Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v1.c5.36

v1.c5.36

We shall note in its proper place the influence of the Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta doctrines on the poetic theory of *rasa*; but it may be pointed out here that the conception of *upamā* (here termed *upamāna*), by which is implied the general idea of analogy or comparison, plays an important part in the different philosophical systems in the discussion of the nature and criterion of knowledge. The *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, for instance, treats of three *pramāṇas* (v 10, 14), viz., perception, (*dṛṣṭa* or *pratyakṣa*), inference (*liṅga* or *anumāna*) and analogy (*upamā* or *upamāna*). Kaṇāda and Kapila, no doubt, reject analogy as an independent and authoritative evidence; but the Naiyāyikas admit it, the purpose served by it being, in their opinion, the perception of a likeness in an object not perceived before. Vātsyāyana, commenting on I.1.3, defines it in terms almost similar to those used in the already quoted passage from the *Mahābhāṣya*,¹ as *sāmīpya-mānam upamānam*. According to the Naiyāyikas, therefore, the object attained by analogy or *upamāna* consists in the recognition of the connexion between the appellation and the thing designated by it, and thus it forms the very foundation of expression. The idea of *atideśa-vākya* reappears as the means of analogical cognition, *i. e.*, as a helper of the actual perception of similarity between the well-known and the novel object at the first sight of the latter. The co-operation of the *upamāna* is also maintained to be essential in syllogistic reasoning, where it appears in the form of the syllogistic factor, called *upanaya* (1.1.32) or statement of the minor premise. A relic of this idea of *upamāna* survives in Poetics in the treatment of Bhoja (iii 50), who distinguishes the figure *upamā* from the figure *upamāna*, although this view finds no supporter except Appayya Dikṣita, who adopts *upamāna* as a separate poetic figure.² It is needless to dilate more on this point; but the idea of *upamāna*, together with that of *atideśa*, is similarly dealt with by the Mīmāṃsakas. They, however, consider that the *upamāna* refers to an object, already familiar to us, as being similar to another object which is seen for the first time; or in the words of Upavarṣa, quoted by Śabarasvāmin, the *upamāna* or analogy, being similarity, produces an idea respecting an object that is not present, just as the sight of a *gavaya* revives the memory of a cow.¹