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Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c84: VI. Abhinavagupta And The Reactionary Systems

Studies in the History of Sanskrit Poetics v2.c84

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VI. Abhinavagupta And The Reactionary Systems

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The importance of Abhinavagupta as writer on Sanskrit Poetics lies in his learned exposition of the *dhvani*-theory in his well known commentary on the text of Ānandavardhana; and his erudition, reputation and influence as a great scholar and philosophical writer of his generation, no doubt, added a weight to his championship of the theory, and contributed a great deal to its ultimate exclusive acceptance in later Poetics. His theoretical standpoint, however, does not differ, except in one material point which will be dealt with presently, from that of the formulators of the *dhvani*-system; and he may be fairly regarded as belonging to that group of faithful commentators who are more anxious to interpret than to incorporate new ideas into the system they comment upon. On the other hand, Abhinavagupta was also greatly interested in the dramaturgic work of Bharata and wrote an elaborate and stupendous commentary on this encyclopaedic text. From this interest in dramaturgy, we have seen¹, he came to be deeply interested in the various theories about the origin and function of *rasa*, not only in the drama but also in poetry; and one of the latest and most important theory on *rasa* is directly associated with his name by Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and others.

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¹ See Ch. IV, p 160.

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In expounding this theory, he tried to explain clearly how the *vyakti* or *vyañjanā* of the *dhvani*-theorists could be applied to the case of the manifestation of *rasa*, thus correlating the *rasa*-doctrine with the *dhvani*-theory. He defined the concept of *rasa* and its place in poetic theory, and furnished a brilliant aesthetic explanation of a phenomenon which had already taxed the ingenuity of many a previous thinker on the subject.

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Having realised the importance of *rasa* in poetry, Abhinava, however, went a step further than the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana in boldly setting it up as the only essence or aesthetic foundation of poetry, a view which has greatly influenced all later speculation on the subject. From the earlier drama and dramatic theory, no doubt, the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* had worked up the idea of *rasa* into poetry and poetic theory; but as the emotional mood in poetry, which the fact of *rasa* emphasises, came to be more and more prominent, the *rasa* stood out more and more in relief as its essential aesthetic basis. We have seen² that Abhinava’s predecessors in the Dhvani school consider *rasa* only as one of the elements of the unexpressed, which may take other forms in the shape of an unexpressed matter (*vastu*) or an unexpressed imaginative mood (*alaṃkāra*). No doubt, their theory puts great emphasis on the *rasa-dhvani* or suggestion of *rasa* in poetry; but both the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana are yet careful in taking into account other kinds of suggestion and do not, as they could not, erect the *rasa* into the very ‘soul’

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² See Ch. v, p. 210.

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of poetry. No doubt, it may be thought that they show a decided partiality to *rasa*, which would practically lead to a conclusion of its essentiality; but they could not, having regard to theoretical consistency give exclusive preference to it; for in their complete scheme of Poetics the *rasa-dhvani*, which is only one of the three forms of the unexpressed, plays as much part as the *vastu-* and *alaṃkāra-dhvani*. They had to recognise that the centre of gravity in a poem may lie in its material and its imagination, as much as in its emotional element. Abhinavagupta appears to have attached little weight to these theoretical considerations, which had restrained his predecessors from explicitly stating what they practically implied; and brushing them aside, he carries their theory to its utmost logical consequence by declaring the essentiality of *rasa* (*rasenaiva sarvaṃ jīvati kāvyam*), without which, in his opinion, there could be no poetry (*na hi tac-chūnyam*, i. e. *rasa-śūnyam, kāvyaṃ kiṃcid asti*, p. 65). He attempts, however, to explain the theoretical discrepancy by saying that the two other aspects of suggestion, concerned respectively with *vastu* and *alaṃkāra*, resolve themselves ultimately into the suggestion of *rasa*, which is in fact the essence of poetry (*rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaṃkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasaṃ prati paryavasyete*, p. 27). This opinion, no doubt, influenced the view of later thinkers to a great extent; for, although Mammaṭa carefully follows the cautious attitude of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, Viśvanātha, developing their theory (after Abhinava) further out of itself, pushes it to its extreme limit and builds up his own scheme of Poetics on the basis of the theory that poetry consists of a sentence of which the ‘soul’ is rasa (vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam). But we shall see that the considerations which led the Dhvanikāra and his commentator to leave their view on this point wisely unstated could not be easily put out of the way, and they are repeated substantially by Jagannātha in his criticism of Viśvanātha’s view. All later writers, however, agree in thinking that the rasa-dhvani is certainly the most important point for consideration in poetry; and even if they do not explicitly state with Abhinava that the vastu-and alaṃkāra-dhvani resolve ultimately into rasadhvani, they yet show a decided partiality to the latter element.

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This is, in brief, the general position of Abhinavagupta as a champion of the new system established by Ānandavardhana. The final dominance of this system in later speculation is due not only to the instrinsic worth of the theory itself and its masterly formulation by Ānandavardhana, but also probably to the authority which Abhinava’s exposition as well as his reputation lent to it. We find in the immediate followers of the system, however, not the extreme position of Abhinavagupta, but the theory and the scheme as finally outlined by Ānandavardhana. With Ānandavardhana, the dhvani-theory, which was itself ancient, came to prevail; but with him also was evolved a more or less complete scheme of Poetics in which the divergent gleams of earlier thought and the accumulated stock of recognised ideas meet and are rationally adjusted. This scheme, with the concept of *dhvani* (especially *rasa-dhvani*) at its centre, was summed up and uttered in the concise form of a systematic text-book by Mammaṭa, another Kāśmirian, whose influence perhaps was no less potent than that of Abhinavagupta in raising it to almost exclusive authority in later times. This system, which for convenience we have called the Dhvani system, absorbed and overshadowed all previous schools and systems, and came to reign supreme, only to be improved in detail by the large crowd of its followers who form the bulk of post-dhvani writers on Poetics. Jagannātha, one of the latest writers of this group, very aptly remarks, therefore, that the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka* settled the path to be followed by later writers on Poetics (*dhvanikṛtām alaṃkārika-saraṇi-vyavasthāpakatvāt*, p. 425).

