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The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c19: 13. Khalji Imperialism

The Sultanate of Delhi, 711–1526 A.D. c19

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13. Khalji Imperialism

Jalal-ud-din Firoz Khalji, 1290-1296

Early career

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Malik Firoz was a Turk of the Khalji tribe. His ancestors, after having migrated from Turkistan, had lived for over 200 years in the Helmand valley and Lamghan, parts of Afghanistan called *Garmasir* or the hot region, and had adopted some Afghan manners and customs. They were, therefore, wrongly looked upon as Afghans by the Turkish nobles in India. Firoz’s family had migrated to our country and taken up service under the Turkish Sultans of Delhi. Firoz had risen to the important position of *sar-i-jandar*, that is, the head of the royal bodyguard, and was, subsequently, appointed governor of Samana. He was a very able soldier and, as a governor of the frontier province of Samana, had fought a number of engagements against the Mongol invaders and repelled them. He had thus acquired reputation as a successful soldier and administrator. He was, consequently, given the title of Shaista Khan. On the death of Malik Tuzaki he was promoted to the high office of army minister by Kaiqubad. Besides being a minister at the court of Delhi, Firoz was also the head of the large Khalji clan whose members were scattered all over Hindustan. A section of this tribe had ruled Bangal since the time of Ikhtiyar-ud-din bin Bakhtiyar Khalji. At the time of his promotion to ministership, he was probably the most experienced and powerful Turkish nobleman in Delhi.

His accession

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It has already been related that there was little sympathy between the new army minister, Malik Firoz, and the orthodox Turkish party at the court headed by Malik Aitemar (Kachhan) and Malik Surkha, who held the important posts of *amir-i-hajib* and *barbak* and, as such, wielded supreme power at Delhi. These two Turkish nobles planned to get rid of Firoz and all other non-Turkish officers in order to re-assert the Turkish monopoly of power. This led to a conflict between the parties, from which Firoz emerged victorious. Kachhan was put to death, his partisans were terrorised and Malik Firoz set himself up as a regent of the infant king, Kayumars. The next step was to put both Kaiqubad and Kayumars to death and seize power. This accomplished, Firoz ascended the throne at Kilokhari, the palace built by Kaiqubad, in March 1290, and assumed the title of Sultan Jalal-ud-din Firoz.

His unpopularity

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The new king was an old man of seventy years. Inspite of having enjoyed the reputation of a seasoned and successful general who had guarded the north-western frontier of the kingdom throughout Kaiqubad's reign, Jalal-ud-din was very unpopular among the nobles and the people of Delhi. The main cause of his unpopularity with the proud Turks was the erroneous belief that the Khaljis were non-Turks and hence not entitled to share power with the Turks. For about eighty-four years the *Ilbari* Turks had occupied the throne of Delhi and, in their eyes, and also in those of the people, it was improper that the crown should have gone to one who did not belong to this race. Thirdly, Jalal-ud-din Firoz was an old man and had, therefore, some peculiarities due to age. He was, moreover, known to be very mild and generous and did not possess that dignity and grace which were supposed to be indispensable in a monarch. Fourthly, if not Firoz himself, at least his followers, particularly the young Khaljis, were known to be highly ambitious. They were, therefore, looked at with suspicion. For these reasons the new reign was unpopular, and Firoz dared not crown himself in Balban's palace at Delhi. He chose the unfinished palace of Kaiqubad at Kilokhari for the coronation ceremony. He lived there for about a year and instructed his courtiers and followers to build for themselves houses around the palace. He completed Kaiqubad's unfinished palace. Within a short time Kilokhari became an important town in the vicinity of Delhi. Firoz was not only unpopular with the old nobility but some of his own followers, specially the more vigorous and restless among them, did not like his generosity and weakness. The old Sultan followed the policy of minimum interference with the administrative arrangements and allowed older officers to remain in possession of their posts and emoluments. Young Khalji warriors who were looking forward to be appointed to top-ranking positions carrying power, prestige and remuneration, felt disgusted. Some of them charged him with senility and dotage, pronounced him unfit for the throne and wanted to remove him and elevate one of their own number to the throne. His own nephew and son-in-law, Ala-ud-din, became the leader of this disgruntled party.

Domestic policy

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Firoz's policy was not to bring about any radical change in the administrative personnel of his government. He confirmed the Turkish nobles in the offices that they had held during the last reign. Malik Chhajju, the nephew of Balban and the sole survivor of the latter's family, was allowed to retain the governorship of Kara Manikpur. Malik Fakhr-ud-din was confirmed as the kotwal of Delhi. He elevated his own sons to high rank. The eldest, Mahmud, was given the title of Khan-i-Khan. The second became Arkali Khan and the third was entitled Qadr Khan. The Sultan's younger brother was ennobled as Yaghrus Khan and was appointed army minister, that is, *ariz-i-mamalik*. Both his nephews, Ala-ud-din and Almas Beg, were similarly rewarded, and Malik Ahmad Chap, a near relative, was appointed *amir-i-hajib*, that is, master of ceremonies.

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Firoz's internal policy was one of conciliation. He tried to be peaceful, merciful and humane and wanted to rule, if possible, without bloodshed. He was anxious not to come into clash with the old nobility or with the citizens of Delhi. That was why he did not take up his residence in the old city for about a year. When, however, he accepted the invitation of the citizens of the capital, headed by kotwal Fakhr-ud-din, he dismounted in front of Balban's Red Palace and wept before entering the throne-room. He did not take his seat on the throne as he had stood many a time, he said, before it when he was a mere noble and courtier.

