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A History of Pali Literature v1: Volume 1

A History of Pāli Literature v1

Language
English

Contents

Volume 1

Front matter

v1.c1.1

The Problem of the "State of Nature"

v1.c1.2

The problem of the "state of nature" is the central problem of the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. It is not a historical problem, but a logical one. It is not a question of what man *was* in the beginning, but of what he *is* in his essence. The state of nature is the state of man stripped of all the artificial additions of society, of all the conventions of law and custom. It is the state of man as he is in himself, in his original purity or his original corruption.

v1.c1.3

The thinkers of the Enlightenment were not in agreement as to the nature of this state. For some, like Rousseau, it was a state of innocence and happiness, a state from which man had fallen through the development of reason and the arts. For others, like Hobbes, it was a state of war, a state of "nasty, brutish, and short" life, from which man had to be rescued by the creation of a sovereign power. But for all of them, the state of nature was the starting point of their inquiry. It was the laboratory in which they tested their theories of human nature and of the origin of society.

v1.c1.4

The state of nature is not a place, but a condition. It is the condition of man before the establishment of civil society. It is the condition of man as a natural being, governed by natural laws, and not by the laws of men. The state of nature is the state of freedom and equality, but it is also a state of insecurity and conflict. It is the state in which every man is his own judge and executioner, and in which there is no common power to settle disputes.

v1.c1.5

The transition from the state of nature to civil society is the central event of political history. It is the event that marks the birth of the state, the birth of law, and the birth of justice. It is the event that transforms man from a natural being into a social being, from a subject of nature into a citizen of the state. The social contract is the instrument of this transformation. It is the agreement by which men renounce their natural freedom and submit themselves to the authority of a sovereign power, in exchange for the protection of their rights and the security of their lives.

v1.c1.6

The social contract is not a historical fact, but a theoretical construct. It is a device for explaining the legitimacy of political authority. It is a way of saying that the state is not a natural growth, but a human creation, and that its authority is derived from the consent of the governed. The social contract is the foundation of modern political theory. It is the principle that justifies the state and limits its power. It is the principle that makes the state the servant of the people, and not their master.

v1.c1.7

¹ See, for example, the discussion in Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 250 ff.

v1.c1.8

The problem of the "state of nature" is the central problem of the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. It is not a historical problem, but a logical one. It is not a question of what man *was* in the beginning, but of what he *is* in his essence. The state of nature is the state of man stripped of all the artificial additions of society, of all the conventions of law and custom. It is the state of man as he is in himself, in his original purity or his original corruption.

v1.c1.9

The thinkers of the Enlightenment were not in agreement as to the nature of this state. For some, like Rousseau, it was a state of innocence and happiness, a state from which man had fallen through the development of reason and the arts. For others, like Hobbes, it was a state of war, a state of "nasty, brutish, and short" life, from which man had to be rescued by the creation of a sovereign power. But for all of them, the state of nature was the starting point of their inquiry. It was the laboratory in which they tested their theories of human nature and of the origin of society.

v1.c1.10

The state of nature is not a place, but a condition. It is the condition of man before the establishment of civil society. It is the condition of man as a natural being, governed by natural laws, and not by the laws of men. The state of nature is the state of freedom and equality, but it is also a state of insecurity and conflict. It is the state in which every man is his own judge and executioner, and in which there is no common power to settle disputes.

v1.c1.11

The transition from the state of nature to civil society is the central event of political history. It is the event that marks the birth of the state, the birth of law, and the birth of justice. It is the event that transforms man from a natural being into a social being, from a subject of nature into a citizen of the state. The social contract is the instrument of this transformation. It is the agreement by which men renounce their natural freedom and submit themselves to the authority of a sovereign power, in exchange for the protection of their rights and the security of their lives.

v1.c1.12

The social contract is not a historical fact, but a theoretical construct. It is a device for explaining the legitimacy of political authority. It is a way of saying that the state is not a natural growth, but a human creation, and that its authority is derived from the consent of the governed. The social contract is the foundation of modern political theory. It is the principle that justifies the state and limits its power. It is the principle that makes the state the servant of the people, and not their master.

v1.c1.13

¹ See, for example, the discussion in Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 250 ff.

v1.c1.14

The problem of the "state of nature" is the central problem of the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. It is not a historical problem, but a logical one. It is not a question of what man *was* in the beginning, but of what he *is* in his essence. The state of nature is the state of man stripped of all the artificial additions of society, of all the conventions of law and custom. It is the state of man as he is in himself, in his original purity or his original corruption.

v1.c1.15

The thinkers of the Enlightenment were not in agreement as to the nature of this state. For some, like Rousseau, it was a state of innocence and happiness, a state from which man had fallen through the development of reason and the arts. For others, like Hobbes, it was a state of war, a state of "nasty, brutish, and short" life, from which man had to be rescued by the creation of a sovereign power. But for all of them, the state of nature was the starting point of their inquiry. It was the laboratory in which they tested their theories of human nature and of the origin of society.

v1.c1.16

The state of nature is not a place, but a condition. It is the condition of man before the establishment of civil society. It is the condition of man as a natural being, governed by natural laws, and not by the laws of men. The state of nature is the state of freedom and equality, but it is also a state of insecurity and conflict. It is the state in which every man is his own judge and executioner, and in which there is no common power to settle disputes.

v1.c1.17

The transition from the state of nature to civil society is the central event of political history. It is the event that marks the birth of the state, the birth of law, and the birth of justice. It is the event that transforms man from a natural being into a social being, from a subject of nature into a citizen of the state. The social contract is the instrument of this transformation. It is the agreement by which men renounce their natural freedom and submit themselves to the authority of a sovereign power, in exchange for the protection of their rights and the security of their lives.

v1.c1.18

The social contract is not a historical fact, but a theoretical construct. It is a device for explaining the legitimacy of political authority. It is a way of saying that the state is not a natural growth, but a human creation, and that its authority is derived from the consent of the governed. The social contract is the foundation of modern political theory. It is the principle that justifies the state and limits its power. It is the principle that makes the state the servant of the people, and not their master.

