The Early History of the Deccan (Parts I–XI) v2.c15.s2.t5.17

v2.c15.s2.t5.17

The failure of this expedition did not, however, affect ‘Alā-ud-Dīn’s designs of conquest, although he could not at that time pay immediate attention to the affairs of the South, owing to the frequent Mongol attacks on his northwestern frontier and the outbreak of war in Rajputana and in Western India. The affairs of Hindustan and Western India had been settled satisfactorily by A.D. 1309: the Mongols had been finally crushed; Mālava had been conquered; Rāy Karan, the king of Gujarāt, had been defeated and driven out of his kingdom; the rebellion of Saṅgama, son of Rāmadēva of Dēvagiri, had been suppressed; and Mahārāṣṭra had been brought effectively under the control of the Sulṭān, who therefore felt that he could now devote himself without distraction to the conquest of the Southern Hindu States, and dispatched a large army under Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr and Khwāja Hājī to effect the conquest of Telingāṇa. Apart from his desire to plunder the rich Hindu kingdoms of the South, ‘Alā-ud-Dīn had two other definite reasons for sending the expedition to Telingāṇa. In the first place he wanted to wipe off the disgrace of the defeat formerly suffered by his army, and secondly he was anxious to chastise Pratāparudra for having given asylum to Rāy Karan of Gujarāt, who had come to seek refuge at his court. The Sulṭān, however, seems to have entertained some doubt about the success of the campaign, for he cautioned Malik Nā’ib Kāfūr against extreme measures and commanded him to leave Pratāparudra in possession of his dominions, if he should submit to him and agree to pay tribute.¹