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Malik Chhajju raised the standard of revolt at Kara Manikpur in the second year of Firoz's reign. He assumed the title of Sultan and was joined by Hatim Khan, governor of Awadh. Their united armies proceeded against Delhi. Firoz marched out to meet them. An advance guard of his army under his son, Arkali Khan, encountered the rebels near Badaun and defeated them. Malik Chhajju was taken prisoner and was brought before the Sultan who wept at the high-born prisoner in fetters. He ordered Malik Chhajju and his followers to be released and then entertained them at a wine party. He openly praised Chhajju's followers for their loyalty to the only heir of their deceased master, Balban. The young Khalji officers, headed by the outspoken Ahmad Chap, protested against this kind of silly talk which, he rightly said, was an incitement to rebellion. Firoz replied that he did not like to kill a single Muslim for the sake of a transitory kingdom. Malik Chhajju was delivered to the custody of Arkali Khan who was appointed to the government of Multan. Kara Manikpur was now given to Ala-ud-din, the Sultan’s nephew.

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Firoz sometimes carried his policy of leniency to excess. A number of thags or robbers were arrested at Delhi. One of these furnished information which led to the arrest of a thousand people belonging to this fraternity. Firoz, however, did not inflict any punishment on this gang. He embarked them in boats and sent them by water to Bangal where they were set free at his orders. There is, however, one instance on record of Firoz’s departure from his policy of leniency. A religious leader, named Sidi Maula, who was a disciple of Shaikh Farid-ud-din Ganj-i-Shakar of Pak-Pattan (Ajudhan), was believed to have been an aspirant for the throne. He had a large number of followers whom he used to entertain in a most lavish manner. There was a plot to marry a daughter of the late Sultan Nasir-ud-din Mahmud to Sidi Maula and then to raise him to the throne. Some of the nobles of Firoz’s court became privy to the conspiracy. The Sultan had, therefore, Sidi Maula and his chief disciples arrested and brought before him. He lost temper in a controversy with the Maula and had him murdered in his presence. A fanatic Muslim, who was opposed to this sect, slashed Sidi Maula several times with a razor and stabbed him with a packing needle. His body was trampled under foot by an elephant. The death of the saint was followed by a dust-storm and a severe famine caused by the failure of seasonal rains. It was superstitiously believed by the people that these were due to the curse of the deceased saint on the Sultan. The famine, in fact, was so severe that the price of grain rose to one *jital* per *seer* and a large number of people drowned themselves in the Yamuna.

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Firoz Khalji did not indulge in aggressive warfare. He conducted only two expeditions, none of which proved to be very successful. The first expedition was directed against Ranthambhor, led by the Sultan in person in 1290. The Chauhan ruler of the fortress of Ranthambhor offered a stout resistance. Firoz, finding himself unequal to the task, gave up the campaign and returned to Delhi. He comforted himself with the argument that he valued each hair of a Muslim's head more than a hundred such fortresses as Ranthambhor. The only advantage that the king gained in the campaign was the occupation of the district of Jhain, where he destroyed the temples and broke the images to pieces. The next expedition was undertaken against Mandawar which had once belonged to Delhi, but had been recovered by the Rajputs. It was recaptured in 1292.

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Two more expeditions were undertaken during his reign—not by the Sultan, but by his nephew, Ala-ud-din, who, in 1292, invaded Malwa and captured the town of Bhilsa which was probably allowed to remain in native hands. At this place he acquired a huge plunder. Here he heard stories of the great southern kingdom of Devagiri and its fabulous wealth, and his imagination was fired by the ambition of conquering southern India. On return, Ala-ud-din was promoted to the governorship of Awadh in addition to that of Kara. Ala-ud-din's next expedition was undertaken in 1294 against the king of Devagiri, Rama Chandra Deva, whom he defeated. He brought from Devagiri a huge booty amounting to many thousand pounds of gold, pearls, gems and silver and one thousand pieces of silk cloth.

The ‘New Muslims’

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The kingdom of Delhi was disturbed in Firoz's reign by a Mongol invasion. A huge Mongol army, said to be one lakh fifty thousand strong, under the command of a grandson of Hulagu, invaded the Panjab in 1292 and advanced as far as the town of Sunam. Sultan Firoz showed great activity and marched quickly to encounter the invader on whom he inflicted a severe defeat. The Mongols made peace. Their army was permitted to retreat peacefully. One of the descendants of Changiz Khan, named Ulugh, entered Firoz's service, embraced Islam and settled down in Delhi. Firoz gave a daughter in marriage to him. He and his followers became known as the ‘New Muslims’.