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But it must not be supposed that the theory of *dhvani* or the system could obtain universal acceptance without some vigorous opposition. Before we take up the post-dhvani followers of Ānandavardhana, it will be necessary to consider here some of the reactionary writers who either follow and develop other traditions of thought, or who refuse to acknowledge the new theory. Adherents of other schools, such as Pratīhārendurāja (pp. 79f) who commented on Udbhaṭa, or Gopendra Tippa Bhūpāla (p. 72) who commented on Vāmana, carry on the older tradition and do not fail to criticise the new theory. Says Mukula, Pratīhārendurāja’s *guru*: *lakṣaṇā-mārgavagāhitatvaṃ tu dhvaneḥ saḥṛdayair nūtanatayópavarṇitasya vidyata iti....etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā* nirūpaṇīyam, na tu jhagityévásūyitavyam ity alam atiprasaṅgena (p. 21). But more hostile opposition or attack came from some really thoughtful writers who urged new systems, or new explanations of the *dhvani*-theory in terms of old ideas. Most of these theorists lived near enough in time to Abhinavagupta; and coming later than the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*, they accept or show themselves cognisant of the general concept of *dhvani*, but attempt to formulate other explanations of it. All of them, however, agree that the *vyañjanā* *vṛtti* need not be postulated or proved for explaining the suggested sense of poetry, and conservatively maintain that the suggested sense can be reached from the expressed sense by some of the recognised means or processes of knowledge (e.g. *anumāna*). None of these writers, therefore, is what the Dhvanikāra would call an *abhāva-vādin*, i.e., none of them would deny the existence of *dhvani*, but they would try to explain it in terms of already recognised concepts or processes. These theorists are Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka who probably preceded Abhinavagupta, Kuntala who was probably the latter's contemporary, and Mahimabhaṭṭa who was either a younger contemporary or lived immediately after Abhinavagupta. It will also be convenient to take up in this connexion the school of opinion represented by the writer on Poetics in the *Agni-purāṇa* and by Bhoja, which stands in many respects apart from the Kashmiri school of Ānandavardhana and which appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the *dhvani*-theory.

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It is unfortunate that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* is now lost. From the citations of Abhinavagupta and others, the conjecture is likely that it was not a commentary on Bharata’s *Nāṭya-śāstra*³ but an independent work written in prose and verse (i.e., with verse-*kārikā* and prose-*vṛtti*) and resembling Mahimabhaṭṭa’s later *Vyakti-viveka* written in the same style and with the same object. Like the latter work, it was composed, if not for establishing a new theory of Poetics, at least for controverting the position of the *Dhvanyāloka* and formulating a different explanation of *dhvani*, especially of *rasa-dhvani*. When Mahimabhaṭṭa later on took upon himself the task of “demolishing” the *dhvani*-theory, he boasted at the outset of this elaborate attack that he had composed his *Vyakti-viveka* without looking into the *Darpaṇa*⁴ (presumably *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa*, as explained by his commentator), which was therefore obviously written with the same object of *dhvani-dhvaṃśa*. No doubt, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was one of the four writers (mentioned by Abhinava, Mammaṭa and others) who formulated explanations of Bharata’s *sūtra* on *rasa*; but this in itself is no reason to take him as a commentator on Bharata’s text⁵. On the other hand, Abhinava’s references in *Locana* make it reasonably clear that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa*, like the *Vyakti-viveka*, had the special object of criticising in detail the text of the *Dhvanyāloka* as well as its theory; and its discussion of *rasa* might have come in topically in connexion with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s general views regarding poetry and poetic expression.

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³ See Vol. I, pp. 39-43.

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⁴ It is curious that Mahimabhaṭṭa says that in composing his own work he has not also looked into the *Candrikā*, which was apparently an adverse commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka*. It is probably the same work as is referred to and criticised frequently by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana*, and as, he says, was composed by one of his ancestors. Abhinava’s references and criticism also confirm the idea that it criticised the text of the *Dhvanyāloka* adversely on many points. See Vol. I, pp. 105-6. This *Candrikā* is also apparently cited by Māṇikyacandra and Someśvara in their commentaries on Mammaṭa.

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⁵ My attention is called to a passage (I owe the reference to Prof. Sovani) in the *Abhinava-bhāratī* ch. i, which appears (see Sovani’s article on the Pre-dhvani Schools in *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, p. 390, contra in *JRAS*, 1909, pp. 450-52) clearly to indicate that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* was a commentary on the *Nāṭya-śāstra*. The passage in my MS runs thus (commenting on *brahmaṇā yad udāhṛtam* in Bharata i 1): *bhaṭṭa-nāyakas tu brahmaṇā paramātmanā yad udāhṛtam kṛta-nidarśanam.........tad anena pāramārthikam prayojanam uktam iti vyākhyānam hṛdaya-darpaṇe paryagrahīt*. This passage is indeed significant, and the relevancy of any comment on Bharata i 1 is difficult to explain in a work, which *ex hypothesi* is not a commentary on that text; but it appears to militate against those references to and passages from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s work (prose as well as verse) which Abhinava cites and criticises in his *Locana* (pp. 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 27, 28, 29, 33, 63, 67-68) and which consist mostly of direct criticism of the text of the *Dhvany-āloka*. Either of two explanations is possible: (1) that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* was in fact a commentary on Bharata’s *Nāṭya-śāstra*, and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s criticism of the *Dhvany-āloka* might have constituted incidental discussions in it (but this does not explain the presence of verses in it which later writers, including Abhinavagupta, quote from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in their exposition of his views); or (2) that it was an independent work in prose and verse, consisting of Bhaṭṭa

