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The Early History of the Deccan (Parts I–XI) v2.c15.s2.t5: Pratāparudra

The Early History of the Deccan (Parts I–XI) v2.c15.s2.t5

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Pratāparudra

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(A.D. 1295–1323)

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Pratāparudra ascended the throne of Warangal at the beginning of the year A.D. 1295, on the death of Rudramadēvī towards the close of the preceding year. He was, at the time of his accession, about thirty-five years old; and as he had been associated with his grandmother for several years before her death in the government of the kingdom, he had already a great deal of military and administrative experience. As a result of the wars which he had conducted during the last years of the late queen, the enemies of the kingdom had been thoroughly subdued, and none dared to lift up his head against the energetic young monarch after his accession. Tradition has it that as soon as he ascended the throne he set about reorganizing the administrative system with a view to strengthening the defences of the kingdom. It is said that Pratāparudra recruited exclusively from the Velama community seventy-seven *nāyaks*, assigned them territories, and entrusted to each of them the defence of one of the seventy-seven bastions of the fort of his capital Warangal.³ Though this tradition is coloured by communal bias, it is undoubtedly based on authentic facts. A study of the inscriptions reveals that from the time of Rudrāmbā, if not earlier, the administration of the kingdom was carried on through *nāyaks* holding sway over districts called *sthalas*; but they belonged to no single community in particular but were recruited from all classes of the people; moreover, the number of *nāyakships* was actually seventy-five and not seventy-seven as tradition would have us believe;⁴ nor is there any evidence to show that they had any definite responsibility for the defence of the capital.

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³ *Mack. MSS.*, 13-4-30, pp. 54-60.

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⁴ *JTA*, ii, p. 106.

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Pratāparudra put his new-modelled army to test by pitting it against the Kāyastha chiefs. It may be remembered that Ambadēva suffered a defeat at the hands of Pratāparudra when he was still the co-regent of his grandmother Rudrāmbā about A.D. 1293, and was compelled as a consequence to retire from Tripurāntakam and its neighbourhood. He, however, continued to rule over his native Muliki-nāḍu until A.D. 1304. He was succeeded by his son Tripurāri II, who held sway over his ancestral kingdom until at least A.D. 1305.¹ The relations between Pratāparudra and the Kāyasthas after Ambadēva’s defeat mentioned above are by no means clear. Though writers on the Kākatīya history declare that Ambadēva subsequently became a vassal of Pratāparudra, the available epigraphic evidence seems definitely to indicate that the status of himself and his successors as independent princes remained for the moment unaltered. Neither in the inscriptions of Ambadēva nor in those of his successors is there found any mention of an overlord. It seems therefore reasonable to assume that they stayed independent for a while. Their power, however, was not destined to endure very long. Pratāparudra sent an army against them under his general Mahārāya-Paṭṭasahini Sōmaya Nāyaka in A.D. 1309, and Indulūri Annaya as well as a number of other commanders accompanied him with their forces. In the war that followed, the kings of Mōpūru, that is, the Kāyasthas, were overthrown, and the government of their territories, which were annexed to the kingdom, was entrusted to Sōmaya Nāyaka.²

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¹ AR, 207 of 1935-6; VR, ii, Cd. 468; AR, 414 of 1911, 391 of 1938-9, and 65 of 1939-40.

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² Ch. Virabhadra Rao, History of the Age of the Kākatīya Kings, v, pp. 481, 548-9.

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The strengthening of the defences of the realm, in fact, called for immediate attention in the face of the Muslim incursions into the Deccan which at that time constituted a standing menace to the security of the southern Hindu kingdoms. Epigraphic evidence makes it quite clear that the Muslim armies first made their appearance in the Deccan about the middle of the thirteenth century. In an inscription at Pānugal in the Nalgonda district of the old Hyderabad State, dated A.D. 1267, the Sēuṇa prince Śārṅgapāṇidēva, a subordinate of Rudrāmbā, is said to have rescued ‘the earth which was submerged under the Turushka deluge’.³ A similar feat is attributed, in another inscription found at Haluvāgalu in the Bellary district, dated A.D. 1282, to the Sēuṇa king Rāmachandrarāya, that is, Rāmadēva, who is described as the ‘rescuer of the earth from the depredations of the Turushkas’.⁴ Although the Deccan Hindus had been conscious of the Muslim danger from the North for several decades before his accession, what actually prompted Pratāparudra to reorganize the military resources of his kingdom was the attack by Garshāsp Malik on Dēvagiri in A.D. 1295, an event which occurred at the same time as his accession to the throne. It demonstrated, as nothing else had done before, how utterly inadequate and inefficient the Hindu military organization was to cope with the new danger. Pratāparudra therefore provided himself, by remodelling the *nāyankara* system, which appears to have come into vogue during the reigns of his predecessors, with a well-equipped army of 900,000 archers besides cavalry and elephants.¹ An opportunity to test the strength of his ‘new-model’ army soon offered itself. Garshāsp Malik, soon after his return to Hindustan from his expedition against Dēvagiri, treacherously murdered his uncle and sovereign, Sulṭān Jalāl-ud-Dīn Khaljī, ascended the throne of Delhi, and having assumed the title of ‘Alā-ud-Dīn Khaljī, began to rule the kingdom. He was the ablest and the most ambitious of the rulers of Turkish descent who ever sat on the throne of Delhi. Having resolved very early in his reign to make himself the master not only of Hindustan but also of the Deccan and the South, he initiated a policy of conquest which, under his successors, resulted in the subjugation of the entire peninsula as far as Sētubandha-Rāmēśvaram in the extreme South. According to contemporary Hindu sources, there were no less than eight Muslim expeditions against Telingāṇa alone during the reign of Pratāparudra, in all of which, excepting the last, he withstood the invaders successfully, though in the final expedition he suffered defeat and was taken prisoner.² The Muslim historians, however, speak of only five expeditions, of which three were victorious and two disastrous. It is just possible that the Muslim historians omitted to mention some campaigns which they considered unimportant; but the claim to an unbroken series of victories except in the case of the last expedition which is attributed to Pratāparudra must be rejected as untenable, since the available evidence on the subject definitely points to its inaccuracy.