The death of Jalal-ud-din

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During the absence of Ala-ud-din from Kara some of the officers of the Sultan tried to convince the latter that Ala-ud-din was an extremely ambitious youth and had his eye on the throne; he shouldtherefore, be suppressed in time. The Sultan, whose credulity was encouraged by the smooth words of Ulugh Khan, Ala-ud-din's brother, declared that there was no reason why Ala-ud-din should be inordinately ambitious when he loved him as a son and was prepared to do everything for him. Ulugh Khan persuaded the Sultan to believe that Ala-ud-din was anxious to present the immense wealth that he had brought from Devagiri, but he was afraid of coming to Delhi and waiting on the Sultan as the Devagiri expedition had been undertaken without the royal permission. Jalal-ud-din disregarded the protests of his officers and decided to proceed to Kara to meet his nephew and son-in-law. He set out from Delhi and travelled by boat, while his army proceeded by land under the command of Ahmad Chap. Ala-ud-din crossed the Ganga to Manikpur and, keeping his army in readiness, sent his brother to lure the Sultan into the trap so cleverly laid for him. Ulugh Khan waited on the Sultan and requested him not to permit his army to cross to the eastern bank of the river, as Ala-ud-din was still full of apprehension and might commit suicide or take refuge by flight. Objections were raised by the courtiers that Ala-ud-din had not come in person to wait on the Sultan and that his army was drawn in battle array. Ulugh Khan replied that he was busy in preparing a feast and making arrangements for the presentation of the spoils from Devagiri and that his troops were drawn up in order to accord a befitting reception to the Sultan. Jalal-ud-din was satisfied by the explanation and proceeded to meet his nephew, followed by a few unarmed attendants. Ala-ud-din now advanced and bowed low before the Sultan. Jalal-ud-din affectionately raised him up and embraced him and then, taking him by the hand, led him towards the boat, sweetly talking with him on the way. Ala-ud-din now gave a signal to one of his followers, named Muhammad Salim, who aimed two sword blows at the Sultan. Jalal-ud-din was wounded and attempted to flee towards the boat crying "Ala-ud-din, wretch ! What have you done ?" Meanwhile another of Ala-ud-din's followers, coming up from behind, severed the Sultan's head from his body. The followers of the Sultan were put to death. Ala-ud-din raised the royal umbrella over his head and proclaimed himself king on 19th July, 1296. Jalal-ud-din's head was placed on a spear and paraded through the two provinces, Kara Manikpur and Awadh, then in the charge of Ala-ud-din.

Estimate of Jalal-ud-din Firoz

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Jalal-ud-din was the first Turkish Sultan of Delhi who placed before him the ideal of benevolent despotism. Though a successful general with powerful army at his back, he gave up the policy of militarism which had been the motive force of his predecessors for about a century. He was very anxious to reconcile the hostile elements in the court and the kingdom by means of a generous policy. He allowed important Turkish officers, who were the followers of Balban's dynasty, to remain in places of power. He showed studied modesty almost to the extent of self-effacement. As has been said, the Sultan did not ride in the courtyard of Balban's palace and refused to sit upon the old throne because he had stood before it as a servant and had a new throne made for himself. It is too much to believe that a lifelong soldier and general like him possessed such natural modesty. Obviously, it was policy. Jalal-ud-din did not undertake any notable military expedition against the Hindu chiefs. Probably he thought that the interests of the State demanded consolidation. During the three years of the rule of Kaiqubad and Kayumars, the administration of Delhi had been thrown out of the gear. It required concentrated attention The charge of pusillanimity does not hold water, for he successfully defended the northwestern frontier of the Sultanate and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongols who had, therefore, to make peace and settle down in Delhi as peaceful citizens. His rule was not in any way remarkable; but it must be admitted that for the first time in the history of the Sultanate of Delhi there was a king who made some attempt at conciliating public opinion and reconciling the various elements of power among the Muslim population, Turkish, non-Turkish and Indian. Some historians are of opinion that owing to his policy of unbecoming leniency the State would have come to harm if his reign had been prolonged. They have, consequently, come to the conclusion that he was unfit to hold the sceptre in that age. This view seems to be erroneous, for Jalal-ud-din was not all kindness. He was as intolerant towards the religion of the vast majority of the people as his predecessors. He destroyed and desecrated temples and broke images at Jhain, as has already been shown. He could put even a Muslim saint to death, if he believed it to be desirable in the interest of the State. It is unfortunate that Barani picked up only those events of his reign which show him in bad light. That historian, [Figure: INDIA IN 1315A.D. Alauddin Khalji.

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TRANS - OXIANA Bukhara Samarqand Balkh Qunduz Ghur AFGHANISTAN Herat Kabul Ghazni Kandahar MONGOLS Peshawar Nandnah Bhera KASHMIR Srinagar Sialkot Kangra Lahore Jalandar Sirhind Thaneshwar Mandawar Bijnor Amroha Badaun Lucknow Ayodhya Jaunpur Kara Kashi Allahabad Patna Gaya Rajmahal Nadia Lakhnauti Sonargaon Chittagong Dipalpur Pakpattan Samana Multan Uch Bhatner Hisar Hansi Delhi Siri Tilpat Mathura Agra Kalpi Kalinjar Khajuraho Jabalpur Bhilsa Ujjain Dhar Mandu Asirgarh Ellichpur Lasura Deogiri Jalna Kalyani Bidar Gulbarga Raichur Vijayanagar Kanchi Kampili Tanjore Madura Rameshwaram Colombo Dwarasamudra Calicut Mudgal Goa (Sandabur) Dabhol Poona Chaul Bombay Thana Navasari Daman Diu KATHIAWAR Cambay BAGALANA Anhilwara Abu 1311 VASSALS Jalor Siwana Chittor Ranthambhor Ajmer Jham Gwalior Chanderi Bayana Marta Nagaur Jaisalmer Amarkot Thatta Sehwan Bhakkor BALUCHISTAN Kalat PERSIA ARABIAN SEA YADAVAS DEOGIRI (1307) SEMI-INDEPENDENT TELINGANA (1303) KAKATIYAS Warangal Rajamundry Jajnagar ORISSA HOYSALAS (1310) PANDYAS CEYLON BAY OF BANGAL ANDAMAN IS. BURMA BENGAL KAMARUPA NEPAL TIBET CHINA

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Boundary of the Empire Conquered, but Semi-independent.

