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Hindu Administrative Institutions c10.s6: Sec. vi. Legal Procedure

Hindu Administrative Institutions c10.s6

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Sec. vi. Legal Procedure

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The term '*vyavahāra*' connotes a judicial procedure. Bhīṣma enlightens Yudhiṣṭhira as to what *vyavahāra* is.² Bhaṭṭa Nīlakaṇṭha explains this term as follows in the extant treatise *Vyavahāra mayukha*.³ It was already stated that according to the *Arthaśāstra* the trial and the enquiry of the case depended on *dharma* or law, *vyavahāra* or evidence, *cāritram* or usage, and *rājaśāsanam* or statutes.⁴ But if a conflict will arise between *dharma* and *vyavahāra*, or between usage and statutes, Kauṭalya rules that the former is more authoritative and hence should be followed. If again there is a conflict between usage and evidence there again dharma prevails. Between the statute and equity (न्याय) it is the latter that counts.

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² Cf. *Śānti Parvan*, cxxi. 9-11.

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³ विप्रतिपद्यमानरांत्तरगताज्ञाता धर्मज्ञापनानुकूलो व्यापारो व्यवहारः । (Cf. Manu viii. 163-7.)

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⁴ संस्थाया धर्मशास्त्रेण शास्त्रं वा व्यावहारिकं । यस्मिन्नर्थे विरुध्येत धर्मेणार्थं विनिश्चयेत । शास्त्रं विप्रतिपद्येत धर्मन्यायेन केनचित । न्यायस्तत्र प्रमाणं स्यात्तत्र पादोहि नश्यति । (Bk. i, Sec. 3.)

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Dr. Jolly in his ‘Study on the *Arthaśāstra* and *Dharmaśāstras*’² shows concordance between the schools of dharma and artha. According to Yājñyavalkya³ if the *smṛtis* are in conflict, equity is to be regarded as more authoritative.⁴ Even then the *Dharmaśāstra* is superior to the *Arthaśāstra*. The commentary of *Mitākṣara*, writes Dr. Nag, ‘attempts to weaken the opposition in stating that the above stanza does not refer to all the conflict between the legal code and the manuals of the *Arthaśāstra* as those of Uśanas, but that it has an allusion to the conflict between the *Dharmaśāstras* and its supplementary chapter on the *Rājanīti*, with the help of which one must interpret the *Arthaśāstra*.⁵ Prof. Rangaswami Aiyangar remarks rightly: ‘The question of such reconciliation was an important topic of *mīmāṃsa* interpretation of Hindu law.’⁶ There is also reference to sacred equity in the Pillar inscription of Aśoka.⁷ The *Kauṭalīya* mentions⁸ four bases of the law in the order of increasing importance: *dharma* or law, *vyavahāra* or evidence, *saṃstha* or *cāritram* or precedent, and *rājaśāsana* or royal writs. By rendering justice agreeably to these as well as to *nyāya* or equity in an impartial spirit (*saman*) the king attains heaven. He agrees with Yājñyavalkya that in conflicts between *dharma* and *saṃstha* or between *dharma* and *vyavahāra* the former always prevails. But if a conflict arises between *dharma* and *dharmanyāya* or equity, the decision may rest with the latter, it being superior to the scholastic logic of the *smṛtis*.¹ Added to these is the obligation of the state to accept as valid every local usage, every custom of a caste, tribe, clan, and family, every bye-law or usage of corporations, guilds and organized non-political communities, or fraternities as was not inconsistent with the state's own laws or interests.² This ruling of the *Arthaśāstra* is also admitted by the *Dharmaśāstras*, the edicts of Aśoka, and the later digests and commentaries and compendia of Hindu law as well as writers of the extant treatises like the *Śukranītisāra*.³

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¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. i, Sec. 3.

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² In *Z.D.M.G.*, 1913, pp. 49-96.

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³ स्मृत्योर्विरोधन्यायस्तु बलवान्व्यवहारतः । अर्थशास्त्रात्तु बलवद्धर्मशास्त्रमिति स्थितिः ॥ (Yāj., ii. 21.)