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³ Corpus, 34.

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⁴ SII, ix, i, 380; AR, 224 of 1981.

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¹ *Nava-laksha-dhanur-dhar-ādhināthē* *Prithvīm lāsati Vīrarudradēvē*—Vidyānātha, *Pratāparudra-yaśō-bhūshaṇam*. مر این قوم را پیش آمد بجنگ ردر دیو آن رائے نہ لکھ تلنگ *Isāmi, Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (Madras edn.), 294.

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² The Vilasa Grant of Prōlaya Nāyaka. *ARE*, cp. 5 of 1938-9, Part II, para. 10.

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The earliest of ‘Alā-ud-Dīn’s expeditions against Telingāṇa took place in A.D. 1303. The objects of the invasion were plunder and territorial expansion. ‘Alā-ud-Dīn wanted money to finance his wars against the Rajputs and the Mongols, who constituted serious menaces to the safety of the Sultanate of Delhi. He was eager to despoil the rich Hindu kingdoms of the South so that he might organize efficiently the defence of his own territories. At the time of dispatching his first campaign against Telingāṇa, ‘Alā-ud-Dīn was also engaged in besieging the fort of Chitor in Rajputana. Malik Fakhr-ud-Dīn Jūna, *dādbek-i-hazart*, and Jhāju of Kara, the nephew of Nuṣrat Khān, were sent with all the available officers and troops of Hindustan to invade Warangal. The account of the expedition which has come down to us is indeed very meagre, since such of the Muslim historians as deign to notice it dismiss it hurriedly in a few words. The Muslim army commanded by the two generals mentioned above is said to have marched by way of Bengal and to have suffered disaster in the course of the march owing to floods in which a large part of it perished. However that may be, the expedition did, as a matter of historical fact, reach Telingāṇa. There is reason to believe that it was worsted in an encounter with the Kākatīya forces. The chronicles of the Velama chiefs embodied in the *Velugōṭivāri Vaṃśāvaḷi* allude to a Kākatīya victory over the Muslims of Delhi prior to the advent of Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr. Pōtugaṇṭi Maili, one of the officers of the court of Pratāparudra, claims to have destroyed the pride of the Turushkas of Delhi in a battle near Upparapalli in the Karimnagar district of the old Hyderabad State.¹ As Maili is said to have visited the court of ‘Alā-ud-Dīn Khaljī at Delhi on a later occasion, the victory at Upparapalli must have been won by him over the army commanded by Malik Fakhr-ud-Dīn Jūna. Venna, the son of Rēcherla Prasāditya, one of Rudrāmbā’s ministers, is also said to have overthrown the Turushka army in battle.² As Venna’s sons are reported to have participated in the later wars of Pratāparudra with the Muslims, his victory over the Turushkas must also have been won at Upparapalli. An epigraph engraved on a pillar standing in the fort of Warangal, copied by the Mackenzie Surveyors in 1806, refers to a victory of Manaraṅgōdari Rāju and Layiṅgayadēva over the Muslims in Saṃvat 1362 (A.D. 1304-5).³ It is evident from these records that Malik Fakhr-ud-Dīn and Jūna penetrated into the heart of Telingāṇa, and reached Upparapalli in the neighbourhood of the capital Warangal. At that place their advance was checked by the Kākatīya army, and in the battle that followed the Delhi army, having sustained a crushing defeat, was compelled to retreat in confusion.

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¹ Mack. MSS, 15-4-3, p. 82.

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² *Velugōṭivāri Vaṃśāvaḷi*, 25.

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³ Mack. MSS, 15-3-20, p. 101.

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The failure of this expedition did not, however, affect ‘Alā-ud-Dīn’s designs of conquest, although he could not at that time pay immediate attention to the affairs of the South, owing to the frequent Mongol attacks on his northwestern frontier and the outbreak of war in Rajputana and in Western India. The affairs of Hindustan and Western India had been settled satisfactorily by A.D. 1309: the Mongols had been finally crushed; Mālava had been conquered; Rāy Karan, the king of Gujarāt, had been defeated and driven out of his kingdom; the rebellion of Saṅgama, son of Rāmadēva of Dēvagiri, had been suppressed; and Mahārāṣṭra had been brought effectively under the control of the Sulṭān, who therefore felt that he could now devote himself without distraction to the conquest of the Southern Hindu States, and dispatched a large army under Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr and Khwāja Hājī to effect the conquest of Telingāṇa. Apart from his desire to plunder the rich Hindu kingdoms of the South, ‘Alā-ud-Dīn had two other definite reasons for sending the expedition to Telingāṇa. In the first place he wanted to wipe off the disgrace of the defeat formerly suffered by his army, and secondly he was anxious to chastise Pratāparudra for having given asylum to Rāy Karan of Gujarāt, who had come to seek refuge at his court. The Sulṭān, however, seems to have entertained some doubt about the success of the campaign, for he cautioned Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr against extreme measures and commanded him to leave Pratāparudra in possession of his dominions, if he should submit to him and agree to pay tribute.¹

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¹ Barani, ED, iii, p. 201.

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The expedition set out from Delhi on the 25th of Jumāda, A.H. 709 (31 Oct. 1309), passed through Dēvagiri where it halted for a few days, and then marched on to Telinġāṇa through the diamond-mining district of Basiragaṛh and reached the fort of Sarbar, which it captured after a siege. The commandant and the garrison resolved to perish rather than fall into the hands of the Musalmāns. They lighted a huge fire and threw themselves into it with their wives and children. The fort was handed over to Annā Niḍ, the surviving brother of the late commandant, who promised obedience to the Sulṭān.²

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² Khusrau, *Khazā’in-ul-Futūḥ*, JIH, viii, 382-3.