v1.c1.19

¹ See, for example, the discussion in Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 250 ff.

v1.c1.20

A HISTORY OF PĀLI LITERATURE

v1.c1.21

By BIMALA CHURN LAW, Ph.D., M.A., B.L., Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Gold Medalist, Griffith Prizeman, Caloutta University; Advocate, High Court, Caloutta; Author, *Some Ksatriya Tribes of Ancient India*, *Ancient Mid-Indian Ksatriya Tribes*, *The Life and Work of Buddhaghosa*, *Geography of Early Buddhism*, *Heaven and Hell in Buddhist Perspective*, *A Study of the Mahāvastu*, *Women in Buddhist Literature*, *Historical Gleanings*, *The Buddhist Conception of Spirits*, *The Law of Gift in British India*, etc., etc., Editor, *Buddhistic Studies*.

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With a Foreword by WILHELM GEIGER, Ph.D., Professor of Indo-Iranian Languages, München University, Germany.

v1.c1.23

IN TWO VOLUMES I.

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KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER & Co., Ltd., 38, Great Russell Street, London, W.C. 1.

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Thesis approved by the University of Calcutta for the Griffith Memorial Prize in Letters for 1931.

Foreword

v1.c2.1

There can be no doubt that a new and ample treatment of the Pāli literature is a great scientific want felt by all the scholars who are working in that field. Many problems connected with the subject are still unsolved. Not even the question of the origin and home of what we call Pāli language and of its linguistic character is definitively settled, and the chronological order of a single book is very often uncertain. Professor Winternitz in his great work on Indian literature has described also the Pāli literature in an admirable manner. But the scope of his work did not allow him, of course, to enter into all the details and to discuss the many divergences of opinion. Malalasekera in his recent publication has confined himself to the Pāli books composed in Ceylon. Hence the whole canonical literature was to be left aside. I was very much pleased, therefore, when I heard that Dr. Bimala Churn Law had intended to publish a comprehensive work on Pāli literature. We all know his former publications on Buddhist topics and their intrinsic value, and I repeatedly congratulated him on the happy choice of his themes and on the clever manner in which he had accomplished his task. I was even more pleased when I had the opportunity to peruse a good deal of the manuscript of the present work. It will prove to be extremely useful to all the Pāli scholars by the sober and impartial judgment of the author and by the clear and exhaustive exposition of the various problems. Above all I wish to point at the important discussion of the relative chronology of the canonical texts, which means a considerable progress beyond what Rhys Davids has said on the subject, and at the ample and very clear summaries of the Tipiṭaka books which will be welcome to those who are unable to read them in the original language but wish to become acquainted with their general plan and contents. I frankly say that I found all I could read extremely suggestive and I am convinced that I shall learn much from the book even where my opinion may perhaps differ from that of the author.

v1.c2.2

WILH. GEIGER.

v1.c2.3

The problem of the "state of nature" is the central problem of the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. It is not a historical problem, but a logical one. It is not a question of what man *was* in the beginning, but of what he *is* in his essence. The state of nature is the state of man stripped of all the artificial additions of society, of all the conventions of law and custom. It is the state of man as he is in himself, in his original purity or his original corruption.

v1.c2.4

The thinkers of the Enlightenment were not in agreement as to the nature of this state. For some, like Rousseau, it was a state of innocence and happiness, a state from which man had fallen through the development of reason and the arts. For others, like Hobbes, it was a state of war, a state of "nasty, brutish, and short" life, from which man had to be rescued by the creation of a sovereign power. But for all of them, the state of nature was the starting point of their inquiry. It was the laboratory in which they tested their theories of human nature and of the origin of society.

v1.c2.5

The state of nature is not a place, but a condition. It is the condition of man before the establishment of civil society. It is the condition of man as a natural being, governed by natural laws, and not by the laws of men. The state of nature is the state of freedom and equality, but it is also a state of insecurity and conflict. It is the state in which every man is his own judge and executioner, and in which there is no common power to settle disputes.

v1.c2.6

The transition from the state of nature to civil society is the central event of political history. It is the event that marks the birth of the state, the birth of law, and the birth of justice. It is the event that transforms man from a natural being into a social being, from a subject of nature into a citizen of the state. The social contract is the instrument of this transformation. It is the agreement by which men renounce their natural freedom and submit themselves to the authority of a sovereign power, in exchange for the protection of their rights and the security of their lives.

v1.c2.7

The social contract is not a historical fact, but a theoretical construct. It is a device for explaining the legitimacy of political authority. It is a way of saying that the state is not a natural growth, but a human creation, and that its authority is derived from the consent of the governed. The social contract is the foundation of modern political theory. It is the principle that justifies the state and limits its power. It is the principle that makes the state the servant of the people, and not their master.

v1.c2.8

¹ See, for example, the discussion in Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 250 ff.

