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State and Government in Ancient India c9: Chapter II: Origin and Types of the State

State and Government in Ancient India c9

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Contents

Chapter II: Origin and Types of the State

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Modern works on polity devote considerable space to the discussion of the question of the origin of the State. No contemporary evidence is available or is ever likely to be available to enlighten us on the point. While we possess ample evidence to show how some particular states originated among people already accustomed to political life, we have only the uncertain light of legends and mythology to visualise the circumstances under which men for the first time associated themselves into a political organisation. We are, therefore, left more or less to speculate on the problem. The modern speculation, however, is largely influenced by the scientific method and the theory of evolution, and seeks to fortify its conclusions by such analogies as can be drawn from the known condition of societies, which are more or less in an uncivilised condition at the present time. We should not forget that this line of approach was unknown to the ancients, whether of the East or the West. Most institutions were regarded in ancient India as due to divine agency or inspiration and the State was no exception to this rule.

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We have occasional speculations on the origin of the State in the *Mahābhārata*¹ and the *Digghanikāya*,² and though these works belong to different centuries and religions, their version shows a marked similarity. They both aver that for a long time after the creation of society, there prevailed a golden age of harmony and happiness, when people led happy and peaceful lives on account of their innate virtuous disposition, though there existed no government to see that the laws of nature were respected and followed. Popular imagination has dreamt of a golden age in the dim and distant past not only in the East but also in the West. Plato's Republic may well be regarded as the idealisation of such a Golden Age; the actual state could be only a faint copy of the ideal one delineated by him. As late as the 18th century, Rousseau held that the era of the Golden Age had disappeared many many centuries ago; the utmost that men could do today was to try to realise it to some extent in the present imperfect society¹

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¹ *Śāntiparvan*, chap. 58.

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² Vol. III, pp. 84-96.

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¹ It is averred by some observers that even during the 19th century there existed some primitive civilisations in the hearts of Africa and Australia, which led a happy and harmonious life in spite of the absence of any government among them. It is, however, not unlikely that the observations may have been incomplete and onesided owing to the difficulty of language or the shortness of the stay.

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The Śāntiparvan² goes on to narrate that society flourished without a king or law court for a long time, but later somehow there was a moral degeneration. People fell from rectitude; greed, selfishness and cupidity began to sway their mind and the earthly paradise which they had been enjoying was soon converted into a veritable hell. The law of the jungle began to prevail; the strong devoured the weak, as is the order of the day among the fish (*mātsyanyāya*). Gods then became alarmed and decided to remedy the situation, when men went out in a deputation to pray for relief. Brahmadeva, the chief god, thought over the matter and came to the conclusion that human society can survive only if a code of law was framed and enforced through the instrumentality of a king. He composed a comprehensive code, created an asexual son named Virajas, appointed him king and men agreed to obey his orders.²

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² नियतस्त्वं नरव्याघ्र शृणु सर्वमशेषतः।

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Elsewhere in the Śāntiparvan (Ch. 67) we have a slightly divergent account of the origin of the state, which seems to refer to an unsuccessful contract at one stage. People were tired of the law of the jungle which prevailed for a long time, and

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यथा राज्यं समुत्पन्नमादौ कृतयुगेऽभवत् ।। 58. 12.
न वै राज्यं न राजासीन्न च दण्डो न दाण्डिकः ।
धर्मेण च प्रजाः सर्वा रक्षन्ति स्म परस्परम् ।।
पाल्यमानास्तथान्योन्यं नरा धर्मेण भारत ।। १४ ।।
दैन्यं परमपाजग्मुस्तस्तस्मान्मोह आविशत् ।
प्रतिपत्तिविमोहाच्च धर्मस्तेषामनीनशत् ।।
कामो नामापरस्तत्र प्रत्यपद्यत वै प्रभो । १६ ।।