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Miles who is the sole authority on his reign, was biased against Jalal-ud-din and, in fact, against all Khaljis. The truth seems to be that he was not over-mild, but was anxious to keep a balance between the contending parties. A moderate ruler is generally disliked by various parties by reason of his modesty and impartiality. Barring a few instances, such as the one of letting off the thieves by taking a promise from them not to commit theft again, the history of his reign shows that Jalal-ud-din knew when it was necessary to be firm and when not.

Ala-ud-din Khalji, 1296-1316

Early career

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Ala-ud-din was a nephew and son-in-law of Jalal-ud-din Firoz. He was a very active and spirited soldier and was gifted with a. fund of commonsense and realism. He was known to be ambitious and must have given early promise of future greatness. On his uncle's accession, in 1290, he was promoted to the office of *amir-i-tuzak* and was, shortly after, appointed governor of Kara Manikpur, near Allahabad. The followers of Malik Chhajju flocked round him. Young Khalji soldiers, too, who were ambitious of rising to power and wealth, recognised him as the man of the hour who could be persuaded to strike for the throne of Delhi and occupy it and reward them for their valour and enthusiasm. These disgruntled men, being dissatisfied with the lenient policy of the aged king, Jalal-ud-din, spurred Ala-ud-din on to fight for the throne. But Ala-ud-din was shrewd enough not to precipitate action. He waited to strike only at a favourable opportunity. His first and more urgent work was that of increasing his followers and of gathering round him men of tried ability and sure loyalty. He kept his uncle and sovereign in good humour through his brother, who served as his representative at the court and looked after his interests there. He obtained the Sultan's permission to lead an expedition to Malwa. In 1292 he penetrated into the heart of Malwa, captured the town of Bhilsa and brought a huge sum of money and valuable articles as plunder. He sent a part of these to the Sultan who rewarded him with governorship of Awadh in addition to that of Kara. Ala-ud-din, thus, ruled over two provinces of his uncle's kingdom.

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His recent success in Malwa whetted Ala-ud-din's appetite for further conquests. At Bhilsa he had heard stories of the prosperity of the southern kingdom of Devagiri and his imagination was fired by dreams of conquest of southern India. He obtained his uncle's permission to increase the number of his troops, but concealed from him his project of a Dakhin campaign. Immediately south of the Vindhya mountains there were, at this time, two flourishing kingdoms in the Dakhin, the kingdom of Devagiri in the west and that of Telingana in the east. Ala-ud-din resolved to raid the former. He made preparations for the enterprise and, placing Malik Ala-ul-mulk, his deputy, in Kara, he proceeded on the enterprise in 1294 with an army consisting of eight thousand horse. He cunningly gave out on the way that he was a refugee noble from Delhi going to seek shelter and service at Rajamundry in southern Telingana. In view of this, he was not suspected or opposed by any one on the way. He appeared all of a sudden on the northern frontier of Devagiri which was ruled by the Yadava king, Rama Chandra Deva. The Yadava ruler was taken by surprise. A greater part of his army was away from his kingdom under his son, Shankar Deva, who had gone on a pilgrimage. Rama Chandra hastily collected 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers and met the invader at Lasura, twelve miles from Devagiri. But he was defeated by Ala-ud-din's vastly superior army and compelled to take shelter within his fort. Ala-ud-din besieged the fort and gave out that his troops were only an advance guard of a big army of 20,000 horse who were coming from Delhi to join him. Rama Chandra was frightened by the news and agreed to make peace. He made over to the invader 1,400 pounds of gold, a large quantity of precious pearls and other things. Ala-ud-din was preparing to depart when the Raja's son, Shankar Deva, returned from the pilgrimage and, contrary to his father's advice, attacked the invader. Ala-ud-din divided his army into two parts. One was left to watch the city and prevent Rama Chandra from coming to the assistance of his son, while with the other he prepared to fight Shankar. He was on the point of being defeated when the second part of his army under Malik Nasrat moved from the border of the city to his assistance. Shankar thought that this was the army from Delhi about which Ala-ud-din had boasted. His nerves were, therefore, shaken and he suffered a defeat. Ala-ud-din once again besieged the fort of Devagiri. After a few days' fighting Rama Chandra discovered that the sacks with which he had provisioned the garrison contained salt instead of grain. He was compelled to sue for peace. Ala-ud-din now imposed much harsher terms than before. He compelled Rama Chandra to cede to him the province of Illichpur and to pay him a very huge indemnity which consisted of "17,250 pounds of gold, 200 pounds of pearls, 58 pounds of other gems, 28,250 pounds of silver and 1,000 pieces of silk cloth." With this enormous booty he returned to Kara.

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This was the first Turkish expedition to southern India. Ala-ud-din's success was well-deserved. His objective was separated from his base by several hundred miles and the entire region was unknown and the people were hostile to him. The successful expedition showed that Ala-ud-din was not only gifted with soldierly talent of a high order, but was also a man of great daring and dash, of organising ability and resourcefulness.

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This remarkable success turned Ala-ud-din's head. He now aspired for the throne of Delhi. His followers had been egging him on to action. His domestic difficulties were also pointing the same way. His wife, who was a daughter of the Sultan, was on bad terms with him. She and her mother, the queen, intrigued against him at court and also embittered his private life. These domestic reasons prompted him to come to a decision in the matter as early as possible. As has already been related, he decoyed his uncle and had him murdered near Kara Manikpur on July 19, 1296, and crowned himself king.

