats at the hands of Indian rulers. He could not equal Mahmud in grandeur and influence. But in practical statesmanship, constructive ability and actual achievements he was far superior to that notable ruler of Ghazni. Like Mahmud, he quickly perceived that the political condition of India was rotten; but while Mahmud helped himself to its riches, Muhammad devoted himself to conquering quite a considerable extent of the country and establishing an empire. Wealth for its own sake had no attraction for him. He wanted territory which he desired to bequeath to his successors. In short, Muhammad’s aim was loftier than that of Mahmud.

c14.s17.3

The causes of his success were his ability to gauge the situation and master it, and his steadfast determination to pursue his objective relentlessly. Moreover, he possessed patience and the quality of not accepting a defeat as final. He realised that he had little chances in Central Asia against his great rival, the Khwarizm Shah; so, like Babar after him, he concentrated all his ability and strength on acquiring a foothold in India. He was a judge of human character and patronised his slaves who fully justified his choice and confidence. Though he had no son of his body to inherit his vast dominion in India, his slaves, like Qutub-ud-din Aibak and others, were there to carry on his work. Muhammad was not a mere soldier. He was not indifferent to culture and had scholars and poets like Fakhr-ud-din Razi and Nizami Uruzi at his court. He was the real founder of the Turkish empire in India.

Causes of our defeat

c14.s18.1

A curious student might well enquire about the causes of our defeat at the hands of Mahmud of Ghazni early in the eleventh century and at those of Muhammad of Ghur at the end of twelfth century. British writers of Indian history, such as Elphinstone, Lane-Poole and Vincent A. Smith have ascribed Indian defeat to our inferiority as soldiers and to the superiority of the Turks who came from the cold climate of the north, were eaters of meat and used to warfare. This view seems to be superficial and inspired by political considerations. The Indian soldier has been superb all through our history. Even during the period of our slavery and decadence our troops showed their mettle in the fields of battle in various parts of the world. It is a matter of common knowledge that during the World Wars I and II the Indian soldier covered himself with glory in Europe, Africa and Asia. It is too much to believe that his ancestor, who was more free and who fought for a national case, was in any way inferior. The theory that makes the people of a cold climate fighters or that which seeks to show that non-vegetarians are necessarily better fighters need not be examined here at length. Suffice it here to say that it does not stand the test of scientific examination. Moreover, our soldiers in the age of Mahmud of Ghazni and of Muhammad of Ghur were not absolute vegetarians, as they are not even today. The causes of our defeat must, therefore, be sought somewhere else. It will be well to divide them into two categories, namely, (1) general causes and (2) particular causes. As regards the general causes, our political disunity must be held primarily responsible. Each prince had to fight single-handed and he fought for his own kingdom and territory, as it were, and not for his country and people. Even in the moments of our greatest crisis our rulers did not combine to put up a united defence against the invader. Lack of political unity and proper organisation and capable leadership must, therefore, remain the most important general cause of our helplessness and defeat. In the second place, our army organisation was based on out-worn conception. They were ill-organised and ill-equipped. Our military leaders did not keep themselves in touch with the development of tactics. This has been the bane of Indian history through the ages. While foreign countries were forging ahead in the field of military development, our people remained stationary. We were, therefore, out-classed in weapons and outmanoeuvred in tactics. The great Mughul emperor, Babar, noted in his diary in 1526 that Indians knew how to die and not how to fight. That is, they were brave and did not shudder from the thought of sacrificing their lives in the field, but they lacked the capacity of taking advantage of the enemy's weakness and making use of feints and manoeuvres in the battle-field. The Rajputs prided themselves on their swordsmanship and looked upon a battle as a tournament in which to display their skill, bravery and chivalry. The Turks, on the other hand, fought to win and believed that everything was fair in war. Thirdly, the masses of our people did not really co-operate with our leaders and soldiers.

c14.s18.2

Not that they were altogether indifferent to them. On the other hand, they laboured under a mistaken notion that it was none of their business to fight. They seemed to believe that their lot would remain the same, it did not matter who occupied the throne of Delhi. Had the people become the second line of defence behind our troops, the Rajput rulers would not have staked everything on the issue of a single contest and must have made repeated attempts at resistance. Fourthly, both Mahmud of Ghazni and Muhammad of Ghur, the former on a much larger scale than the latter, made use of shock-tactics to dishearten and demoralise our countrymen. With lightning rapidity they swooped down upon our troops and fair cities and devastated the land with fire and sword. These tactics were repeated times out of number and so much terrified our people that they began thinking that Mahmud of Ghazni’s troops were invincible. Political and military demoralisation, therefore, set in among the Indians of that age and made them think that resistance against the Turkish hordes was useless. It was this feeling that paralysed our society in that age. Fifthly, the Turks were inspired by a great religious and military enthusiasm, while our people had no such ideology to sustain them in their hour of trial. Mere physical strength and military weapons do not constitute the total equipment of an army. An inspiring ideology is as essential as military training and equipment.

c14.s18.3

As regards the particular causes, it is not possible to notice them here in detail. The Turkish invader almost invariably acquired a correct knowledge of the strength of his adversary and made full endeavours to exploit his weakness. Our rulers did not care to find loop-holes in the organisation of their common enemy. The Sultans almost every time had the survey of a prospective battle-field made and took the geography into consideration before engaging in a conflict. Our rulers divided their armies into three traditional divisions—right, centre and left—and they almost invariably made a frontal attack on the enemy, whereas the Turkish invaders had five divisions, the two additional ones being the Advance Guard and the Reserve. The Reserve was kept in readiness to launch an attack when the Sultan found our army in its last gasps. One often comes across the Turkish invaders defiling a tank or a river from which our troops drew their water supply or diverting the course of a channel so as to deprive them of water. They ravaged the territory in the vicinity so as to cut off supplies of grain and to starve their opponents. No contemporary Muslim writer, however, makes any mention of any of the Indian rulers of his time having recourse to such tactics or stratagems against the invader. Above all, our rulers committed many a silly mistake. We have already mentioned a few such mistakes committed by king Dahir of Sindh. Similar mistakes were committed by Jayapala of the Panjab and by other rulers of northern India. Jayapala burnt himself on a funeral pyre in order not to survive his disgrace, instead of preparing himself afresh for a further contest. Very often, elephants in a battle, in which arrows were used, proved a liability rather than an asset. They were frightened and fled from the field. Our people fought mainly with sword, while the favourite Turkish weapon was archery. The mobile Turkish cavalry was more than a match for the slow Indian mares and mountain-like elephants.