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Pratāparudra was informed of the Muslim invasion by refugees from Sarbar who had fled to the capital for protection. He was not, however, surprised, as he had been expecting an attack on his dominions by the Sulṭān sooner or later. He had a strong and well-equipped army of 900,000 foot, 20,000 horse, and 100 elephants. Besides this some of the neighbouring chiefs had promised to join him. Malik Nā’ib, however, did not give him time to gather his forces together in fighting array. He moved swiftly towards Warangal and laid siege to the city before Pratāparudra could complete his preparations.

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Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr met with no serious opposition on his way. On his arrival near the Kākatīya capital on 20 January, A.D. 1310, he seized the hill of Aanumakoṇḍa, and having erected a *katkhar* or wooden palisade to protect his camp he established himself there. The city of Warangal had two forts, one within the other, and both were surrounded by a deep ditch; the outer fort was built of mud and was protected, according to the *Pratāpacharitra*, by seventy-seven bastions, the defence of each of which was entrusted to a *nāyak*. All the fighting men of the kingdom were assembled in it; the subordinate chiefs and the distinguished nobles with their treasures and elephants took up their residence with the king in the inner citadel, built of stone. The siege began on 19 January, A.D. 1310. Notwithstanding a counter-attack by the Hindus on the Muslim camp, it continued with unabated vigour for a period of twenty-five days when on 12 February, A.D. 1310, the mud fort was taken by storm, and the defenders who survived the fight retired into the inner fort. Pratāparudra, however, refused to surrender, and Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr had to lay siege to the stone fort. His attention was much distracted by the activities of Hindu soldiers who were operating in the countryside around him. The postal system, by means of which news passed between his army headquarters and Delhi, had been put out of action, and it was even apprehended that the communications might be entirely cut off. Nevertheless, Malik Nā’ib did not relax the vigour of his operations. He sent parties of soldiers out into the country to devastate it and to terrify the inhabitants. The condition of the besieged in the inner fort became increasingly difficult owing to lack of accommodation, and at last Pratāparudra could hold out no longer. Thereupon he sued for peace and Malik Nā’ib agreed to raise the siege and to return to his own country on the condition that Pratāparudra should hand over all his accumulated wealth and should further promise to pay the Sulṭān annually a stipulated sum of money and send a contingent of elephants as tribute. Pratāparudra accepted these conditions and surrendered all his treasure and his elephants and horses. The Malik Nā’ib, who was now satisfied that he had fully carried out the instructions of the Sulṭān, set out for Delhi and arrived safely at the capital on 10 June, A.D. 1310.¹

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¹ N. Venkataramanayya, *The Early Muslim Expansion in South India*, pp. 31-41.

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Pratāparudra discharged his obligations faithfully. Every year thereafter he sent the stipulated amount of tribute and the quota of elephants to the Court of Delhi. An interesting incident which took place in the court of the Sulṭān on one occasion when some of the officers of Pratāparudra were there on a visit deserves notice, since it demonstrates the existence of friendly relations between the conquerors and the conquered at this time. Two officers of Pratāparudra, Pōtugaṇṭi Maili and Teliṅga Bijjana, who had probably gone to Delhi in command of the troops conveying the tribute, fought an exhibition duel at the Dākhōl in the presence of the Imperial Court, perhaps in order to display before the Sulṭān and his courtiers the skill in swordsmanship for which the Deccanīs had long been famous. Sulṭān ‘Alā-ud-Din seems to have held Pratāparudra in high esteem, since he later called for his assistance, as will presently be shown, in the execution of certain military enterprises in the South.

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The failure of Pratāparudra to ward off the Muslim invasion let loose the forces of disintegration in his kingdom, especially in the southern districts which had only recently been reduced to subjection. A rebellion appears to have broken out in the erstwhile Kāyastha dominions; and Raṅganātha, the Telugu Chōḷa ruler of Nellore, threw off the yoke and asserted his independence. Pratāparudra concerted measures, as soon as circumstances permitted after the retirement of the Muslim invaders from Teliṅgāṇa, to suppress the rebels and bring back the southern districts under his control. He sent an army under Juṭṭaya-leṅka Goṅkaya Reḍḍi against Mallidēva, probably a scion of the Kāyastha family, who had established himself at Gaṇḍikōṭa, and had attempted there to revive his ancestral kingdom. He perhaps received some help from the Sēuṇas, since Pratāparudra is referred to in the inscription describing Goṅkaya Reḍḍi’s expedition as Oḍḍiyarāyadiśāpaṭṭa and Sēuṇa-dhaṭṭu-vibhāla.¹ Mallidēva was defeated and killed and Gaṇḍikōṭa was captured. Pratāparudra appointed Goṅkaya Reḍḍi as the governor of Muliki-nāḍu and the adjoining territories and posted him at Gaṇḍikōṭa. But while he was further engaged in making preparations for invading the Telugu Chōḷa kingdom of Nellore he received a mandate from Delhi instructing him to accompany the Imperial Army with all his forces against the Pāṇḍyan dominions in the South.

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¹ SII, x, 506 and 536; AR, 328 and 329 of 1905.

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The circumstances in which the Sulṭān issued his command to Pratāparudra to proceed to the South call for explanation. On the death of the Pāṇḍyan king Māravarman Kulaśēkhara in A.D. 1310, a civil war had broken out for the possession of the throne between his two sons Sundara Pāṇḍya and Vīra Pāṇḍya. While the struggle between the brothers was still in progress and the issue as yet undecided, Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr invaded the Pāṇḍyan kingdom in A.D. 1311 at the instance of his master, 'Alā-ud-Dīn Khaljī. Owing to the confusion caused by the intestine conflict, he was able to overrun the country without opposition as far south as the Pāṇḍyan capital Madura. But though at first he swept everything before him, he was ultimately overcome, and had to retreat homewards, carrying with him whatever booty he could lay hands on. The civil war, which had been interrupted for the time being by Malik Nā’ib’s invasion, was resumed after his defeat. And soon the situation was further complicated by the rise of Ravivarman Kulaśēkhara of Quilon, a subordinate of Sundara Pāṇḍya, who rose against his master and drove him out of the kingdom; he next attacked Vīra Pāṇḍya, and having put him to flight in a pitched battle, had himself crowned at Kāñchī in A.D. 1313. Sundara Pāṇḍya, thus dispossessed of his kingdom, fled to the Court of Delhi and solicited the help of 'Alā-ud-Dīn. 'Alā-ud-Dīn, who was eager to bring the Pāṇḍyan kingdom under his suzerainty, readily undertook to restore him to his throne; but he was unable, owing to the outbreak of a rebellion at Dēvagiri after the death of Rāmadēva in A.D. 1312-13, and the fact that the major part of his forces under Malik Nā’ib were engaged in warfare in Mahārāshṭra, to send a fully fledged expedition for this purpose. Therefore, while dispatching a contingent to accompany Sundara Pāṇḍya, the Sulṭān, in order to ensure the success of the enterprise, also, as we have mentioned above, instructed Pratāparudra to co-operate with the imperial troops in their effort to reinstate the Pāṇḍyan king as ruler over his lost territories.

