A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest Times to the End of the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D. c10: Chapter IV. The Mahābhārata and the Manusamhitā and the Synthesis of the Arthaśāstra and the Dharmasūtra Material (Circa 200 B.C.—200 A.D)—The Chatuḥśatikā of Āryadeva (Circa 200 B.C.—200 A.D.)
A History of Hindu Political Theories from the Earliest Times to the End of the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century A.D. c10
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Chapter IV. The Mahābhārata and the Manusamhitā and the Synthesis of the Arthaśāstra and the Dharmasūtra Material (Circa 200 B.C.—200 A.D)—The Chatuḥśatikā of Āryadeva (Circa 200 B.C.—200 A.D.)
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THE MAHĀBHĀRATA AND THE MANUSAMHITĀ AND THE SYNTHESIS OF THE ARTHAŚĀSTRA AND THE DHARMASŪTRA MATERIAL (CIRCA 200 B.C.—200 A.D)—THE CHATUḤŚATIKĀ OF ĀRYADEVA (CIRCA 200 A.D.).
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The ‘rājadharma’ sections of the Mahābhārata and the Manusamhitā involve the grafting of the Arthaśāstra stock upon a canonical stem—The blending of the king's public and his domestic functions—The approximation of the concepts of rājadharma and daṇḍanīti—The end of these sciences—The conception of organic unity of the factors of government—The king's fulfilment of the essential needs of the people—The theories of the divine creation of the king—The doctrine of the king's divine nature—The theories of submission and obedience of the subjects—The king's reciprocal duty of protection and its relation to the collection of taxes—The king's divinely ordained duty of protecting his subjects—Protection is the sole justification of the king's office—The right of tyrannicide—The joint authority of the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya and the mutual relations of these powers—The rules of statecraft in the Mahābhārata and the Manusamhitā—The attitude of the authors towards religion and morality—The conditions of success in republican communities (gaṇas).
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II
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The Chatuḥśatikā represents in part an independent tradition of political thinking—The king is the servant of the body politic--Politics is completely subservient to morality.
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In the two preceding chapters we have endeavoured to describe as completely as the surviving materials at our disposal would permit, the exuberant growth of political ideas in the literature of Arthaśāstra. We have seen how the teachers of this science not only explored the region of practical politics which was their special province, but also made important and original contributions to the theory of the State. In the two canonical works of this period, especially in their sections and chapters relating to the branch of kingly duties (rājadharma)∗ an attempt seems to have been made to graft a more, or less considerable Arthaśāstra stock upon a slender canonical stem derived from the Dharmasūtras.† To the stimulus derived from contact with the predominant Arthaśāstra element it is, we think, mainly owing that the Manusamhitā and still more the Mahābhārata make, as we hope to show presently, some of the most important contributions to political theory.
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∗ These are chap. VII of the Manusamhitā and the first two parts (especially chaps. LVI—CLXXIII) of the twelfth book (called the Śāntiparvan) of the Mahābhārata. The latter chapters, besides being greater in bulk and more comprehensive than the former, are distinguished by their dramatic character inasmuch as they take the form of a series of addresses delivered to king Yudhiṣṭhira by the dying Kṣattriya hero Bhīṣma, the *doyen* of the royal house of Kuru.
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† In this connection it should be especially noticed that the Mahābhārata in the course of its introductory chapters twice (I 2, 383 ; Ibid 62, 23) annonunces itself to be, *inter alia*, an Arthaśāstra work.
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The above characteristic of the works that we are now considering, involving, that is, a synthesis of ideas is, we think, closely connected with the circumstances of their origin and their essential nature. The Manusamhitā, while based upon a lost Dharmasūtra work of the school of Manu, is distinguished from the latter by the fact that it is the product not of a Vedic school, but of one of the special law schools which took over at an early period the complete teaching of the Sacred Law\*. Hence it is able to develop in fuller detail those rules of civil law and public administration to which the authors of the Dharmasūtras had given the most perfunctory attention. The Mahābhārata, again, is unconnected with any school, and while belonging in form to the literature of heroic history (Itihāsa), it claimed and obtained early recognition as a work on the Sacred Law (Smriti or Dharmaśāstra) such as the Manusamhitā was†.
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¹ \* Cf. Bühler, S. B. E. Vol. XXV, Introduction, pp. li—lvi.
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† For the evidence, vide Bühler and Kirste, *Indian Studies*, Vol. 2 pp. 4-27 (especially pp. 24-26). With regard to the Sāntiparvan with which we are specially concerned it may be added that Bhīṣma's discourse on 'rājadharma' is introduced in such a fashion as to suggest that it was meant by the author to embody the standard list of the king's duties. Consider for example the historical setting of the scene in which Bhīṣma, stretched upon his bed of arrows, is made to utter these discourses as his parting message to the assembled princes headed by Yudhiṣṭhira. Consider again how Bhīṣma is singled out in the immediately preceding chapters by the sages Vyāsa (Śāntiparvan XXXVII 1-16) and Nārada (Ibid LIV 7-10) and above all by the lord Kriṣṇa (Ibid LIV 34-35) as the fittest person to communicate this message on the ground of his unrivalled knowledge of the whole circle of
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We have noticed above, as the leading characteristic of the canonical works of this period in so far as
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human duties. Add to these points the fact that Kṛiṣṇa Himself (Ibid LIV 29-31) inspired the hero with His own divine wisdom (divyā matiḥ) to qualify him for his task and blessed his speech beforehand by prophesying that it would last on the face of the earth as though it were a Vedic discourse (Vedapravāda).
