Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v1.c5: I Beginnings

Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v1.c5

Language
English

I Beginnings

v1.c5.1

There is an interesting passage in the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* in which Rājaśekhara, while giving us a somewhat fanciful account of the divine origin of Poetics, mentions at the same time the names of the supposed original exponents of the discipline. It is said that the Spirit of Poetry (*kāvya-puruṣa*), born of the Goddess of Learning (*sarasvatī*), was set by the Self-existent Being to promulgate the study of Poetics in the three worlds; and he related it in eighteen *adhikaraṇas* to his seventeen will-born pupils. These divine sages, in their turn, are said to have composed separate treatises on the portions respectively learnt by them. Thus Sahasrākṣa wrote on *kavi-rahasya*, Uktigarbha on *auktika*, Suvarṇanābha on *rīti*, Pracetāyana on *anuprāsa*, Citrāṅgada on *yamaka* and *citra*, Śeṣa on *śabda-śleṣa*, Pulastya on *vāstava*, Aupakāyana on *upamā*, Pārāśara on *atiśaya*, Utathya on *artha-śleṣa*, Kubera on *ubhayālaṃkāra*, Kāmadeva on *vainodika*, Bharata on *rūpaka*, Nandikeśvara on *rasa*, Dhiṣaṇa on *doṣa*, Upamanyu on *guṇa* and Kucamāra on *aupaniṣadika*. This tendency on the part of a Sanskrit author towards glorifying his science and thereby investing it with an ancient unalterable authority is not unusual, and such legendary accounts are often fabricated where the actual origin is forgotten; but it is curious that we do not meet with them elsewhere in Alaṃkāra literature, although they find expression in Bharata and in Vātsyāyana with regard to the origin of the allied disciplines of Dramaturgy and Erotics respectively. The historical value of this passage of Rājaśekhara may, indeed, be well doubted; but it is possible that this unique account, apart from its obviously mythical garb, embodies a current tradition, implying the actual existence, at some remote and forgotten period, of early expounders of poetic theory, some of whose names are still familiar, but most of whose works have apparently perished. Thus Suvarṇanābha and Kucamāra (or Kucumāra) are also cited with reverence by the author of the Kāma-sūtra (I. 1. 13, 17), both of them as authorities on Erotics, but the latter especially as well-versed in the particular subject of aupaniṣadika, which is thus included in Erotics as well as in Poetics.¹ The present-day text of the Nāṭya-śāstra, which goes by the name of Bharata, deals in an encyclopaedic manner with various topics, but Bharata is well known, as described by Rājaśekhara, as an authority on rūpaka. No work of Nandikeśvara on rasa has yet been discovered; but his name is associated with a number of works, mostly late compilations, on erotics, music, histrionic art, grammar and tantra.²

v1.c5.2

¹ Cf. Journal of the Department of Letters, Calcutta University, iv p. 95.

v1.c5.3

² Aufrecht i 276, ii 59, iii 206. The writer on Erotics is cited as Nandiśvara in Pañca-sāyaka (Bik. 533, Peter-

v1.c5.4

This traditional account may lead one to make the tempting suggestion of a very early systematic investigation of rhetorical issues but for the serious difficulty that there is hardly any material in the ancient literature itself to enable us to trace the origin of Poetics to a very remote antiquity. The Alaṃkāra-śāstra is never mentioned among the orthodox disciplines which constitute the so-called vedāṅgas, nor do we meet with any passage in the Vedic Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas or the earlier Upaniṣads in which we may find a real basis for a system of Poet-

v1.c5.5

son ii 110), whom Aufrecht is inclined to identify with Nandin quoted by Vātsyāyana (I.1.8); but the name Nandikeśvara is given in Rati-rahasya (ABod 218a, Schmidt Ind. Erotik 1911 pp. 46, 59). The work on histrionic art, attributed to Nandikeśvara, is known as Abhinaya-darpaṇa (ed. Poona 1874. MSS: IOC 3028, 3090; Oppert i 16, 950, 2503, 7264, ii 450, 2205, 5473; Burnell 436; ŚgS ii 304; WRAS 109; Madras Cat. 12980-85). Nandikeśvara is better known as an authority on music, and is cited as one of his sources by Śārṅgadeva (13th century) in his Saṃgīta-ratnākara (I. 1. 17) and by his commentator Kallinātha p. 47. Works on music attributed to Nandikeśvara are: Nandikeśvaranate Tilādhyāya in Weber 1729, and Bharatārṇava Āndhra-ṭīkā-sahita (Madras Cat. 13006-08), supposed to be a condensed version of Nandikeśvara's work by Sumati, treating of dramatic gestures and tāla. This probably explains why the last chapter in the existing version of Bharata's Nāṭya-śāstra (ed. Kāvyamālā) is designated nandi-bharata-saṃgīta-pustaka. The other names mentioned by Rājaśekhara cannot be connected with works, actual or traditional, on Poetics or kindred topics. Curiously enough, an Alaṃkāra-sūtra, consisting of 75 sūtras, is ascribed to Vātsyāyana himself in Hultzsch 269.