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⁴ Cf. *Nārada Smṛti*, i. 39; *S. T. R.*, viil. 1, 38; Agni, 253, 50.

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⁵ *Trans. Jour. Ind. His.*, p. 259, vol. v, part ii.

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⁶ *Aspects of Polity*, p. 127.

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⁷ iv; cf. *S. T. R.*, viii. 1. 37.

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⁸ *Supra*, p. 255.

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¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. iii, Sec. 1. स्वे स्वे तु वर्गे देशे काले च स्वकरणकृताः सम्पूर्णचाराः शुद्धदेशा दृष्टरूपलक्षण प्रमाणणाः सर्वव्यवहाराः सिध्येयुः । ( *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. iii, Sec. 1 quoted in *Ancient Indian Polity*, p. 54.)

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² Cp. Gautama, xi. 20 : Āpastamba, ii. 15. 1 ; Vasiṣṭha, i. 17 ; Bauda. i, 2, 12 ; Manu, ii. 6, 12, 18 ; vii. 203, viii. 41, 46 ; Yāj., i. 7 ; ii. 5.

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³ S. T. R., viii, 1, 23-25.

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✔ In the procedure followed, when a certain case is filed each of the contending parties was expected to present an affidavit before the registration officer containing particulars of the year and the place, the nature of the offence,⁴ etc. Other regulations were that excepting in criminal cases the defendant could not file a counterpetition against the plaintiff. Again two suits touching one and the same offence were disallowed.⁵ The *Agni Purāṇa* lays down thus: ‘a court should neither entertain nor hear a cross-case, without first deciding the original one, nor should it take up a case or a suit dismissed or rejected by another tribunal of competent authority.’⁶

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⁴ Agni., ccliii. 38.

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⁵ Ibid., M. N. Dutt. Trans.

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⁶ 33

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The following is the categorical list of court offences termed (परोक्तदोष) which, if either committed by the defendant's party or the plaintiff's party, were punishable by the court.¹

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¹ *Arthaśāstra*, Bk. iii, Sec. 1.

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1. Not answering straight to the point involved,
2. Inconsistency in statements,
3. Pressing for advice from quarters unworthy of consultation,
4. Not continuously answering the question at issue,
5. Further irrelevant points,
6. Not accepting the statements offered by his own witnesses,
7. Conversing secretly with the latter without permission,
8. Meeting the arguments of defence the self-same day,
9. If either party failed to make his defence or to prove his case respectively within the appointed time,
10. Unwarranted statements.

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The fines for these offences were Pañchabandha and Daśabandha the fifth and tenth parts of the sums sued for.²

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² *Ibid.*, Sec. 11; cf. Yāj., ii. 171; Vijñāneśvara's commentary, on *Pañchabandha* and *Daśabandha* :

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In the *Arthaśāstra* occurs, परस्पराभियोगे चैषामत्तमाः परोक्ताः दशबन्धं दद्युर्वराः पञ्चबन्धम् । (Bk. iii, Sec. 11.) Dr. Shama Śāstri translates : ‘ Creditors guilty of *parokta* shall pay a fine of ten times the amount : but if incapable to pay so much, they shall at least pay five times the amount sued for.’ On this he remarks in the footnote (p. 216 of his Translation) thus : ‘ Since the *pañchabandha* must be less than *daśabandha*, the interpretation of *pañchabandha* as *pañchamāṁśa*, one-fifth by Vijñāneśvara in his commentary on verse 171, ii (Yājñavalkya), cannot be accepted.’ How Vijñāneśvara is right and Shama Śāstri faulty is seen from the It would be interesting to examine who were eligible and who were ineligible to depose as witnesses, and how they played their part in the court.¹ One curious feature of the administration of justice was to get at the facts of the case by means of official secret agents appointed for the purpose. This coupled with the evidence of the witnesses would go to decide a case. A case cannot be dismissed on the plea of the absence of witnesses.² Generally three honest and truthful witnesses were asked to depose. There may be certain cases like the one relating to debts where two witnesses were enough; but never was the deposition of one witness taken with approval. The following is the categorical list of those who were ineligible for deposition:³ brother-in-law, companion, prisoner, creditor or debtor, enemy, dependant,

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¹ Cf. Agni., ccliii. 41-48.