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Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar, while rightly emphasising the debt of the ‘rājadharma’ section of the Mahābhārata to the early authors of the Arthaśāstra, has, we think, ignored the real character of this section as involving a synthesis of Arthaśāstra and Dharmasūtra thought. This omission, it appears to us, has prevented him from indicating the true relation of the rājadharma section to the older Arthaśāstra works. He writes (op. cit. pp. 110-111), “To the same period (viz. 600-325 B. C.) seem to belong the chapters from the Mahābhārata, especially from the Śāntiparvan, which deal with rājadharmānuśāsana; and it is not at all improbable that this section represents in the main the work of the pre-Kauṭilyan political philosopher Kauṇapadanta as this is but another name for Bhīṣma. The account of polity which they contain seems to have been drawn principally from the systems of Bṛihaspati, Uśanas and Manu.” Now this pronouncement is, we think, open to exception on the following grounds:—(1) Dr. Bhandarkar’s date for the rājadharma section of the Mahābhārata apparently rests upon his view of the priority of the Śāntiparvan to Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra—a view which, as we have shown elsewhere (supra pp. 72-73 footnote) not only runs counter to the general trend of authoritative opinion on the point, but is unsupported by valid evidence. Furthermore, it is directly contradicted by a historical allusion occurring in one of the chapters of the above section. In chapter LXV (13-15) Māndhātā is quoted as asking the god Indra, “How should all these folk living in kingdoms, the Yavanas, the Kirātas, the, Gāndhāras, the Chīnas, the Śavaras, the Barbaras, the Śakas, the Tuṣāras, the Kaṅkas, the Pahlavas, the Andhras, the Madrakas, the Puṇḍras, the Pulindas, the Ramaṭhas, the Kāmbojas, the castes which sprang from the Brāhmaṇas and the Kṣattriyas, the Vaiśyas and the Śūdras live?” The same passage occurs in the South Indian recension (Ch. LXIV 13-15) with our point of view is concerned, their blending of materials derived from the Arthaśāstra and the Dharmasūtras. One important consequence of this connection with the earlier canon is, we think, that the authors present their extensive rules of
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some minor changes. The mention of the Śakas and the Pahlavas in both the above lists precludes the possibility of an interpolation in later times and it shows the second century B. C. to be the upper limit of the composition of the Śāntiparvan. This date, it may be added here, has been arrived at independently by the best authorities. (Cf. E. W. Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India* pp. 397-398). (2) The rājadharma section of the Śāntiparvan, although professing to embody the teaching of Bhīṣma, reveals no especial connection with the views, few and fragmentary as they are, that are attributed to Kauṇapadanta by Kauṭilya. In the parallel example of the Manusaṃhitā, Manu often flatly contradicts the view of the school of Arthaśāstra called by that name. Thus while the latter (Kauṭ. p. 6) declares the sciences to be three in number, the former (VII 43) includes all the four traditional sciences in the curriculum of the king's studies. Again, while the Mānavas (Kauṭ. p. 29) make the mantripariṣat consist of twelve members, Manu (VII 54) gives the number of councillors (sachivas) as seven or eight. A more general basis of difference between the two sets of works that we are now considering is that while the Arthaśāstra authors known to Kauṭilya are distinguished by their controversial spirit, the canonical authors of this period are principally concerned in their rājadharma sections to lay down the approved rules of kingly conduct. These discrepancies can, we think, be satisfactorily explained on our hypothesis of the synthesis of the Arthaśāstra and early canonical ideas in the later works. (3) Much as the rājadharma sections of the Śāntiparvan are indebted to the Arthaśāstra it is not difficult to detect in them some instances of original contribution to political theory. Such, for example, are the theories of the origin of monarchy which, as we hope to show later on, are so advanced in character in comparison with the earlier ideas on the subject that they may be safely assigned on the ground of internal evidence alone to the present period.
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public administration in the setting of the Whole Duty of the King. Thus Manu has no hesitation in mentioning in the course of his chapter on kingly duties that the king should worship the learned Brāhmaṇas, should marry a queen of equal caste and should appoint a domestic priest as well as other officiating priests for the performance of sacrifices\*. Similarly Bhīṣma in chapter LVI of the Śāntiparvan opens his address by observing that the king's foremost duty is to behave towards the gods and the Brāhmaṇas according to the prescribed rule, for, he explains, it is by worshipping these that the king repays his debt to virtue and is respected by his subjects.† The same mingling of functions is observable in the frequent and characteristic summaries of kingly duties that occur in these works. Manu, for example, says in one place, "Not to turn back in battle, to protect the people, to honour the Brāhmaṇas is the best means for a king to secure happiness"‡.
