A History of Indian Literature v1.c8.s9: The Fundamental Doctrines of the Upaniṣads

A History of Indian Literature v1.c8.s9

Language: English

The Fundamental Doctrines of the Upaniṣads

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² See A. E. *Gough*, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, London, 1882; P. *Deussen*, The Philosophy of the Upanishads. Authorised English Translation by A. S. *Geden*, Edinburgh, 1919 (from AGPh., I, 2); G. *Thibaut*, SBE., Vol. 34, pp. cxv ff.; P. *Oltramare*, L'histoire des idées théosophiques dans l'Inde, t. I, Paris, 1906, pp. 63 ff.; H. *Jacobi*, ERE., II, p. 801; H. *Oldenberg*, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, Göttingen 1915; B. *Barua*, A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, Calcutta, 1921; R. E. *Hume*, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Introduction; S. *Dasgupta*, A History of Indian Philosophy, I, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 28 ff.; S. *Radhakrishnan*, Indian Philosophy, I, London, 1923, pp. 137 ff.

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(That which is of the greatest value in the Upaniṣads is those fundamental thoughts, on the basis of which we can speak of a "philosophy of the Upaniṣads," above all, the fundamental doctrine which pervades all the genuine Upaniṣads, and which can be summed up in the sentence: "*The universe is the Brahman, but the Brahman is the Ātman,*" which in our mode of philosophical expression would be equal to: "The world is God, and God is my soul.")

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(The entire thought of the Upaniṣad philosophers revolves around the two conceptions of *Brahman* and *Ātman*; )and it is necessary to get a clear idea of these conceptions, in order to be able to understand the philosophy of the Upaniṣads. The etymology of the word "*Brahman*" is doubtful.³) If we turn to the St. Petersburg Sanskrit Dictionary we find "Brahman" explained as "the devotion which appears as the craving and fulness of the soul," and strives after the gods, while according to Deussen,¹ the Brahman is supposed to be "the will of man, striving upwards to that which is sacred and divine." These explanations may correspond to Jewish-Christian ideas of divinity, but are diametrically opposed to the *Indian* conception of the relationship between gods and men, as we know it in the Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas.² What the word signifies etymologically is not certain. But in the Veda itself "Brahman" occurs countless times in the meaning of "prayer" or "magic formula"; there is nowhere any thought of devotion or exaltation to the divine, but it always means mere formulae and verses containing secret magic power, by which man desires to influence divine beings, or to obtain, or even to force something from them. When a later period united these magic formulae and prayers in "books" or school texts as the three Vedas these were called *trayī vidyā* or "threefold knowledge," also briefly "the Brahman." But as divine origin was ascribed to this Veda or Brahman—the two words being used with exactly the same meaning—and as the sacrifice, which, as we have seen, was itself conceived as a superhuman, nay superdivine power, was, according to the Indian view, derived from the Veda or contained in the Veda,³ so at last this Brahman or sacred knowledge, came to be called the first created thing (brahma prathamajam), and finally even to be made into the creative principle, the cause of all existence (brahma svayambhu). Thus the Brahman as divine principle is a conception of the priestly philosophy, and quite explicable in the light of the brahmanical views upon prayer and sacrifice.¹

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³ The most probable etymology is that suggested by H. *Osthoff* (Bezz. Beitr., 24, 1899, 113 ff.) who connects *brahman* with Old Irish *bricht*, "magic, magic formula." Oldenberg (Lehre der Upanishaden, pp. 44 ff., and "Zur Geschichte des Worts bráhman," NGGW., 1916, pp. 715 ff.) and *Hillebrandt* (ERE, II, pp. 796 ff.) have also accepted this etymology. An older etymology is that from the root *bṛh* "to grow" (M. *Haug*). *Hillebrandt* and *Dasgupta* (*l. c.*, p. 36) follow M. Haug in explaining *brahman* as "the magical force which is derived from the orderly co-operation of the hymns, the chants, and the sacrificial gifts." J. Hertel ("Das Brahman" in Indogerman. Forschungen, 41, 1923, pp. 185 ff.) connects *brahman* etymologically with Greek θλεγμα, Latin *flagro*, and tries to prove that the original meaning of *brahman* was "fire," viz., both the internal fire in man and the cosmic fire. I, however, am not convinced by his arguments.

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¹ System des Vedanta, p. 128. AGPh., 1, 1, pp. 241 f.

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² Cf. above, pp. 79 f., 200 f., 221.

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³ Śat. V, 5, 5, 10; "The whole sacrifice is as great as the three-fold Veda." According to Chāndogya-Up VII, 4, 1. "the sacrificial acts are contained in the mantras (*i.e.* in the Veda)."

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¹ Cf. above, pp. 224 f. *A. Weber* already has compared Brahman with the logos-idea in Neo-Platonism and in Christianity. Thus also *Deussen*, System des Vedanta, p. 51 and Max F. *Hecker*, Schopenhauer und die indische Philosophie (Cologne, 1897), p. 3. Deussen desires to bring Brahman into accord with the "will" of Schopenhauer, but, as Hecker (p. 82) mildly expresses it, is forced "to offer some violence to the conception of Brahman." A comparison which is more justifiable is that with the "*mana*" of the Melanesians, which has been emphasised by N. *Söderblom*, in his "Das Werden des Götterglaubens," 1916, pp. 270 ff.