Preface

v1.c3.1

Scholars interested in Buddhism have no doubt felt a great want of an exhaustive treatment of Pali literature. I have, therefore, attempted for the first time to supply the need of a detailed and systematic history of Pāli literature in two volumes. Drs. M. H. Bode and G. P. Malalasekera have published their respective monographs on the Pāli literature of Burma and of Ceylon. Drs. Geiger and Winternitz have also given us a brief survey of Pāli literature in their respective works, "Pali Literatur und sprache" and "Geschichte der Indischen Literatur die Buddhistische literatur und die Heiligen texte der Jainas (1920)". But my treatment of the subject is entirely different from those of my predecessors. The first volume deals with the chronology and general history of the Pāli Piṭakas. In the Introduction to this volume I have briefly discussed the origin of Pāli and the importance of the study of Pāli as one of the Indian languages. A systematic and critical treatment of the puzzling problem of the chronology of the Pāli canon follows next, throwing a new light on this intricate and difficult subject. I have tried to discuss at some length the date and composition of each and every book included in the Pāli canon. This volume contains a critical exposition of the Vinaya Piṭaka. An elaborate treatment of the Sutta Piṭaka consisting of the five nikāyas, the Dīgha, Majjhima, Saṃyutta, Aṅguttara, and Khuddaka has received the attention it deserves. I have also taken care to point out the peculiarities of the style and language in which each suttanta has been written. Under each suttanta and under each nikaya the ancient and modern literature hitherto published has been noticed. In the section on the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, I have noted the significance and importance of the Abhidhamma treatises not without paying attention to the style and language of the Abhidhamma texts. The Pāli counterparts of the Abhidhamma books of the Sarvāstivāda School have been dealt with in the last chapter of the first volume. I have everywhere considered it worth while to mention the available printed editions, manuscripts, and different recensions of each sutta noting the points of textual variations wherever possible. An attempt has been made to collect the parallel passages by way of comparison from other literatures wherever found.

v1.c3.2

The second volume which treats of post-canonical Pāli literature is devoted to the study of extra canonical works presupposed by the Pāli commentaries, the Pāli chronicles, the Pāli manuals, the Pāli literary pieces, the Pāli grammars, lexicographies, and works on rhetoric. In the concluding chapter

v1.c3.4

I have tried to give a general survey of the whole book and traced the development of Pāli poetry. I have given two appendices dealing with the Historical and Geographical references in the Pāli Piṭakas and the Pāli tracts in the inscriptions, which, I believe, will be found useful. I have appended an index at the end for the convenience of readers. I have not found it necessary to deal with some of the unimportant books about which nothing much can be known, e.g., the Sārasaṃgaha (containing many points concerning Buddhism), the Kāmaṇḍakī (a book on polity), the Akkharasamohacheda (word book), the Sotabbamālini (containing edifying tales), the Takkabhāsā (a book on logic), Amatākaravaṇṇanā, Sucittālaṅkāra, Laṅkākathā, Muniguṇālaṅkāra, Sārasaṃgaha, Rājādhirājavilāsinī, Dhammasattapakaraṇa, Dabbaguṇa (pharmacology), Sāratthasaṃgaha, Sūlacaraka, Sādhucaritodaya, Kosalabimbavaṇṇanā, Sahassavatthupakaraṇa, Lokappadīpakasāra, etc.

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The task which I have performed is, no doubt, beset with difficulties but I shall consider my labour amply rewarded if this treatise is found useful by scholars interested in Buddhist literature, history, and religion.

v1.c3.6

I am grateful to Mrs. Rhys Davids and Dr. B. M. Barua for their valuable suggestions for the improvement of this work. Dr. W. Geiger has really laid me under a deep debt of gratitude by writing a foreword.

v1.c3.7

I have to offer my sincere thanks to Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, M.A., Ph.D., and Mr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, M.A., B.L., Barrister-at-Law, who have evinced a keen interest in the publication of this work.

v1.c3.8

43, Kailas Bose Street, Calcutta, the 22nd May, 1933.

v1.c3.9

BIMALA CHURN LAW.

Contents

v1.c4.1

| | PAGE |
| FOREWORD | iii |
| PREFACE | v |
| INTRODUCTION | ix |

v1.c4.2

CHAPTER I

v1.c4.3

CHRONOLOGY OF THE PĀLI CANON | 1

v1.c4.4

CHAPTER II

v1.c4.5

CANONICAL PĀLI LITERATURE

v1.c4.6

| SECTION I—VINAYA PIṬAKA | 43 |
| SECTION II—SUTTA PIṬAKA | 79 |
| A. DĪGHA NIKĀYA | 80 |
| B. MAJJHIMA NIKĀYA | 115 |
| C. SAṂYUTTA NIKĀYA | 157 |
| D. AṄGUTTARA NIKĀYA | 180 |
| E. KHUDDAKA NIKĀYA | 193 |
| SECTION III—ABHIDHAMMA PIṬAKA | 303 |

v1.c4.7

CHAPTER III

v1.c4.8

PĀLI COUNTERPARTS OF THE SEVEN ABHIDHAMMA TREATISES OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA SCHOOL | 336

v1.c4.9

The problem of the "state of nature" is the central problem of the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. It is not a historical problem, but a logical one. It is not a question of what man *was* in the beginning, but of what he *is* in his essence. The state of nature is the state of man stripped of all the artificial additions of society, of all the conventions of law and custom. It is the state of man as he is in himself, in his original purity or his original corruption.

v1.c4.10

The thinkers of the Enlightenment were not in agreement as to the nature of this state. For some, like Rousseau, it was a state of innocence and happiness, a state from which man had fallen through the development of reason and the arts. For others, like Hobbes, it was a state of war, a state of "nasty, brutish, and short" life, from which man had to be rescued by the creation of a sovereign power. But for all of them, the state of nature was the starting point of their inquiry. It was the laboratory in which they tested their theories of human nature and of the origin of society.

v1.c4.11

The state of nature is not a place, but a condition. It is the condition of man before the establishment of civil society. It is the condition of man as a natural being, governed by natural laws, and not by the laws of men. The state of nature is the state of freedom and equality, but it is also a state of insecurity and conflict. It is the state in which every man is his own judge and executioner, and in which there is no common power to settle disputes.

v1.c4.12

The transition from the state of nature to civil society is the central event of political history. It is the event that marks the birth of the state, the birth of law, and the birth of justice. It is the event that transforms man from a natural being into a social being, from a subject of nature into a citizen of the state. The social contract is the instrument of this transformation. It is the agreement by which men renounce their natural freedom and submit themselves to the authority of a sovereign power, in exchange for the protection of their rights and the security of their lives.

v1.c4.13

The social contract is not a historical fact, but a theoretical construct. It is a device for explaining the legitimacy of political authority. It is a way of saying that the state is not a natural growth, but a human creation, and that its authority is derived from the consent of the governed. The social contract is the foundation of modern political theory. It is the principle that justifies the state and limits its power. It is the principle that makes the state the servant of the people, and not their master.

v1.c4.14

¹ See, for example, the discussion in Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, pp. 250 ff.