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The Sulṭān’s command fell in with Pratāparudra’s designs, since it would enable him not only to re-establish his authority over the kingdom of Nellore without difficulty but also to wrest from the Pāṇḍyas the city of Kāñchī, which they had taken from his predecessors in earlier times. He therefore gathered together all his forces, and placing them under the command of Muppiḍi Nāyaka, dispatched them to the South with instructions to take possession of Nellore and to restore Sundara Pāṇḍya to his kingdom. Although the available epigraphical evidence clearly indicates that the Sulṭān’s army participated in the struggle,¹ yet the main burden of the expedition seems to have devolved on the shoulders of Pratāparudra himself, owing to the death of the Sulṭān in A.D. 1316, and the subsequent withdrawal of all the Muslims from the Deccan by the orders of Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr.² Operations during the campaign fell into three definite stages: (1) the subjugation of the kingdom of Nellore; (2) the fight with Ballāḷa III and the restoration of the Śambuvarāya; and (3) the war with the Pāṇḍyas and the restoration of Sundara Pāṇḍya. The Kākatīya army commanded by Muppiḍi Nāyaka’s son Pedda Rudra seems to have set out from Warangal and to have marched against king Śrī Raṅganātha of Nellore, who was defeated and put to flight. The commander next came into conflict somewhere in the neighbourhood with a certain chief of the name of Kōṭa Tikka, who was slain in battle together with all his followers. After this he proceeded to the forest tracts of Nārāyaṇavanam, and reduced the numerous manniya forts which then abounded in that region. The Nellore kingdom which Pratāparudra seems to have assigned to Muppiḍi Nāyaka as an appanage was quickly brought under control, and Pedda Rudra then advanced against Ballāḷa III, who seems to have been somewhere in the neighbourhood at that time. How he came to be there just then is not difficult to surmise. Ever since the death of his cousin Viśvanātha and the unification of his kingdom in A.D. 1300, Ballāḷa III had been making attempts, whenever circumstances appeared favourable, to recover his family possessions in the Tamil country. Thus on the death of Māravarman Kulaśēkhara in A.D. 1310, and the outbreak of civil war between his two sons, Vira Pāṇḍya and Sundara Pāṇḍya, Ballāḷa set out toward the South on an expedition of conquest, but was compelled to retrace his steps by the unexpected appearance in his rear of the Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr at the head of the Delhi army. Although he had for a time to give up his project of annexing the southern country owing to his fear of the Sulṭān and the presence of the Malik Nā’ib in the Deccan, yet the death of the former and the withdrawal across the Narmadā to Delhi of the latter, with all his Muslim forces, emboldened him to make a fresh attempt to realize his ambi-

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¹ SII, viii, 247; AR, 642 of 1901. munnaḷ Rājarājan Sundara Pāṇḍyadēvar Tulukkar-uḍan vanda-nāḷil.

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² Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn (Madras edn.), p. 348.

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شتابان رسى چون برآن بوم و بر
بدان عين ملک همايون سير
بگوتـا بـه ايـدر برانـد شتـاب
ابا شهسواران چابک رکاب
بیارد همـه اهـل اسليـم را
کند خالی آن جملـه اقليـم را
غرض عيـن ملـک خجسته سير
چون لشکر روان کرد از آن بوم و بر
همی راند آن صفدر کينـه خـواه
. . . . . . . . . .

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tion. This time he was evidently successful in his enterprise, since a large part of Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam, including perhaps Kāñchī, the capital of the district, seems to have passed into his hands, and some of the local chieftains, such as the Śambuvarāya of Paḍaivīḍu and the Yādavarāya of Chandragiri, probably tendered their allegiance. Pedda Rudra, however, defeated Ballāḷa III and his feudatories, took possession of the territory recently conquered by Ballāḷa, and conciliated at the same time the Śambuvarāya by reinstating him in his hereditary dominion. He next proceeded to Kāñchī and occupied that city without much opposition.¹

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¹ *Mack. MSS*, 15-4-4, p. 37; *JOR*, xii, 213-16.

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The Kākatīya occupation of Kāñchī roused the Pāṇḍyas to fresh activity. The ‘Five Pāṇḍyas’, according to the *Velugōṭivāri Vaṃśāvaḷi*, collected their forces and marched on Kāñchī to expel the Kākatīyas from the city and to re-establish their own authority there. Pratāparudra seems to have arrived in the city at this juncture to conduct the operations in person and to have taken over the command of the army. A great battle took place in the vicinity of Kāñchī in which both sides fought with great determination. The Pāṇḍyan elephant corps charged the Telugu infantry furiously and spread panic in their ranks; but the Velamas, under their chief, Rēcherla Erra Dācha, as well as the Reḍḍi contingents, stood firm and averted disaster. Erra Dācha is said to have excited the admiration of the famous warriors of Pratāparudra’s court by rushing on the leader of the Pāṇḍyan elephant squadron and arresting the charge. This act was the turning-point of the battle, and victory soon declared itself in favour of the Kākatīya monarch. Pratāparudra appointed Mānavīra as the governor of Kāñchī, and ordered Dēvari Nāyaka to carry the war into the interior of the Pāṇḍyan dominions and to install Sundara Pāṇḍya on his throne at Viradhāvala; he then returned to his capital.