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The history of the word "*Ātman*" is simpler. The etymology of this word, too, is uncertain. Some derive it from the root *an* "to breath" (German "atmen") and explain it as "exhalation, breath, soul, self." Others, like Deussen,² derive it from two pronominal roots, so that it would originally mean "This I." However that may be, Ātman is not only a philosophical conception, but a word which frequently occurs in Sanskrit, and whose meaning is perfectly clear. It signifies "self," is often used as a reflexive pronoun, and as a substantive denotes one's own person, one's own body in contrast to the outside world, sometimes the trunk in contrast to the limbs, but most frequently the *soul*, the true *self*, in contrast to the *body*.³

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² AGPh., I, 1, p. 285.

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³ On the term Ātman s. *Deussen*, ERE. II, 195 ff.; *Jacobi*, ERE. II, 801; *Dāsgupta*, History of Indian Philosophy, I, 25 f. According to Deussen, Ātman is "the most abstract, and therefore the best name which philosophy has found for its sole and eternal theme." Schopenhauer named his white poodle "**Ātman**," whereby, following the Vedantic doctrine, he desired to acknowledge the inner being as equal in man and beast." (*Hecker*, *loc. cit.*, p. 8.)

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These two conceptions Brahman and Ātman have become united in the philosophy of Upaniṣads. Thus the famous *doctrine of Śāṇḍilya* begins with the words: "Truly, this All is Brahman," and ends, after a description of the Ātman, with the statement that Brahman and Ātman are one:)

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"This my Ātman in my inmost heart is smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn, or a mustard seed, or a millet grain.......This my Ātman, in my inmost heart is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than the heavens, greater than all spheres. In him are all actions, all wishes, all smells, all tastes; he holds this All enclosed within himself; he speaks not, he troubles about nothing;—*this my Ātman in my inmost heart is this Brahman.* With him, when I depart out of this life, shall I be united. For him to whom this knowledge has come, for him, indeed, there exists no doubt. Thus spake Śāṇḍilya yea Śāṇḍilya."[^\1)

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Deussen expresses this fundamental idea of the Upaniṣads briefly and pertinently in the words: "The *Brahman*, the power which presents itself to us materialised in all existing things, which creates, sustains, preserves, and receives back into itself again all worlds, this eternal infinite divine power is identical with the *Ātman*, with that which, after stripping off everything external, we discover in ourselves as our real most essential being, our individual self, the soul."[^\2) (This doctrine has found expression most pointedly and clearly in the Upaniṣad dictum which later became the confession of faith of millions of Indians, in the "*tat tvam asi*" (so often quoted by Schopenhauer), "that art thou," *i.e.*, the universe and the Brahman, that art thou thyself, or in other words: The world exists only in so far as thou thyself art conscious of it.) Let us hear in what manner the poet-philosophers of the Upaniṣads endeavour to make clear this doctrine of the unity of the world with the Brahman and of the Brahman with the Ātman:[^\3)

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"Śvetaketu was the son of Uddālaka Āruṇi. To him said his father: 'Śvetaketu, betake thyself as a Veda-student to a teacher. For, my dear

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[^\1): Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, III, 14. *Cf.* above, p. 225. [^\2): Deussen, "The Philosophy of the Upanishads," translated by A. S. Geden, Edinburgh, 1906, p. 39. [^\3): Chāndogya-Upaniṣad, VI, 1 ff.

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one, in our family it is not customary to be a Brahmin in name only, without having learnt the Veda.' So at the age of twelve years he was initiated as a pupil. And at twenty-four years of age, after he had learnt everything in all the Vedas he came home—proud, haughty, and regarding himself as a learned man. Then said his father to him : 'As thou art now, my dear Śvetaketu, so proud and haughty, and regardest thyself as a learned man, tell me, hast thou also inquired into that doctrine by which that which is unheard becomes heard, that which is unthought becomes thought, that which is unknown becomes known?' 'Venerable one, of what does this doctrine consist?' 'Just as, my dear one, through *one* lump of clay everything that is of clay is known and the difference lies only in the word, is merely a name—but in truth it is clay—; and just as, my dear one, through *one* copper trinket everything which is of copper is known and the difference lies only in the word, is merely a name—but in truth it is copper—; and just as, my dear one, through *one* pair of nail scissors everything which is of iron is known and the difference lies only in the word, is merely a name—but in truth it is iron-- ; so, my dear one, it is with this doctrine.' 'Surely my honourable teachers did not know this; for if they had known it, why should they not have told it to me? Then, venerable one, do thou expound it to me.' 'Very well, my dear one,' said his father.