Introduction

v1.c5.1

I. The Origin and home of Pāli.—The term Pālibhāsā ¹ or Pāli language is a comparatively modern coinage. Whether the credit of this misleading coinage is due to the European Orientalists or to the latter-day Buddhist theras of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam, is still a matter of dispute. It is certain, however, that even up to the 6th or 7th century A.D., the term Pāli does not appear to have gained currency as a nomenclature for any kind of language. Even if we look into the Cūḷavaṃsa forming a later supplement to the Mahāvaṃsa we find that the term Pāli is used in it clearly in the sense of original Buddhist texts, the texts of the canon, as distinguished from the commentaries:

v1.c5.2

¹ Pāli—Pā rakkhane ḷi; Pāti, rakkhatīti, Pāli Pālīti ekacce. Tanti, Buddhavacanaṃ, Panti, Pāli. (Bhagavatā vuccamānassa atthassa vohārassa ca dīpanato saddoyeva Pāli nāmāti gaṇṭhipadesu vuttan ’ti Abhidhammaṭṭhakathāya likhitaṃ); Pāli saddo Pālidhamme-taḷākapāḷiyampi ca Dissate pantiyam ceva-iti ñeyyaṃ vijānatā. Ayaṃ hi Pālisaddo, Pāliyā atthaṃ upaparikkhanti ’ti ādisu pariyattidhammasaṅkhāte Pālidhamme dissati; ‘Mahato taḷākassa pāli ti ādisu taḷākapāliyaṃ Pāliyā nisīdimsūti ādisu paṭipāṭiyā ṅisidimsūti attho, imasmim panatthe dhātuyā kiccam natthi, paṭipātiko hi pantivācako Pālisaddo; pariyattidhammavācake pālisadde, atthaṃ pāti, rakkhatīti pālīti ca, antodakaṃ rakkha-ṇatthena mahato taḷākassa thirā mahatī pāli viyā ti pāli ti ca, pakaṭṭhānaṃ ukkaṭṭhānaṃ silādiṭṭhānaṃ badhanato sabhāvaniruttibhāvato Buddhādihi bhasitattā ca, pakaṭṭhānaṃ vacanappa-bandhānaṃ āḷi ti pālīti ca nibbacanāni veditabbāni.’ (Abhidhammappadīpikā sūci.)

v1.c5.3

‘Pālimattaṃ idhānītaṃ, natthi aṭṭhakathā idha’—only the Pāli has been brought over here from Ceylon but not the commentaries. In the commentaries themselves there are several passages in which the term Pāli has been employed precisely in the sense of the original authoritative text of the canon. In the Visuddhimagga, for instance, we have at p. 107 ‘Idaṃ sabbākārena neva Pāliyaṃ, na aṭṭhakathāyaṃ āgataṃ, kevalaṃ ācariyamatānusārena vuttaṃ, tasmā na sārato paccetabbaṃ,’ and also at page 450 of this work we read ‘Imāni tāva pāliyaṃ : aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana : aññāni pirūpāni āharitvā’. A similar distinction between the Pāli and the aṭṭhakathā on the one hand and between the aṭṭhakathā and the ācariyamata on the other is brought out by Buddhaghosa also in his Puggala-Paññatti commentary in the use of such expressions as (1) Pālimuttakena pana aṭṭhakathānayena, p. 171; (2) aṭṭhakathāmuttakena pana ācariyanayena, p. 173¹. As a matter of fact, the earliest issue of the term Pāli can be traced in the commentaries of Buddhaghosa and not in any earlier Buddhist writings. It is again in the commentaries that the term Pāli came to be regarded as a synonym for Buddhavacana, Tipiṭaka, tanti, and pariyatti. The transition from Pāli the text to Pāli the language came about sooner or later by a natural process. Although the conscious attempt on the part of the commentators was to keep the term Pāli dissociated from its linguistic implication, they felt constrained to commit themselves to such an expression as tantibhāsā in order to distinguish the language of the Pāli or the text of the canon from Sīhalabhāsā or the Sinhalese language. The language of the Pāli itself was characterised by them as Māgadhinirutti or the Māgadhī idiom. In tantibhāsā they attained a coinage approaching Pālibhāsā or Pāli language. And the other term Māgadhī or Māgadhinirutti was held out by them as a word of praise, claiming thereby as they actually did, that the Māgadhī idiom of the Pāli texts was the mūlabhāsā or the primary speech of all men.²

v1.c5.4

¹ For other references see the P.T.S. Pāli-English Dictionary, Sub voce Pāli.

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² Vinayavinicchaya-ṭīkā : ‘Sakalajanasādhāraṇāya mūlabhāsāya’ (Quoted in Buddhadatta’s Manuals, p. xiv, Kaccāyana’s Pāli Grammar, ‘Sā Māgadhīmūlabhāsā narāya ādikappikā’). Visuddhimagga, pp. 441-442, Sabhāvaniruttiyā Māgadhikāya sabbasattānaṃ mūlabhāsāya.

v1.c5.6

If it can thus be established that the use of the term Pāli is not earlier than the writings of Buddhaghosa, and further that when it first came into use, it denoted texts of the canon and was kept dissociated from all linguistic implications, one must at once repudiate all modern attempts at the characterisation of the language of the canon by means of the sound similarity of Pāli with Pallī (a village) as idle ingenuity. To contemplate Pāli as the typical Buddhavacana or the text of the canon is chiefly to deal with the set formulations of Buddha’s doctrine and discipline, the Buddha’s mode of expression or presentation or exposition, apart from the question of language.