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The question, however, cannot be definitely settled so long as we get only glimpses of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s views set forth in the brief exposition and adverse criticism of Abhinava and others. We have already considered at some length Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s views regarding the origin and function of *rasa* in poetry⁶. We have seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka regards *rasa-carvaṇā* as the essence of poetry, but he is apparently not prepared to accept the function of *vyañjanā* as its means of manifestation⁷. Nāyaka’s propounding of his own views in opposition to those of the *Dhvanyāloka*; and the discussions of *rasa*-theory and of Bharata’s text are not altogether inexplicable, as they might have been topical in connexion with his general theory. The passage from the *Abhinava-bhāratī* cannot be taken as decisive; and I am inclined to accept the latter explanation, with which Kane also (*HAL* p. xii) appears to agree. Kane, however, does not appear to have seen this passage from the *Abhinava-bhāratī*.

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⁶ see Ch. IV, pp. 154f.

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⁷ Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s objection to the *abhivyakti*-theory is thus summarised by Abhinavagupta (*Locana* p. 68): “If the potentially existing *śṛṅgāra* is supposed to be manifested by *abhivyakti*, then it would occupy its field of action in diverse degrees (*viṣayārjana-tāratamya-pravṛttiḥ*), i.e., thus contradicting the nature of *rasa* as one. There would also be the difficulty mentioned before (see above p. 153), namely, whether the *rasa* is manifested as existing in oneself or in another person”.

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It is possible that he admits a suggested sense, as the essence of poetry (*rasa-dhvanis tu tenaivā-tmatyāṅgīkṛtaḥ*, *Locana* p.15); but from Abhinava's twitting him on this score it is probable that he denied *vastu-dhvani* (*kiṃ tu vastu-dhvaniṃ dūṣayatā rasa-dhvanis tadanugrāhakaḥ samarthyata iti suṣṭhu-tarāṃ dhvani-dhvaṃso'yam*, p. 29). Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains in a verse attributed to him by Abhinava (p. 27), Hemacandra (p. 4), Māṇikyacandra (p. 4) and Jayaratha (p. 9) that the distinction between various kinds of literary composition lies in the fact in the *śāstra*, *śabda* predominates, *artha* in the *ākhyāna*, (=probably *itihāsa*), while in the *kāvya*, both *śabda* and *artha* are subordinated (*guṇībhūta* or *nyagbhāvita*). Elsewhere he is represented by Abhinava (p. 68) as saying that the verbal composition (*śabda*) which makes up poetry is different from other species of verbal composition by the fact that it possesses three elements. Of these elements, *abhidhā* or Denotation belongs to the province of expressed meaning, *bhāvakatva* or power of generalisation to that of *rasa*, and the *bhojakatva* or the power of enjoyment to the appreciating audience; thus we have three functions attributed to the three elements of poetry. If Denotation, among these, is taken by itself (i.e. without the other two), then what is the essential difference, he asks, between the poetic figures and the dogmas which form the method of *śāstras*? Or, if this manifold distinction of functions is without importance (metaphorically as well as intrinsically), then why avoid faults like unmelodiousness (*śrutiduṣṭa*)? These considerations, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka thinks, would give us the second function, viz., *bhāvakatva*, by which generalisation is accomplished of poetry as well as of its factors (*vibhāvas*). It is on account of this function that *abhidhā* or Denotation is also Indication (*lakṣaṇā*), i.e., the Denotion can give to the expressed sense a metaphorical significance as the basis of *rasa*. After the *rasa* is thus generalised (*bhāvita*), comes its enjoyment or *bhoga* which, we have seen, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka represents, after the Sāṃkhya philosophers, as a process of disinterested contemplation akin to the philosophic contemplation of Brahma.

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Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka thus postulates a function of *bhoga*, beyond those of *abhidhā* and *bhāvakatva*, inherent in poetry, in order to explain the working of *rasa*. He seems to imply that the *rasa*, which the *dhvani*-theorists would take as the suggested emotional sense of poetry, is, in his opinion, purely *sva-saṃvedya* and therefore transcending definition. In other words, he belongs to that class of objectors to the *dhvani*-theory regarding whom the Dhvanikāra says that they do not deny *dhvani* but think that its essence lies beyond the province of words (i 1c). In a verse attributed to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka by Abhinava (pp. 15, 11) and Jayaratha (p. 9), he speaks of *kāvyāṅgatva* and not *kāvya-rūpatā*⁸ of what is known as *dhvani*; a statement, which would indicate that having assumed the concept, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s object was to establish an explanation different from that of the *dhvani*-theorists. Ruyyaka thinks that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka would regard what is called *vyaṅgya-vyāpāra* to be an element (*kāvyāṃśatva*) and not an essence of poetry, being reached by the bold utterance of the poet (*prauḍhókti*). In this sense, the *kavi-karman* or act of imagination on the part of the poet (indicated by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as Jayaratha points out, by the word *vyāpāra*), which makes *śabda* and *artha* subservient to itself, is the most important thing in poetry; a view which approximates Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s theory to that of Kuntala, who makes *kavi-karman* the source of *vakrokti* in poetry.

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⁸ Read in the verse *kāvyāṅgatvaṃ na rūpatā*, instead of *kāvyāṅgatvaṃ na rūpitā*, as given by the reading of MS *ga* indicated in *Locana* p. 15.

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Kuntala, author of the *Vakrokti-jīvita*, on the other hand, had no direct intention of attacking or disproving the *dhvani*-theory. He appears to have accepted the fact of a suggested sense in poetry, but, following the tradition of Bhāmaha's *vakrokti*, he develops a system of *vakrokti* of his own, in some aspects of which he includes all ideas of *dhvani* and *rasa*. Nearly the whole of his long lost work has been recently recovered, and a part of it (chs. i and ii) has been published by the present writer⁹; it is now possible, therefore, to depend no longer on the references to Kuntala in later literature for an account of his views, but gather it independently from his own statements¹⁰.