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² Śānti Parvan, lxxxv. 19-20; cf. Yāj., ii. 69; Manu, viii. 59-60; S.T.R., viii. 1, 87-88.

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³ > स्त्रियालवृद्धकितवमत्तोन्मत्ताभिशस्तकाः ।

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Śrīmūlam commentary (p. 68, vol. ii). एषां स्वामिभृत्यानां परस्परभियोगे उत्तमाः परोक्ताः स्वामिभृत्यादयः, पराजिताश्चेत, दशबन्धं पराजितधनदशभागं दद्युः, अवरेभ्यः । अवराः भृत्यादयः, परोक्ताः, पञ्चबन्धं पराजितधनपञ्चभागं दद्युः, उत्तमेभ्यः । This interpretation completely fits in with that of Vijñāneśvara पञ्चबन्धो नष्टद्रव्यस्य पञ्चांशो । p. 243 (Nirnayasāgar edition of Yājñavalkyasmṛti, 1926.) In the light of these two authoritative interpretations the translation of the Arthaśāstra passage should be: ‘Creditors of high social status guilty of parokta shall pay a fine, equal to one-tenth of the amount sued for; creditors of lower status one-fifth of the amount.’

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रङ्गावतारापिषण्डिकूटकृद्विकलेन्द्रियाः ॥
पतिताप्तसम्बन्धि सहायरिपुतस्कराः ।
साहसो दृष्टदोषश्च निर्धूताद्यास्त्वसाक्षिणः ॥ (Yāj., ii. 70-1.)

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convict, the king, a *śrotriya*, village servant, lepers, out-castes, *caṇḍāla*, the self-conceited (अहंवादि), persons in low situations, women, government officials, ascetics, those versed in palmistry, merchants, robbers, cheats, swindler (शलाकधूतः), physicians, enemy or friend and minstrel.¹ But there was no hard and fast rule. Sometimes some of these appeared as witnesses. This depended more on the nature of the case in question. Members of all castes and communities were eligible to depose as witnesses.² The first preliminary was to swear as to their honesty. If all the witnesses joined together and did not give out the truth they were punished.³ The decision depended more upon the witness and especially of the elders. It was the custom to get witnesses by summons (स्वामिवाक्य). For instance the jury sent for the mother of the lady courtesan Vasantasena to adduce evidence as to her daughter in the *Mṛcchakaṭika*.⁴ Travelling and halting allowances were usually given to these witnesses and these were generally borne by the party defeated.⁵

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¹ सामुद्रिकं वणिजं चोरपूर्वं शलाकधूतं च चिकित्सकं च । अरिं च मित्रं च कुशीलवं च नैतान्साक्ष्ये लधिकुर्वोत सत्त ॥ (Udyoga Parvan, Prajāgara Parvan, xxxv. 55.) Cf. Yāj., ii. 72-74. Agni, the whole of chapter cclv contains details in regard to witnesses.

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² Cf. Manu, viii. 62 ; S.T.R., viii. 1, 89-90. For further details see Vyavahāra Mayūkha, pp. 21 ff.

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³ S.T.R., viii. 1, 96; Mahābhārata, Ādi Parvan, vii. 3.

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⁴ Act ix.