His early difficulties

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Ala-ud-din literally waded through blood to the throne of Delhi. He had expected it to be a bed of roses; but at least for some time, it actually proved to be one of thorns. He found himself surrounded by difficulties. He was a usurper and guilty of the murder of his uncle and his greatest benefactor on earth. For this reason he became the object of hatred for all decent and right-thinking people. Then, there were the nobles and followers of the late Sultan (called Jalali nobles) who were not expected to forgive the murderer of their patron. The most redoubtable supporter of the legitimists was the brave Ahmad Chap, who was one of the most fearless living soldiers in the Turkish dominion. Thirdly, Delhi was far off and the sovereignty of Hindustan was supposed to belong to the occupant of the throne in that capital city. The widowed queen, Malka-i-Jahan, thinking it to be dangerous to keep the throne vacant, made hasty arrangements to fill it by raising her second son, Qadr Khan, to it and proclaiming him as Sultan under the title of Rukn-ud-din Ibrahim. If properly supported, the new king, Ibrahim, was likely to be a formidable rival to Ala-ud-din. Besides, there were powerful Hindu chiefs who chafed under the Turkish yoke and were waiting for an opportunity to get rid of it. Finally, the Mongols were hammering at the north-western gates of the Sultanate of Delhi. The situation, therefore, looked formidable and would have quelled a heart less stout than that of Ala-ud-din.

Occupation of Delhi

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Ala-ud-din faced the manifold difficulties with a vigour and determination that recalled the early activity of Iltutmish. His initial hesitation and desire to retire into Bangal was given up in favour of a bold policy of striking at Delhi without loss of time. His resolution was strengthened by the welcome news that there was a rift among the supporters of the legitimists. Arkali Khan, the eldest living son of Jalal-ud-din, took objection to the elevation of his younger brother to the throne, refused to recognise him and sulked at Multan. Many of the partisans of Jalal-ud-din went to join him there. Encouraged by this division, Ala-ud-din proceeded towards Delhi, conciliating the public on the way by distributing the Dakhin money among them. His army swelled up to a gigantic figure. On the news of his approach, Ibrahim issued out of Delhi and an encounter took place between the two rivals at Badaun. Ala-ud-din got the better of his opponent without fighting. Most of Ibrahim's troops and followers deserted him to join Ala-ud-din who was able to proceed to Delhi at the head of sixty thousand horse and sixty thousand foot. Ibrahim fled towards Multan with his mother and followers. Ala-ud-din entered the capital and was formally crowned in the Red Palace of Balban on October 3, 1296.

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The first act of the new sovereign was to conciliate the people so as to make them forget the heinous crime of which he had been guilty. He lavishly distributed the cash spoils from Devagiri. It is said that on his way from Kara Manikpur to Delhi he set up a *balista* before his tent at every halting place from which small gold and silver coins were scattered among the public. He continued this practice at Delhi for some days. People's memory is proverbially short; they forgot Ala-ud-din's treachery and ingratitude and most people began to talk of his lavish generosity. Almost all the important nobles and officers joined him and forgot the past. His second act was to put down Rukn-ud-din Ibrahim and his supporters with the assistance of the new army of adventurers who had been drawn to him by lavish distribution of gold. An army, forty thousand strong, under Ulugh Khan and Hijabr-ud-din, was sent to Multan to dispose of Arkali Khan, Ibrahim and their mother. The city was captured without resistance and the princes were taken prisoners. Arkali, Ibrahim and Ahmad Chap were blinded and so also Ulugh Khan, the Mongol, who was a son-in-law of Jalal-ud-din. Malka-i-Jahan, the widowed queen, was thrown into prison. By a clever and tactful policy the new Sultan disposed of his rivals and their supporters and was firmly seated upon the throne.

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The Sultan's success made it possible for him to punish those of the prominent nobles and officers who had deserted Rukn-ud-din Ibrahim and joined him for love of money. Ala-ud-din believed that such people who could desert one master and join another were not dependable men and as such, deserved punishment. Accordingly, he put some of them to death, blinded some others and imprisoned the rest of them. Their wives and children were deprived of all their property and reduced to beggary. Ala-ud-din made it a rule to profit by treachery and then to punish it.

His theory of kingship

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As soon as he had established himself firmly, Ala-ud-din decided to revive Balban's theory of kingship. Like Balban, he believed in the majesty of the monarch and in his being God's representative on earth. He had the firm conviction that greater wisdom was given to the Sultan than to any other human being and that his will should be the law. He believed in the maxim that 'kingship knows no kingship' and that all the inhabitants of the country must be either his servants or his subjects. He decided that he would not be influenced by any individual or party in laying down his policy for the State. Throughout the thirteenth century two powerful groups had exercised influence on the Sultan of Delhi. The one was the nobility and the other was the order of the *ulema*. Ala-ud-din was not prepared to suffer the old aristocracy to set itself as a power in the State. He would not like them to influence his policy. He wanted to reduce them to the position of mere servants who could be appointed and dismissed by the Sultan at will. He inspired so much awe that no courtier had the courage to give him advice or to ask for any favour. The only man who could presume to advise the king was his old friend, Ala-ul-mulk, the kotwal of Delhi. As regards the second group, namely that of the *ulema*, Ala-ud-din declared for the first time in the history of the Sultanate that he would not allow them to dictate to the Sultan in the administration of the State. He said that he knew much better than the religious divines to what was necessary and useful for the welfare of the state. He enunciated his policy in the following words: “I do not know whether this is lawful or unlawful; whatever I think to be for the good of the state or suitable for the emergency, that I decree; and as for what may happen to me on the Day of Judgment, that I know not.” Thus to Ala-ud-din belongs the credit of being the first Turkish Sultan of Delhi to bring the Church under the control of the State and to usher in factors that might make the State secular in theory. Unfortunately, this policy was not followed up by his successors and the Turkish State in India, therefore, reverted to a theocracy soon after his death. Though he thus prevented the interference of the *ulema* in matters of administration, he did take advantage of Muslim fanaticism in his wars against the indigenous chiefs and people. In fact, he incited them to a high pitch of bigotry whenever he stood in need of the support of the Muslim public opinion or their military co-operation. Ala-ud-din did not cease to be a Musalman. He did not lose faith in the Muslim law and did not act against it. In fact, he remained as good a Musalman as any of his predecessors on the throne of Delhi.