v1.c5.6

ics. The word *upamā*, for instance, is found as early as the *Ṛg-veda* (V. 34. 9 ; I. 31. 15), and Sāyaṇa explains it in the sense of *upamāna* (as in Pāṇini II. 3. 72) or *dṛṣṭānta*; but there is nothing unusual in this use of the general idea of similitude, which need not be interpreted as having a particular speculative significance. It is conceded, on the authority of Yāska and Pāṇini, that the conception of *upamā* or similitude considerably affected the Vedic language as well as its accent; but beyond this grammatical or philological interest, there is no indication of a dogma, much less of a theory, of Poetics in the Vedic times. Nor should undue emphasis be laid on the use of poetic figures in Vedic literature; for between this unconscious employment of figures of speech and the conscious formulation of a definite system, there must necessarily be a long step.

v1.c5.7

The first evidence of a definite, if somewhat crude, activity in this direction is traceable in the *Nighaṇṭu* and *Nirukta*. From the investigation of the peculiarities of the general form of language, which began early, attention was apparently directed to the analysis of the poetic forms of speech; but the question was still regarded entirely from the linguistic point of view. The term *alaṃkāra* in the technical sense does not occur in the *Nirukta*, but Yāska uses the word *alaṃkariṣṇu* in the general sense of ‘one in the habit of adorning’, which Pāṇini explains in III. 2. 136 and which is apparently the meaning of the word occuring in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (xiii. 8. 4. 7; iii. 5. 1. 36), and in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (viii. 8. 5). But in the *Nighaṇṭu* iii 13, a list is given of particles of comparison relating to the Vedic *upamā*, comprising twelve varieties, which are illustrated in the *Nirukta* i 4, iii 13-18 and ix 6. Six of these varieties, viz., those indicated by the particles *iva*, *yathā*, *na*, *cit*, *nu* and *ā*, are discussed in connexion with Yāska’s treatment of *upamārthe nipātas* or particles indicative of comparison (i 4), and partly included in what he designates as *karmópamā* in iii 15. Then Yāska mentions *bhūtópamā*, in which the *upamita* becomes the *upamāna* in character, and *rūpópamā*, where the *upamita* resembles the *upamāna* in point of form. The fourth variety occurs where the particle *yathā* is used. Then comes *siddhópamā*, in which the standard of comparison is well established and known to surpass every other object in a particular quality or act, and is characterised by the suffix *vat*. The last variety is *luptópamā* or suppressed simile, also called *arthópamā* (equivalent to the *rūpaka* of later theorists), which is illustrated in iii 18 (also ix 6), where the example is given of the popular application of the terms *siṃha* and *vyāghra* in a laudatory and *śvan* and *kāka* in a derogatory sense. The term *upamāna* itself is used by Yāska, but only to denote these particles of comparison (vii 31). The significance of comparison in general is also referred to in i 19, ii 6, iii 5, iv 11, v 22 and vii 13. Incidentally Yāska quotes (iii 13) the grammarian Gārgya's definition of *upamā*¹, which is important from our point of view. As explained by Durgācārya, it lays down that *upamā* occurs when an object which is dissimilar is reckoned, through similarity, with an object having similar attributes². It also states as a general rule that the standard of comparison should be superior in merit and better known than the object of comparison; but the reverse case is also admitted and illustrated (iii 14-15) by two examples from the *Ṛg-veda*. The definition, too wide as it is, recalls Mammaṭa's similar dictum, and undoubtedly establishes a very early, but more or less definite, conception of the poetic *upamā*.