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Dēvari Nāyaka marched southwards in obedience to his master’s command. The movements of his army and the events which took place during the course of his march are not known. It is, however, certain that Vira Pāṇḍya made up his quarrel with his former rival, Ravivarman Kulaśēkhara, and gathering together the other Pāṇḍyan princes under his banner prepared to withstand the advance of the Telugu army. The opposing forces met near the village of Tiruvaḍikuṇram in the Ginjee *tāluk* of the South Arcot district, and a fierce engagement, elephants again playing an important part, took place, in which Dēvari Nāyaka inflicted a defeat on Vira Pāṇḍya and the Malayāla Tiruvaḍi Ravivarman Kulaśēkhara and re-established Sundara Pāṇḍya on his throne at Viradhāvala.²

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² *AR*, 79 of 1938-9; *ARE*, 1938-9, Part II, para. 8.

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But whilst Pratāparudra was engaged in waging war on the Pāṇḍyas in the South, important political changes were taking place in Delhi. Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr, who was carrying on the administration of the empire in the name of Sulṭān Shihāb-ud-Dīn, was murdered, and Quṭb-ud-Dīn Mubārak Shāh, another son of 'Alā-ud-Dīn, ascended the throne. As soon as Mubārak Shāh had consolidated his position, he set out in the second year of his reign (A.D. 1318) on an expedition to the Deccan to restore the imperial authority in Marhaṭṭa, where a formidable rebellion had broken out under the leadership of Harapāladēva, who had proclaimed his independence and attempted to revive the old Sēuṇa kingdom of Dēvagiri. A second object of the campaign was to collect the tribute from Pratāparudra, who appears to have omitted to forward his payments, having taken advantage of the revolution in the imperial capital and the breakdown of the Muslim power in the Deccan. The Sulṭān soon arrived in Marhaṭṭa and there put down the Hindu rebellion with a stern hand. He then dispatched his favourite slave Khusrau Khān to Warangal at the head of a powerful army with instructions to overthrow Pratāparudra unless he should immediately submit and pay the arrears of tribute due to the Sulṭān. What happened during Khusrau Khān's expedition to Warangal is not easy to determine, since the available evidence on the subject is conflicting in character. Amir Khusrau and 'Iṣāmī, the earliest historians who describe the events connected with the expedition, are unfortunately at variance with each other. According to the former, Pratāparudra refused to pay the tribute and offered resistance. Khusrau Khān, like Malik Nā'ib Kāfūr before him, marched at the head of the Delhi army from Dēvagiri, and halted in the neighbourhood of Warangal. Pratāparudra is said to have attacked him with 10,000 horse and innumerable foot, but to have been defeated and driven back into the fort by a small band of about 300 horsemen. Khusrau next laid siege to Warangal and captured the outer fort. A large number of Hindus of distinction, including Pratāparudra's commander-in-chief Antil Mahta, were killed in the fight. The bold advance of the Muslim forces alarmed Pratāparudra, who realizing that it would be useless to resist further made peace with Khusrau Khān and agreed to cede five districts of his kingdom to the Sulṭān and to pay an annual tribute of more than 100 elephants and 12,000 horses, together with gold, jewels, and precious stones beyond compute. Khusrau Khān then raised the siege and returned to Delhi laden with booty.¹

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¹ Amir Khusrau, Nuh Sipihr, ED, III, 550-61.

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This seems to be an overdrawn picture of Khusrau Khān's achievements in Telingāṇa; for 'Iṣāmī, who also describes Khusrau's Telingāṇa expedition, does not refer to any hostilities; on the contrary, he states that Khusrau collected all the tribute due to his master without having any recourse to force.

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When Khusrau Khān reached the frontier of Telingāṇa, he dispatched a courier to Pratāparudra with a letter demanding the payment of arrears of tribute, threatening him with dire consequences in the event of refusal. When the courier arrived at Warangal, Pratāparudra received him with cordiality and respect. He sent a reply to Khusrau Khān affirming that he was a loyal vassal of the Sulṭān; that his failure to pay the tribute was not due to any attempt at evasion but to the insecurity of the roads which were infested with malefactors, and that he would send the tribute to the Khān who had arrived in his kingdom and would add presents for the general himself. He sent back the messenger with this reply, and immediately dispatched the stipulated amount of tribute, together with more than one hundred elephants, to the Khān’s camp. Khusrau was satisfied, and in accordance with the Sulṭān’s instructions he presented to Pratāparudra an umbrella, a durbash, and a qaba set with gems. Having successfully accomplished the task entrusted to him by the Sulṭān, Khusrau Khān then marched away with his forces in the direction of Delhi.¹

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¹ Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn (Madras edn.), pp. 361-3: کیفیت خسرو خان و عزیمت او جانب تلنگ

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It is hardly possible to reconcile these incompatible accounts. Amir Khusrau was a contemporary historian; he could not have been ignorant of the events that had taken place during the expedition; but ʿIṣāmī was himself a Daccani; and he wrote his history within thirty years of the occurrence of the events. Having regard to the authentic character of his chronicle, his narrative cannot easily be set aside as untrustworthy. Whichever of the two accounts one may be disposed to accept, there can be no doubt that Khusrau Khān successfully executed the task entrusted to him; for Amīr Khusrau and ʿIṣāmī both agree that he collected the arrears of tribute from Pratāparudra and restored the imperial authority in Telingāna.