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entered into a mutual contract that persons guilty of unsocial acts like misappropriation and adultery would be expelled from society. We are expressly told that in order to inspire mutual confidence, they entered into a universal social contract to guarantee the agreement. We are however told that people still continued to be unhappy, probably because there was no king or government to enforce the contract. They then approached the Creator with a request to appoint a king, who on the one hand, should be worth the reverence of the community and on the other, should be able to protect the people. The Creator straightway appointed Manu as the king.¹ To rule over a refractory populace was however distasteful to him and he did not like to undertake the job. Here the epic does not refer to the Creator solving the difficulty by composing a law code ; continuing the atmosphere of the theory of Social Contract it states that people themselves assured Manu that law would be followed and the sin would go the law-breakers and not to the king for punishing them. They further agreed to pay the necessary taxes.²

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¹ वाक्शूरो दंडपुरुषो यश्च स्यात्पारजायिकः। यः परश्चमथादद्यात्त्याज्या नस्तादृशा इति ॥ 67. 18 विश्वासार्थं च सर्वेषां वर्णानामविशेषतः। तास्तथा समयं कृत्वा समयेनावतस्थिरे ॥ सहितास्तास्तदा जग्मुरसुखार्ताः पितामहम् । अनीश्वरा विनश्यामो भगवन्नीश्वरं दिश ॥ 20 यं पूजयेम संभूय यश्च नः प्रतिपालयेत् । ततो मनुं व्यादिदेश मनुर्नाभिनन्दिताः !!

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² तमब्रुवन्प्रजा मा भैः कर्तृ नेनो गमिष्यति । धान्यस्य दशमं भागं दास्यामः कोशवर्धनम् ॥ *Ibid* 23

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These divergent theories would show that the Great Epic is merely speculating about the origin of the state. According to both the theories God helped the humanity to escape from the law of the jungle by giving it a king. But one of theories refers to an apparently unfructuous earlier social contract, which however failed to put an end to anarchy before a God-appointed king appeared on the scene to restore law and order.

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The accounts in the *Mahābhārata* show that the state was regarded as a divine institution; king's right to govern was partly due to his divine creation and partly due to the agreement of the subjects to be governed by him in order to terminate the anarchy.

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We may passingly note that the theory of the divine origin of State was widely held in Europe under the influence of the Christian dogma, especially in the Middle Ages, when the king was regarded as the annointed representative of God, ruling by divine right. Islam also shared a similar view, for it regarded king as the shadow of God.

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The version of the *Dīghanikāya*¹ resembles the above account to a great extent. Buddhists did not believe in God and so Brahmadeva as the creator of the first king and code does naturally not figure in it. But we are told that in the dim and distant past, there was a golden age, when men who had ethereal and refulgent bodies, lived in virtue and happiness. Somehow there was a fall from this ideal state; there arose anarchy and chaos, and people wondered how to put an end to it. Eventually there arose on the scene a person named Mahājanasammata (lit. one acceptable to the great community), who was born asexually. He was wise, virtuous and able, and the public requested him to become their king and to put an end to the prevailing chaos. He acceded to their request and people then elected him to be their king, agreeing to give him a part of their paddy in return for his services.

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¹ Vol. III, pp. 84-6.

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Jinasena, a Jain author of the 9th century, also holds that the earth was a paradise (*bhogabhūmi*) in the distant past, when all human wants were satisfied by desire-yielding trees (*kalpavṛikshas*). These latter, however, gradually disappeared and there was a chaos. But order was soon restored by the first Tīrthaṅkara, Ṛishabhanātha, who introduced kings, officers castes and professions.²

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² *Ādipurāṇa*, III. 30 ff.

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Let us now take a review of the opinions of other writers on politics. Kauṭilya refers to the problem of the origin of the state only incidentally during a discussion of spies among themselves. One party there argues that government came into existence to counteract the law of the jungle that prevailed in society. People themselves selected Manu as their king and agreed to pay him the necessary taxes (I. 13). The work does not make any reference to any Golden Age existing in prehistoric times. Nārada (I. 1-2) and Bṛihaspati (I. 1-16) postulate the original existence of a Golden Age and point out that it soon came to an end and was succeeded by a social chaos. Government came into existence to put an end to it. They do not enter into any detailed discussion of the problem. Śukra has no useful observations to make about the origin of the state. He recognises a quasi-divinity in the case of a virtuous king; this may suggest that he was not much inclined to believe in the theory of Golden Age or social contract.

