Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c84.47

v2.c84.47

Mahimabhatta maintains, by analysing many examples taken from the Dhvanyāloka, that the expressed sense does not really suggest the unexpressed sense, but that between the two, other inferences are possible and do occur. The vyakti, as Ānandavardhana himself admits (p. 192), is the manifestation of that which is desired to be manifested, and which becomes manifest along with that which manifests it, just as a jar in a dark room becomes visible along with the light which makes it visible. The vastu, alaṃkāra and rasa, which are the three suggested elements in the opinion of the dhvani-theorists, are not manifested in this way, for they are not comprehended along with the expressel which suggests them, but only afterwards. The interval between the perception of the expressed vibhāvas and the suggested rasa, for instance, is indeed very short, and is therefore called by the *dhvani*-theorists themselves a process of imperceptible sequence (*asamlakṣya-krama*); but this very nomenclature shows that the existence of a *krama* or sequence cannot be denied, and that the expressed and the unexpressed, therefore, are sequential. Being such, they must bear the relationship of a logical premise and its conclusion (pp. 11 f). Even in the case of the indicated sense, as in the phrase *gaur vāhīkaḥ*, what one first understands is that the two (*gaur* and *vāhīka*) are not identical, and from this the conclusion arises that they are meant as possessing similar qualities; the indicated sense here is ultimately reached by *anumāna* (p. 24). Thus *artha* is merely a ground of inference and not a *vyañjaka*. The process of inference is very wide in its scope, much wider than *dhvani* which is naturally included in it (*tasya*, i. e. *anumānasya*, ca *tadapekṣayā mahā-viṣayatvāt* p. 12). With regard to *śabda*, it cannot be taken as the *vyañjaka* or suggestor of anything else but its literal meaning. As it exhausts itself after expressing its literal or primary sense, even the secondary indicated meaning (*lakṣya artha*) has admittedly to be inferred, not from itself but from the latter; how can it be supposed to suggest any deeper sense? But such words, through their expressed sense, can well become the ground or source of inferences (*anumāpaka*), pp. 27 f.