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Besides involving the fusion of the king's public and his domestic functions, the synthesis of the secular and canonical material in the works we are now considering tended, we think, to bring about a close approximation of the concepts of rājadharma and daṇḍanīti, which, as we have seen in another place, were at first associated respectively with the literature of the Dharmasūtras and of the Arthaśāstra. Rājadharma, to begin with, as conceived by the canonical authors of this period consists, in an overwhelming measure, of the rules of internal administration and external policy. Thus its scope is virtually co-extensive with that of daṇḍanīti, involving in either case the conception of an Art of Government. Furthermore it appears that the canonical writers magnified the antiquity and sanctity of daṇḍanīti with the result that the concept of this science was brought into line with that of rājadharma. Manu, for example, applies to itstar the epithet eternal (śāśvatī) which is usually applied to the holy Vedas alone, while Bhīṣma in chapter LIX of the Śāntiparvan declares it to have been created by the god Brahmā along with the institution of kingship by Viṣṇu.dagger
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n \* VII 37 ; Ibid 77, Ibid 78-79.
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n † Śāntiparvan LVI 2-13.
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n ‡ VII 88, S. B. E. Vol. XXV, p. 230. It may be noticed here that the commentators of the Smriti works, while treating the concept of rājadharma, introduce a twofold distinction which, we think, virtually corresponds to the difference between the king's public and his domestic functions. For they conceive the rājadharma to be of two kinds, namely those bearing visible fruit (drriṣṭārtha) and those producing invisible fruit (adriṣṭārtha). The former are illustrated by the sixfold policy and the latter by the Agnihotra sacrifice. Cf. Medhātithi's commentary on Manusaṁhitā VII. 1.
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star VII 43.
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dagger It may be here remarked that Bhīṣma, while describing the merits of rājadharma, implies in one passage (LXIII 28) daṇḍanīti and rājadharma to be synonymous terms.
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What, then, in the opinion of these thinkers, is the end of the Art of Government, as we may render more or less roughly the concepts of rājadharma and daṇḍanīti. It is, we think, a striking illustration of the importance of the intrusive Arthaśāstra element in their thought that the authors take over and amplify the necessarily one-sided estimate of the science furnished by the secular teachers. As we have seen in another place, Kauṭilya conceives the Arthaśāstra to fulfil the threefold end of human existence.∗ Now Bhīṣma in chapter LIX of the Śāntiparvan sums up his elaborate description of Brahmā's original work on daṇḍanīti by saying that it treated the four ends of life, namely, virtue, wealth, desire and salvation.† In another place, speaking on the great benefit accruing from daṇḍanīti, Bhīṣma says that this science, when properly applied by the king, directs the four classes towards righteousness and weans them from unrighteousness. When the four classes observe their respective duties, Bhīṣma goes on, and the established usage is not violated, when security springs from daṇḍanīti and the people are free from fear, the three (sic) classes seek their welfare according to the prescribed rule, and thence ensues the happiness of the people. Continuing his argument, the hero states in language of bold hyperbole, that the four ages of the world arise according as the king exercises daṇḍanīti in a full or more or less partial measure or finally abandons it altogether. Daṇḍanīti, he says in conclusion, fixes the limits of duties and is the established usage that has for its end the welfare of the people; when properly applied, it is, as it were, the mother and the father.‡
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∗ Supra, pp. 130-131.
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† Śāntiparvan LIX 79.
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‡ Ibid LXIX 76-103.
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In the above extracts, it will be noticed, the canonical author develops, however unconsciously, the idea expressed by Kauṭilya with reference to the end of the Arthaśāstra. The view of the author of the Śāntiparvan relating to the nature of rājadharma is similarly connected with that of an earlier teacher, Indra, who held, as we have seen in another place, that the Kṣatriya's duty was the foremost of all.∗ Its keynote is struck in the very first question addressed by Yudhiṣṭhira to Bhīṣma. Rājadharma, says the king in introducing his question, is declared by those versed in the sacred law to be the foremost of all duties: it is the refuge of the whole world: virtue, wealth and desire, nay, salvation itself depend upon it: like the rein unto the steed and the goad to the elephant is the rājadharma unto the people. If the king were to err with respect to that duty which is followed by the royal sages, the stability of the world would cease and everything would be thrown into confusion. Rājadharma does away with the evil condition which fails to secure heaven, just as the rise of the sun dispels darkness.† This point is treated in fuller detail in some later chapters where Bhīṣma, after describing the duties of the four castes and the four orders, winds up with a comparative estimate of the merits of rājadharma and other duties. All the duties of the three classes, he says, together with their minor duties, are settled out of the king's duties by the Kṣatriyas who follow the highest duty among man. All duties are swallowed up in those of the king, just as the foot-prints of all other creatures sink in those of the elephant. The other duties are the refuge of the few and bear little fruit, while the duty of the Kṣatriyas is the refuge of many people and produces many blessings. If daṇḍanīti were to perish, the triple Veda would disappear and all duties would decline : if the primeval rājadharma of the Kṣatriyas were to be given up, all duties of the orders would come to an end\*. The address is continued in the same strain through the two following chapters, but these do not add anything to the force of the argument. The panegyric reaches, we think, its climax in some earlier verses of the same address. There Bhīṣma says that all duties have rājadharma at their head, and all kinds of renunciation are comprised therein. Further he states that every enjoyment, all religious ceremonies, all learning, and all worlds are included in rājadharma†. The gist of the above passages may perhaps be expressed by saying that rājadharma comprehends all other classes of duties and is the mainspring as well as guarantee thereof ‡.
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∗ Supra p. 82.
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† Śāntiparvan LVI 2-7. In verse 5 of the above we adopt the reading ‘narendradharmo lokasya’ of the South Indian recension instead of ‘narendro dharmalokasya’ (Calcutta edition).