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Ala-ud-din did not think it necessary to invoke the sanction of the Khalifa’s name for strengthening his claims to sovereignty. He did not apply for an investiture from the Khalifa. Yet he styled himself only as an assistant or a deputy of the Khalifa (*Yamin-ul-Khilafat Nasiri Amir-ul-Mumnin*). His object in doing this was not to pay homage to the Khalifa as to a political superior, but only to keep the tradition of theoretical Khilafat alive.

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As regards the Hindus, Ala-ud-din does not seem to have looked upon himself as their king in the same sense as of the Muslims and responsible for their welfare. His policy, which was one of repressing them completely, was not due to a momentary vagary, but formed part of his settled ideology. He consulted the famous qazi Mughis-ud-din of Bayana about the position which the Hindus should be allowed to enjoy in his kingdom. The qazi replied: “The Hindus are designated in the Law as payers of tribute (*kharaj* *guzar*); and when the revenue officer demands silver from them, they should, without question and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer throws dirt into their mouths, they must, without reluctance, open their mouths wide to receive it. By these acts of degradation are shown the extreme obedience of the *zimmi*, the glorification of the true faith. God Himself orders them to be humiliated, (as He says, till they pay the *jizya*) with the hand and are humbled .... the Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them and to make them captive .... no other authority except the great *Imam* (Abu Hanifa), whose faith we follow, has sanctioned the imposition of the *jizya* on the Hindus." According to all other theologians, the rule for the Hindus was "either death or Islam". Ala-ud-din heartily agreed with the qazi. He was happy that he had been following the above policy in regard to the overwhelmingly vast Hindu population in his dominions.

Suppression of rebellions; analysis of their causes

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The early years of Ala-ud-din's reign were distracted by rebellions. The first rebellion was that of the Mongols who had settled in India since the time of Jalal-ud-din Firoz and were known as the New Muslims. In 1299 they had accompanied Nasrat Khan in his expedition to Gujarat. When, after the successful termination of the campaign, the army began its return march, the New Muslims, feeling discontented with the distribution of the booty, mutinied and became guilty of killing a nephew of Ala-ud-din and a brother of Nasrat Khan. Nasrat ordered an attack and slaughtered a considerable number of them. Some of them fled to Ranthambhor and took refuge with its ruler, Hamira Deva. Ala-ud-din avenged himself by putting the wives and children of the rebels, who were in Delhi, to death. The second rebellion was that of Akat Khan who was the son of the Sultan's brother. When the Sultan was proceeding to Ranthambhor he halted for some days at Tilapat to indulge in his favourite pastime of hunting. Seeing Ala-ud-din left all alone during the course of one of the hunting expeditions, Akat Khan ordered his troops to attack him. Ala-ud-din defended himself bravely until some soldiers of his escort came up. But Akat Khan, believing that the Sultan had been killed, returned to the army, announced his death and attempted to enter his *harem* to take its possession. Meanwhile, the Sultan, who was saved by the timely assistance of his bodyguards, returned to his camp. Akat Khan along with his followers was put to death. This rebellion was followed by another, and of a more serious nature. Amir Umar and Mangu Khan, the two sons of his sister, raised the standard of revolt in Badaun and Awadh while the Sultan was busy in the siege of Ranthambhor; but they were defeated and imprisoned by the loyal governors of the provinces. A fourth rebellion occurred at the capital city of Delhi where Haji Maula, a disaffected officer, collected an army of ruffians and killed the kotwal, named Tamardi. He attempted to follow up his success by trying to lay hand on Ayaz, the kotwal of Siri. In this, however, he failed; but he placed a nominee of his own on the throne of Delhi and proceeded to capture power. The rebel was, however, defeated and killed by a loyal officer, named Malik Hamid-ud-din. These rebellions, occurring as they did, one after another, within the space of a few years, convinced the Sultan that there was something radically wrong in his system of administration. In consultation with his friends he made a close study of the existing state of affairs and came to the conclusion that the rebellions were due to four causes. These causes, according to Ala-ud-din, were : (1) the inefficiency of his spy system which kept the king ignorant of the doings of his officers and people; (2) the general practice of the use of wine which promoted fellowship and prompted people to indulge in rebellions and conspiracy; (3) social intercourse among the nobles and inter-marriages between them which gave them an opportunity to combine against the king; and (4) the excess of wealth in the possession of certain notable people which gave them leisure for idle thoughts and for indulging in plots and rebellions.