v1.c5.8

¹ *athāta upamā yad atat tat-sadṛśam iti gārgyaḥ, tad āsām karma jyāyasā vā guṇena prakhyātamena vā kanīyāṃsam vāprakhyātam vopamimite'thūpi kanīyasā jyāyāṃsam.*

v1.c5.9

² *evam atat tat-svarūpeṇa guṇena guṇa-sāmānyād upamīyate ityevam gārgyūcāryo manyate.*

v1.c5.10

By the time of Pāṇini, this conception of *upamā* seems to have been tacitly recognised, and we find him using in this connexion the technical terms *upamāna*³, *upamita*⁴ and *sāmānya*⁵ as well as general expressions like *upamā*⁶ (used in the sense of the rhetorician's *upamāna*), *aupamya*⁷, *upamārthe*⁸ and *sādṛśya*¹. It is noteworthy that in nearly fifty *sūtras* distributed all over his work, Pāṇini incidentally discusses, from the grammarian's point of view, the influence of the conception of comparison on the language, in the varied dominion of affixes, including case and feminine suffixes, *kṛt*, *taddhita* and *samāsānta* terminations², in the making of compounds³ and in accent⁴. The same influence is also traceable in the idea of *atideśa*, a term which is not used by Pāṇini himself but which is made clear by his commentators, and which may be translated as ‘extended application by analogy or similarity’. Kātyāyana, in several *vārttikas*⁵, follows Pāṇini in noting the same influence of the idea of similitude, while Śāntanava in his *Phiṭ-sūtra* discusses it in connexion with accentuation.⁶ In the *Mahābhāṣya* on II. 1. 55, Patañjali has defined and illustrated Pāṇini's use of the term *upamāna*.⁷ A *māna* or measure, he says, is that which is employed in ascertaining a thing unknown; *upamāna* is approximate to the *māna* and determines the thing not absolutely (but approximately), *e.g.*, when we say ‘a *gavaya* is like a cow’.⁷ Strictly speaking, a writer on Poetics will not accept the example adduced by Patañjali as an instance of poetic *upamā*¹, inasmuch as the characteristic charmingness essential in a poetic figure is wanting in such a plain expression; but this grammatical analysis of the general idea of comparison is an early and near approach to the technical conception of Poetics.²

v1.c5.11

³ II. 1. 55 ; III. 1. 10, 2. 79, 4. 45 ; V. 4. 97, 137 ; VI. 1. 204, 2. 2, 72, 80, 127, 145, 169.

v1.c5.12

⁴ II. 1. 56.

v1.c5.13

⁵ II. 1. 55 ; II. 4. 5 ; VIII. 1. 74.

v1.c5.14

⁶ II. 3. 72.

v1.c5.15

⁷ I. 4. 74 ; IV. 1. 69 ; VI. 2. 113.

v1.c5.16

⁸ VIII. 2. 101.

v1.c5.17

¹ II. 1. 6-7 ; VI. 2. 11.

v1.c5.18

² I. 4. 79 ; II. 3. 72 ; III. 1. 10, 2. 79, 4. 45 ; IV. 1. 69, 4. 9 ; V. 1. 115-16, 2. 39, 3. 96, 106, 4. 97, 137.

v1.c5.19

³ II. 1. 7, 31, 55-6 ; VI. 2. 11.

v1.c5.20

⁴ V. 1. 18 ; VI. 1. 204, 2. 2, 11, 72, 80, 113, 127, 145, 169 etc.

v1.c5.21

⁵ on I. 3. 21 ; II. 1. 55, 2. 24, 4. 71 ; III. 1. 10 etc.

v1.c5.22

⁶ e.g. II. 16, IV. 18.

v1.c5.23

⁷ *Mānam hi nāmānirjñāta-jñānārtham upādīyate nirj-

v1.c5.24

¹ *go-sadṛśo gavaya iti nupamā*, *Citr. mīm.* p. 6.

v1.c5.25

² The conception of *upamā* appears to be fully established in Bhartṛhari’s *Vākyapadīya*, e.g. i. 63.

v1.c5.26

A special interest attaches to these rules of Pāṇini and the dicta of early grammarians, inasmuch as they form the basis of what may be termed the grammatical sub-division of the figure *upamā* into direct (*śrautī*) and indirect (*ārthī*) simile as well similes based on *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes, recognised as early as Udbhaṭa’s time. Thus the authority for the *śrautī upamā*, in which the notion of comparison is conveyed by particles like *yathā*, *iva*, *vā* or by the suffix *vat*, when *vat* is equivalent to *iva*, is supposed to be based on two rules of Pāṇini (V. 1. 115-16), which lay down that the suffix *vat* is applied to the standard of comparison in the locative or genitive case and takes the place of the case-ending and *iva*, as well as to a noun which should otherwise be in the instrumental case in the sense of *tena tulya* (like that), if the similarity consists in an action and not in quality. Thus we get *hatam artham jñāsyāmiti, tat-samīpe yan nṛtyantāya mimīte tad nupamānam, gour iva gavaya iti*, ed. Kielhorn I p. 397.