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⁵ पुरुषभृतिरष्टांशः । पथभक्तमर्थविशेषतः । तदुभयं नियम्यो दद्यात ।

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The law-giver Manu is communal also in the matter of witnesses. According to him persons entering into contracts should take as witnesses persons of the same sex or group. That is women for women’s contracts, Brahmans for Brahmans, Sūdras for Sūdras and so on.¹ It is easy to understand why the law-giver ordained this regulation. Members of the same community could better appreciate the motives of the members entering on contractual or other agreements. Witnesses were to depose on oath.² They should speak nothing but truth. But Gautama shows himself the most practical of the law-givers by saying that a witness can utter even a falsehood to save a good soul, and thereby does not incur the sin of speaking an untruth.³ This is absolutely forbidden in the case of a wicked person. That evidence is quite imperative is shown by Yājñavalkya who remarks wisely, ‘ Even a fact unsupported by evidence gets vitiated in a legal procedure.’⁴ Among evidences are mentioned documents, possession, and witnesses.⁵ If these are not available recourse may then be had to ordeals for sifting the truth.⁶

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¹ स्त्रियां साक्ष्यंस्त्रियः कुर्युर्द्विजानां सदृशा द्विजाः । शूद्राश्चसन्तः शूद्राणामन्त्यानामन्त्ययोनयः ॥ (Manu, viii. 68.)

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² Gautama, xiii.

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³ Ibid., Mbh., Ādi Parvan, lxxvi. Lying allowed in five cases : for fun, to please women, for marriage purposes, when life is in danger, and when all property is in danger.

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⁴ भूतमनुपन्न्यस्तं होयते व्यवहारतः । (Yāj., ii. 19.)

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⁵ S.T.R., viii, 1, 38 ff.

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⁶ प्रमाणं लिखितं भुक्तिः साक्षिणश्चेति कीर्तितम् । एषां अन्यतमाभावे दिव्यान्यतममुच्यते ॥ (Yāj., ii. 22.)

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The punishments for offences were fines, reprimand, torture, imprisonment, sentence of death and banishment. The last was invariably for members of the Brahmana community.¹ Reprimand was for minor crimes. The imposition of fines was by no means at fixed rates. While Yājñavalkya² recommends 80,000, 40,000 and 20,000 *paṇas* for *uttama*, *madhyama* and *adhama* *sāhasas*, Kauṭalya and Manu recommend 1,000, 500 and 250 respectively.³

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¹ Cf. Manu, viii. 379-81.

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² साशोतिः पणसाहस्तो दण्ड उत्तम साहसः । तदर्धं मध्यमः प्रोक्तस्तदर्धमधमः स्मृतः ॥ (Yāj., i.366) पणानां द्वे शते सार्द्धे प्रथमः साहसः स्मृतः । मध्यमः पंच विज्ञेयः सहस्रन्वेव चोत्तमः । (Manu, viii. 138.) The word *paṇa* occurs invariably both in the legal and other technical literature of the ancient Hindus. What was its actual worth is given by Yājñavalkya, i. 365. This verse states that copper weighing a *karṣa* is a *paṇa*. And a *karṣa* is a weight of gold or silver equal to sixteen *māṣās*.

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³ Manu, viii, 138 ; cf. Viṣṇu, iv. 14.

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Illegal encroachments on land, wilful removal of movables, adultery and other similar crimes were awarded the punishment of fines, and imprisonment. Thefts, sedition, and treason, murders, setting fire to buildings, intermixture of castes, led to the punishment of torture.⁴

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⁴ Śānti Parvan, lxxxv. 22-23. Vide Beal, *Buddhist Records of Western World*, Bk. ii, pp. 83-4. That such punishments lost their severity from the age of Harṣa is evident. 'Treason was punished by imprisonment for life and not by any corporal punishment. For offences against the social morality and for disloyal and unfilial conduct, the punishment was either mutilation of limbs or deportation of the offender to another country or into the wilderness. Other offences can be atoned for by a money payment. Trial by ordeal was also in force.' Watters, i. 171-2; *Rulers of India, Harsha* by Dr. R. Mookerjee, p. 100.