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The authors of the Śāntiparvan and the Manusaṃhitā characteristically take over from the Arthaśāstra the category of the seven elements of sovereignty.∗ This of course involves the exclusion, as before, of the ‘purohita’ or the royal chaplain.† In this connection it ought to be particularly noticed that Manu develops an idea that is at best latent in the system of the Arthaśāstra, for while arranging the ‘calamities’ of the ‘limbs’ in an order of descending importance, he immediately qualifies its effect by saying, “Yet in a kingdom containing seven constituent parts, which is upheld like the triple staff (of an ascetic), there is no (single part) more important (than the others), by reason of the importance of the qualities of each for the others. For each part is particularly qualified for (the accomplishment of) certain objects, (and thus) each is declared to be the most important for that particular purpose which is effected by its means''[^ *]. This important extract exhibits, we think, for the first time, the application of two principles in relation to the category of seven 'limbs.' These principles would be called, if we were to borrow Western equivalents, those of integration and differentiation. It follows from the above that Manu presents a completer conception of the organic unity of government than had occurred to his predecessors.
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¹ \* Śāntiparvan LXIII 24-27.
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² † Ibid LXIII 27-30. In verse 29 we read ‘bhogāh’ of the South Indian recension instead of ‘tyāgāh’ of the Calcutta edition.
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³ ‡ That this does not represent the considered view of the author appears, among other things, from the fact that the rājadharma and the āpaddharma sections of the Śāntiparvan lead up to the disquisition or mokṣadharma which Yudhiṣṭhira introduces by saying (CLXXIV 1) that it is the foremost of the duties pertaining to the orders.
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∗ Vide Manusamhitā IX 294 ; Śāntiparvan LXIX 64-66. Cf. Yājñavalkya I 353. Some slight verbal changes are observable in these works in the designation of the component factors of sovereignty. For Kauṭilya's ‘durga,’ fort, Manu and the author of the Śāntiparvan (loc. cit.) substitute ‘pura,’ city,—a change which was doubtless suggested by the antithesis between ‘pura’ and ‘janapada.’ Furthermore, Manu (loc. cit.) has ‘rāṣṭra’ instead of ‘janapada’, while Yājñavalkya (loc. cit.) uses the term ‘jana,’ people.
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† This personage, however, was too important to be ignored for long in the standard list of the seven ‘elements.’ In the Nītisāra of Kāmandaka (VII 31) the purohita’s good qualities are described under the heading of the excellent qualities of the minister (sachiva). Vijñāneśvara (commentary on Yājñavalkya (I 353) similarly includes the ‘purohita’ along with the ‘mantrin’ in the list of amātyas. Nīlakaṇṭha goes a step further and finds (commentary on Śāntiparvan LXXIX 1) a place for the ‘purohita’ as well as the sacrificial priest (ritvij) in the category of svāmin by making the latter consist of these two persons along with the king.
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The theories of kingship in the canonical works with which we are here concerned involve, we think, the amplification in a greater or less measure of the principles jointly bequeathed by the early Arthaśāstra teachers and the authors of the canonical Dharmasūtras. The author of the Mahābhārata, to begin with, reproduces, obviously for the purpose of justifying the royal authority, the earlier conception of the essential importance of the king's office. In chapter LXVII Bhīṣma, replying to one of Yudhiṣṭhira's questions, declares that the 'chiefest' duty of the subjects consists in the consecration of the king. A kingless State, he explains, is overcome by robbers : there virtue does not become settled, and the people devour one another. In a kingless State Bhīṣma goes on, fire does not convey libations to the gods, even the wicked do not prosper ; the two rob the one and many others rob the two ; he that is not a slave is made a slave ; the women are forcibly abducted. If the king, says Bhīṣma in concluding this part of his argument, did not exist in this world as a wielder of punishment, the stronger would
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[^ *]: IX 296-297, S. B. E. Vol. XXV, p. 395.
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devour the weaker in the fashion of fishes living in the water[^asterisk]. The gist of the above passages may perhaps be expressed by saying that the happiness and indeed the existence of the people depend upon the king's office. In the following chapter Bhīṣma reproduces what purports to be the address of the sage Brihaspati to Vasumanas wherein, as we have seen in another place, both the evils attending the king's non-existence and the blessings following from his presence are described with great force.dagger
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dagger † Supra, pp. 96-91. A similar conception of the extraordinary importance of the king's office occurs in chapter LXVII of the Rāmāyaṇa. There we are told how after the exile of prince Rāma and the death of king Daśaratha the Brāhmaṇas and the ministers approached Vasiṣṭha, the family priest of the royal house of Ayodhyā. "The great king," said they, "is gone to heaven, Rāma again has betaken himself to the forest, the valiant Lakṣmaṇa also has accompanied Rāma. Both Bharata and Śatrughna have gone away to the city of Rājagriha in the Kaikeya kingdom to live in the delightful abode of their maternal uncle. Appoint a king over the Ikṣākus this very day, for this kingdom of ours would perish in the absence of a king." This prayer is supported by a passionate plea on behalf of monarchy. In a kingless State, it is said, the clouds do not sprinkle the earth with rain; the seeds are not sown; the son does not obey his father nor the wife her husband; there exists neither wealth nor family; truth does not prevail. There the Brāhmaṇa does not perform sacrifices, festivities and social gatherings do not take place; the girls decked with golden ornaments do not stroll to the gardens in the evening; the rich cultivators and herdsmen do not sleep with the doors of their houses unbarred; the merchants accustomed to wander long distances with rich wares do not travel with security; even the ascetic who is always in the habit of meditating on the Infinite Soul, does not stay; and the soldiers are powerless to defeat a foe. Such a kingdom is like a river without water, a forest without grass, and a herd of cattle without the herdsman. In such a kingdom nobody is one's own and the people constantly
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[^asterisk]: * Śāntiparvan, LXVII. 2, 3, 5, 14-15, 16.