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'Only the *existent*, my dear one, was here in the beginning, and this only as One without a Second. To be sure, some people have said: Only the non-existent was here in the beginning, and this only as One without a Second, and out of this non-existent arose the existent. But how, my dear one, could this be so? How could the existent arise out of the non-existent? Only the existent, my dear one, was here in the beginning, and this only as One without a Second!' (He then demonstrates further, how this *existent* had created heat, which had created water, which, in its turn, had created food; and how the existent, penetrating those three elements, developed the material world out of itself. In the phenomena of sleep, of hunger and of thirst, he then explains how everything leads back to the three elements, heat, water, food—or, as we would say: fire, water, earth—while these three elements in their turn rest only upon the existent. But as this *existent* has, with the Ātman, its soul, penetrated into all beings, so it is also the soul in us. When, therefore, a man dies, he becomes again that which he originally was; he unites again with the existent, out of which he was produced. Now follow a number of similes which are all intended to illustrate the doctrine of the oneness of the world with the Alone-existing and the human soul.) 'As, my dear one, the bees, when they are preparing honey, collect the juices of the most diverse trees and then combine the juice in one unity;—as in this unity those juices do not retain any difference, so that they could say: I am the juice of this tree, I am the juice of that tree—so, my dear one, all these creatures here, when they have become absorbed in the *existent* have no consciousness of the fact that they have become absorbed in the existent. Whatever they may be here, whether tiger or lion, wolf or boar, worm or bird, fly or gnat,—*this* (namely, the *existent*) they become. And it is this very minute thing which constitutes the being of the All, that is the truth, that is the Ātman, *that art thou*, O Śvetaketu.' 'Venerable one, instruct me yet further.' 'Very well, my dear one...........'

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'Fetch me a fruit from yonder fig-tree!' 'Here it is, venerable one.' 'Split it' 'It is split, venerable one' 'What dost thou see therein?' 'Very tiny grains, venerable one!' 'Split one of these!' 'It is split.' 'What seest thou therein?' 'Nothing, venerable one.' Then said the father to him: 'My dear one, it is as a result of that very quintessence which thou dost not perceive, that this big fig-tree stands here. Believe me, my dear one, it is this very minute thing which constitutes the being of the All, that is the truth, that is the Ātman, *that art thou*, O Śvetaketu!' 'Venerable one, instruct me yet further.' 'Very well, my dear one.'

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'Place this piece of salt in water and come to me again to-morrow morning.' He did so. Then his father said to him: 'Bring me the salt which thou didst place in water last night.' He felt for it, but did not find it; it had vanished. 'Just taste the water from one side. How does it taste?' 'Salty.' 'Taste from the middle. How does it taste?' 'Salty.' 'Taste from the other side. How does it taste?' 'Salty.' 'Eat something with it and then return to me.' He did so, but the salty taste still remained. Then his father said to him: 'Truly, my dear son, here also (in the body) thou dost not perceive the *existent*, and yet it is there. And this very minute thing it is which constitutes the being of the All, that is the truth, that is the Ātman, *that art thou*, O Śvetaketu.'"

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What inspires us with the highest respect for these ancient thinkers of India is the earnestness and the enthusiasm with which they endeavoured to fathom the divine principle, or what Kant would call the thing-in-itself whether they called it "the one" or "the existent," Brahman or Ātman. Thus we read in a dialogue, which recurs in two Upaniṣads in two different versions,¹ how Gārgya Bālāki, a proud and learned Brahman, comes to Ajātaśatru, the King of Benares, and pledges himself to explain the Brahman to him. One after another he explains the Puruṣa, *i.e.*, the personal spirit, in the sun, in the moon, in the lightning, in the ether, in the wind, in the fire, in the water, then the spirit which appears as a reflected image or shadow, in the echo, in sound, in dreams, in the human body, or in the eye, as the Brahman. Ajātaśatru, however, is not satisfied with any of these explanations, so that finally, the learned Brahman himself goes for instruction to the king, who then explains to him that the true Brahman is to be sought only in the *intelligent spirit* (Puruṣa) in man, *i.e.*, in the Ātman, in the self. "As a spider spins her web out of herself, as out of a fire the little sparks fly in all directions, so out of this Ātman emanate all vital breaths, all worlds, all gods and all beings."

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¹ Kauṣītaki-Up. IV and Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Up. II, 1.

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Similarly, in a famous Upaniṣad passage, the difference between the true and the false Ātman is shown. There we read:

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" 'The Ātman, from which all evil has fled, which is free from old age, free from death and free from care, which is without hunger and without thirst, whose wishes are the true, whose intentions are the true, that Ātman should one investigate, that Ātman should one endeavour to know: he who has found and known this Ātman, attains to all worlds and the fulfilment of all wishes.' Thus spake Prajāpati. This was heard by the gods, as well as the demons, and they said: 'It is well, we will investigate this Ātman—the Ātman, through the investigation of which one obtains all worlds and the fulfilment of all desires.' From among the gods, Indra arose, and from among the demons Virocana arose, and both, without having communicated with each other, came