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It would thus appear that discrimination was used in rendering justice. The primitive Vedic custom of inflicting heavy fines and accepting compensation price for murder had no more force. With the coming of an empire, complicated cases of law became more common. As a consequence organized punishments came into vogue. Nārada enjoins upon Yudhiṣṭhira that no distinction should be made between the rich and the poor in adjudicating cases.¹ Impartial and just punishments alone must be meted out. But a question may be asked how a poor man could pay a heavy fine if it were imposed on him. That discrimination was further made is evident from the Mahābhārata. It lays down that the rich are to be heavily fined, the poor put in chains and the wicked to be subjected to blows. This is the easiest method of correcting wrong-doers.²

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¹ Sabhā Parvan, v. 92.

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² > अपराधानुरूपं च दण्डं पापेषु धारयेत् ।

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Administration of justice was then equitable. Manu uses the power of discrimination too far. If it is the first crime of the offender he could be let off with a warning to behave properly in future. If the same offender commits a second criminal act, he must be censured and let go. Fines will be imposed for a third offence. Even then if he continues to commit offence in any manner, nothing but corporal punishment is suitable.³

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³ वाग्दण्डं प्रथमं कुर्यात्धिग्दण्डं तदन्तरम् । तृतीयं धनदण्डन्तु वधदण्डमतः परम् ॥

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वियोजयेद्धनैर्द्धान धननाथ बन्धनैः ॥
विनयेच्चापि दुर्वृत्तान्प्रहारैरपि पार्थिवः ।
सान्त्वेनोपप्रदानेन शिष्टांश्च परिपालयेत् ॥

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(Śānti Parvan, lxxxv. 20-21.)

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Draupadī narrates to Yudhiṣṭhira what Prahlāda spoke to his grandson Bali in days of yore. Those who committed offences unwittingly for the first time may be forgiven after proper enquiry (सुपरीक्ष्यपरोक्षया). But those who wrong a second time and that knowingly, are liable to punishment.¹

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¹ *Sabhā Parvan*, xxviii. 31-32.

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Mention has already been made of the appeal which a suitor could make to a higher tribunal, if in his opinion the judgment of the lower court was not impartial or reasonable. The legal procedure of the ancient Hindus also allowed retrial of cases. If it were proved by the retrial that the case had been enquired into with prejudice and partiality, and if the accused were found to be not guilty, in that case the king is empowered to punish the authorities of the lower court for their irresponsible conduct and take legal proceedings against the really guilty party.² If on the other hand a man who is legally defeated makes a fresh appeal, his suit could be dismissed with a penalty for his having unjustly resorted to the court a second time, and thus casting unfair reflection on the lower court.³

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² दुर्दृष्टांस्तु पुनर्द्रष्टा व्यवहारान् नृपेण तु । सभ्याः सजयिनो दण्ड्याः विवादाद्विगुणं दमम् । यो मन्येताजितोऽस्मोति न्यायेनापि पराजितः । तमायान्तं पुनर्जित्वा दापयेद्विगुणं दमम् ॥ (Yāj., ii. 308-9.)

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³ *Ibid.* ; cf. Śukra, iv, v. 85-91 and 109, 126 ; Agni, ccliii, 38.

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वधेनापि यदा त्वेतान्निग्रहीतुं नशक्नुयात् ।
तदैषु सर्वमप्येतं प्रयुञ्जीत चतुष्टयम् ॥
(Manu, viii. 128-29; cf. S.T.R., viii. 1, 238.)

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What the ancients understood by the institution of a law-suit is given in the *Agni Purāṇa*.¹ ‘A suit is determined by a reference to four things: (*chatuṣpāda*), is adjudicated with the help of four factors (*chatuṣsādhana*), has its root in the four places (*chatuṣsthānam*), proves beneficial to four classes of men (*chaturhita*), is connected with four different parties (*chaturvyāpin*), and benefits the society in a four-fold way (*chatuṣkari*). Similarly a law-suit involves the co-operation of eight persons (*aṣṭāṅga*) at the time of its trial, proceeds out of the eighteen causes of action (*aṣṭādaśapada*), is divided into a hundred subdivisions (*śataka*), owes its origin to three different sources (*triyoni*), admits of two sorts of statements (*dvyaviyoga*), is contested by two parties (*dvidvāra*), and is decided by the determination of two sorts of issue (*dvigati*).²

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¹ Ch. ccliii. 1-2.