v1.c5.27

the forms *mathurāvat* (=*mathurāyām iva*) *pāṭaliputre prākāraḥ*, *caitravat* (=*caitrasya iva*) *maitrasya gāvaḥ*, as well as *brāhmaṇavad* (=*brāhmaṇena tulyam*) *adhīte*, but not *caitravat kṛśaḥ*. In the same way, we have compounded simile like *kumbhāviva stanau*, according to the *vārttika* (*ivena samāso vibhaktyalopaḥ*) on Pāṇini II. 4. 71, which is, therefore, taken as an instance of compounded direct simile (*samāsagā śrautī upamā*). Similarly, the ending *kyac*, according to Pāṇini III. 1. 10, is applied to a noun in the objective case, which is expressive of *upamāna* in the sense of ‘behaviour’ (*ācāra*), and gives us a simile in phrases like *pauram janam sutīyasi*; while the next rule of Pāṇini lays down that the suffix *kyan* may be applied to a noun in the nominative case in the sense of ‘behaving like’ and forms the basis of a simile in such expressions as *tava sadā ramaṇīyate śrīḥ*. It is needless to cite more examples, for this will be sufficient to indicate that some of the speculations on poetic speech can be traced back to the early grammatical analysis of the same ideas, as well as the fact that even in the age of Pāṇini, some of these conceptions appear to have been well established and to have considerably influenced his enquiry. It must be admitted that these tentative sallies of the grammarians are not definite enough to indicate the existence of a system, but the stock of notions, thus indirectly relating to Poetics, though not large, yet throws an interesting light on the genesis of later speculations on poetic speech.

v1.c5.28

If any deduction is permissible from the name ‘*Alaṃkāra*’ (lit. embellishment) given to the discipline as well as from the contents of the earliest existing works on the subject, it will appear that the science started *a posteriori* out of the very practical object of analysing poetic embellishments of speech with a view to prescribe definite rules of composition; but it cannot be doubted that it received a great impetus from the highly developed enquiry into the forms of language made by the grammarians. From internal evidence as well as from the testimony, which admits of little doubt, of some of the ancient authorities on Poetics, it is clear that the theoretical background of the discipline was, to some extent, founded on the philosophical speculations on linguistics, so that Grammar, one of the oldest and soundest sciences of India, was its god-father and helped it towards ready acceptance. Ānandavardhana speaks of his own system as being based on the authority on the grammarians, to whom he pays an elegant tribute as the first and foremost thinkers (*prathame hi vidvāṃso vaiyākaraṇāḥ, vyākaraṇa-mūlatvāt sarva-vidyānām*, p. 47); while Bhāmaha, one of the earliest known formulators of poetic theory, not only devotes one whole chapter to the question of grammatical correctness—a procedure which is followed by Vāmana—but also proclaims openly the triumph of the views of Pāṇini (vi 63). Apart from such details as the linguistic analysis of the idea of comparison referred to above, it can be easily shown that some of the fundamental conceptions of poetic theory, relating to speech in general, are avowedly based on the views of the grammarians to the exclusion of other schools of opinion. Thus the question whether the convention (*saṃketa*), whereby the expressed meaning of a word (*abhidhā*) is to be understood, is accepted by a reference to the views of the grammarians on this point. The grammarians hold, in opposition to the Naiyāyikas, Saugatas and Mīmāṃsakas, that the import of a word is either *jāti*, *dravya*, *kriyā* or *guṇa*, as expressed by the dictum *catuṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ*, cited from the *Mahābhāṣya*¹ by Mukula (p. 4) and Mammaṭa (*Svp.* p. 2.) Indeed, the whole analysis of the two functions of word and its sense, called *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*², are borrowed from the grammatico-philosophical ideas already elaborated by the grammarians; and even the new aesthetic system of Ānandavardhana, in establishing the third function of *vyañjanā* attempts to seek an authority for its theory on the analogy of the quasi-grammatical theory of *sphoṭa*, which is associated with the name of the pre-pāṇinian grammarian Sphoṭāyana, and which we find fully developed in the *Vākyapadīya*

v1.c5.29

¹ I have not been able to trace this sentence in the *Mahābhāṣya*, but its purport has been sufficiently explained at the very commencement of that work. Cf. also *Kumārasambhava* ii 17, where this view is clearly mentioned, although Mallinātha would explain the *catuṣṭayī pravṛtti* with reference to the four *vivartas* of *vāc*.