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to Prajāpati with firewood in their hands.¹ They stayed with him as pupils for thirty-two years. Then said Prajāpati to them: ‘What is your desire in living here as pupils?’ and they said: ‘The Ātman, from which all evil has fled, which is free from old age, free from death and free from care, which is without hunger and without thirst, whose wishes are the true, whose intentions are the true, that Ātman shall one endeavour to know: he who has found and known this Ātman, gains all worlds and the fulfilment of all desires. This thy speech, venerable one, we have heard. Our desire is for this Ātman; therefore we have lived with thee here as pupils. (Prajāpati now first explains to them that the Puruṣa in the eye or in the reflected image is the Ātman. Virocana is satisfied with this, returns to the demons and proclaims to them the doctrine that the body is the Ātman, and that one has only to please and care for the body in order to obtain all worlds. Indra, however, soon understands that the explanation given by Prajāpati cannot have been meant seriously. Dissatisfied he returns and again stays with Prajāpati as his pupil for thirty-two years.) Then the latter said to him: ‘He (the spirit) who roams about blithely in dreams,² he is the Ātman, that is the Immortal, the dangerless, that is the Brahman.’ Then Indra departed thence with a quiet heart.” (But even before he had reached the gods he comprehended that the vision in dream could not be the true Ātman, either. Once again he returns to Prajāpati and stays with him as a pupil for thirty-two years. Now Prajāpati declares the soul in dreamless, profound sleep to be the true Ātman. With that also Indra is not satisfied, he returns, and Prajāpati suffers him to live with him for another five years, when at last he reveals to him the doctrine of the true Ātman.) ‘O Indra, mortal indeed is this body, of which death takes possession. It is the dwelling-place of that immortal, incorporeal Ātman. Possessed by pleasure and pain is the (Ātman) which is united with the body, for so long as he is united with the body, there is no defence for him against pleasure and pain. But when he is incorporeal, then certainly pleasure and pain do not touch him...........Now when the eye is directed to yonder ether, then *he* is the spirit (Puruṣa) in the eye, but the eye serves only for seeing. And it is the Ātman who *knows*: "this I will smell"; the organ of smell serves only for smelling. And it is the Ātman who *knows*: "this will I speak"; the voice serves only for speaking. And it is the Ātman who *knows*; "this will I hear"; the organ of hearing serves only for hearing. And it is the Ātman who *knows*; "this will I think"; the organ of thought is his divine eye. He it is who is pleased when, with the organ of thought, this divine eye, he sees the objects of his desires. *Him*, indeed, *this* Ātman, do the gods worship in the Brahman-world; therefore do they possess all worlds and all their desires are fulfilled. And he obtains all worlds and the fulfilment of all desires, who has found and recognises this Ātman.' Thus spake Prajāpati, so spake Prajāpati."¹

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¹ The pupil has to live with the teacher and serve him, and especially tend the sacred fire. “To come with wood in one's hand” therefore means “to go to someone as a pupil for instruction.”

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² As in the Upaniṣads the development of the Ātman conception is traced to the true Ātman through the preliminary steps of the puruṣa in the eye, in the reflected image, in the shadow and in the dream-picture, to which the prāṇa or breath of life is often added, so we find in remarkable agreement also among the primitive races, the breath, the “little dweller in the eye,” the reflected image, the shadow, and visions, as preliminary steps to the belief in a soul. (Cf. E. B. Tylor, “Primitive Culture,” London, 1903, 1, pp. 430 ff. Fritz Schultze, Psychologie der Naturvölker, Leipzig, 1900, pp. 254 ff.)

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Thus here again the true Ātman is explained as the knowing and intelligent spirit in man. But (the doctrine that this Ātman is one with the universe and that everything exists only in so far as it is in the cognitive self, is taught by the beautiful conversation between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī.) Yājñavalkya is about to leave home in order to conclude his life as a hermit in the forest. So he wishes to make a settlement between his two wives, and tells this to the one, Maitreyī.

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"Maitreyī said: 'My Lord, if this whole earth, full of wealth, belonged to me, tell me, should I be immortal by it?'
'No,' replied Yājñavalkya; 'like the life of rich people will be thy life. But there is no hope of immortality by wealth.'
And Maitreyī said: 'What should I do with that by which I do not become immortal? What my Lord knoweth (of immortality), tell that to me.'
Yājñavalkya replied: 'Thou who art truly

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And he said: 'Verily, a husband is not dear, that you may love the husband; but that you may love the Self, therefore a husband is dear.

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'Verily, a wife is not dear, that you may love the wife; but that you may love the Self, therefore a wife is dear.

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'Verily, sons are not dear, that you may love the sons; but that you may love the Self, therefore sons are dear . . . . .

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'Verily, the Devas are not dear, that you may love the Devas; but that you may love the Self, therefore the Devas are dear.

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'Verily, creatures are not dear, that you may love the creatures; but that you may love the Self, therefore are creatures dear.

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'Verily, everything is not dear that you may love everything; but that you may love the Self, therefore everything is dear.

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'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked, O Maitreyī! When we see, hear, perceive, and know the Self, then all this is known!'"[^1)

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One of the most frequent appellations of the Ātman in the Upaniṣads is the word "prāṇa," *i.e.*, "breath of life, life, life-principle." And numerous portions of the Upaniṣads deal with this Prāṇa, which is one with the intelligent self; or with the relations of the same to the organs of the soul, the so-called Prāṇas (prāṇāḥ, plural of prāṇa). These organs—speech, breath, sight, hearing and the organ of thought—correspond to five forces of Nature in the universe: fire, wind, the sun, the quarters of heaven and the moon. And the Upaniṣads often talk of the reciprocal action between the organs and the forces of Nature. That is to a certain extent the psychology, which indeed cannot be separated from the metaphysics, of the Upaniṣads. The oft-related "psychological fable" of the dispute of the vital organs about rank, is very popular. It is there told how the Prāṇas, or vital organs, once fought for precedence. They went to the father Prajāpati, that he might settle their dispute.

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"He said to them: 'That one of you after whose going off the body appears as if it were the very worst off—he is the most superior of you.' 8. Speech went off. Having remained away a year, it came around again, and said : ‘How have you been able to live without me ?’