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⁹ In the Calcutta Oriental Series, 1923.

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¹⁰ An account of Kuntala's theory of poetry is given

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The central idea in Kuntala is that the vakrokti is the essence (*jīvita*) of poetry; and by vakrokti he understands a certain striking or charming (*vicitra*) mode of expression (*vinyāsa-krama*), which is different from or excels the common or matter-of-fact expression of words and ideas in the *śāstras* and the like (*śāstrādi-prasiddha-śabdārthópanibandha-vyatireki*). It is therefore a deviation from the established mode of speech for the purpose of attaining a certain strikingness (*vaicitrya* or *vicchitti*), or an imaginative turn of words and ideas (*bhaṅgī-bhaṇiti* or *bhaṇiti-prakāra*) peculiar to poetry and abhorrent of common speech, in which facts are more or less simply stated. This is the vakratva or *vakra-bhāva* underlying all poetic speech. A distinction, therefore, is implied not only between the method of the sciences and the scriptures (*śāstrādi*), on the one hand, and that of poetry, on the other, but also between what may be called the "naturalistic" and the "artistic" mode of expression¹¹.

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¹¹ See above Ch. II, pp 61-2.

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Kuntala, therefore, holds that *sālaṃkṛta śabda* and *artha* or embellished word and sense alone constitute poetry, and this embellishment consists of vakrokti. The so-called embellishments, which go by the name of poetic figures (*alaṃkāras*) in orthodox Poetics, are merely aspects of this vakrokti, and can be properly included in its comprehensive scope. So can also the ideas of *dhvani* and *rasa*. This vakrokti being the only possible *alaṃkāra* and being essential

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in my introduction to the above edition, which see for detailed references.

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as such, Kuntala finds fault with the common statement that the *alaṃkāra* belongs to poetry; for such a statement would imply that poetry may exist without it (i 7, 11).

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Kuntala then explains that the *vakrokti* charms us by the skill of the poet, and is therefore called *vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhaṇiti*¹². It rests ultimately on the conception (*pratibhā*) of the poet, or on his skill (*kauśala*), or on an act of imagination on his part, which is termed *kavi-vyāpāra* or *kavi-karman*. Kuntala does not exactly define this *kavi-vyāpāra*, which is the ultimate source of poetry, perhaps because he is conscious of the fact that it is in its nature undefinable; but he analyses it elaborately, and distinguishes and classifies its function in six different spheres, namely, in the arrangements of letters (*varṇa*), of the substantive and terminal parts of a word (*pada-pūrvārdha* and *pada-parārdha*), of a sentence (*vākya*), of a particular topic (*prakaraṇa*), and of the composition as a whole (*prabandha*). He devotes nearly the whole of his work, with the exception of the introductory portion of the first chapter, to the definition, classification and illustration of these varieties of *kavivyāpāra-vakratā*, which thus form the different categories into which poetic speech may be analysed.

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¹² The word *vidagdha* is used in opposition to the word *vidvat* to signify a man versed in belles-lettres as distinguished from a scholar; and the *Dhvanyāloka* often speaks of an appeal to *vidagdha-vidvat-pariṣat* (pp. 201, 239). Avantisundarī is cited in *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* p. 46 as saying *vidagdha-bhaṇiti-bhaṅgī-nivedyaṃ vastuno rūpaṃ na niyata-svabhāvam*. The *vaicitrya* is discussed by Ānandavardhana at p. 243, in which connexion he uses the term *bhaṇiti-kṛtam vaicitrya-mātram*. Abhinava speaks of infinite variety of *upamā-vicchitti* (*upamā-vicchitti-prakārāṇām asaṅkhyatvāt*, p. 5 *Locana*), and uses it also synonymously with *cārutva* (p. 8). It would appear from the verse quoted by Ānandavardhana at p. 130, the word *vicchitti*, used in this sense in poetic theories, is applied analogically from the same word used to signify a certain feminine charm or elegance derived from carelessness in dress and decoration (Bharata xxii 16). See on this point Haricand Śāstrī, *L'art Poétique de l'Inde* pp. 64-65. The word *bhaṅgī* in the sense of a turn of expression is used in *Dhva*° pp. 139, 241. Etymologically it appears to have the same meaning as *vicchitti*.

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It is clear from this brief exposition that Kuntala cannot admit as poetry a composition involving mere *svabhāvokti*, which he takes to be plain description without the requisite strikingness; and he consequently develops Bhāmaha’s indication that a kind of *atiśaya* is involved in *vakrokti-vaicitrya*. This *atiśaya*, if it is taken in the sense of the *lokāti-krānta-gocaratā* of Bhamaha’s *atiśayokti*, would imply a kind of heightened charm of expression which is *lokōttara* or dissociated from personal interests and relations. The dissociation, therefore, which is supposed in the artistic attitude involved in the relish of *rasa*¹³, is also implied in *vakrokti*; and on this point Kuntala appears to agree with the main position of the *rasa*-theorists. Kuntala also thinks that the ultimate test of this *lokōttara vaicitrya* is *tadvid-āhlāda* or pleasure in the appreciating *sahr̥daya*, who plays here apparently the same part as he does in the *rasa*-theory, or in poetic theories generally. It seems, therefore, that the exponents of the different theories approach ultimately the same standard, albeit through different avenues of thought, and agree in holding that vaicitrya or camatkāra (in alaṃkāra or rasa) must be finally subjected to the taste of the sahr̥daya.

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¹³ See above Ch. IV.