v1.c5.7

The story of Māgadhinirutti is a pure invention of the theras of Ceylon, if not exactly that of Buddhaghosa. It is very curious indeed how this myth had originated and gradually gained ground to mislead even the modern scientific investigators. One will look in vain through all the canonical texts and other earlier writings of the Buddhists for any hint to imagine that Māgadhī was the dialect used by the Buddha as a sole medium of expression and that he had used no other dialect as the medium of instruction. It is no doubt claimed in some of the canonical texts that the Buddha was the boasted religious reformer of Magadha, Aṅga-Magadha constituting the Magadhan kingdom under the suzerainty of Bimbisāra. But is it a sufficient reason to maintain that the Māgadhika form of speech was the language of the Buddha and that of the Buddhist canon? We are aware that much has been made of the Vinaya passage enjoining that the bhikkhus should promulgate the teachings of the Buddha through the medium of sakānirutti instead of translating them into chandasa. The Vinaya passage reads:

v1.c5.8

“Na bhikkhave Buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropetabbaṃ. Yo āropeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa. Anujānāmi bhikkhave sakāya niruttiyā Buddhavacanaṃ pariyāpunituṃ” (Cullavagga, V. 33. I, p. 139).

v1.c5.9

Buddhaghosa interprets the term *chandasa* in the sense of the Sanskrit language which served as a diction of the Vedas (Vedam viya sakkata-bhāsāya vācanāmaggam) and the other term *sakānirutti* is explained by him as signifying that form of the Māgadhaka dialect which was used by the Buddha himself (ettha sakāniruttināma sammāsambuddhena vuttappakāro Māgadhako vohāro-Samantapāsādikā, Cullavagga commentary, Sinhalese edition, p. 306).

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Thus it is clear from Buddhaghosa’s comment that he has taken the term *chandasa* indiscriminately as a synonym for the Sanskrit language and the term *sakānirutti* as a synonym for the Māgadhī dialect used as a medium of instruction (vācanāmagga) by the Buddha. But we are aware that the term *sanskritabhāṣā* is of later origin, we mean later than the time of the Buddha and Pāṇini. In Pāṇini’s Aṣṭadhyāyī, *bhāṣā* (that is, Sanskrit language) is divided into Vedic (vaidika) and current (laukika) and by the term *chandasa*, Pāṇini meant the Vedic language as distinguished from the current form of Sanskrit. It is precisely in this sense that the term *chandasa* was used, if it was used at all by the Buddha in the 6th century B.C. With the Buddha *chandasa* or Vedic language was the prototype of languages that had become archaic and obsolete, dead as distinguished from living speech. It is beyond our comprehension how Buddhaghosa went so far as to suggest that by the term *sakānirutti*, the Buddha meant his own medium of instruction and nothing but Māgadhaka or the Māgadhī dialect. Nothing would have been more distant from the intention of a rational thinker like the Buddha than to commit himself to such an opinion which is irrational, erroneous, and dogmatic. He could not have done so without doing violence to his position as a sammāditthika and vibhajjavādin. To give out that the Māgadhī is the only correct form of speech for the promulgation of his teachings and every other dialect would be the incorrect form is a micchādiṭṭhi or erroneous opinion which the Buddha would ever fight shy of. Buddhaghosa has misled us all. To rightly interpret the injunction of the Buddha, we should first of all look into the context. The circumstances that led the Buddha to lay down the injunction are stated as follows :—

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“ tena kho pana samayena yameḷutekulā nāma bhikkhū dve bhātikā honti brāhmaṇajātīkā kalyāṇavācā kalyāṇavākkaraṇā. Te yena bhagavā ten ’upasampamimsu, upasaṃkamitvā bhagavantaṃ abhivādetvā ekamantaṃ nisīdiṃsu, ekamantaṃ nisinnā kho te bhikkhū bhagavantaṃ etad avocuṃ : etarahi bhante bhikkhū nānānāmā nānāgottā nānājaccā nānākulā pabbajitā, te sakāya ’niruttiyā buddhavacanaṃ dūsenti. Handa mayaṃ bhante buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropemāti. Vigarahi buddho bhagavā. Kathañ hi nāma tumhe moghapurisā evaṃ vakkatha : handa mayaṃ bhante buddhavacanaṃ chandaso āropemāti ”.... This passage may be translated into English thus—At that time the two brothers who were bhikkhus of the yameḷutekula were of brahmin origin and spoke and talked of good only. They approached the Buddha where he was and having approached the Blessed One saluted him and sat on one side. Those bhikkhus who were seated on one side spoke to the Blessed One thus, “ Venerable sir, these bhikkhus who embraced pabbajā, possess different names and are of different lineages, births, and families. They are polluting the Buddha’s words by preaching them in their own local dialects. And now Venerable sir, we shall render the Buddha’s words into chandaso.” But the Buddha rebuked the bhikkhus thus, “ How you foolish persons speak thus : And now Venerable sir we shall render the Buddha’s words into chandaso (one who knows the Vedas)”. [Oldenberg, The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ, Vol. II, p. 139.]

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This goes to show that the Buddhist Fraternity of the time was composed of persons of diverse names, of diverse cultural groups, of diverse races, designations ? Here, O Bhikkhus, it so happens that in some locality a thing is known by the name of Pāti, in some by the name of Patta, in some by the name of Vittha, in some by the name of Sarāva, in some by the name of Dhāropa, in some by the name of Poṇa, and in some by the name of Pisīla. Now the people of different localities pay too much attention and lay too much stress on the different names of the same word and boastfully say regarding their own form for the word: "This is the only correct form, and the others are incorrect." Thus a man, O Bhikkhus, pays too much attention to the local forms, and lays too much stress on the local designations. How, O Bhikkhus, a man does not pay too much attention to the local forms, and does not lay too much stress on the local designations ? Here, O Bhikkhus, it so happens that a thing is known by different designations in different localities, in some by the name of Pāti, in some by the name of Patta, in some by the name of Vittha, in some by the name of Sarāva, in some by the name of Dhāropa, in some by the name of Poṇa, and in some by the name of Pisīla. Now a man of a particular locality, when he is in other localities where different names of the same thing are in vogue, knowing that in different localities different names of the same thing are used conventionally by the gentlemen, uses different names in different localities without any attachment to his own local form. Thus a man does not pay too much attention to the local forms, and does not lay too much stress on the local designations. Accordingly, it is stated that the local forms should not merit too much attention and the local designations should not be stressed too much.