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A survey of the above passages shows that whatever may be the state of affairs in the mythical past, Hindu thinkers held that State was an indispensable institution for the orderly existence and progress of society in the imperfect world as known to us in historic times; a country without government cannot even exist.¹ The idea of a primeval Golden Age is accepted only in some sections of the *Mahābhārata* and Buddhist literature. Writers on polity only toy with it for some time and hasten to point out that it was soon succeeded by a social chaos, which was terminated only when God gave a king to society. They thus regarded State as a divine institution, implying thereby that it is as old as society and owed its origin to that socio-political instinct which is twin-born with man.

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¹ अराजकं नाम रट्ठं पालेतुं न सक्का। *Jātaka*, VI, p. 39.

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The *Mahābhārata* implies that people accepted Virajas as king; the *Dīgghanikāya* expressly states that Mahājanasammata accepted the people's request to put an end to anarchy and thereupon people elected him to be their king. There is no doubt a notion here of government coming into existence as a result of some implied contract. Some such idea seems to have been also in the mind of the Dharmasūtra writers, when they aver that the king is a servant of the people charged with the duty of protection, 16% tax being his wage.² Hindu writers, however, do not further develop the theory of contract, as was done in the West. Probably they had realised that it could not be fully applicable to the origin of government and society. These come into existence out of conditions primarily arising from the sociability inherent in human nature.

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² षड्भागभृतो राजा रक्षेत्प्रजाम्॥ *B. D. S.* I, 10, 6.

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It is now generally recognised that the contract theory of the origin of government is bad history and worse logic; it can no doubt explain the origin of a particular form of state among people who have already developed governmental institutions, but it cannot explain how the first agreement took place among the members of a community, which was still in the state of nature. Contract is possible only in a society where mutual rights and obligations are respected, and this is obviously impossible in a society where the law of the jungle prevails.

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It would be, however, interesting to compare ancient Indian theory of contract with similar theories advanced in the west. The theory is rarely referred to by ancient thinkers of Greece and Rome; it is worked out in detail only in the post-Reformation period. Hobbes and Locke are its important advocates.

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Like most of the ancient Indian thinkers, Hobbes held that there was a state of anarchy in the beginning, the hand of each being against all. Tired of this state, people eventually agreed to surrender part of their rights to the sovereign. It was not, however, a contract between the sovereign on one side and the people on the other. It was merely an agreement among the people, which imposed no obligation upon the sovereign, who however got unlimited and irrevocable rights under it. Hindu writers also, like Hobbes, have presupposed a contract, which eventually put an end to the law of the jungle; but it was not a contract which imposed obligations only on the people. The first king Virajas got no unlimited rights under it; his powers were restricted by the Code of Law prepared by Brahmadeva for him. The same was the case with his son Kardama and grandson Anaṅga. The latter’s son Vena was a tyrant, but the sages destroyed him by their supernatural powers. Vena’s son Pṛithu was however brave and law-abiding and he willingly took the vow to rule righteously, as required by the sages. It would be thus seen that the king who came into power after the agreement among the people and at the intervention of divine power, was far from being a law unto himself, as was the case with the king as conceived by Hobbes.

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According to Locke, the state of Nature in the pre-government period was more or less analogous to the Golden Age of the Hindu mythology. People as a general rule obeyed the laws of reason and nature, and respected one another's person and property. Society had thus come into existence, but not government. When, however, occasional breaches of law occurred, each individual could act both as a judge and executor of his own decrees, which created certain inconveniences. Though the law of Nature was known to all, still owing to difference of intelligence and conflicts of interests disputes arose as to the method of its enforcement, which gave rise to confusion and uncertainty in life. To put an end to it people entered into a covenant, surrendered their right to enforce the law of Nature and organised a government which was also bound by the terms of the original contract. Hindu writers vaguely suggest that somehow there was a fall from the Golden Age of the primeval period, owing to greed getting the upper hand in human nature. How the greed once absent from human nature began to warp it, they cannot explain, just as Locke cannot explain how in a society where the laws of reason prevailed, there were occasional breaches of its provisions and how, when they occurred, every party in the transaction could act both as the judge and the executor. Locke makes the provisions of the original contract binding on the king. Hindu writers seek to regulate his powers by the provisions of the original divine code.