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Thus a new turn was given to the alaṃkāra-system of Bhāmaha; or rather, what was implicit or naively expressed in it was developed to its logical consequence by Kuntala’s systematic analysis of its implications¹⁴. In spite of the obviously extreme nature of his central theory and his somewhat quaint nomenclature, his work is of great value as presenting a unique system, or rather as systematising the alaṃkāra-theory of earlier writers in a refreshingly original way. The dhvani-theorists had either dismissed the poetic figures (alaṃkāras) as mere vāg-vikalpas, or considered them only as heightening the charm of the unexpressed element in poetry. They speak of the relation of the alaṃkāra to the principal suggested element of poetry (e. g., in the shape of rasa); but there might arise cases where the poet’s obvious intention is not to awaken the rasa or anything else unexpressed, but simply to produce a strikingness in the form of an expressed poetic figure. In these cases, the authors of the Dhvanyāloka think that all such figures which, in connexion with an involved unexpressed element, possess a peculiar charm, belong to the class of poetry called by them guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya; if there is no such unexpressed element involved, they have a pictorial effect merely, and may be included in the lowest class of poetry, called by them *citra* and described by them as no poetry but an imitation thereof. In other words, they take such poetic figures as being connected with the unexpressed possess a peculiar charm, and and thus justify their position in poetry; the figures unaccompanied by the unexpressed or in no way connected with it are condemned to the level of no-poetry, as phases of speech which is of infinite variety (*anantā hi vāg-vikalpās tat-prakārā eva cālaṃkārāḥ*). Kuntala, on the other hand, justifies the significance of such figures in poetry as *figures*, and shews that this significance is independent of all considerations of their connexion with the unexpressed, as it consists in the very *vaicitrya* or strikingness involved in in them, which is sufficient in itself, and does not borrow its power of appeal from elsewhere.

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¹⁴ The vakrokti-system of Kuntala may properly be regarded as an off-shoot of the older alaṃkāra-system (Ch. II).

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But he justifies the *alaṃkāra* as such only when it involves the *vaicitrya*, *vicchitti* or *vakratva* and becomes a phase of *vakrokti*. He admits that the poetic figures are particular forms of speech, aspects of the expressed denotation (*abhidhā-prakāra-viśeṣāḥ*), in which one need not suppose any connexion with the unexpressed, but he supposes at the same time a specific differentia in it which consists in a peculiar turn of expression resulting in a characteristic strikingness (*vaicitrya* or *vicchitti*) and depending upon an act of imagination on the part of the poet (*kavi-pratibhā-nirvartita*). Thus the so-called *alaṃkāras* of orthodox Poetics are admissible when they are found on analysis to possess these characteristics of peculiar charm imparted to them by the fertile imagination of the poet; and these therefore constitute the elements which go to make up the being of a poetic figure¹⁵. Kuntala in this way not only supplies a remarkable deficiency in the teaching of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, but also justifies the existence and fixes the conception of a poetic figure as distinguished from a mere speech-figure. It is no wonder, therefore, that later followers of the Dhvani school, who form the bulk of post-dhvani writers on Poetics, readily accept Kuntala's analysis, and regard the two characteristics, viz., vicchitti and kavi-vyāpāra, as forming the ultimate test of a poetic figure. Mammaṭa lays down that where there is no suggested rasa, the poetic figures simply result in ukti-vaicitrya or charmingness of expression, and states generally that alaṃkāra is charmingness itself (vaicitryam alaṃkāraḥ). We shall see that Ruyyaka was the first writer who accepts Kuntala's test of a poetic figure and applies it systematically to a detailed examination and classification of individual poetic figures.

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¹⁵ Hence, the word "poetic" figure or kāvyālaṃkāra, instead of "figure of speech." See above Ch. II. pp. 94. In a formal scheme of Poetics they no doubt correspond, but this point of view of its involving poetic charm would be entirely omitted in a treatise of rhetoric. It is therefore misleading to translate Sanskrit Alaṃkāra as Sanskrit Rhetoric. See ZDMG, lvi, 392 fn.

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It follows from the prominence given by Kuntala to vakrokti in poetry that all ideas of dhvani and rasa should be comprehended in certain aspects of vakratā, just as the vṛttis of Udbhaṭa, connected with *anuprāsa*, as well as *anuprāsa* itself and *yamaka* of orthodox writers, are taken as kinds of *varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā* or *vakratā* depending upon the peculiar arrangement of letters. The idea of *dhvani* is included partly in *rūḍhi-vaicitrya vakratā*, where Ānandavardhana’s own verse *tālā jāanti guṇā* as well as the verse *snigdha-śyāmala-kānti* cited by Āuanda as an example of *arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācya dhvani* (i. e. the case of suggestion where the expressed sense passes into another sense), is given as instances. Other aspects of *dhvani* are acknowledged in *upacāra-vakratā*, where the verse *gaaṇam ca mattamehaṃ*, cited by Ānanda as an instance of *atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya dhvani* (i. e., the case of suggestion where the expressed sense disappears entirely), is given as an example. From Kuntala’s treatment it appears that he takes *upacāra* in the sense of a supposed or fancied identification of two objects, however distinct, on the basis even of the slightest resemblance. As such, therefore, it is admittedly involved in figures like metaphor (*rūpaka*) and forms the basis of metaphorical expression generally. This would come under the comprehensive domain of transferred expression known as *lakṣaṇā*, and would be included by the *dhvani*-theorists under *lakṣaṇā-mūla-dhvani*, i. e. suggestion based on transference or Indication¹⁶. Kuntala would thus belong to that group of writers regarding whom the Dhvanikāra says that they do not deny the existence of *dhvani* but regard it as *bhākta* (*bhāktam āhus tam anye*), i. e., depending on a transference of sense or Indication.

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¹⁶ It is for this reason that Ruyyaka thinks that the Vakrokti-jivita-kāra comprehended all ideas of *dhvani* in *upacāra-vakratā* and the like (p. 8 with Jayaratha thereon).