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That which we are now taught to call the Pāli language is a distinct Indian vehicle of expression standardised in the Theravāda recension of the Buddhist canon and its commentaries and other auxiliary works which are current in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam. The history of Buddhism bears a clear testimony to the fact that none of the other sects adopted or adhered to this particular vehicle of expression. The Theravādins or no-changers among the followers of the Buddha sighed in vain over the departure made by each new sect (Dīpavaṃsa, Oldenberg, Chap. V, Verses 42–44, 48–50) from that which was considered by them to be the standard language, or the standard corpus of authentic texts or the standard mode of interpretation and in this respect it is the bhikkhus of the Vajjian origin who led the way.¹

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“ Mahāsaṃgitikā bhikkhū vilomaṃ akaṃsu sāsanaṃ,
bhinditvā mūlasamgahaṃ aññaṃ akaṃsu samgahaṃ
aññattha samgahitṃ suttaṃ aññattha akarimsu te,
atthaṃ dhammañ ca bhindimsu ye nikāyesu pañcasu.
pariyāyadesitañ cāpi atho nippariyāyadesitaṃ
nītatthañ c’eva neyyatthaṃ ajānitvāna bhikkhavo
aññaṃ sandhāya bhaṇitaṃ aññatthaṃ ṭhapayiṃsu te,
byañjanacchāyāya te bhikkhū bahu atthaṃ vināsayuṃ.
chaḍḍetvā ekadesañ ca suttaṃ vinayañ ca gambhīraṃ
patirūpaṃ suttavinayaṃ tañ ca aññaṃ karimsu te.
parivāraṃ atthuddhāraṃ abhidhammappakaraṇaṃ
patisambhidāñ ca niddesaṃ ekadesañ ca jātakaṃ
ettakaṃ nissajjetvāna aññāni akarimsu te.
nāmaṃ liṅaṃ parikkhāraṃ ākappakaraṇāni ca
pakatibhāvaṃ vijahetvā tañ ca aññaṃ akaṃsu te ”
(Oldenberg, Dīpavaṃsa, Verses 32–38, p. 36).

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The above stanzas may be thus translated:—

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The bhikkhus of the Great Council made a compilation of the doctrine quite opposite to the true faith. They destroyed the original redaction of the dhamma and made a new redaction of the same. The sutta which has been placed in one place originally was placed by them in another place. They altered the meaning (attha) and the faith (dhamma) in the five nikāyas. They not knowing what had been taught in long expositions nor without exposition, neither the natural meaning nor the suppressed meaning, gave a different meaning to that which had been said in connection with an altogether different thing. They altered a great deal of meaning under the shadow of letter. They discarded some portions of the sutta and of the profound vinaya and compiled different sutta and vinaya which had only the appearance of the genuine ones. They rejected the Parivāra, that which enables one to arrive at the meaning, the Abhidhammappakaraṇa, the Paṭisambhidā, the Niddesa and some portions of the Jātaka and composed new ones. They did away with the original rules regarding nouns, genders, composition and the embellishments of style and made new ones.

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According to Max Walleser, Pāli is contracted from Pāṭali or Pāḍali and the assumption is that it was a language of Pāṭaliputra. Dr. E. J. Thomas says that Dr. Walleser has not produced any evidence to show that Pāli is ever used in the commentaries to indicate a language. "What we want is at least a single example to show that the commentator was contrasting the Pāli language with some other (E. J. Thomas' note on Dr. Walleser on the meaning of Pāli, Indian Historical Quarterly, December, 1928—Miscellany).

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According to R. C. Childers, the internal evidence confirms that Pāli was a vernacular of the people. The change which Pāli has undergone relatively to Sanskrit is almost wholly confined to vocabulary; its alphabet is deficient in vowels, the dual is lost, some verbal roots are unrepresented while many vowel forms have disappeared. But the gain in other direction due to the latitude of phonetic change and the incorporation of new nouns and verbal forms is not inconsiderable. There is no foreign element in Pāli with the exception of a very few imported Dravidian nouns. It is on the whole in the same inflexional stage as Sanskrit and everything in its vocabulary, grammar and syntax can be explained from the sister tongue (Childers' Pāli Dictionary, pp. xv-xvi). In the opinion of James Alwis,¹ Sanskrit was no longer the vernacular speech of the people when Buddhism arose. Pāli was one of the dialects in current use in India. It was the language of Magadha. Many Pāli theological terms have cognate expression in the brahmanic literature but the significations assigned to them are different in the two languages. Pāli was retained more than two centuries afterwards till Aśoka's time. The difference between the dialects of the inscriptions and that of the Pāli text denotes that the former as a spoken language underwent changes while the latter became fixed in Ceylon as the sacred language of the scriptures. Mr.