v1.c5.30

² Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* on VIII. i. 12

v1.c5.31

Some of these ideas, again, are more or less recognised in the different philosophical systems, which concern themselves with *śabda* or speech in general, in connexion with the question of scriptural revelation and interpretation. The theory of *sphoṭa*, which, however, has only a far-fetched relation to Poetics, has also its significance in some systems of philosophy; and the idea of manifestation, implied in the *vyañjanā-vṛtti*, which consists not in the expression of something new but in the manifestation of something already existing, is not altogether unfamiliar to Indian speculation. A similar train of thought meets us in the Sāṃkhya idea of causation (i 117-18), in which the effect is not produced but is already comprehended in the cause and therefore can only become manifest. We find another analogy in the general idea of the Vedântin's *mokṣa* or liberation, which consists of a condition, not to be produced but to be made manifest or realised, by the removal of enveloping obstacles.¹ The theory relating to the other two functions of words (*abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā*), which play such an important part in poetic speculation, had already engaged the attention, not only of the philosophical grammarians, but also of the philosophers themselves, especially the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas. The Naiyāyikas, for instance, hold that by denotation (*abhidhā*) of a word, we understand not only the individual (*vyakti*), but also the genus (*jāti*) and the quality (*guṇa*)¹; while the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that it signifies primarily (*jāti*), and the *vyakti* is understood by implication (*ākṣepa*) through its inseparable connexion with *jāti*.² The *Nyāya-sūtra*, again, gives an exhaustive list of the relations through which a word may be used in a secondary sense, the idea of secondary sense, variously called *gauṇa*, *bhākta*, *lākṣaṇika* or *aupacārika artha*, being tacitly admitted in almost all the systems.³ Indeed, the theories of Poetics on these points are considerably mixed up with the doctrines of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools; and even Bhāmaha’s early work devotes a considerable space to the discussion of the logic of poetry and the expressive functions of words.

v1.c5.32

¹ It is noteworthy that the *Vedânta-sūtra* makes a direct use of the term *rūpaka* in the technical sense (I. 4. 1), upon which Appayya Dīkṣita remarks: *bhagavatā bādarāyaṇena "nānumānikam apyekeṣām iti cen na śarīra-rūpaka-vinyastagṛhīter darśayati ca" iti śārīraka-sūtre rūpakam aṅgīkṛtam* (Citr. mīm. p. 54 ed. *Kāvyamālā* 1907). cf also *Vedânta sūtra* iii. 2. 18.

v1.c5.33

¹ *Nyāya-sūtra* II. 2. 68

v1.c5.34

² *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* I. 3. 33 ff.

v1.c5.35

³ *Vedānta-sūtra* II.3.16, III.1.7; *Nyāya-sūtra* II.2.64, also I.2.11, 14, 35; *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* V 67 etc.

v1.c5.36

We shall note in its proper place the influence of the Nyāya, Sāṃkhya and Vedānta doctrines on the poetic theory of *rasa*; but it may be pointed out here that the conception of *upamā* (here termed *upamāna*), by which is implied the general idea of analogy or comparison, plays an important part in the different philosophical systems in the discussion of the nature and criterion of knowledge. The *Maitrī Upaniṣad*, for instance, treats of three *pramāṇas* (v 10, 14), viz., perception, (*dṛṣṭa* or *pratyakṣa*), inference (*liṅga* or *anumāna*) and analogy (*upamā* or *upamāna*). Kaṇāda and Kapila, no doubt, reject analogy as an independent and authoritative evidence; but the Naiyāyikas admit it, the purpose served by it being, in their opinion, the perception of a likeness in an object not perceived before. Vātsyāyana, commenting on I.1.3, defines it in terms almost similar to those used in the already quoted passage from the *Mahābhāṣya*,¹ as *sāmīpya-mānam upamānam*. According to the Naiyāyikas, therefore, the object attained by analogy or *upamāna* consists in the recognition of the connexion between the appellation and the thing designated by it, and thus it forms the very foundation of expression. The idea of *atideśa-vākya* reappears as the means of analogical cognition, *i. e.*, as a helper of the actual perception of similarity between the well-known and the novel object at the first sight of the latter. The co-operation of the *upamāna* is also maintained to be essential in syllogistic reasoning, where it appears in the form of the syllogistic factor, called *upanaya* (1.1.32) or statement of the minor premise. A relic of this idea of *upamāna* survives in Poetics in the treatment of Bhoja (iii 50), who distinguishes the figure *upamā* from the figure *upamāna*, although this view finds no supporter except Appayya Dikṣita, who adopts *upamāna* as a separate poetic figure.² It is needless to dilate more on this point; but the idea of *upamāna*, together with that of *atideśa*, is similarly dealt with by the Mīmāṃsakas. They, however, consider that the *upamāna* refers to an object, already familiar to us, as being similar to another object which is seen for the first time; or in the words of Upavarṣa, quoted by Śabarasvāmin, the *upamāna* or analogy, being similarity, produces an idea respecting an object that is not present, just as the sight of a *gavaya* revives the memory of a cow.¹