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Regarding *rasa-dhvani* which comes under *asaṃlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya* (i. e., suggestion of an imperceptible process), it is clear that Kuntala who admits not the essentiality of *rasa* but that of *vakrokti*, can comprehend *rasa* only as an element in some aspects of *vakrokti*. In the third chapter of his work, dealing with *vākya-vakratā*, he discusses how poetry may be made charming by delineating appropriate *rasas*. In this connexion he examines in some detail such figures as *rasavat*, *preyas* etc., in which the *rasa* was admitted as an element by early theorists, whose system, maintaining the importance of *alaṃkāra* in poetry, could not otherwise recognise *rasa* independently. The special poetic figures like *rasavat* etc., constituted the back-gate, as it were, for the admission of the idea of *rasa* in the *alaṃkāra*-systems. When, however, the theory of *rasa* assumed its proper importance in the schools, the necessity naturally arose of explaining how the *rasa*, which is essential and therefore fit to be embellished (*alaṃkārya* or *upakārya*) can itself be regarded as a means of embellishment (*alaṃkāra* or *upakāraka*) in figures like *rasavat*. We find accordingly in the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana an attempt to comprehend the *rasavat* etc., under the class of poetry called by them *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya*, in which the suggested sense (in this case the suggested *rasa*) is subordinated to the expressed sense. The theory was put into shape by distinguishing the sphere of *asaṃlakṣya-krama dhvani* from that of figures like *rasavat*.

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on the ground that when the *rasa* is predominant and forms the essence of the poem in question, it constitutes the principal suggested element, and as such it is *alaṃkārya*; but when it is subordinate to the expressed sense, it constitutes mere *alaṃkāra* or embellishment (*Dhva*° ii 4 f). The °*Pradīpa* puts this concisely by saying : *yatra pradhānaṃ rasādis tatra dhvaniḥ, yatra tvapradhānaṃ tatrālaṃkāra iti bhāvaḥ*. Logically following this view, Mammaṭa does not regard the cases of *rasavat* etc., as poetic figures at all, but only as a variety of *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* poetry¹⁷.

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¹⁷ Later writers and commentators, however, unwilling to depart from the authority of the "ancients", attempt to explain the problem of *rasavat* in various ways by a method of ingenious interpretation, which keeps to the letter but changes the spirit of the old dictum. Most these views are discussed by Viśvanātha. One school holds that the designation *alaṃkāra*, given to figures like *rasavat* merely because they help the development of *rasa*, is a purely secondary application of the term (*bhākta*), for they are not really *alaṃkāras* but should be accepted as such in deference to the practice of ancient writers (*rasūdyupakāra-mātreṇālaṃkṛti-vyapadeśo bhāktaś cirantana-prasiddhyṅgīkārya eva*). These theorists admit a difference between *rasavat*, on the one hand, and *alaṃkāras* properly so called (such as *upamā*), on the other : for in the one case the *rasa* directly embellishes another *rasa*, while in the other case, the *rasa* is indirectly embellished through the form of word and sense. But they maintain at the same time that there is one thing in common between the two kinds, viz, that both of them embellish the *rasa*, either directly or indirectly, by being subservient to it. On account of this similarity of function, the designation *alaṃkāra*, which is properly applicable to such

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Kuntala takes up the *rasavat* topically under *vastu-vakratā*, which may relate to both *sahaja* and *āhārya vastu*, the delineation of *rasa* coming apparently under the latter head, which is described as *kavi-śakti-vyutpatti-paripāka-prauḍha*. He criticises the definitions of *rasavat* given by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and others, and holds that it is neither *darśita-spaṣṭa-śṛṅgārādi-rasam*, nor *rasa-saṃśrayam*, nor again *rasa-peśalam*, but *rasena tulyam vartamānam*; and consequently it is not an *alaṃkāra* but an *alaṃkārya*. In other words, the *rasa* is awakened in these cases for its own sake, and not for the purpose of embellishing the expressed word and sense. If not theoretically invulnerable, this view is interesting as indicating that the importance of *rasa*, first advocated in poetic theories by the Dhvanikāra, appears to have influenced thinkers belonging to other traditions of thought. The Dhvanikāra attempts to reconcile the older idea

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figures as *upamā*, is applied to the *rasavat* by an extension of the sense (*bhakti*), and this usage has the sanction of ancient and respectable authority to which we must bow. But this explanation is rejected by others as being too fine. The difference between *alaṃkāras* like *upamā*, on the one hand, and the *rasavat*, on the other, which is supposed to be due to the fact of direct and and indirect embellishment, is admitted to be true, but is explained away as purely accidental and immaterial; and, strictly speaking, we should designate both as *alaṃkāras* instead of indulging in fine distinctions. A third view, which altogether rejects this distinction between direct and indirect embellishment, maintains that the general definition of *alaṃkāra* as that which embellishes the *rasa* through word and sense, is applicable as much to *rasavat* as to regular figures like *upamā*.

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of *rasavat* as involving the idea of *rasa* secondarily, by admitting it in his second division of poetry; but Kuntala brushes aside even the view of his master Bhāmaha in this respect, and thinks that this case should be regarded as one in which the poet has an opportunity of creating a kind of *vakrokti* in which the *rasa* supplies the principal charm. But he allows the *rasa* to play the greatest part in what he calls *prabandha-vakratā*, i. e., in *vakratā* occurring in the composition as a whole, which, he thinks, must be accomplished chiefly by the aid of pleasing *rasas* (*rasāntareṇa ramyena yatra nirvahaṇam bhavet*). It is not the mere matter or plot, but the beauty imparted to it by the continuous sense of *rasa* in it which can make the words of a poet live (*nirantara-rasoddhāra-garbha-saundarya-nirvahāḥ | giraḥ kavīnām jīvanti na kathā-mātram āśritāḥ*). Kuntala even accepts the *Dhvanyāloka's* judgment that in the two great epics, the *śānta rasa* is the *aṅgin* (predominant *rasa*) and constitutes their principal charm, although he thinks that it is ultimately the *kavi-pratibhā* which is the all-important thing in poetry.