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It will thus be seen that the desire to put an end to anarchy and evolve a better type of society and government are stated to be the chief grounds for people entering into the original contract, that brought government into existence.¹ Western thinkers, however, looked at the problem from a purely secular point of view ; it is well-known how the views of some of them were unconsciously influenced by people's struggle against autocracy that was then in full swing in some countries. They, therefore, are anxious to thrash the idea of contract threadbare, initiate fundamental principles of political association, define the authority of the sovereign and prescribe the conditions under which popular obedience would be expected, and discuss whether the transfer of power by the people to the sovereign is irrevocable or otherwise. Ancient Indian writers did not live in an age of rationalism like Locke and Rousseau ; they looked at the question from a semi-religious and semi-sociological point of view. They have, therefore, neither gone deep into the fundamentals of the problem, nor defined precisely the limits of the powers of the state and the people. They observe, for instance, that people offer obedience and taxation in return for the protection and services they expect from the government. If the king's government fails in its duty, they permit the people to remove the king, and even to kill him. But what precisely will constitute a breach of the contract on the part of government, and what is the secular constitutional machinery by which people can enforce the performance of the terms of the original contract is nowhere clearly described. The permission to remove a tyrant or to kill him no doubt assumes the ultimate soveriegnty of the people and invests them with supreme authority. This remedy, however, is drastic and difficult ; it would have been more useful if our authorities had recommended a less extreme but more practicable remedy in the form of an everyday constitutional check. We should not, however, forget that such a remedy has been perfected even in the West only in the modern age.

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¹ Rousseau, however, is an exception in this connection. His State of Nature described in the *Discourse on Inequality* is as happy and idealistic as that of the Kṛita Yuga of the ancient Hindus; but he differs from them in postulating that the political organisation was introduced not as a means of escape from an intolerable condition, but as a means of conserving rights that were naturally enjoyed by men in the State of Nature. Cocker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, p. 478. The rise of the State was thus due according to Rousseau to the general will of the people; according to the *Mahābhārata* it was due to the Code of Brahmā and the willingness of the people and king to follow it.

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There are various other theories advocated about the origin of State by modern writers. It is argued that people in the distant past willingly entrusted government powers to an individual, either because he was a priest who could ensure divine help and favours, or because he was a magician who could command rain, or because he was a doctor who could cure patients. It is suggested that individuals who thus happened to gain ascendancy over the minds of their contemporaries, managed to retain it by the use of force, which they could exercise with ease owing to their pre-eminent position, already recognised on a large scale. It is quite possible that in some primitive societies government may have actually arisen owing to the operation of the above factors. But as far as the Indo-European communities are concerned, the institution of the patriarchal joint family seems to have been the germ out of which State was gradually evolved. The evidence of the comparative philology shows that even when the Aryans were in their original home, they were living in joint families consisting of the grandfather, father, uncles, nephews, sons and daughters-in-law.¹ The evidence of Homer shows that these joint families were sometimes so big as to include two or three hundred persons.² The patriarch of the joint family wielded very wide powers over its members ; he could pledge, sell, amputate and even kill any person under his *potestas* for an offence committed by him. The Roman patriarch possessed these powers ; some Vedic legends also show that the father could blind or sell a guilty son by virtue of his patriarchal authority.³ The position of the patriarch in pre-historic times was more or less like that of a king amongst all the Indo-European communities. His jurisdiction increased, though perhaps his powers diminished, as the joint family expanded into a big federation of several natural families, springing from a common ancestor, real or imaginary, and living in the same village. The senior member of the senior-most family in such a village was regarded with great reverence by the whole community and used to be entrusted with most of the governmental functions to be discharged, no doubt, in consultation with other elder persons of the locality. The Ṛigvedic evidence shows that the Aryan society in that early period was divided into families, *janmans*, *viśas* and *janas*.¹ *Janmans* seem to have corresponded to a village consisting of people claiming a common descent, and a number of such villages joined together by a bond of kinship seem to have constituted a *viś*; its chief was known as a *viśpati*. *Viśas* were closely knit together, and on the battle fields battalions were often arranged as per *viś* from which they had been recruited (*R. V.*, X, 84, 4). Several *viśas* made a *jana* or tribe, which had its own *janapati* or the king. This organisation among the Vedic Aryans shows a striking resemblance to the condition prevailing in Rome in early days. There the smallest unit, gens, consisted of a small number of families descended from a common ancestor; a number of these gens constituted a curia and ten curiae made a tribe. Vedic *jana* probably corresponded with the tribe, *viś* with the curia and *janman* with the gen.