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² M. N. Dutt Translation. Agni, ccliii. 3-30.

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| *Chatuṣpāda* | ... | ... | *dharma*, *vyavahāra*, *āchāra* and *nyāya*. |
| *Chatuṣsādhana* | ... | ... | Jury, plaintiff, defendant and witnesses. |
| *Chatussthānam* | ... | ... | Amicable settlement, unanimous public opinion, *dharma* or rule of law, and royal ordinances. |
| *Chaturhita* | ... | ... | Four classes of society: Brahmana, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya and Śūdra. |
| *Chaturvyāpin* | ... | ... | C o m p l a i n a n t, defendant, king and witnesses. |
| *Chatuṣkari* | ... | ... | Fame, property, social status and character of the person affected. |
| *Aṣṭāṅga* | ... | ... | King, judge and jurors, *dharmaśāstra*, astrologer, clerk, gold, fire, water-body of a law-suit. |
| *Aṣṭādaśapada* | ... | ... | Eighteen kinds of litigation, ccliii. 13-30. |
| *Śataśākha* | ... | ... | The hundred branches of litigation, *Ibid*., 30 ff. |
| *Triyoni* | ... | ... | Lust, anger and greed—three sources of litigation. |

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The eighteen kinds of litigation are debts, trusts, co-operative enterprises (*sambhūyasamuthāna*), withdrawal of gifts (दत्ताप्रदानिक), contract, wage Were suits admitted and enquired indiscriminately? Was there any order of precedence in the procedure? Was there any time fixed for posting the cases? These interesting questions are answered well by Sukrāchārya. According to this political theorist there were postings only in respect of civil cases.¹ On these appointed days the plaintiff as well as the defendant could appear in the court and argue, by means of their lawyers, the causes of their contention. As has been already said this is only for civil cases. There was no restriction of time for criminal cases such as murder, sedition, theft or assault. The cases can be presented at any part of the day and there must be no delay in examining them.² In illustration of this we can again quote the Mṛchchakaṭi where Saṁsthānaka, the king's brother-in-law, proffers a plaint against Chārudatta accusing the latter with the murder of a courtesan lady Vasantasena.

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¹ न्यायान् पश्येत्तु मध्याह्ने पूर्वाह्ने स्मृतिदर्शनं । मनष्यभारणेस्तेये साहसेऽत्यधिके सदा । नकालनिय मस्तत्र सद्य एव विवेचनं ॥ (Sukra, iv. v. 53-54.)

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² साहसस्तेयपारुष्य गोऽभिशापान्तये स्त्रियाम् । विवादयेत् सद्य एवकालोऽन्यत्वेच्छया स्मृतः ॥ (S.T.R., viii, 1, 29.)

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The adhikārikan or judge who is first under the impression that it is a civil suit sends reply through an officer that his cause was not on that particular day.

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of labourers, selling of another's goods (अस्वामिविक्रय), non-delivery of vended articles, or delivery of useless ones, peace unions (समय), boundary disputes, marriage suits, division of hereditary property, indictable offences abusive language (वाक्पारुष्यं), assault (दण्डपारुष्यं), gambling and disobedience to royal orders.

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But when he knows his to be a criminal case he admits him into the court immediately and begins the trial.¹ We have to take this position for granted for the dramatist does not bring out this point clearly in the context. But when the judge finally admits the case, it is implied that the judge has understood it to be a criminal cause.