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Pratāparudra seems to have sent an expedition against the kingdom of Kampili some time after the departure of Khusrau Khān from Telingāna. The circumstances in which he invaded Kampili are not definitely known. According to the tradition preserved in the Kumāra-Rāmana-Sāngatya and other late Kannaḍa literary works, Kumāra Rāma, the son of Kampilirāya, paid a visit to the court of Pratāparudra at Warangal to solicit that ruler’s help against Ballāḷa III, with whom he was in conflict at the time. Though Pratāparudra honoured him and treated him with consideration, he declined to join him in the war against Ballāḷa III. Kumāra Rāma returned to his country in great anger and offered an affront to Pratāparudra by assuming some of the Kākatīya titles. Pratāparudra, provoked by this act, declared war and sent his army to invade the kingdom of Kampili. He was, however, defeated in battle by Kumāra Rāma and had to make peace with him and retire into his own territories.² This account is, however, contradicted by the evidence of Telugu literary works of the later centuries. Prōlaya Annaya, one of Pratāparudra’s commanders, destroyed, according to Śrīnātha’s Bhīmēśvara-Purāṇam, the pleasure gardens on the outskirts of Kummaṭha, the capital of Kampilirāya.³ Koṭikaṇṭi Rāghava, an elder brother of Sōmadēvarāja, one of the forebears of the later Āreviḍu chiefs, is stated to have defeated Kampilirāya in battle and deprived him of the ‘seven members of his royalty’.¹ Taking into consideration all the evidence furnished by both the Kannaḍa and the Telugu sources it is not unreasonable to conclude that victory leaned at one time to the side of Kampilirāya and at another to the side of Pratāparudra, though it is not possible to conclude, in the present state of knowledge, what the ultimate issue of the war actually was.

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² N. Venkataramanayya, Kampili and Vijayanagara, p. 17, and M. H. Rama Sarma, ‘Studies in Vijayanagara History’, QJMS, xx, pp. 95-96.

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³ Bhīm, 1, 48.

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¹ Bhārati, vi, p. 848.

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Pratāparudra, however, was not allowed to rule his kingdom long in peace. Within a year of their return from Warangal the Muslim armies were again on the move. Malik Ek-Lakhy, whom Sulṭān Quṭb-ud-Dīn had appointed as the governor of Mahārāṣṭra, rose in revolt and proclaimed his independence; he assumed the insignia of royalty, adopted the title of Shams-ud-Din, and minted coinage in his own name. The Sulṭān, on getting news of this rebellion, sent Khusrau Khān out again with an army, and commissioned him not only to put down Ek-Lakhy and to restore the royal authority in Mahārāṣṭra, but also to reduce Ma'bar to subjection. The presence of the Delhi forces on his frontiers must have caused much anxiety to Pratāparudra, but the storm passed away without affecting his territories. Khusrau Khān defeated Ek-Lakhy quite easily and sent him as a prisoner to Delhi. He restored order in the country and put in force measures for carrying on the administration. Next he proceeded to Ma'bar and had reached its capital Paṭṭan, when he was taken back to Delhi as a prisoner by his mutinous followers, who suspected his loyalty to the imperial government. The Sulṭān, who was infatuated with him, set him at liberty and restored him to favour. Then followed a series of events which shook the Muslim empire of Delhi to its foundations. Khusrau Khān basely murdered his sovereign and benefactor and usurped the throne; but the Turkish nobles, who resented his usurpation, conspired against him and put him to death. Ghiyāṣ-ud-Dīn Tughluq, their leader, then ascended the throne and proclaimed himself Sulṭān in A.D. 1320. During the first three years of his rule he was engaged in establishing his authority over Hindustan, and when that business had been successfully accomplished, he turned his attention to the South and, in A.D. 1323, sent an expedition against Telingāṇa under his son Ulugh Khān.

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The circumstances which decided Ghiyāṣ-ud-Dīn Tughluq Shāh to send his forces against Telingāṇa are not definitely known; but Firishta, writing in the early years of the seventeenth century, states that ‘Rudradēv, the rāja of Warangal, during the late disturbances had refused to send the tribute’ and Ulugh Khān was therefore sent against him.² This in itself is not unlikely, since Pratāparudra had withheld the payment of tribute once before under similar circumstances. Ulugh Khān marched to Warangal by way of Dēvagiri. Pratāparudra, according to Firishta, opposed the advance of the Muslim army with spirit, but was obliged in the end to retreat to his capital, which was immediately invested by Ulugh Khān.³ The succeeding struggle was indeed both protracted and fierce. Nor was the fighting confined exclusively to Warangal and its neighbourhood. A part of the Delhi army under Majīr Abū-Riza was engaged in besieging Kōṭagiri at the same time as Ulugh Khān was vainly attempting to capture Warangal. It is not at all unlikely that other places of importance in the country were also attacked by various detachments. Nevertheless, Ulugh Khān failed to achieve his object and had to beat a hasty retreat from Teliṅgāṇa, hotly pursued by the Kākatīya army. The failure of Ulugh Khān is attributed by Muslim historians to the machinations of the poet 'Ubaid, a treacherous companion and friend of the prince.

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According to Baranī, Ulugh Khān had closely invested Warangal, and had reduced the defenders to extremities. Of the two forts that surrounded the city, the outer or the mud fort was about to fall, when Pratāparudra sued for peace and offered to submit to the authority of the Sulṭān and to pay the tribute demanded; but Ulugh Khān, who had set his heart on the capture of Pratāparudra and his capital, rejected the offer. In the meanwhile, a change came over the spirit of the Muslim army. Since the postal system had broken down, no recent news had reached the camp from the capital, and at this juncture the poet 'Ubaid and Shaikh Zāda-i-Dimashqī, who were intimate friends of Ulugh Khān, spread in the army the false rumour that the Sulṭān was dead in Delhi, that a usurper had seized the throne, and that the Khān was about to arrest some of the important chiefs of the army, their loyalty being suspect in his eyes on account of their Khalji sympathies. This information, coming as it did from the intimate companions of the Khān, created panic in their minds, and they fled from the camp with their followers. The Muslim army was thrown into confusion as a consequence of their flight, and the Hindus, taking advantage of the sudden misfortune that had overtaken their enemies, stormed into Ulugh Khān's camp and plundered it.