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Turning to the doctrine of divine nature of the king we have to observe that this is presented by our authors principally in connection with the remarkable, and as it seems to us, original theories of the creation of monarchy. These views, we are inclined to think, were formulated in the works we are now considering with the deliberate object of countering the tendencies inherent in the older theory of the king’s origin. The Buddhist theory of contract, as we have observed in another place, tended to strengthen a notion already familiar to Hindu political theory, namely that the king was an official paid by his subjects for the service of protection.∗ Such a notion could not but be repugnant to those schools and teachers who upheld, as well in the canonical Dharmasūtras as in the secular Arthaśāstra, the king’s office as the guarantee of individual and social existence. Kauṭilya, as we have seen, was satisfied with a modified version of the Buddhist theory which he twisted to justify the king’s authority and backed up with the doctrine of the king’s divine nature. But his attempt was obviously a bold makeshift and nothing more. It was therefore neces-
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∗ Supra, p. 121.
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devour one another in the fashion of fishes. Even those atheistical persons that are guilty of violating the established usage and have been punished by the king, give up fear and try to assert themselves. The king is the Truth, he is Virtue, he is the pedigree of the high-born, he is, as it were, the mother and the father; he surpasses by his excellent conduct the gods Yama, Kubera, Indra and Varuṇa. If the king did not establish the distinction between good and bad deeds, this universe, alas !, would be like darkness and no sound knowledge could exist.
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sary that new theories of the king's origin should be propounded, involving a higher basis for the king's office than the mere agreement of the people. Of such a nature, in our view, are the theories of the Mahābhārata and the Manusamhitā which, while based upon the ground-work of an antecedent state of nature, uniformly express, as we hope to show presently, the idea of the king's creation by Divine will.∗
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∗ The doctrines of divine creation of the king mentioned above appear to have found their ultimate support in the Brahminical theory relating to the creation of the world by a Supreme Being, just as the Buddhist theory of contract apparently found its resting-place in the conception of a natural world-order (dharma or niyama) independent of the Divine Will.
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It will appear from the above that the theories of the origin of kingship as conceived by the authors with whom we are now dealing, were anti-popular in their origin, their object being, in other words, to support as against the anarchical tendencies of the theory of contract the principle of the king's authority. Let us consider these theories in some detail. The Manusamhitā describes the origin of kingship in the briefest outline. "For when these creatures being without a king dispersed in all directions, the Lord created a king for the protection of this whole (creation), taking (for that purpose) eternal particles of Indra, of the Wind, of Yama, of the Sun, of Fire, of Varuṇa, of the Moon, and of the Lord of Wealth (Kubera)."† This passage, it will be observed, begins with a reference to an original evil state of nature. But the author, instead of considering this like the earlier writers as the prelude to a contract between the people and a human or a semi-divine being, introduces the Highest God as Himself creating the king out of His own will. The king, then, according to this view is, so far from being an official paid by the people for the service of protection, ordained by God to rule over his subjects. His rule, in short, rests not upon agreement but upon Divine ordination. The further bearing of the above passage upon the doctrine of the king's divinity will be more conveniently treated in another place.
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† VII, 3-4, S. B. E. Vol. XXV p. 216.
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The Mahābhārata has two distinct theories of the origin of kingship which are of a more elaborate and complex nature than the theory of the Manusamhitā. For these theories traverse at length the whole process of social evolution from its beginnings in the original state of nature, and involve the blending of the two ideas of divine creation and coronation-oath or popular agreement. It will be convenient to begin with the shorter of the two stories which is told by Bhīṣma in the course of his address, already referred to, relating to the 'chiefest' duty of the subjects. There he mentions, after describing what he conceives to be the evil consequences of the king's non-existence, "It was for this reason that the gods created the king." This idea of divine creation is developed by the speaker in greater detail in the following lines. People having no king in early times, we are told. met with destruction devouring one another as the larger fishes devour the smaller. They then assembled together and made compacts (samayāh) mutually undertaking to expel from their midst persons guilty of abuse, assault, and connexion with other men’s wives as well as those who would break the compact. Thus they lived by the terms of the compact for the purpose of inspiring confidence among all classes without distinction. Afterwards they collectively (sahitāḥ) approached the God Brahmā, being afflicted with sorrow. “Without a chief, O Lord,” they said, “we are perishing. Give us a chief whom we shall worship in concert and who will protect us.” The God appointed Manu to rule over them, but he would not at first accept them. “I fear,” said he, “the sinful consequences of acts. Government, again, is a very difficult task, especially among men who are always deceitful in their conduct.” The people, however, overcame his scruples by saying, “Don’t fear. The sins will only devolve upon those who perform (the sinful acts). For the increase of your treasury we shall give you one-fiftieth of our animals and gold as well as one-tenth of grain. Of the spiritual merit that the people, well protected by the king, will acquire, the fourth part will belong to you.” Thus coaxed, Manu made a tour round the world, striking terror into the hearts of all, and making them conform to their duties.∗
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∗ Śāntiparvan LXVII 17-32. ‘Kartrīneno gamiṣyati’ ‘the sins will devolve upon the authors (of the sinful acts)’ is the reading in the Calcutta edition. This is preferable to the reading ‘vidhāsyāmo dhanam tava’ of the South Indian recension, since the object of the people’s address is clearly to quiet Manu’s apprehension of sinful contamination.