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¹ Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Up., II, 4. Translated by *Max Müller*, SBE., Vol. 15, pp. 108-110.

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‘As the dumb, not speaking, but breathing with the breath, seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, thinking with the mind. Thus.’

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Speech entered in.

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9. The Eye went off. Having remained away a year, it came around again, and said : ‘How have you been able to live without me ?’

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‘As the blind, not seeing, but breathing with the breath, speaking with speech, hearing with the ear, thinking with the mind. Thus.’

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The Eye entered in.

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10. The Ear went off. Having remained away a year, it came around again, and said : ‘How have you been able to live without me ?’

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‘As the deaf, not hearing, but breathing with the breath, speaking with speech, seeing with the eye, thinking with the mind. Thus.’

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The Ear entered in.

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11. The mind went off. Having remained away a year, it came around again, and said : ‘How have you been able to live without me ?’

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‘As simpletons, mindless, but breathing with the breath, speaking with speech, seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, Thus.’

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The Mind entered in.

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12. Now when the Breath was about to go off—as a fine horse might tear out the pegs of his foot-tethers all together, thus did it tear out the other Breaths all together. They all came to it, and said : ‘Sir ! Remain. You are the most superior of us. Do not go off.’

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15. Verily, they do not call them ‘Speeches,’ nor ‘Eyes,’ nor ‘Ears,’ nor ‘Minds.’ They call them ‘Breaths’ (prāṇa), for the vital breath is all these.”[^1)

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Just as the doctrine of the Prāṇa and the Prāṇas is connected with the fundamental doctrine of the Ātman, the same doctrine also affords the poet-philosophers of the Upaniṣads a motive for magnificent philosophical poems, as they can best be called, on the fortunes of the individual Ātman, *i.e.*, the human soul, in the conditions of waking and of dreaming, of sleep and of death, and in its wanderings in the Beyond up to its final “emancipation,” *i.e.*, its complete absorption in the

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[^1): Chāndogya-Up. V, 1. Translated by R. E. Hume, “The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,” pp. 227 f. *Cf.* Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Up. VI, 1, 7-14.

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Brahman. Thus, above all, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad (IV, 3-4) sketches a picture of the fortunes of the soul, which, as Deussen¹ rightly remarks, “for richness and warmth of expression surely stands alone in Indian literature, and perhaps in the literature of all nations.” Here we find also the doctrine of the *transmigration of souls*, and in the closest connection with it, developed clearly and distinctly for the first time, the *ethical doctrine of Karman*, *action*, which, with the unerringness of a law of Nature, must have its consequences. This great doctrine of *action*, which was later, especially in Buddhism, preached in every street and by-way, is still a great mystery in the Upaniṣads. Ārtabhāga asks Yājñavalkya:

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¹ Sechzig Upanishads, p. 463.

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“‘Yājñavalkya,’ said he, ‘when after the death of this man here his voice enters into the fire, his breath into the wind, his sight into the sun, his organ of thought into the moon, his hearing into the quarters of heaven, his body into the earth, his soul (Ātman) into the ether, the hairs of his body into the herbs, the hairs of his head into the trees, and his blood and seed are laid down in the water,—where then is this man?’ ‘Take me by the hand, my dear one!’ said Yājñavalkya. ‘Ārtabhāga, let us two only know of this; let this discussion of ours not be in public.’ And the two went out and discussed together; and it was *Action* of which they spoke; it was *Action* which they praised. Verily, he becomes good through good action, bad through bad action.”²

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² Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Up., III, 2, 13 f.

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This doctrine is then treated in a more detailed manner along with the magnificent description of the departure of the soul out of the body. It says there:

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“The point of his heart begins to shine, and by this light the Ātman departs, be it out of the eye or out of the head, or out of other parts of the body. And while he is departing the breath of life (prāṇa) follows him; and behind the departing breath of life depart all the vital organs, the consciousness also follows them. But he, the cognitive one (the Ātman) is endowed with cognition. Knowledge and the *actions*, the experiences of the former life, remain attached to him. Just as a grass-leech,³ when it has arrived at the end of a

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³ See *Barua*, Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy, p. 175.

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blade of grass, making another start (for another blade), draws itself together towards (this blade), so man, when he has stripped off the body and has rid himself of non-knowledge, making another start (for another body), draws himself together towards (that other body). Just as an embroideress undoes a small portion of a piece of embroidery, and out of it creates a different, quite new and more beautiful design, so man, when he has stripped off his body and has rid himself of non-knowledge, creates for himself a different, quite new and more beautiful form, that of the spirit of an ancestor or of a Gandharva, of a Brahman or of a Prajāpati, of a god or of a man, or that of some other being . . . . . As he has acted, as he has lived, so he becomes; he who has done good, is born again as a good one, he who has done evil, is born again as an evil one. He becomes good through good action, bad through bad action. Therefore it is said: ‘Man here is formed entirely out of desire, and according to his desire is his resolve, and according to his resolve he performs the action, and according to the performance of the action is his destiny.’”[^1)