v1.c5.37

¹ P. 7 *ante*.

v1.c5.38

² *Kuvalay.* ed. N. S. P. 1913 p. 174. Nāgeśabhaṭṭa takes it as included in the figure *upamā* itself, and Vāmana appears to deal with one of its varieties (viz., *anubhūta-viṣaya*) as an instance of what he calls *tattvākhyānopamā* or descriptive simile (IV. 2. 7).

v1.c5.39

¹ *upamānam api sādṛśyam a-sannikṛṣṭe'rthe buddhim utpādavat, vathā gavaya-darśanam go-smaraṇam*, on I. 1. 15.

v1.c5.40

Although these speculations have an indirect bearing on Poetics and might have suggested and helped to develop some of its fundamental theories, they cannot be taken as a definite basis of any deductions as to the antiquity of the discipline itself. It is striking indeed that we have no direct or indirect reference to Poetics as a *śāstra* in early texts, although at the end of the 9th century Rājaśekhara speaks of a tradition which makes it the seventh *aṅga*. Poetics is omitted in the enumeration of the different branches of study in the well-known passage in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (VII. 1. 2. 4, ed. Böhtlingk). Āpastambha (II. 4, 11), speaks of the usual six *aṅgas*, but Yājñavalkya (i 3) enumerates in all fourteen *śāstras*, to which the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* adds four more, in which Poetic is not mentioned at all. In a similar list in the *Lalita-vistara*¹, there is a reference to *kāvya-karaṇa-grantha* and *nāṭya*, which may be taken to imply Poetics and Dramaturgy respectively, but the designation ‘Alaṃkāra’ is not met with until we come to *Śukra-nīti* which includes it, in company with *Artha-śāstra*, *Kāma-śāstra* and *Śilpa-śāstra*, among thirty-two different *śāstras*. It has been pointed out by Rhys Davids² that the old Pāli texts, *Aṅguttara* (i 72, iii 107) and *Saṃyukta* (i 38, ii 267), there are references to a similar study. These passages are interesting historically as being opposed to the science, but they do not expressly or by implication mention it as Alaṃkāra-śāstra.³

v1.c5.41

¹ Ed. Lefmann I p. 156.

v1.c5.42

² In a letter to me dated 24. 2. 1921.

v1.c5.43

³ In Kauṭilya’s *Artha-śāstra* there is a chapter devoted to the procedure of writing *śāsanas*, where mention is made of *arthakrama*, *paripūrṇatā*, *mādhurya*, *audārya*, and *spaṣṭatva* as excellences which should be attained. These do not correspond to the *guṇas* defined in earlier Alaṃkāra-works, but perhaps represent the common-sense view of the matter.

v1.c5.44

It seems likely, therefore, that Poetics as a technical discipline must have been of comparatively late origin, and probably began to develop in the first few centuries of the Christian era.⁴ With the flourishing of Sanskrit learning and literature in the 4th and 5th centuries under the Gupta Emperors, its development probably proceeded apace. Bühler’s epigraphical researches ¹ have confirmed the indication, first given by Lassen, as regards the development of Sanskrit *kāvya*-style in this period, and it may be taken as the prelude to a rhetorical activity which bore rich fruit in the 8th and 9th centuries in systematic investigations of poetic principles. His examination of the early inscriptions, not only proves the existence of a body of highly elaborate prose and metrical writings in the *kāvya*-style during the first five centuries A.D., but it also establishes the presumption that most of these *praśasti*-writers were “acquainted with the rules of Indian poetics” ². Bühler attempts to show that the manner in which these writers conform to the rules of Alaṃkāra, crystallised in the oldest available manuals like those of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, would go to indicate “the existence of an Alaṃkāra-śāstra or some theory of poetic art” ³.