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The story of the origin of kingship that we have just described connects itself historically with the individual figuring in Kauṭilya's version of the king's creation. The other story to which we have now to turn our attention is associated with the person who was remembered in Vedic tradition as the first consecrated ruler of men.∗ In chapter LIX of the Śāntiparvan Yudhiṣṭhira is introduced as asking Bhīṣma two distinct questions, which are substantially as follows. How did the title of 'king' (rājan) come into existence, and why does one man rule over persons of great intelligence and valour, although he has the same physical organs and mental attributes, is subject to the same changes of birth and death and is equal in all respects to the others ? The answer to these questions involves a complete account of the creation of the king's office and of the basis of his rule over his subjects. For the moment we are concerned with the former point alone. There was at first, says the hero, neither sovereignty nor sovereign, neither punishment nor punisher (naiva rājyam na rājāsinna cha daṇḍo na dāṇḍikaḥ). At that time the people used to govern themselves by means of Justice or Righteousness (dharma). Afterwards however they became completely worn out and were assailed successively by the vices of intoxication, greed, wrath and self-indulgence. The world was disturbed, and the Vedas as well as Justice perished. The gods were affrighted, and they sought the protection of the Lord Brahmā. The great God created for their sake and for the good of the world a gigantic treatise consisting of one hundred thousand chapters which treated the fourfold end of life—virtue, wealth, desire and salvation. This was called Daṇḍanīti and became the archetype out of which successive summaries were prepared by the gods Śiva and Indra and the sages Brihaspati and Śukra. Thereafter the gods approached Viṣṇu and implored Him to select a person deserving to occupy the highest place (śraiṣṭhyam) among mortals. The great God created by a fiat of his will a son produced out of his own lustre. This person however did not desire sovereignty, and he treated his authority as a trust (nyāsa). His fourth successor became skilled in policy and protected the people, while the next gained an empire, and became self-indulgent. Then came Veṇa who was killed by the angry sages for his tyranny. Out of his right arm, pierced by the great sages, came forth Prithu, handsome, fully armed, skilled in the Vedas and in the science of archery. He was enjoined by the gods and the great sages to follow the established laws (dharma) without fear or favour, and with strict control of his passions. The gods and the sages, moreover, proposed to him an oath (pratijñā) which he accepted in the following terms, “I will constantly protect the earth in thought, word and deed, as if it were Brahman. I will carry out the established laws in accordance with daṇḍanīti. I will never act arbitrarily. The twice—born classes shall never be punished by me and the world shall be saved from the danger of inter-mixture of classes.” Prithu was consecrated by the Brāhmaṇas and the sages as well as by the gods including Viṣṇu Himself. He was called king (rājan) because all his subjects were gratified (rañjitāḥ) by him, and he earned the title of Kṣatriya as he healed the wounds of the Brāhmaṇas. The eternal God Viṣṇu in person established his status by declaring that no one would transcend him. The divine Viṣṇu, moreover, entered the person of the king, and hence the whole universe worships the kings as if they are gods.∗
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∗ Cf. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa V 3.5.4 : "Pṛithu, son of Veṇa, was consecrated first of men." *S. B. E.*, Vol. XLI, p. 81.
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∗ Śāntiparvan LIX 5-136. Mr. K. P. Jayswal (*Calcutta Weekly Notes*, Vol. XVI p. xx, corrected and amplified, *Modern Review*, Calcutta, Vol. XI p. 193) was the first to discover in the above passage the two successive stages of the evolution of kingship, as conceived by the canonical author, as well as the formula of the coronation-oath.
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Such are the two stories of the origin of kingship that are set forth in the Mahābhārata. The mythological atmosphere is patent in either case as also the curious blending of ideas and notions of an incongruous nature. Nevertheless the above extracts, it is hardly too much to say, mark the culmination of the Hindu theories of the king's origin. Let us analyse the leading ideas in these passages. In both, it will be observed, the starting-point is an original State of Nature which is so vividly described in the words of the latter extract, "naiva rājyam na rājāsinna cha daṇḍo na dāṇḍikah." While, however, this involves, in the first case, from the very start a dreadful condition of anarchy, it is presented in the second case as a preliminary condition of peace and righteousness followed by a period of growing degeneracy and accumulating evil. The first theory introduces immediately at the close of the anarchical state of nature a stage which, we think, has no parallel in Hindu political theory except in the passages of the Buddhist canon that have been quoted in another place.∗ This stage involves the formation by popular agreement of society without a political superior, in this approaching closely, to borrow the language of Western political philosophy, to the notion of a social contract as distinguished from a governmental pact. Passing to the immediately following stage it should be noticed that both the extracts attribute the king's creation,—and herein lies the essential difference of the Mahābhārata story from the older theories of the Buddhist canon and of the Arthaśāstra,—to the will of the Supreme Deity. For while in the first story Manu is ordained by the god Brahmā to rule over the people, in the second Viṣṇu creates a mind-begotten son for the same purpose. Here the story might well have ended, but the author goes on to supplement this by importing notions having little or no affinity to that of divine creation. In the first case it is declared that the people made what may be called a one-sided contract with the king-designate, by which they relieved him from the responsibility for their own sins, while charging themselves to pay the royal dues. The king, then, it would seem, rules his subjects by the right of divine creation, which is reinforced by the voluntary agreement of the subjects. In the second case, Pṛithu who is the first true king and is the seventh lineal descendant of Viṣṇu's nominee has to accept an oath of observance of the established laws and institutions, and at the same time he is mentioned to have been not only ordained by Viṣṇu but animated by the God's essence.