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Mahimabhatta begins his *Vyakti-viveka*, whose very name implies that it is a consideration of the theory of *vyakti* or *vyañjanā* established by the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*, with the proposition that his object is to comprehend all ideas of *dhvani* in the process of *anumāna* or syllogistic reasoning (*anumāne* ntarbhāvaṃ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum). He proceeds therefore to consider in detail the text as well as the theory of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana. He criticises minutely the definition of dhvani given in Dhva° i 13, which, if properly considered, applies, he thinks, to anumāna. He considers (especially in the third chapter) most of the examples given in the Dhvanyāloka and tries to demonstrate that they are really cases of anumāna. Indeed, throughout his work he proceeds by an elaborate process of destructive criticism and makes the definition of dhvani, propounded by its advocates, conform to his definition of what he calls kāvyānumiti as the process through which another sense is revealed by the expressed sense, or by a sense inferred from it connectedly (vācyas tad-anumito vā yatrārtho'rthāntaram prakāśayati | sambandhataḥ kutaścit sā kāvyānumitir ityuktā, p. 22).

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This being his main position, he accepts only two senses of śabda, namely, the actually expressed (vācya) and the inferrible (anumeya), including under the latter both lakṣya and vyaṅgya senses, whose independent existence he does not admit. He says (p. 7); "Meanings are of two kinds, the expressed and the inferrible. Of these, the expressed belongs to the function of a word, and is alone called the primary sense of a word......From it, or being inferred from it, as from a logical hetu or middle term in a syllogism, another sense which is inferred, is called the inferrible sense. This again is threefold, consisting of mere matter (vastu), the poetic figures (alaṃkāra) or the rasas.

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The first two of these varieties can also become the expressed, the last is always inferrible”. It is clear enough from this that Mahimabhatta apparently accepts the recognised concept of a suggested sense in the shape of a vastu, alaṃkāra and rasa, but maintains that these are not revealed by vyakti or suggestion, but by anumāna¹⁸; for the expressed sense and the so-called suggested sense stand in the relation of liṅga and liṅgin, the middle and the major terms of a syllogism (p. 12).

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¹⁸ This is the only important point of his disagreement with the Dhvanyāloka; in other respects, he says, there is hardly any disagreement (prāṇabhūta dhvaner vyaktir iti saiva vivecitā | yat tvanyat tatra vimatiḥ prāyo nāstityupekṣitam ||).

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Mahimabhatta maintains, by analysing many examples taken from the Dhvanyāloka, that the expressed sense does not really suggest the unexpressed sense, but that between the two, other inferences are possible and do occur. The vyakti, as Ānandavardhana himself admits (p. 192), is the manifestation of that which is desired to be manifested, and which becomes manifest along with that which manifests it, just as a jar in a dark room becomes visible along with the light which makes it visible. The vastu, alaṃkāra and rasa, which are the three suggested elements in the opinion of the dhvani-theorists, are not manifested in this way, for they are not comprehended along with the expressel which suggests them, but only afterwards. The interval between the perception of the expressed vibhāvas and the suggested rasa, for instance, is indeed very short, and is therefore called by the *dhvani*-theorists themselves a process of imperceptible sequence (*asamlakṣya-krama*); but this very nomenclature shows that the existence of a *krama* or sequence cannot be denied, and that the expressed and the unexpressed, therefore, are sequential. Being such, they must bear the relationship of a logical premise and its conclusion (pp. 11 f). Even in the case of the indicated sense, as in the phrase *gaur vāhīkaḥ*, what one first understands is that the two (*gaur* and *vāhīka*) are not identical, and from this the conclusion arises that they are meant as possessing similar qualities; the indicated sense here is ultimately reached by *anumāna* (p. 24). Thus *artha* is merely a ground of inference and not a *vyañjaka*. The process of inference is very wide in its scope, much wider than *dhvani* which is naturally included in it (*tasya*, i. e. *anumānasya*, ca *tadapekṣayā mahā-viṣayatvāt* p. 12). With regard to *śabda*, it cannot be taken as the *vyañjaka* or suggestor of anything else but its literal meaning. As it exhausts itself after expressing its literal or primary sense, even the secondary indicated meaning (*lakṣya artha*) has admittedly to be inferred, not from itself but from the latter; how can it be supposed to suggest any deeper sense? But such words, through their expressed sense, can well become the ground or source of inferences (*anumāpaka*), pp. 27 f.

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The process of inference in poetry by which the unexpressed may be thus reached is presumably the ordinary process of syllogistic reasoning, which consists in the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of the middle (*liṅga*) and the major (*liṅgin*) terms. The *dhvani* or suggested sense is the *liṅgin*, and its suggestors (viz., word and sense) are apparently its *liṅga*. The invariable concomitance is ascertained in three ways, viz., by *anupalabdhi* (non-cognition), *tādātmya* (identity) and *tadutpatti* (causation). In reply to Mahimabhatta's position, it has been shewn that none of these means of proving a syllogism is applicable to establishing the invariable concomitance between the *liṅga* *śabdārthau* and the *liṅgin* *dhvani*. The non-cognition of word and sense does not prove the existence of *dhvani*; for non-cognition only proves that *liṅgin* which consists of the absence of something. That a jar is absent can be proved from its non-cognition. But here the *liṅgin* *dhvani* does not consist of the absence of anything. Therefore the *hetu* is vitiated, and the non-cognition of word and sense can only prove *their* absence, but not that of *dhvani*. There can be no identity, again, between the suggested sense (*dhvani*) and that which suggests it (*śabda* and *artha*); for the suggested meaning is essentially different from the expressed, and comes out prominently by keeping the latter in subordinate position. Similarly, the test of *tadutpatti* or causation does not apply, for here the word and sense cannot be regarded as being caused by the suggested sense, in the same way as the smoke, which proves the existence of fire, can be taken as being produced from the fire itself.