v1.c5.45

⁴ Patañjali refers to a large number of poetical works (ed. Kielhorn I 283, 340, 426, 444; II 34, 102, 119, 167, 313, 315; III 143, 338 etc.), which fact apparently indicates a considerable poetical activity in his age, preluding a systematic investigation of poetic principles; but there is no reference to Alaṃkāra literature in his time.

v1.c5.46

¹ *Die Indischen Inschriften*, trans. *IA* xiii, pp. 29f.

v1.c5.47

² *Ibid*, p. 146.

v1.c5.48

³ p. 243. This conclusion is, to some extent, supported by a passage in the Girnar inscription itself (2nd century A. D.), which contains a reference to “prose and poetry embellished (with poetic figures) and rendered attractive by poetic conventions and expressions which are clear, light, pleasing, varied and charming” (*sphuṭa-laghu-madhura-citra-kānta-śabda-samayōdārālaṃkṛta-gadya-padya*) *EI* viii p. 44.

v1.c5.49

From this period of time, we get more or less definite indications of the existence of doctrines of Poetics in the *kāvya*-literature itself. In the two earlier epics, no doubt, some of the more general terms of Alaṃkāra (like *upamā*, *kāvya*, *nāṭaka*, *kathā* and *ākhyāyikā*) are used, but no chronological conclusion is safe from the admittedly composite character of the present-day texts. But in the *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghoṣa, as Cowell notes, we have the use of common poetic figures like *upamā*, *utprekṣā* or *rūpaka*, as well as of elaborate ones like *yathā-saṃkhya* and *aprastuta-praśaṃsā* in an ingenious way, which presumably betrays an acquaintance with the teachings of Poetics. The very first verse uses the word *upamā* in a some what technical sense, and we have also in iii 51 the use of the term *rasāntara* to indicate a counter-emotion which cancels an already prevailing one. Cowell, therefore, is justified in remarking that a peculiar interest attaches to such poems "from their importance in establishing Prof. Bühler's views as to the successful cultivation, in Northern India, of artificial poetry and rhetoric—*kāvya* and *alaṃkāra*—in the early centuries of our era." This remark applies with greater force to the works of Kālidāsa, which appear with all the polish and perfection imparted to them by a trained and careful artist. To the later theorists they supply an inexhaustible store-house of quotations for the illustration of different poetic figures, expressions and principles. This conscious employment of varied and elaborate poetic figures and general observance of poetic rules in these early *kāvya*-poets are not without their significance, and we may reasonably presume from them a general diffusion of the knowledge of Poetics in this age.

v1.c5.50

The same tendency towards the artificial or factitious composition is shown also in the prose romances of Subandhu and Bāṇa. Subandhu prides himself on his skill in the use of *śleṣa* in every letter of his composition¹, and his *Vāsavattāda* justifies this boast as a *tour de force* of extraordinary verbal jugglery. In the work itself Subandhu speaks of poetic compositions adorned with poetic figures like *śleṣa*, divided into *ucchvāsas*², and displaying skill in the employment of *vaktra* metre. He specifies also two important poetic figures, viz., *utprekṣā* and *ākṣepa*.³ Equally definite is Bāṇa’s references to rhetoric in his mention, in one of the introductory verses of his *Kādambarī*, of the poetic figures *upamā*, *jāti* (=*svabhāvōkti*), *dīpaka* and *śleṣa* as well as of poetic *rasa* and *śayyā*. Bāṇa also refers to verbal puzzles, such as *akṣara-cyuta*, *bindumatī*, *gudha-caturthapāda* and *prahelikā* ¹, and he seems to be aware of the *ālaṃkārika* distinction between *kathā* and *ākhyāyikā*.²

v1.c5.51

¹ *pratyakṣara-śleṣamayaprapañca-vinyāsa-vaidagdhyanidhim prabandham | sarasvatī-datta-vara-prasādaś cakre subandhuḥ sujanaika-bandhuḥ*, ed. Śrīraṅgam, 1906, p. 357-8

v1.c5.52

² Cf Bhāmaha i 25-26; Daṇḍin i 26-27.