The ordinances

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Having analysed the causes of rebellions, Ala-ud-din proceeded to prevent their recurrence. He issued four important ordinances. The first ordinance aimed at confiscation of all religious endowments and free grants of land. Many hundreds of families had been in enjoyment of free land to support themselves. Some of them held land from time immemorial. A class of idlers had, thus, come into existence which derived its subsistence without labour. Ala-ud-din's measure hit this class hard. They had to pay land tax for their holdings and tax collectors were required to extort from them as much money as possible on any pretext that they liked. The Sultan’s attack on private property yielded wholesome results from his point of view. We are told by Barani that gold was not to be seen except in the houses of great nobles or high officials or the topmost merchants. By a second ordinance the Sultan reorganised the espionage. An army of spies was created. News-writers and spies were placed in the houses of nobles and officers and in all offices, towns and even in important villages. They were required to report all occurrences fit for the Sultan’s ear and likely to be useful. The result of this ordinance was that the gossip of nobles and officers and even of common people came to an end and they became filled with awe of the Sultan’s wrath, for he knew not only their doings but even their designs and thoughts. The third ordinance prohibited the use of liquor and drug. The Sultan himself gave up wine and caused his wine vessels to be broken in a dramatic fashion before the gaze of the public. Wine was banished from Delhi and the suburbs of the city also were closely watched. The violators of the law were cruelly punished, but the people did not give up drinking. They resorted to smuggling. Some of them travelled twenty to twenty-five miles to satisfy their craving. Ala-ud-din ultimately realised that people could not be made sober by legislation and hence he relaxed the ordinance, permitted private manufacture and consumption of liquor; but its sale was prohibited, and so also wine parties were forbidden. By the fourth ordinance, Ala-ud-din ordered that nobles should not have social gatherings and that they should not inter-marry without his permission. This regulation was rigorously enforced. Social gatherings and friendly meetings of the nobles came to an end.

The Hindus reduced to poverty

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Along with these four ordinances the Sultan devised special regulations to put down Hindus and prevent them from rebelling against his tyranny. He rigorously enhanced the land revenue, fixing it at one-half of the gross produce. Besides the land tax, he also imposed other burdens, such as, grazing tax on cattle, sheep and goats. Other taxes, such as, *jizya*, customs and excise taxes, were retained as before. The result was that the Hindus, who were mainly connected with land in one form or the other, were hit hard and reduced to extreme poverty. They were closely watched, and if any one of them made an attempt to evade any of the taxes, he was severely punished. Hitherto the upper class of Hindu officers in the revenue department, such as, headmen, farmers of revenue and chaudharis, were leniently treated in matters of fixing the State demand of the land given to them and in that of collection of revenue. Ala-ud-din withdrew this concession and compelled the hereditary assessors and collectors of revenue to continue to work as before without any special remuneration. These regulations were very strictly enforced by the minister of finance, named Sharaf Qai, and the band of Muslim officers under him. The officers earned the hatred of the public for the rigour with which they enforced them. Writes Sir Woolseley Haig, “Hindus throughout the kingdom were reduced to one dead level of poverty and misery, or, if there were one class more to be pitied than another, it was that which had formerly enjoyed the most esteem, the hereditary assessors and collectors of the revenue.” The contemporary historian, Zia-ud-din Barani, in summing up the effects of the measures observes: “*the chaudharis, khuts and muqaddams* were not able to ride on horseback, to find weapons, get fine clothes, or to indulge in *betel*.” Their wives were obliged, owing to poverty, to work as maid-servants in the houses of their Muslim neighbours.

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Ala-ud-din made it an object of his policy to raise able men of low birth to eminence so that they might act as a counterpoise to the nobility and the clergy.

The standing army

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In order to enforce the above regulations, to act upon the principles of his theory of kingship, to satisfy his ambition of conquest and to protect the country from the ever-recurring Mongol invasions, it was necessary for Ala-ud-din to have a powerful army. Royal despotism of the type that was Ala-ud-din’s aim was impossible without a military force of a high order. With this object in view Ala-ud-din undertook the reform of the army. To him belongs the credit of being the first Sultan of Delhi to lay the foundation of a permanent standing army which was always kept in readiness for service at the capital. The army was directly recruited by the army minister (*ariz-i-mamalik*). It was paid in cash from the royal treasury. The pay of a trooper was 234 *tankas* a year, while one with an additional horse was paid 78 *tankas* more. The soldiers were supplied with horses, arms and other equipment at the expense of the State.

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In order to do away with corruption and to prevent proxy at a military review or in the field of battle, Ala-ud-din instituted the practice of recording the descriptive roll (*huliya*) of individual soldiers in the army minister's register. To prevent the defrauding of the government by the substitution of a bad horse for a good one the branding of horses (*dagh* system) was introduced. These innovations were not altogether new. They had been known before in India and abroad. According to Farishta, the central army consisted of 4,75,000 cavalrymen. The strength of the infantry is not recorded by any contemporary writer, but it must have far exceeded the cavalry. The Sultan bestowed a great deal of personal attention on the organisation, equipment and discipline of his military establishment.