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¹ अधिकरणिकः—भद्रशोधनक, बहिनिष्क्रम्य ज्ञायताम्—‘कः कः कार्यार्थी’ इति ।

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शोधनकः—यदार्थ आज्ञापयति । आर्याः अधिकरणिका भणन्ति—‘कः क इह कार्यार्थी’ इति ।

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शकारः—(सहर्षम्) उपस्थिता अधिकरणिकाः । अहं वरपुरुषो मनुष्यो वासुदेवो राष्ट्रियश्यालो राजस्यालः कार्यार्थी ।

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शोधनकः—हन्त, प्रथममेव राष्ट्रियश्यालः कार्यार्थी । भवतु । आर्य, मुहूर्त्तं तिष्ठ । तावदाधिकरणिकानां निवेदयामि । आर्याः एष खलु राष्ट्रियश्यालः कार्यार्थी व्यवहारमुपस्थितः ।

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अधिकरणिकः—कथम् । प्रथममेव राष्ट्रियश्यालः कार्यार्थी । यथा सूर्योदय उपरागो महापुरुषनिपातमेव कथयति । शोधनक, व्याकुलेनाद्य व्यवहारेण भवितव्यम् । भद्र, निष्क्रम्योच्यताम्—‘गच्छाय । न दृश्यते तव व्यवहारः’ इति ।

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शोधनकः—यदार्थ आज्ञापयति । आर्य, अधिकरणिका भणन्ति—‘अद्यगच्छ । न दृश्यते तव व्यवहारः’ ।

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शकारः—(सक्रोधम्) आः, किं न दृश्यते मम व्यवहारः ।

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(Act ix, Sec. vii, pp. 202-3.)

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We had occasion to mention that lawyers were appointed to argue civil cases.¹ According to Śukrāchārya there were no lawyers employed for criminal cases.² They were tried before the jury and the evidence was furnished by the parties themselves along with their witnesses. Did the court fix any fees for the lawyers appearing for any parties? Though this question does not find an answer in any of the legal texts to our knowledge, yet the author of the Śukranītisāra, a practical politician, has answered this point also.³ There were different rates of fees: 1/10; 1/20; 1/40; 1/60; 1/80 of the value of the interests involved in the court. It would appear that small cases got only small remuneration while important cases got a higher remuneration. It is then manifest that the institution of professional lawyers had come into being at least at the time of Śukrāchārya whose date we could not, however, fix with any certainty.

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¹ *Vide* the interesting leading article in the *Madras Law Journal*, May-June, 1909.

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² > मनुष्यमारणे स्तेये परदाराभिमर्शने ।

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³ *Ibid.*, 112-115.

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We shall conclude this section with the following reflection of Hanumān on the dignity of law and order.⁴

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⁴ > निग्रहानुग्रहैः सम्यग्यदा नेता प्रवर्तते ।

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अभक्ष्यभक्षणे चैवकन्याहरणदूषणे ॥
पारुष्ये कूटकरणे नृपद्रोहे च साहसे ।
प्रतिनिधिर्न दातव्यः कर्तातु विवदेत् स्वयम् ॥ (iv. v. 119-120.)

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तदा भवन्ति लोकस्य मर्यादाः सुव्यवस्थिताः ॥ (40)

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‘When a king confers favours truly and awards punishments justly, then only the order of the world becomes well established. He must bestow favours on well behaved persons who seek his aid prudently. On the other hand he must punish those who transgress law and order. When the king duly prescribes and shows proper regard to the deserving, then law is well preserved, and good order is maintained.’ That this was realized in practice is evident from the testimony of Hieun Tsiang. He says¹: ‘with respect to the ordinary people, although they are naturally light minded, yet they are upright and honourable. . . . They are not deceitful or treacherous in their conduct, and are faithful to their oaths and promises . . . with respect to criminals or rebels, these are few in number, and only occasionally troublesome. . . . There is no infliction of corporal punishment. . . . In questioning an accused person, if he replies with frankness the punishment is proportioned accordingly. . . .’

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¹ Beal, Buddhist Records of the Western World, Bk. II, pp. 83-84.

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बुद्ध्या स्वप्रतिपत्तेषु कुर्यात्साधुष्वनुग्रहम् । निग्रहं चाप्यशिष्टेषु निर्भयेदिषु कारयेत् ॥ (49) निग्रहे प्रग्रहे सम्यगदा राजा प्रवर्तते । तदा भवति लोकस्य मर्यादा सुव्यवस्थिता ॥ (50) (Mbh., Vana Parvan, clii.)

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