v1.c5.53

³ *satkavi-kāvya-racanām ivālaṃkāra-prasādhitām*, p. 303; *dīrghocchvāsa-racanānukulam su-śleṣa-vaktra-ghaṭanā-paṭu satkāvya-viracanam iva*, pp. 238-39; *utprekṣākṣepau kāvyālaṃkāreṣu* p. 146. The reading of the first of these passages in the Calcutta edition is *bauddhasaṃgatim ivālaṃkāra-bhūṣitām*, and the commentary of Śivarāma explains it as *alaṃkāro nāma dharmakīrti-kṛto grantha-viśeṣaḥ*, implying that Subandhu here refers to a work on Alaṃkāra, so designated, by the Buddhist Dharmakīrti. If this were so, and if this Dharmakīrti can be identified with the Buddhist logician, who appears also to be quoted in the *Dhv.* pp. 217, then he is apparently one of the earliest writers on Alaṃkāra whose work is now lost; for he is generally placed in the first half of the 7th century. This conflicts with the accepted date of Subandhu, and undue reliance need not be placed on an unauthenticated statement of a very late commentator. Levi is probably correct in denying that Subandhu

v1.c5.54

¹ ed. Peterson, p. 7

v1.c5.55

² *ibid*, p. 7 and *Harṣa-c.* p. 7

v1.c5.56

From all these indications, the inference is not improbable that with the growth of a body of highly finished prose and poetical literature, the science of Poetics or at least the investigation of rhetorical rules made considerable progress by the end of the sixth century A. D. The earliest known writers on Poetics, who lived somewhat later, themselves refer to still earlier authorities. Thus Bhāmaha speaks of Medhāvin and others, whom he cites and whose work he avowedly utilises. Similarly Daṇḍin refers to earlier writings, and one of his commentators mentions in this connexion two theorists before Daṇḍin, viz, Kāśyapa and Vararuci, who are otherwise unknown to us as writers on Alaṃkāra. Apart from this fact of their own citation of earlier views, makes any allusion to Dharmakīrti’s literary activity (*Bulletin de l'Ecole d'Extreme Orient* 1903, p. 18).

v1.c5.57

it cannot also be maintained with any cogency that the relatively developed style and treatment of even these early writers could have been evolved by themselves in the absence of earlier tentative works, the existence of which may be presumed, for instance, by the employment, by these writers, of certain technical words and formulas (e. g. *vakrókti*, *rīti*, *guṇa* etc) without a previous explanation.

v1.c5.58

As a cognate branch of study, however, which probably supplied Poetics with a model and the poetic theory with the important content of *rasa*, Dramaturgy (*nāṭya-śāstra*) appears to have established itself a little earlier. Comparatively early texts, both brahmanical and buddhistic, speak of some kind of dramatic representation, and we have a very early reference in Pāṇini to Kṛśāśva and Śilālin as authors of *naṭa-sūtras* (IV. 3. 110-11)¹. The early existence of treatises on the dramatic art is also evidenced by the fact that all the early authors on Poetics, Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmana, omit a discussion of this subject and refer their readers for information to such specialised works. The older specimens of these are perhaps lost; but Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra*, which is cited as the oldest known and most authoritative, cannot possibly be put, even in its present version, at a date lower than the 6th century A. D. Bharata himself, however devotes a whole chapter to the treatment of poetical *guṇas* and *alaṃkāras* as decorative devices of dramatic speech. It seems, therefore, that the study of Alaṃkāra was older than Bharata; and the tradition of opinion, followed by Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, may have been post-Bharata in date, but was probably pre-Bharata in substance. Indeed, the different schools of opinion, represented by the *alaṃkāra-*, *rīti-* and *dhvani-* theories, probably flourished some centuries before their views became crytallised in the present works of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the Dhvanikāra respectivly, none of whom, as we shall see, can be taken as the absolute founder of the system he represents. This process of crystallisation must have covered a tentative stage, whose productions, if they had been extant today, would have shown Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the Dhvanikāra in the making. We cannot, therefore, start with the works of these writers as the absolute beginnings of the science, although with them we enter upon the historic and the most creative stage of its existence. Taking this fact into consideration, we may presume without dogmatising that the Alaṃkāra-śāstra started as a separate technical discipline from about the commencement of the Christian era and probabably flourished in a relatively developed form in the 5th and 6th centuries A.D. The course of this development is unfortunately hidden from us, until it emerges in a more or less self-conscious form in some chapters of Bharata and in the *Kāvyālaṃkāra* of Bhāmaha.

v1.c5.59

¹ It is interesting to note that both Amara and Śāśvata in their lexicons do not explain the technical terms of Alaṃkāra, although they have distinct references to dramaturgic technicalities and to *rasa*.

Linked texts (36)