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Unable to withstand their attack, he rallied his troops and retreated in haste towards Dēvagiri.¹ Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who came to India some ten years after the conquest of Teliṅgāṇa, attributes the disaster to the miscarriage of the ambitious designs of Ulugh Khān himself, and represents 'Ubaid as the unfortunate victim of his treachery. Ulugh Khān who, according to Baṭṭūṭa, was planning to stir up a rebellion against his father, instigated 'Ubaid to spread in the army the false rumour of the Sulṭān's death, expecting that the leaders of the army would swear allegiance to him as their sovereign; but his plan miscarried. The *amīrs* rose against him and would have killed him; but Malik Tīmūr, one of the principal *amīrs* in the army, offered him protection and helped him to flee to Delhi. Though the Sulṭān was aware of the treacherous designs of his son, he accepted the false accusations which the latter levelled against the *amīrs*, and not only punished them severely but also sent him back with men and money to Teliṅgāṇa to retrieve the disaster.² Though Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visited India within a decade after the fall of Warangal, he actually wrote his Risāla from memory in the last quarter of the fourteenth century, after his return to his native Morocco. The accuracy of his account is not free from doubt; for it not only contradicts the evidence of the contemporary Indian Muslim historians but also runs counter to the character of the Sultān.

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Ghiyās-ud-Din Tughluq Shāh was a just and upright ruler. It is not likely that he would have condoned Ulugh Khān’s treachery and sent him back to Telingāna with men and money, if the latter had really acted in the manner described by Baṭṭūṭa.

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² Briggs, Firishta, i, p. 403.

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³ Ibid.

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¹ *Tārīkh-i-Fīrūz Shāhī*. ED, iii, pp. 231-3.

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² ED, iii, p. 609.

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The most satisfactory account of the events mentioned above comes from the pen of ‘Iṣāmi, the earliest writer on the subject, who finished his history in A.D. 1349. According to him Ulugh Khān plundered the country until he reached Warangal. He then invested the fort for six long months but could not reduce it. The Sultān at Delhi became impatient, and wrote letters to Ulugh Khān charging him with indifference in the execution of his commands. Ulugh Khān, in his eagerness to bring the siege to a successful end, consulted ‘Ubaid, the astrologer, to find out the day on which the fort was destined to fall into his hands. The astrologer made his calculations, fixed the day of the fall, and declared that if the fort still remained unconquered on that day he would forfeit his life on the gibbet in its vicinity. The day fixed by ‘Ubaid approached; but the defenders of the fort showed no signs of submission. ‘Ubaid was greatly alarmed. If his prediction should fail, as it appeared certain to do, Ulugh Khān would certainly demand his head. To escape the evil consequences of the failure of his prediction, he devised a plan, and spreading in the army the false news of the Sultān’s death, of a revolution in the capital, and of Ulugh Khān’s secret resolve to kill the principal amirs in the camp for their alleged ‘Alā’i sympathies, he created a panic which led to their conclusion of peace with Pratāparudra and their subsequent flight from Warangal followed by that of Ulugh Khān himself.¹

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¹ *Futūḥ-us-Salāṭīn* (Madras edn.), pp. 394-7.

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Although all the three Muslim writers mentioned above were contemporaries of Ulugh Khān (the later Muḥammad bin Tughluq) yet the account of ‘Iṣāmi, as already stated, is the earliest, and may probably be considered more trustworthy than the other two. What presumably happened at Warangal may now be stated briefly, though it is not possible, owing to the conflicting character of the available evidence, to present an indisputably accurate picture of the events. Ulugh Khān marched to Warangal with his army and besieged the city for six months, but failed to capture it. A rebellion broke out in his camp owing to the machinations of ‘Ubaid who is variously spoken of as a poet and an astrologer, and Ulugh Khān was obliged as a consequence to raise the siege and retreat homewards, hotly pursued by the Hindus, who attacked him frequently, plundered his baggage, and followed him until he reached Kōṭagiri, where Majīr Abu Riza, who was engaged in besieging the fort there, came to his help and saved his army from destruction.

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Second Telingāna Expedition. Ghiyās-ud-Din Tughluq was a man of strong will and firm determination. Defeat did not discourage him, but rather urged him on to make a fresh effort to achieve his purpose. He severely punished the rebel amirs, and sent reinforcements to Dēvagiri, where Ulugh Khān had taken refuge, with instructions to his son to march again into Telingāna and to subjugate the country. As soon as the reinforcements arrived in Dēvagiri, Ulugh Khān started for Telingāna, which he reached by rapid marches to the frontier post of Badrikot (Bidar?). He seized that fort and several others along his route and posted strong garrisons in them under trustworthy officers with instructions to hold them to the last. Finally he came to Bōdhan which was distant ten days' journey from Warangal. After a siege of three or four days the fort capitulated, and the governor and his followers saved themselves by embracing Islām. Ulugh Khān next proceeded to Warangal and laid siege to the city. Not much information is available about the second siege of Warangal by Ulugh Khān. It is disposed of briefly by Barani and the later Muslim historians who follow his account. It is stated that Ulugh Khān first laid siege to the mud fort and seized it; and that the inner citadel next fell into his hands. The fort was captured and Pratāparudra was taken prisoner and sent to the court of the Sulṭān at Delhi. The capture of Warangal was not so easily effected as these historians would have us believe; but for the amazing lack of foresight of Pratāparudra, it is doubtful whether Ulugh Khān would have effected its capture as quickly as he did. The siege, as a matter of fact, lasted for five months. 'Iṣāmī describes this siege and the circumstances in which the fort was captured. It appears that after the retreat of Ulugh Khān from Warangal at the end of his first expedition, Pratāparudra held a feast to celebrate his victory over the Muslims. Believing that they would not again invade his kingdom in the near future, he opened the granaries within the fort and sold the whole of the grain stored up there; he also commanded his subjects to abandon their military activities and to busy themselves with their cattle and crops. But he was soon undeceived. Within four months of his retreat Ulugh Khān returned with a fresh army to Warangal and sat down before the walls. The fort was without any proper garrison to maintain its defence, and lacked adequate stores of corn to provision the garrison during the siege. No wonder the Muslims quickly succeeded in effecting its capture. Though taken by surprise Pratāparudra put up a plucky fight; but the scanty stock of provisions which he hastily gathered together soon ran out, and the troops inside the fort began to suffer severely from hunger. Pratāparudra was obliged to surrender. He threw open the gates of the fort, and delivered himself with the other members of his family into Ulugh Khān's hands. The Muslims then entered the fort, plundered the houses, and demolished the public buildings.