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¹ Words for the uncle, the nephew, the father-in-law, the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law are derived from common roots in most Indo-European languages.

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² Priam had fifty sons and twelve daughters ; they lived with their parents in a common home along with their wives, husbands and children.

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³ *R V.* I. 116.16 tells us how Aśvins restored the eyesight of Ṛjrāśva, who was blinded by his father, exasperated to find that his son had permitted his hundred sheep to be devoured by a wolf. Śunaśśepa had been sold by his father to save the family from starvation (*A. Br.* VII. 15).

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¹ स इज्जनेन स विशा स जन्मना स पुत्रैर्वाजं धरन धनान्नृभिः II. 26. 3.

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The available evidence thus shows that as among other Indo-Aryan communities, State was evolved in India also in pre-historic times out of the institution of the joint family. The patriarch of the family was instinctively revered and obeyed; and social traditions and atmosphere inspired a similar respect for, and evoked a similar obedience to the head of the village and tribe, who generally acquired the status of chiefs and kings. The power of the kings gradually became more and more extensive as states became larger and larger.

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The institution of the joint family thus gradually led to the evolution of kingship. It also presupposed the rise and acceptance of the notion of family property, and also of the inviolability of the sacred family ties and relationships, especially connected with the institution of marriage. Molestation of women had to be stopped and the peaceful enjoyment of property had to be ensured. This could be guaranteed only by the rise of the Institution of State. The institution of the family with the notion of the family property thus played its own part in the origin of the State.

Type of States

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Let us now see what were the different types of states existing in ancient India. Ancient constitutional writers hardly discuss this problem. This is probably due to their having flourished in an age when monarchy had become the prevailing type of State. Had a book on *daṇḍanīti* been written by a citizen of an aristocratic or republican state, we might have got some interesting discussion about the nature and types of different states like monarchy, aristocracy and republics and their relative merits and defects. But curiously enough this does not seem to have happened.

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Our writers again and again revolve round the same type of state, viz., monarchy; only a few of them passingly refer to the *Saṅgha* (republican) state. We have shown already how for a long time the state was tribal. Apart from the frequent references to *viśpatis* and *janapatis* the *Ṛigveda* (*c.* 2500 B. C.) frequently refers to specific tribes like the Yadus, the Purus, the Anus, the Turvaśas, etc. Viśvāmitra's prayers are said to have protected the Bharata people;¹ in the Rājasūya sacrifice, the king is announced as the ruler of the Bharatas or the Kuru-Pañchālas and not as the sovereign of a particular province or kingdom. The notion of a *rāshṭra* or a territorial state, however, was being gradually evolved in the later Vedic period; we find it clearly referred to in the *Atharvaveda*.² The *Taittīriya Saṁhitā*³ refers to a ritual, a partial performance of which could secure a king the over-lordship over his tribe (*viś*), but not over the country (*rāshṭra*). The Brāhmaṇa literature frequently refers to the emperors as the rulers not over all the tribes but over the whole earth bounded by the sea. It is clear that the notion of the territorial state was fully established at this time (*c.* 1000 B. C.)

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¹ विश्वामित्रस्य रक्षति ब्रह्मेदं भारतं जनम्। III. 53. 2

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² XX. 127. 9-10; XIX. 30. 3-4; III. 4, 2; VI. 98. 2

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³ II. 3. 3-4.

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Monarchy was the normal form of the State in the Vedic period, *rājā* (a king), *mahārāja* (a great king), *samrāṭ* (an emperor) are the different terms by which kings were designated according to their power and prestige. Some of them were also called *svarājas* and *bhojas*; probably they were feudatories and zemindars.