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Alwis says that Māgadhī is undoubtedly the correct and original name for Pāli. It is clear, therefore, that he agrees with the view of Childers. He further points out that at the time of Gautama there were 16 dialects prevalent in India. Preference was given to Māgadhī. The Buddhist scriptures of the Hīnayānists were written in that dialect. The existence of 35 works on Pāli grammar in Ceylon shows the great attention paid to the language. The high antiquity of Pāli, its refinement, its verbal and grammatical simplicity, its relationship with the oldest language of the brahmins, proves it to be a dialect of high antiquity. The decline of Pāli in Asia was co-existent with the decline of the religion taught through its medium. Dr. Oldenberg rejects the mission of Mahinda as unhistorical and points out that the introduction of Pāli into Ceylon was due to the influence of the people of Kaliṅga. He says that the home of the Pāli language must be looked for more to the south than to the north of the Vindhya mountains (*vide* Vinaya Piṭaka, Intro., pp. i, foll., and p. liv). Sir George Grierson agrees with Windisch¹ in holding that literary Pāli is Māgadhī. Winternitz supports this view. According to him, Pāli is a language of literature which has been exclusively employed by the Buddhists and has sprung like every literary language more or less from an admixture of several dialects. Such a literary tongue is ultimately derived from one definite dialect.

v1.c5.18.3

And this the Māgadhī can very well be so that the tradition which makes Pāli and Māgadhī synonymous is not to be accepted literally but at the same time it rests on an historical basis. The literary language, Pāli, developed gradually and was probably fixed when it was reduced to writing in Ceylon under Vaṭṭagāmani (Views of Winternitz quoted by Mr. Nariman in his book "Literary History of Sanskrit Buddhism", pp. 213-214). Literary Pāli was then spoken and was used as a medium of literary instruction in the University of Taxila. It was the language of the educated Buddhists and in a polished form would naturally be used by them for literary purposes (Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, 1917—The Home of Literary Pāli). Otto Franke points out that literary Pāli cannot have had its home in the Eastern part of Northern India. There are points of similarity and dissimilarity between literary Pāli and the language of the Kharoṣṭhī documents of the North-Western India; literary Pāli has many points of difference as compared with the language of the inscriptions of the Deccan, and the language of the inscriptions of the western Madhyadeśa shows most points of agreement with literary Pāli though there are points of dissimilarity (Pāli und Sanskrit, Ch. X, p. 138). According to Edward Müller (Pāli Language, p. ix), in early times it was the north-west of Ceylon which was the seat of culture pointing to influence from Southern India and not to Aryan immigration from the Ganges valley.

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Westergaard¹ and Kuhn² connect Pāli with the dialect of Ujjain, relying not merely on the connection with the Girnar dialect of Aśokan inscriptions but also on the view that this was the mother tongue of Mahinda. W. Geiger regards Pāli as a keine based on Ardhamāgadhī.³ Dr. H. Lüders (Bruchstücke buddhistischer Dramen, pp. 40 ff.) suggests that the oldest Buddhist scriptures were composed in old Ardhamāgadhī and that in part at least the existing Pāli canon represents a translation from the old Ardhamāgadhī. Dr. Sten Konow says that the Vindhya tract is the home of Pāli. He finds similarity in Pāli and Paiśācī Prākṛit which seems to have been spoken in the country to the north of Vindhya. Sylvain Lèvi (Journal Asiatique, Ser. XX, 495 ff.) holds that we must recognise in Pāli traces of a dialect in which sound changes had proceeded further than what is found in Pāli. The Jains and Buddhists used first one of the dialects of Magadha in which consonant degradation had been in progress; when finally they came to reduce their scriptures to permanent form, the Jains carried out a systematic reduction of intervocalic consonant to the Ya-sruti, while Buddhism acted in the opposite sense under the influence of Western elements which gained control over the church. Dr.

v1.c5.18.5

Keith is right in pointing out that the argument of Lèvi rests on a number of peculiarities in Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit in which he holds we must see traces of the forms of words employed in the older version of the canon and supported by the analogous forms in inscriptions. Thus the Bhābrū Edict contains the form ‘Lāghulovāde’ instead of ‘Rāhulovāda’, ‘Adhigicya’ instead of ‘Adhikritya’, but the softening of ‘k’ is rare in Pāli and the retention of ‘cy’ is alien to Pāli. Besides he mentions ‘Anādhapeḍika’ instead of ‘Anāthapiṇḍika’, ‘Maghādeviya Jātaka’ instead of ‘Makhādeva Jātaka’, ‘avayesi’ instead of ‘avādesi’ and so forth. According to Rhys Davids, Pāli was a literary dialect based on the spoken language of Kośala (Buddhist India, pp. 153-4). Rhys Davids further says that there existed a standard Kosalan speech in the 7th and

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¹ Vide the Buddhist Scriptures and their language.

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¹ Über den sprachlichen charakter des Pāli in actes du xiv Congrès International des Orientalistes, pt. I, pp. 252 foll. and 277 foll.

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¹ Über den altesten zeitraum der Indischen Geschichte, p. 87.

v1.c5.22

² Beiträge Zur Pāli Grammatik, p. 9.

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³ Prof. P. V. Bapat in his paper on the relation between Pāli and Ardhamāgadhī published in the Indian Historical Quarterly, March, 1928, has adequately shown that from the evidences of phonology, grammar, the relation of Ardhamāgadhī vocabulary with that of Sanskrit, Pāli and Māhrātti and the works of Kātyāyana and Pātañjali, it is not safe to come to the conclusion that Pāli is a literary language based on Ardhamāgadhī. Vide also "A Comparative Study of a few Jain Ardhamāgadhī Texts with the Texts of the Buddhist Pāli Canon" by Prof. P. V. Bapat in the

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Sir Ashutosh Mukerji Memorial Volume published by Prof. J. N. Samaddar, pt. II, pp. 91-105.

v1.c5.25.1

6th centuries B.C., which was the speech of the Buddha and the Pāli scriptures were in the main composed within a century after the Buddha’s death in this Kosalan country. The Aśokan inscriptions prove the existence of a standard language which is a younger form of the standard Kosalan. Dr. Keith ably points out that there is no reason whatever to accept the view that the language of Aśoka’s Magadhan empire was Kosalan or to accept the suggestion that Kosala became a part of Magadha by the peaceful succession of the Magadhan ruler to the Kosalan throne with the result that the language of Kosala prevailed over the language of Magadha. Rhys Davids ignores the conclusive evidence of the Bhābrū inscription which shows that Aśoka did not follow a Pāli canon even if he knew a canon and if he adapted his own language to give titles of canonical texts, we cannot doubt that his contemporaries would also hand down the text adapted in language to the speech of the day in accordance with the probable intention of the Master himself. Dr. Keith further criticises Rhys Davids by saying that the facts revealed a different aspect. The Buddha preached in dialect which we cannot define because we have no authentic information, it may have been standard Kosalan or Magadhan dialect but we have no knowledge to decide or to describe their characteristics. The Aśokan official or standard speech cannot be styled Māgadhī but Ardhamāgadhī.