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Viśvanātha puts the objections in another way.

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Inference is the knowledge of the *lingin* by means of the *linga*, qualified by its existence in the subject (*pakṣa-sattva*), its existence in similar instances (*sapakṣa-sattva*) and its exclusion from opposite instances (*vipakṣa-vyāvartatva*). For example, we conclude in the subject, e. g., a smoky hill, the existence of the *lingin* fire by the *linga* smoke, which we see existing in it, as well as in similar instances (such as in the culinary hearth, where there is no doubt as to the existence of fire), and which we see absent from opposite instances (e. g., such places where the absence of fire is certain). But this syllogistic method is not strictly applicable to establishing the suggested sense from the expressed; for logical inference, Viśvanātha points out, has nothing to do with works of imagination. Take, for instance, the following verse:

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*dṛṣṭiṃ he prativeśini kṣaṇam ihāpyasmad-gṛhe dāsyasi*
*prāyeṇāsya śiśoḥ pitā na virasāḥ kaupīr apaḥ pāsyati |*
*ekākinyapi yāmi satvaram itaḥ srotas tamālākuḷam*
*nirandhrās tanum ālikhantu jaraṭha-cchedā nala-granthayaḥ //*

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“O neighbour, will you cast your eyes for a moment here on our house? The father of this child will scarcely drink the tasteless water of a well. Though alone, I go quickly hence to the river whose banks are covered with *tamāla*-trees. Let the densely swarming knots of reeds with their hard projections scratch my body”. Here the reed-knot’s scratching the woman’s body and her going alone to the quiet river-side may be taken as the *linga* of her enjoyment with a lover, which is the suggested sense (*liṅgin*) here. But these alleged reasons, though they help to reveal the unexpressed sense, are not invariable; for dalliance with a gallant is not, from the logical point of view, universally predicable of a woman going alone to a river-side or from her being scratched by the reed-knots.

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It is noteworthy that Mahimabhatta relies (p. 26) also upon the arguments of those objectors of the *dhvani*-theory who think that *dhvani* is identical with *bhakti*¹⁹; but he opposes alike the views of those Mīmāṃsakas who believe in the single pervasive power of the expressed sense²⁰, as well as the view of the Vakroktijīvita-kāra. His objection to the latter system is naturally based on his own idea of the importance of *rasa* and unimportance of *dhvani*. In his opinion, any deviation from common usage involving charmingness of expression, such as Kuntala upholds, may take either of two forms, viz., (1) it may resolve itself more or less into a theory of propriety (*aucitya*)²¹, or (2) it 'may mean the manifestation of an implied sense other than the expressed sense. If the first alternative is meant, it is superfluous to one who admits *rasa* in poetry, as no theory of *rasa* can dispense with a theory of propriety or suitability with regard to the adjustment of its factors²². To admit the other alternative is to bring in the idea of *dhvani* in a more or less disguised form.

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¹⁹ See above Ch. v, pp. 194f.

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²⁰ See above Ch. v, pp. 192-93.

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²¹ Mahimabhatta treats the question of *aucitya* (already dwelt upon in the *Dhvanyāloka*) in the second *vimarśa* of his work. He divides the subject of impropriety, which may be *śabda-viṣaya* and *artha-viṣaya*, into two heads according as it concerns the matter or form of poetry. The former, called *antaraṅga anaucitya*, consists in improper employment of the *vibhāvas* etc. in the manifestation of *rasa*. It has already been dealt with in the *Dhvanyāloka*. The formal impropriety, called *bahiraṅga anaucitya*, is chiefly concerned with the occurrence of five defects, viz., *vidheyavimarśa* (pp. 37-58), *prakrama-bheda* (pp. 58-66), *krama-bheda*

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²² A similar criticism, Prof. Sovani thinks (in a letter to me, dated March 2, 1924), is levelled against the Vakroktijivitakāra's theory by Abhinavagupta in *Locana* p.

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It is true that Mahimabhatta's work is a masterpiece of scholastic argumentation, exhibiting much fastidious criticism and great learning of a miscellaneous kind; but its avowed object is polemical and it does not pretend to set up a new system. Mahimabhatta possessed all the qualifications of a good controversialist and enters into his task with a decided animus, which constitutes the source at once of his weakness as well as of his strength. A fine product of a scholastic age, he cannot yet look beyond the pettiness of immediate issues; and whatever might be the value of his peculiar proposition, he hardly ever adds to its limited interest any indepen- (pp.66-69), *paunaruktya* (pp.69-84) and *vācyavacana* (pp.84-109). The question of *aucitya* will be dealt with in the next chapter.

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²⁰⁸ But, in my opinion, it really refers in the context to Ānandavardhana's discussion of the views of those who think, after Bhāmaha, that the *atiśayokti* is involved as an essential element in most poetic figures. This standpoint is similar to that of Kuntala: but the passage in question cannot be taken as a decisive reference to him or his theory of *vakrokti*.

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dent treatment of the larger problems of Poetics. This is perhaps one of the reasons why even his logical acumen and his erudition failed to keep the interest of his work alive; but the chief reason why his book was forgotten in later times and was cited only to be condemned—a fate which it shared with the *Vakrokti-jīvita* of Kuntala—was that it pitted itself against the more formidable theory of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana which was destined to supersede it by attracting away the best thinkers of later times. The *anumāna*-theory of Mahimabhatta, like the *vakrokti*-theory of Kuntala, appears to have never received any liberal recognition in the hands of later theorists, nearly all of whom, since Mammaṭa's time, accepted without question the system of the *Dhvanyāloka*; and in attempting to explain away the new theory in terms of the already recognised idea of *anumāna*, or reviving Bhāmaha's old position in the face of the more widely received theory of the new aesthetic school, Mahimabhatta and Kuntala were apparently fighting on behalf of a cause already doomed.

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