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In the description of the coronation, the ritual is sometimes described as securing *rājya*, *svarājya*, *bhaujya*, *vairājya*, *mahārājya* and *sāmrājya* to one and the same individual.¹ A doubt, therefore, naturally arises as to whether these terms really denoted different types of states or monarchies. It is, however, not unlikely that it is the desire to emphasise the omnipotence of the ritual that is responsible for the priest claiming that the king who is receiving the holy coronation from him, can attain to all the different positions referred to above. This conjecture becomes more probable when we remember that a passage in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* states that the different types of States like *rājya* *bhaujya*, *vairājya*, and *sāmrājya* flourished in different provinces of the country.²

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¹ *A. Br.*, VIII, 2.6; VIII, 3, 13.

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² *A. Br.*, VIII, 3, 14.

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In the later Indian history we always come across a large number of kings, enjoying different degrees of autonomy and ruling as feudatories of an emperor (*samrāṭ*). It is not unlikely that such feudatories existed in the Vedic period as well; they may have been known as *bhojas* and *svarājas* and their feudal lords as *samrāṭs*. The territorial extent of the dominion of a *samrāṭ*, as compared to that of *svarāṭ*, cannot be difinitely determined. Most of the states in Vedic period were small; it is doubtful whether there was a state big enough to extend over a quarter of the Punjab. The dominion of a *samrāṭ* was perhaps not much bigger than that of an ordinary king. Military glory and achievements were probably more responsible for his higher title than the extent of his dominion. Rājya probably denoted a smaller but independent kingdom. The statement in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* that kings were common in the Madhya-deśa and emperors in Eastern India would support our interpretation. *Vairājya* denoted a republic, a state which had no king.

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States where the principal executive authority was vested in two rulers as in ancient Sparta were not unknown in ancient India. One such state existed at Paṭala in Sindh in Alexander's days, where the sovereignty was vested in two different kings hailing from different houses.¹ The *Arthaśāstra* (VIII. 2) also refers to such a state; probably it used to come into existence when two brothers or cousins, being claimants to the same kingdom, preferred to rule it jointly instead of dividing it into two parts. But just as two swords cannot remain in the same scabbard, two kings can hardly rule in harmony, when the power of each is unlimited and extends over the same kingdom. Such a state must have been often torn by factions and parties supporting the power of each ruler; one can, therefore, well understand why the *Arthaśāstra*² does not approve of it, and why a Jain monk is advised not to travel through or stay in it. To avoid discord, very often the brother or cousin rulers of a *dvairājya* state would divide the kingdom between them, as was done in the *dvairājya* kingdom, created in Vidarbha by the Śuṅgas.³ It would appear that though the kingdom was divided, the two rulers would hold joint consultations on all important matters. When the two kings were ruling in harmony, the state was called a two-kings-state (*dorajja* in Prakrit and *dvirājaka* in Sanskrit); when they were pulling in opposite directions, it was called a self-fighting state (*virudharajja* in Prakrit and *viruddharājya* in Sanskrit).⁴

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¹ Mc Crindle, *Alexander's Invasion*, p. 296

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² द्वैराज्यमन्योन्यपक्षद्वेषानुरागाभ्यां परस्परसंघर्षेण वा विनश्यति । VIII. 2

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³ *Mālavikāgnimitra*, Act V, v. 13.

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⁴ अरायणि वा गणरायणि वा जुवरायणि वा दोरज्जणि वा बेरज्जणि वा विरुद्धरज्जणि वा । *Āchārāṅga-Sūtra*, II, 3, 1, 10.

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The Vedic literature sometimes refers to *kings* meeting together in an assembly;¹ we are also told that that person alone can become a *king* who is permitted to become one by other kings.² These passages probably refer to the existence of an oligarchy, where power was vested in a council of nobles, each member of which was entitled to call himself a kin and had a right to elect the chief of the state, who also was called a king. We shall see later how this type of the state continued to exist down to the 6th century B. C. in some parts of North-Eastern India.

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¹ यत्रौषधीः समग्मत राजानः समिताविव । *R. V.*, X. 97. 6.

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² यस्मै वै राजानो राज्यमनुमन्यन्ते स राजा भवति न स यस्मै न । *S. Br.*, IX 3. 2. 5.