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In consequence of this doctrine of Karman the moral element plays a far greater part in the Upaniṣads than in the Brāhmaṇas. Moreover, we should not ignore the fact that the metaphysical doctrine of the Ātman, for whose sake we love our fellow-creatures[^2) involves a deep ethical idea: as it is in reality the universal soul which we love in each individual, love for all creatures wells up from the recognition of the Ātman.[^3) However, in the Upaniṣads, too, there is not much room left for actual moral teaching. Comparatively rarely do we meet with moral precepts, such as for example in the Taittirīya-Upaniṣad (I, 11) the teacher gives the scholar who is departing on his life’s journey:

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“Speak the truth, do thy duty, neglect not the study of the Veda. After thou hast brought thy teacher the agreeable gift (after completion of the period of training) see that the thread of thy race does not break

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[^1): Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Up., IV, 4, 2-5. [^2): See above, pp. 249 f. [^3): On the ethics of the Upaniṣads, s. *Hume*, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, pp. 58 ff. John Mackenzie, Hindu Ethics, London, 1922, pp. 67 ff. ; S. *Radhakrishnan*, Indian Philosophy, I, pp. 207 ff.

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off...........Neglect not the ceremonies for the gods and Fathers. A god be to thee thy mother, a god be to thee thy father, a god be to thee thy teacher, a god be to thee the guest," and so on.

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There is another passage referring to ethics which we find in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad (V, 2) which is more interesting and much more Upaniṣad-like than these moral precepts:

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"Three kinds of sons of Prajāpati, the gods, human beings, and the demons, sojourned with their father Prajāpati as pupils. After the gods had sojourned there as pupils, they said: 'Tell us something, O master!' And he uttered the syllable '*da*' and said: 'Did you understand that?' 'We understood it,' they said: 'thou didst say to us *dāmyata* (restrain yourselves).' 'Yes,' said he; 'you understood it.' Then the human beings said to him: 'Tell us something, O master!' And he uttered the same syllable '*da*' and said: 'Did you understand that?' 'We understood it,' they said, 'thou didst say to us: *datta* (give).' 'Yes,' said he, 'you understood it.' Then the demons said to him: 'Tell us something, O master!' And he uttered to them the same syllable '*da*' and said: 'Did you understand that?' 'We understood it,' they said, 'thou didst say to us '*dayadhvam* (have pity).' 'Yes,' said he, 'you understood it.' And it is just this which yonder divine voice, the thunder, proclaims: da-da-da, that means dāmyata, datta, dayadhvam. Therefore shall he learn these three things: self-restraint, generosity and pity."

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It is easy enough to see why we meet but seldom with such ethical doctrines in the Upaniṣads. According to the doctrine of the Upaniṣads the highest object to be aimed at is union with the Brahman, and this union can be attained only by giving up non-knowledge, by *cognition*. Only he who has *recognised* the oneness of the soul with the Divine will obtain deliverance, *i.e.*, complete union with the Brahman. But in order to attain this highest object it is necessary to give up all works, good as well as bad. For sacrifices and pious works only lead to new re-births, *knowledge* alone leads from this maze to the One and Eternally True. "As no water remains attached to the leaf of the lotus blossom, so no bad deed remains attached to him who knows this."¹

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¹ Chāndogya-Up. IV, 14, 3. *Cf.* Kauṣītaki-Up. I, 4; III, 8.

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Already in the Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas there is repeated mention of the advantages which accrue to him who knows some secret doctrine or other of sacrificial science,—“who knows this.” Nothing is more characteristic of the Upaniṣads, however, than the ever-recurring promise of happiness and blessedness, of earthly possessions and heavenly joys as a reward for him “who knows this.” The idea that knowledge is not only power, but the highest object to be aimed at, is traceable throughout all the Upaniṣads. Not only Indra serves Prajāpati for 101 years as a pupil, but it is also often reported that human beings serve a teacher for years as pupils in order to receive from him the transmission of some knowledge or other. Kings are prepared to present thousands of cows and piles of gold to the Brahman who can proclaim to them the doctrine of the true Ātman or Brahman. But Brahmans also humble themselves before kings, rich people before beggars, when these, as is not seldom the case, are in possession of higher wisdom.[^1) This yearning for knowledge has found its most touching expression in the beautiful poem of *Naciketas*, which we find in the Kāṭhaka-Upaniṣad.

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The youth Naciketas has descended into the lower world and the god of death has vouchsafed him three wishes. Naciketas wishes, firstly, that he may return alive to his father, secondly he wishes for heavenly bliss. When he is to express his third wish he says:

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“This doubt that there is in regard to a man deceased :
‘He exists,’ say some ; ‘He exists not,’ say others—
This would I know, instructed by thee !
Of the boons this is boon the third.”

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Thereupon Yama replies that this question of what happens to man after death, is so difficult to investigate that even the gods were once in doubt about it, and he begs the youth to give up his wish.

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[^1): *Cf.* above pp. 227 ff.