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Ulugh Khān did not allow Pratāparudra to remain long in Telingāna after his submission. Considering that it was not safe to keep him in the country, where his presence might lead to popular revolts and other political complications, he sent him immediately to Delhi with all the members of his family, escorted by a contingent of his army under Qādir Khān and Khwāja Hājī, two officers in whom he had great confidence. They were not, however, destined to bring the fallen monarch into the metropolis, for before they could reach Delhi he died. Shams-i-Sirāj ‘Afīf, who dispatches him to hell with a single sentence, does not disclose the circumstances in which he died.¹ More information is furnished by the inscriptions. In the Vilasa grant of Musunūri Prōlaya Nāyaka (c. A.D. 1330) it is stated that Pratāparudra, while being carried away as a captive to Delhi, died on the banks of the river Sōmōdbhavā, i.e. the Narmadā.² His death does not seem to have been the result of natural causes, for according to the Kaluvachēru grant of the Reḍḍi queen Anitalli, dated A.D. 1423, he departed to the world of Gods by his own desire.³ This seems to suggest that he either committed suicide or was slain by one of his followers at his own instance. Pratāparudra was a proud monarch, and it would seem that he could not reconcile himself to the changed conditions of his life in captivity. Considering perhaps that death was preferable to dishonour he seems to have voluntarily embraced it. With the defeat and death of Pratāparudra ended the rule of the Kākatīya line of kings; and the country passed into the hands of rulers belonging to an alien race and religion.

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¹ Shams-i-Sirāj ‘Afīf, *Tārīkh-i-Fīrūz Shāhī*, p. 395.

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² *AR*, A. 5 of 1938-9.

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³ *JTA*, ii, p. 106: *Tasmin Pratāparudrē Svasthānam svēchchhayāiva yātavati*.

v2.c15.s2.t5.61.1

*Pratāparudra’s Family.* The available information about Pratāparudra’s family is scanty. None of his queens is mentioned in any of the numerous inscriptions and literary works of his time. The *Pratāpacharitra*, a late legendary account of the Kākatīya kings, no doubt refers twice to his chief queen Viśālākshi;⁴ but this document is so encrusted with legend that no real reliance can be placed on its evidence. The *Krīḍābhirāmam*, a fifteenth-century Telugu rendering of the Sanskrit *Vidhinaṭakam*, *Prē-mābhirāmam* of Rāvipāṭi Tripurāntaka by Vallabharāya of Vinukoṇḍa, speaks of the beautiful and highly cultured hetaera, Māchaladēvī of Warangal, as his favourite mistress.⁵ Although persons alleged to have been his sons are referred to in the inscriptions and in the historical and quasi-historical works, he appears actually to have died without leaving issue. Of the various persons mentioned as his descendants Juṭṭaya-leṅka Goṅkā Reḍḍi, who is described in an undated inscription of his time found at Upparappalli in the Proddatur *tāluk* of the Cuddapah district as ‘his [Pratāparudra’s] dear son’, deserves notice first.⁶ Juṭṭaya-leṅka Goṅkā Reḍḍi cannot possibly have been the son of Pratāparudra for, as his name clearly indicates, his father was a person called Juṭṭaya who was a *leṅka* by profession.

v2.c15.s2.t5.61.2

Juṭṭaya-leṅka Goṅkā Reḍḍi is a compound word consisting of two names, Juṭṭaya-leṅka and Goṅkā Reḍḍi, signifying that the persons whose names are thus joined together are related to each other as father and son respectively, and obviously Goṅkā Reḍḍi could not have been the son both of Juṭṭaya-leṅka and of Pratāparudra. The truth of the matter is that Gonka Reḍḍi, like his father Juṭṭaya and his younger brother Rudraya, who is mentioned in an epigraph at Chanduvāyi in the Siddhavatam *tāluk* of the Cuddapah district,¹ was a member of the order of the *leṅkas*; and by custom, like all the other persons belonging to this brotherhood, he is referred to in the inscription as a son of the king. The historian Firishta introduces a son of Pratāparudra called Kishan Nāyak, who headed a rebellion against the Musalmāns in Teliṅgāṇa in 1336 A.D., and having expelled them made himself master of the country.² The name Kishan is the result of a scribal error. In actual fact, there never was any person bearing the name of Kishan Nāyak who played any such part at that time as is attributed to him by Firishta. On a careful examination of the text of available manuscripts of Firishta and a comparison of these with the accounts found in other Muslim histories, the real name of the author of the rebellion against the Musalmāns in A.D. 1336 is found to have been Kāpaya Nāyaka;

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and a study of the inscriptions left by him reveals the fact that he was a member of the Musunūri family and was in no way related to the Kākatīyas. How Firishta came to regard Kāpaya as the son of Pratāparudra cannot be ascertained without further resources than we at present possess. His statement that Pratāparudra had a son of the name of Kishan Nāyak must therefore be discarded as completely unhistorical. The *Pratāpacharitra* states that Pratāparudra was succeeded by his son Virabhadra. On the death of Pratāparudra, ‘it is said that Annamadēva performed his funeral rites and himself renounced the world. In accordance with the wishes of his brother’s son Virabhadra, he had him crowned king and retired with Virūpāksha to the Vindhya hills in the north-east.’³ There is absolutely no evidence to show that Pratāparudra either had a son called Virabhadra or that such a person was crowned king of the country on the death of his father. The author of the chronicle seems to have confounded Pratāparudra with the Gajapati king of that name who ruled over Coastal Āndhra and Teliṅgāṇa during the first half of the sixteenth century. This latter had indeed a son called Virabhadra, a celebrated warrior, who held sway over Koṇḍavīḍu-*daṇḍapatha* as the governor of that territory under his father. It is not improbable that the author of the *Pratāpacharitra* had this person in mind when he spoke of Virabhadra as being the son of Pratāparudra.

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