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Side by side with monarchical and oligarchical states, there also existed republican governments in ancient India as early as the Vedic age. A passage in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* states that the people in the vicinity of the Himalayas like the Uttarakurus and the Uttaramadras have a *virāṭ* (kingless) type of the state and are, therefore, called *vi-rāṭ* or kingless. When it is remembered how the same passage earlier refers to the *kings* of the easterners and the southerners and the titles that were borne by them, and how it carefully states that it is the *people* among the Uttarakurus and Uttaramadras,—not their *kings*,—who were called *virāṭ*, it becomes quite certain that these people had a non-monarchical or republican form of government. This conclusion is further strengthened when we remember how Greek authorities tell us that in the territory above referred to, republican types of states were the order of the day as late as the time of Alexander the Great. Whether the non-monarchical states of ancient India were also republican will be discussed later in Chap. VI.

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The city state was another feature of the political life in the early period. We get some account of its constitution and administration from the Greek writers. Arrian describes Nyasa as a free city state flourishing at the time of the invasion of Alexander the Great ; its President, when out to meet the Macedonian hero with thirty deputies, said, ‘How Oh king, can a single city, if deprived of a hundred of its best men, continue to be well governed ?’ It is thus clear that Nyasa was not the capital of a kingdom, but a city state, almost entirely dependent upon its own resources. When Diodorus describes how the citizens from the Śibi state offered their submission, upon which Alexander permitted them to retain their freedom, he is obviously referring to the city state of the tribe. Several other city states are referred to by Greek writers ; among them we may mention Pimprama of the Adraisti and Sangala of the Kathaians and Patala in Sindh. When the *Mahābhārata* refers to the powerful *grāmas* on the bank of the Indus, it is obviously referring to the powerful city states,³ some of which are mentioned by the Greek historians. Coins issued by a number of cities like Tripuri, Mādhyamikā, Ujjayinī, Vārāṇasi, Kauśāmbī etc. have come to light.⁴ It is quite probable that at some periods of their history they were city states, rather than capitals, issuing coins on their own authority. It was but natural that the city states should have brought under their control some of the outlying villages ; but the government was usually carried on by the aristocratic classes in the city itself.

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³ सिंधकूलाश्चिता ये च ग्रामणीया महाबला: II. 32. 9.

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⁴ *J. N. S. I.*, XIII, pp. 40-45.

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Composite and confederate states were not unknown to ancient India. The Kurupañchālas in the later Vedic period seem to have formed one composite state, ruled by a common king. The Kshudrakas and the Mālavas were separate states in the days of Pāṇini, but are very frequently mentioned together in the *Mahābhārata*. They had formed a confederation to meet the invasion of Alexander the Great, and it seems to have lasted for about a century. The alliance had been cemented by 10,000 intermarriages. The Yaudheya republican state seems to have comprised three sub-states. These confederations often lasted for short periods ; in the life-time of the Buddha and Mahāvīra, the Lichchhavis had formed a confederation, once with the Mallas and once with the Videhas. The Lichchhavi-Malla federal council consisted of 18 members, nine being elected by each of the confederating state. We do not, however, possess sufficient information to indicate how these composite or confederate states were functioning,—what powers were retained by the federating units and what authority was delegated to the federal centre. It, however, seems very probable that the jurisdiction of the central government of the confederating states was confined only to foreign policy and the declaration and prosecution of war. Otherwise each state retained its sovereignty. The general for the joint army in a particular campaign was elected by the confederating states; in the campaign against Alexander the Great, Kshudrakas and Mālavas had elected a Kshudraka generalissimo, who was famous for his skill and bravery.

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¹ McCrindle, *Invasion of Alexander the Great*, p. 81.

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² *Ibid*, p. 285.

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Normally, however, states in ancient India were unitary in character. King was the fountain source from which the ministers and provincial governors derived their power. Village Panchayats, town-councils and trade-guilds also were under the general supervision and control of the central government. Long established tradition had, however, limited the state's intervention in the autonomy of these bodies only to those rare occasions when they were guilty of a breach of their traditional rules and constitutions. The unitary character of the the state in ancient India was, therefore, to a great extent modified by the presence of these autonomous bodies, which used to function on their own lines, though revolutions occurred at the centre.

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