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∗ Supra, pp. 117-119.
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From this it would appear to follow that the king, according to the author, while ruling by virtue of divine creation, is subject to the terms of his coronation oath.
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In examining the theories of the king's origin as above described, we have found involved in them the notion of the king's divine nature. This point deserves to be treated in some detail. The teachers of the Arthaśāstra including even Kauṭilya imputed, as we have seen in another place, a kind of divinity to the king by metaphorically assimilating his functions to those of various specified deities. This view is not unknown to the authors whom we are now considering. Manu, for example, enjoins the king in one place to imitate the energetic action of eight specific deities, and he seizes the occasion to show how the king's acts resemble severally the functions of those deities.n∗ Similarly Bhīṣma, in chapter LXVIII of the Śāntiparvan, asked as to why the king is called a god, quotes the long address of the sage Brihaspati in which, as we have observed before, the king is said to assume the forms of five deities according to the varying nature of his functions.n† Yet the most characteristic pronouncement of the canonical authors of this period on the present point, and that which in their system bears directly upon the question of the mutual relations of the king and his subjects, is centred in the doctrine of the king's divine personality—a doctrine which, we can not help thinking, was deliberately introduced by these authors with the object of strengthening the principle of authority. In Manu's theory of the king's origin, it will be observed, the king is stated to have been created out of the particles of eight guardians of the world. The consequence of this act in investing the king with superhuman majesty is described in the immediately following lines. "Because a king has been formed of particles of those lords of the gods, he therefore surpasses all created beings in lustre; and, like the sun, he burns eyes and hearts; nor can anybody on earth even gaze on him. Through his (supernatural) power he is Fire and Wind, he Sun and Moon, he the Lord of justice (Yama), he Kubera, he Varuṇa, he great Indra."cont∗ While Manu conceives the king to be formed out of eight guardians of the world, the author of the Śāntiparvan declares him, by way of justifying his authority, to have absorbed the essence of the god Viṣṇu,—a view which recalls the idea conveyed in a text of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa.cont† In the passage bearing on this point, Bhīṣma, after answering Yudhiṣṭhira's first question regarding the origin of kingship, proceeds, as it seems to us, to answer the second query of the king, namely why the people submit to one man who is their equal in all respects. The Lord Viṣṇu, he says, entered the person of king Pṛthu, and hence the world bows down to one man as to a god. What reason is there, he asks, for the people's submission to one man except his divine quality (daivādṛite guṇāt)? A god, he continues, whose stock of spiritual merit is exhausted comes down upon earth from heaven, and is born as a king versed in the science of polity and as a man endowed with Viṣṇu's majesty. As he is established by the gods, no one transcends him and everybody submits to him. This capacity of ruling the earth does not accrue to him by his own merit. Meritorious acts lead to meritorious results, and hence mankind obeys the voice of one man who is equal to it.∗ In this case, it will be observed, the author categorically denies the king's authority to arise from his intrinsic qualities. He derives it on the contrary from the king's divine origin and nature, on the hypothesis of the king's creation by the god Viṣṇu and his incorporation of the god's essence.†
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n∗ * IX 303-311.
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n† † Supra p. 95.
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cont∗ * VII 5-7, S. B. E. Vol. XXV p 217. With the last verse cf. Ibid V 96 where the king is held to be an incarnation of the same list of eight deities.
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cont† † V 1. 5. 14. cf. supra, pp. 32-33.
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∗ Śāntiparvan, LIX 128, 131, 133-136.
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† We may consider in the present place certain current estimates of the Hindu doctrine of the king's divinity. Prof. Pramatha Nath Banerjea (op. cit. p. 71 and foot-note) holds on the authority of certain texts of the Śukranīti (I 30-34 ; Ibid 87) that in ancient India "only a righteous king was regarded as divine," and "the king was not a devatā but a nara-devatā." Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (op. cit. p 130) virtually endorses the former statement and quotes one of Dr. Banerjea's texts (Śukra I 70) to prove that according to the Hindu theory "a king is a naradeva only so long as he is virtuous and he ceases to be so the moment he goes to the bad." Now however important Śukra's qualification of the older doctrine of the king's divinity might be, it is difficult to understand the grounds on which his view is held to represent as above the Hindu theory on the point in question. For Śukra's theory, so far as we are aware, is peculiar to him and is not shared by the other Hindu authors. As for the contention that the king was not a '*devatā*' but a '*nara-devatā*', it is pointedly disproved by one of the concluding verses of chapter LIX of the Śāntiparvan which categorically states that the kings and the gods ever since Pṛthu's time have been declared by the sages to be equal (tato jagati rājendra satatam śabditam budhaiḥ devāścha naradevāścha tubyā iti viśāmpate). [^asterisk]: * VII 8; 13, S. B. E. Vol. XXV pp. 217-218.