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“ Choose centenarian sons and grandsons,
Many cattle, elephants, gold and horses.
Choose a great abode of earth.
And thyself live as many autumns as thou desirest.
This, if thou thinkest an equal boon,
Choose—wealth and long life !
A great one on earth, O Naciketas, be thou.
The enjoyer of thy desires I make thee.
Whate'er desires are hard to get in mortal world—
For all desires at pleasure make request.
These lovely maidens with chariots, with lyres—
Such (maidens), indeed, are not obtainable by men—
By these, from me bestowed, be waited on !
O Naciketas, question me not regarding dying (maraṇa) ! ”

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Naciketas, however, will not be deterred from his wish by these promises of earthly possessions :

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“ Ephemeral things ! That which is a mortal’s, O End-maker,
Even the vigor (tejas) of all the powers, they wear away.
Even a whole life is slight indeed.
Thine be the vehicles (vāha) ! Thine be the dance and song !
Not with wealth is a man to be satisfied.
Shall we take wealth, if we have seen thee ?
Shall we live so long as thou shalt rule ?
—This, in truth, is the boon to be chosen by me……
This thing whereon they doubt, O Death :
What there is in the great passing-on—tell us that !
This boon, that has entered into the hidden—
No other than that does Naciketas choose.”

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Then Yama, the god of death, praises Naciketas for having chosen knowledge and not pleasures, and at last imparts to him the doctrine of the immortality of the Ātman.¹

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¹ The above verses (Kāṭh.-Up., I, 20, 23-25, 26, 27, 29) are given in the translation of *Hume*, Thirteen Principal Upanishads, pp. 344 f. A fine poetical, but very free translation of the legend is given by J. *Muir*, Metrical Translations from Sanskrit Writers, pp. 54 ff.

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But how this high esteem of knowledge leads not only to the disregard of earthly pleasures, but to *contempt of the* *world altogether*,¹ is shown us by another Upaniṣad, in which for the first time that pessimistic trait of Indian thought appears, which we will meet with again and again in the later Indian literature. There we read:²

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¹ Cf. P. Regnaud, Le Pessimisme Brahmanique (Annales du Musée Guimet, t. I, pp. 101 ff.)

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² Maitrāyana-Up., I, 2-4.

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"A king named Bṛhadratha, after having installed his eldest son on the throne, thinking that his body is non-eternal, turned to renunciation and went forth into the forest. There he gave himself up to the severest mortification, standing with arms stretched upwards and gazing into the sun. After one thousand days had elapsed there approached him........... the Ātman-knowing, venerable Śākāyanya. 'Stand up, stand up and choose a wish!' thus spake he to the king. He made his obeisance to him and said: 'O venerable one! I am not cognizant of the Ātman. Thou knowest his nature, as we have heard; mayest thou explain this to us!' (The Brahman desires to dissuade him from this wish and invites him to wish for something else. Then the king bursts forth into the words:) 'O venerable one! In this evil-smelling, pithless body, composed of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, flesh, seed, blood, mucus, tears, gum of the eyes, faeces, urine, bile and phlegm,—how can one possibly enjoy pleasure! In this body burdened with passion, anger, desire, delusion, fear, cowardice, envy, separation from that which is beloved, attachment to that which is not beloved, hunger, thirst, age, death, disease, trouble and such like,—how can one possibly enjoy pleasure! We see also that this whole world is transitory, just like these flies, mosquitoes, and such like, these herbs and trees, which rise and again decay.' (There then follows an enumeration of ancient kings and heroes who had to perish, also gods and demigods, who all fall victims to annihilation.) 'But what of these! There are yet other things,—drying-up of great seas, falling down of the mountains, swaying of the Pole Star,...... sinking of the earth, the fall of the gods from their place,—in the course of a world in which such things happen, how indeed can one enjoy pleasure! When even he who is satiated with it, must return again and again! Therefore rescue me! For I feel in this world-cycle like the frog in a waterless well. Thou, O venerable one, art our refuge,"

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It is noteworthy, however, that this passage, to which numerous parallels may be found in the Buddhist as well as in the later Sanskrit literature, belongs to one of the *latest* Upaniṣads. For the Maitrāyaṇa-Upaniṣad is, in language and style, nearer to the classical Sanskrit literature than to the Veda and is decidedly post-Buddhist.[^1) The old *Vedic* Upaniṣads contain but the germs of pessimism in the doctrine of the non-reality of the world. Only the Brahman is real, and this is the Ātman, the soul, "which passes beyond hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and death." "That which is different from it is full of suffering."—ato'nyad ārtam.[^2) But "that which is different from it," does not exist at all in reality, and therefore also the suffering and misery of the world are not real. The knowing one, who has comprehended the doctrine of the Unity, knows no fear, no pain. "He who knows the joy of the Brahman, for him there is no fear." "Where is delusion, where sorrow, for him who knows the Unity?" Joy (ānanda) is a name of the Brahman. "Consisting of joy (ānandamaya) is the Ātman. And like a song of triumph of optimism sound the words of an Upaniṣad: Joy is the Brahman. For truly, out of joy arise all these beings, by joy they live after they have arisen, and when they pass away they are again absorbed into joy."[^\*3)

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Thus the doctrine of the Upaniṣads is at bottom not pessimistic. Certainly it is only a small step from the belief in the non-reality of the world to contempt of the world. The more extravagantly the joy of the Brahman was praised, the vainer, the more worthless did earthly existence appear.[^4) Therefore, after all, the pessimism of later Indian philosophy has its roots in the Upaniṣads.

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In fact the whole of the later philosophy of the Indians is rooted in the Upaniṣads. Their doctrines formed the

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[^1): Maitr.-Up., VII, 8 f., contains distinct allusions to the Buddhists as heretics. On the style of the Maitrāyaṇīya-Upaniṣad, see *Oldenberg*, Zur Geschichte der altindischen Prosa, p. 33. [^2): Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Up. III, 5. [^\*3): Taittirīya-Up., II, 9. III, 6; Īśā-Up., 7. [^4): *Cf.* M. F. *Hecker*, Schopenhauer und die indische Philosophie, pp. 116-120.