v1.c5.25.2

But this Ardhamāgadhī or other Magadhan dialect is not reproduced in Pāli. The basis of Pāli is some western dialect and in its literary form as shown in the Pāli canon, we have a decidedly artificial composite product doubtless largely affected by Sanskrit and substantially removed from a true vernacular. But it must be noted as against Rhys Davids that the forms of Pāli are not historically the oldest of those known to us. Even in the case of the Girnar dialect of the Aśokan inscriptions, it is impossible to establish the priority of Pāli in view of such phenomena as the retention of long vowels before double consonants and traces of the retention of ‘r’ in certain consonantal combinations as well as the use of ‘ṣṭ’ where Pāli assimilates; moreover that dialect appears to have maintained a distinction for sometime between the palatal and lingual sibilants. There is, therefore, nothing whatever in the linguistic facts to throw doubt about the date above suggested. (Pāli, the Language of the Southern Buddhists, published in the Indian Historical Quarterly, September, 1925.) Mrs. Rhys Davids points out that Pāli is not the name of any localizable tongue. Pāli means ‘row’. She says that we have it in the name of the famous courtesan convert Ambapāli (Mango-orchard-er lit. mango-rower) whose birth tradition suggested her name and she also quotes the Visudhimagga to show that the teeth are said to be in a pāli (dantapāli).

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She further says that it is almost in juxtaposition to this term that we read, “Give him the Pāli of the 32 bodily parts to learn”, in other words, give him either a written leaf of that list of parts or merely the repeated “row” of terms. She is much against the theory that Pāli is only another name for Māgadhese, i.e., the Prākrit spoken in Aśoka’s day at Patna. According to her, it is truer to say that in Pāli, here and there, we find forms of Māgadhī and Ardhamāgadhī peeping out, than that Pāli has its base in them and them only. When India was bookless and laboriously punching letters on little metalplates, she was cutting shapes in stones she was carving. For these two operations she appears to have had but the one word ‘likh’, ‘lekh’, to scratch or incise. We began our writing relatively earlier; we had the two words. With the growing need, and the new material for setting down not mere lists, donations, contracts in writing, but also the expanded masses of her mantras, there came to pass the new and impressive phenomenon of seeing that which had been a time-series in air, become a “ row ” of things in space. And for a long time it remained customary to allude to the two series in juxtaposition : the “ row ” as not the ‘ talk on the meaning ’ (aṭṭhakathā). Still later, when more were learning to read the row, the word ‘ reading ’ (pāṭha) was substituted for the word ‘ row ’, e.g., “ the reading is also thus ”, alluding to variant readings, “ ayaṃ pi pāṭho ”.

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But not at first; and so in Pāli, in default of an alternative term for graphic presentation, we have emphasis thrown not on to the handicraft, as in lekhana, likhi, but on to the thing produced by handicraft, the visible, finished act. Pāli is just “ Text ” and there is no reason to believe that it was ever more than that. (Sakya or Buddhist Origins by Mrs. Rhys Davids, App. I, pp. 429-30.) Prof. Turner says that according to some the meaning of Pāli has been extended to cover all the cognate Middle Indian dialects found in the inscriptions and other documents. Pāli, in its earliest texts, is a language of mixed dialectical forms, some common to both northwestern and eastern dialects; others peculiarly eastern. These may be due to the influence of an original recension in an eastern dialect or to the general influence of the eastern vernaculars on the other Indo-Aryan languages, especially during the predominance of the Mauryan empire with its eastern capital. Its main characteristics are those of a western dialect. Tradition has it that the Buddhist Scriptures were brought to Ceylon by Aśoka’s son, Mahinda, who had spent his childhood in Ujjenī. In Ceylon the study and the use of Pāli which died out in India, was prosecuted by the Buddhists and carried thence to Burma and Siam, where it still remains to some extent the language of literature or at least of religion. (Pāli Language and Literature, The Encyclopædia Britannica, 14th Edition, Vol.

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XVII, 145-146.) Taking into consideration the fact that the Buddha and Mahāvīra were natives of the East, some presume that in their discourses they must have used the eastern or Prācya dialect. It is difficult to say what is that, because we have contemporary records of the earlier speech. Thus we find various theories regarding the original home of the Pāli language. It is difficult to come to a definite conclusion about it. All attempts to ascertain the dialect which the Buddha made the medium of his instructions have proved futile. We think that Pāli is based on a western form of the Indian Prakritic dialects particularly the form which tallied with the dialect of the Girnar version of Aśoka’s Rock Edicts and to some extent with the Saurasenī prākrit as known to the grammarians. On examining the Pāli canonical texts it will be clear that the tendency of Pāli is to steer clear of Māgadhism. The instances of Māgadhism cited from the Pāli texts, e.g., “sukhe-dukkhe jīvasattame”, “akaṭā akaṭavidhā” (Dīgha Nikāya, Vol. I, p. 56), “N’atthi attakāre n’atthi parakāre, n’atthi purisa-kāre”, (Dīgha, Vol. I, p. 53) do not affect the character of Pāli as these occur where the doctrines of other contemporary teachers, e.g., Pakudha Kaccāyana and Makkhali Gosāla have been quoted and discussed. It is important to observe that these forms do not occur in those places where the doctrines of Pakudha Kaccāyana and Makkhali Gosāla have been restated in their own language, i.e., in Pāli.

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Cites (75)