Control of the market

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Such a huge army could not be permanently maintained without unduly straining the resources of the state. But an army of that size was an indispensable necessity, Ala-ud-din had not only to put down sedition and weed out rebellions, but he had also to fight the Mongols who were annually visiting our north-western frontier. He had, besides, the ambition of conquering the whole of India. He was, therefore, compelled to think of a device to cheapen the cost of the maintenance of his powerful military establishment. This he did by regulating the prices of grain, cloth and other necessaries of life and cheapening them so much that a soldier could live comfortably on a mere pittance. He fixed the prices of food-grains, cloth and other commodities far below the usual market rates. The State collected its revenue in kind from the *khalisah* lands and, if possible, also from the territory held by vassals and, thus, raised large stocks of grain. No one else was permitted to purchase grain from the tillers of the soil, except those merchants who were authorised by a permit to do so. All merchants in Delhi were required to register themselves in the office of the *shahana-i-mandi*. Advances were given to those merchants who did not possess enough capital of their own. The merchants had to sell all commodities at the fixed rates and no deviation was permitted. If a merchant failed to carry out the orders and sold a commodity underweight, the same amount of flesh was cut off from his body. All kinds of speculation and black marketing were rigorously put down. The officers of the Doab were required to furnish guarantee in writing that they would not permit anyone to hoard grain. Similarly, merchants were not to hoard grain or other articles, but must sell them at demand. Notable persons, nobles, officers and other well-to-do people had to get permits from the office of the *shahana-i-mandi* before they could purchase costly articles from the market. These regulations were rigorously enforced by two officers who were called *diwan-i-riyasat* and *shahana-i-mandi* who were assisted by a judge called *sarai adl* and a host of subordinate officers. They performed their duties with strict honesty and regularity and punished everyone who was guilty of violating the regulations. The result of these measures was that corn, cloth and other things became very cheap. Price of other things, such as, horses, cattle, maid-servants and slaves fell considerably. Throughout the reign of Ala-ud-din the cost of living remained cheap and almost constant. Modern writers have bestowed lavish praise upon Ala-ud-din for the success of his economic policy. There is a difference of opinion as to whether the measures were enforced in all the territory under Ala-ud-din, or they were restricted to Delhi and its suburbs. The latter view seems to be correct. It was impossible to enforce the regulations in the whole of the country. Even so, Ala-ud-din deserves credit for successfully tackling this difficult problem. The lavish distribution of wealth from southern India had cheapened money and inflated prices. The inflation was largely restricted to Delhi and the surrounding areas. The Sultan's measures well attained the object he had at heart, that is, fighting inflation and reducing the cost of living.

The revenue policy

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Ala-ud-din did not rest satisfied with the control of the market and cheapening the cost of living. He desired, at the same time, to augment his financial resources. Accordingly, he turned to the reform of his revenue department. His predecessors had not paid much attention to formulating a scientific revenue policy. They had contented themselves with the time-honoured system which they had inherited from the Hindu times. But Ala-ud-din was a bold administrative reformer. He not only wished to introduce vigour and efficiency in the administration, but also desired to make a fundamental change in order to tap the resources of the country and increase his revenue to the utmost limit. With this object in view, he introduced a series of new measures which transformed the revenue rules and regulations of the Sultanate of Delhi. His first measure was to confiscate land held mostly by Muslim grantees and religious men as *milk* (proprietary rights given by the state), *inam* (free gift), *idrarat* (pensions) and *waqfs* (endowments). It is too much to believe that all such land was confiscated and annexed by the state. Most probably, most of the land of the above description was attached; but some assignees were left untouched, as we have undoubted evidence of their existence in the beginning of the next reign. His second measure was to withdraw all the privileges which the Hindu *muqaddams* (headmen), *khuts* (farmers of revenue) and *chaudhanue collectors* had enjoyed for generations, as we have already seen. These three classes of revenue officers were paid their dues as before; but, like all others who were connected with the land, they had to pay the land, house and grazing taxes. Thus, neither the Muslims nor the Hindus were left with any special privilege in the matter of land revenue. His third measure was to increase the State demand to the highest point possible. He fixed the State's share at fifty per cent of the gross produce of the land.¹ Over and above this, he charged, as has been related already, house tax, grazing tax and export and import duties. The Hindus, of course, were required to pay the *jizya* in addition. His fourth regulation was the introduction of the measurement of land with a view to ascertain the amount of land in the possession of each cultivator and the actual produce thereof. Although measurement of land was the usual feature of the revenue administration during the Hindu times and must have continued in some of the indigenous principalities, it was not adopted by any of the predecessors of Ala-ud-din. The credit of reviving it goes to this notable Khalji ruler who also made arrangement for ascertaining from the *patwari's* records the amount of arable land and revenue from each village in this dominions as a preliminary to his land settlements (*bandobast*). He employed honest and competent revenue officers to enforce the above regulations. We are told by the historian, Zia-ud-din Barani, that in matters of the revenue assessment and collection the entire kingdom was treated as a single village; but from what Barani himself has written, it seems that measurement could not be introduced in all the provinces of Alaud-din's dominions. It was confined to some parts only. The net result was that the revenue increased considerably and all classes of the population, including cultivators, landholders, merchants and traders, were required to shoulder the burden. But whether Ala-ud-din desired it or not, the brunt of the burden had to be borne by the Hindus, a vast majority of whom were closely connected with the land.

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¹ As far as the Muslims were concerned, he probably charged from them one-fourth of the produce as land-revenue

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Ala-ud-din was not in favour of grant of land to soldiers and officers in lieu of their salaries. Yet many men continued to enjoy the *iqtas* during his time as it was not possible to abolish the system altogether, specially in the newly conquered territories.

Centralisation of the administration

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With a large army at his back, Ala-ud-din was able to suppress all lawless elements in his dominions and to take steps for the complete concentration of authority in his hands. Although there were the ministers, as usual, yet like Louis XIV of France or Frederick the Great of Prussia, Ala-ud-din was really his own prime minister. His ministers were secretaries or glorified clerks who had to carry out his will and look after the daily routine of administration. He did consult them whenever he liked, but he was not bound to accept their advice. The governors of provinces or *muqtis*, too, unlike in the days of his predecessors, were brought under greater control of the central government. His espionage, developed to frightful perfection, overawed the nobles and courtiers who feared to exchange views among themselves or even to talk aloud. We are told by the historian, Barani, that they communicated their thoughts by means of signs. While the Sultan put down the old nobility ruthlessly he raised the common people, who were possessed of merit and loyalty, to positions of importance. Throughout the kingdom no one could claim equality with the Sultan. All were reduced to the position of his vassals, servants or subjects. Under him the Sultanate reached a high watermark of despotism, the like of which had been unknown in India for ages.

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