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foundation for the *Vedānta-Sūtras* of *Bādarāyaṇa*, a work of which a later writer¹ says: "This text-book is the chief of all the text-books. All other text-books serve only as its complement. Therefore all who aim at deliverance, shall exalt it." The theological-philosophical systems of *Śaṅkara* and of *Rāmānuja*, whose adherents at the present day are still counted by millions, are built upon this text-book. Moreover, all other philosophical systems and religions which have arisen in the course of the centuries, the heretical Buddhism no less than the orthodox Brahmanical religion of the post-Buddhist period, have sprung forth from the soil of the Upaniṣad doctrines.

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¹ Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his Prasthānabheda.

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On the other hand it proved fatal for the development of Indian philosophy that the Upaniṣads should have been pronounced to be "revelations," and sacred texts; for in the Upaniṣads we still find vigorous, independent, creative philosophical thought, which grew rarer and rarer in the later development of Indian philosophy for the very reason that progress was not only hindered at every step by the fetters of the dogmatism of the schools—which is the case in other lands as well as in India—but still more by the orthodox belief that every word of an Upaniṣad must be regarded as divine truth.

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However, it was not the belief in their divine revelation which gave these philosophical poems (there is hardly a better name for them) such enormous power over the minds of men: for even the silliest hymns and the most stupid Brāhmaṇa passages were regarded as uttered by the deity: but it was rather the circumstance that, arrayed in the language of *poetry*, they appealed just as much to the heart as to the intellect. And it is not because, as Schopenhauer asserts, they present the "fruit of the highest human knowledge and wisdom,” and contain “almost superhuman conceptions,” “whose originators can hardly be regarded as mere men”¹ that across the space of thousands of years the Upaniṣads *still* have much to tell *us also*; not because, as Deussen thinks, these thinkers have obtained, “if not the most scientific, yet still the most intimate and immediate light upon the last secret of existence;” and because (with which Deussen seeks to justify the belief of the Indians in revelation) in the Upaniṣads “there are philosophical conceptions unequalled in India or perhaps anywhere else in the world.”² No, it is because these old thinkers *wrestle* so earnestly for the truth, because in their philosophical poems the eternally unsatisfied human yearning for knowledge has been expressed so fervently. The Upaniṣads do not contain “superhuman conceptions,” but human, absolutely human attempts to come nearer to the truth—and it is this which makes them so valuable to us.

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¹ *Hecker*, loc. cit., p. 7.

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² *Deussen*, System des Vedānta, pp. 50, 99 f. What exaggerations!

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For the historian, however, who pursues the history of human thought, the Upaniṣads have a yet far greater significance. From the mystical doctrines of the Upaniṣads *one* current of thought may be traced to the mysticism of the Persian Sufism, to the mystic-theosophical logos-doctrine of the Neo-Platonics and the Alexandrian Christians down to the teachings of the Christian mystics Eckhart and Tauler, and finally to the philosophy of the great German mystic of the nineteenth century, Schopenhauer.³ What Schopenhauer owed to the Indians he has himself told us often enough. He himself calls Plato, Kant and “the Vedas” (by which Schopenhauer always means the Upaniṣads) his teachers. In his manuscript written for University lectures he wrote: “The results of that which I intend to present to you, agree with the oldest of all views of life, namely, the Vedas.” He calls the opening up of Sanskrit literature “the greatest gift of our century,” and prophesies that Indian pantheism might become the popular belief in the Occident also. The agreement of his own system with that of the Upaniṣads appears to him absolutely marvellous, and he tells us “that each of the separate and detached sayings which constitute the Upaniṣads might be taken as a conclusion from the idea communicated by himself, although on the other hand the same is by no means to be found there already.” It is well known that the Oupnek’hat used to lie open on his table and that before retiring to rest he performed his “devotions” in it. And he says of this book: “It is the most satisfying and elevating reading (with the exception of the original text) which is possible in the world; it has been the solace of my life and will be the solace of my death.”¹ The fundamental doctrine of the Upaniṣads, however, is the same which, according to Schopenhauer, “was at all times the ridicule of fools and the endless meditation of sages,” namely, the doctrine *of Unity*, *i.e.* the doctrine “that all plurality is only apparent, that in all the individuals of this world, in whatever endless number they may present themselves after and beside one another, yet only one and the same, truly existing Being, present and identical in them all, manifests itself.”² And if Ludwig Stein, who once said: “The philosophy of the present is Monism, that is the interpretation of all that happens in the universe,” as one unity³ is right, then this “philosophy of the present” was already the philosophy of the ancient Indians three thousand years ago.

Linked texts (10)

Chāndogyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Taittirīyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Kauṣītakibrāhmaṇopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Kaṭhopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Śatapathabrāhmaṇa — Yājñavalkya & Śāṇḍilya (Vedic teacher), Sanskrit
Maitrāyaṇīyopaniṣad — Sanskrit
Prasthānabheda — Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 1570, Sanskrit
Brahmasūtra — Bādarāyaṇa, Sanskrit
Īśopaniṣad — Sanskrit