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We have thus far endeavoured to show how the older ideas relating to the essential importance of the king's office and his divine nature were developed by the canonical writers of this period. As in the earlier case, these theories led as a logical corollary to the formulation of the doctrines of submission and obedience of the subjects. "Even an infant king," says Manu in one place, "must not be despised (from an idea) that he is a (mere) mortal; for he is a great deity in human form. Fire burns one man only, if he carelessly approaches it; the fire of a king's (anger) consumes the (whole) family, together with its cattle and its hoard of property." Again, he says, "The (man), who in his exceeding folly hates him, will doubtlessly perish; for the king quickly makes up his mind to destroy such (a man). Let no (man), therefore, transgress that law which the king decrees with respect to his favourites, nor (his orders) which inflict pain on those in disfavour."[^asterisk] Like Manu the author of the Śāntiparvan inculcates the submission of the subjects to their ruler. In chapter LXVII where Bhīṣma develops his view making the consecration of the king the 'chiefest' duty of the subjects, he says that the person who desires his own welfare should honour the king as he honours the god Indra. Again, he states that the people should respectfully salute the king as the disciples salute their preceptor, and they should wait upon him as the gods wait upon Indra, for he who is honoured by his own subjects is feared even by his enemies, while he who is not so honoured is overwhelmed by them : if the king is overwhelmed, all his subjects feel unhappy.∗
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∗ *Śāntiparvan* LXVII 4,34-36.
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We have mentioned above those ideas of the canonical authors of this period which, it appears, were meant by them to justify the king's authority over his subjects. Let us next consider what, if any, counteracting principles derived more or less from the same source were drawn by these authors into their common synthesis. We find that however much these writers stressed the duty of the subjects, they insisted, as before, upon the king's observance of the reciprocal duty of protection.† In some passages the duty of protection is brought into relation, as before, with the king's collection of taxes so as to imply that the former follows as a corollary from the latter.∗ Furthermore the theory of divine creation in the Manusamhitā while leading, as we have observed in another place, to the doctrine of submission and obedience of the subjects, suggests in its actual context that the king is liable to the divinely ordained duty of protection.∗ Finally, it should be remarked that Bhīṣma in one passage, while answering the question relating to the condition of a state *in extremis*, pointedly declares protection to be the sole justification of the king's existence,—a view which obviously serves as a powerful counterpoise to the canonical doctrine relating to the duty of the subjects.†
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† Cf. *Śāntiparvan* LVIII 1-4 where protection is declared to be the cream of the king's duties and is held to be particularly approved by seven specified teachers who are the authors of treatises on the science of polity. In the Manusaṁhitā as well as the *Śāntiparvan* protection is frequently inculcated in the earlier fashion by means of moral and spiritual sanctions. Thus Manu in one place, while urging the king to punish thieves, compares (VIII 303) the king's protection of the subjects to the performance of a sacrifice, and he writes (VIII 306) "A king who protects the created beings in accordance with the sacred law and smites those worthy of corporal punishment, daily offers (as it were) sacrifices at which hundreds of thousands (are given as) fees." On the other hand Manu (VII 111-112) threatens the oppressive king with the loss of life, family, and kingdom. In the Śāntiparvan (LXXI 26-29) Bhīṣma, after declaring the king's protection of the subjects to be his highest duty, observes, "In a thousand years the king expiates the sin which he commits in one day by his failure to protect his subjects from fear. For ten thousand years the king enjoys in heaven the fruit of the merit which he acquires in a single day by just protection of his subjects." In other passages the canonical authors inculcate protection by making the king participate in the spiritual merits as well as demerits of his subjects. Thus Manu observes (VIII 304) in the context from which we have just quoted, "A king who (duly) protects (his subjects) receives from each and all the sixth part of their spiritual merit; if he does not protect them, the sixth part of their demerit also (will fall on him)." Yājñavalkya (I 333) similarly states that the king who justly protects his subjects obtains one-sixth of their merits, since the gift of protection is greater than all other gifts. In chapter LXXV 5-10 of the Śāntiparvan Bhīṣma, asked as to how the king may attain blissful regions, says that the king enjoys a fourth part of the spiritual merit earned by his well-protected subjects. On the other hand the king is liable to one-fourth or one-half or even the whole of whatever evil befalls the kingdom. From this the author draws the practical conclusion that the king who fails to recover wealth stolen by thieves should return its equivalent out of his own treasury.
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∗ Cf. Manu (VII 144), "The highest duty of a Kṣatriya is to protect his subjects, for the king who enjoys the rewards just mentioned (viz. the taxes specified, Ibid 130-132; 137-139) is bound to (discharge that) duty"; Ibid IX 254: "The realm of that king who takes his share in kind though he does not punish thieves (will be) disturbed and he (will lose heaven"; Ibid VIII 307-308: "A king who does not afford protection, (yet) takes his share in kind, his taxes tolls and duties, daily presents and fines, will (after death) soon sink into hell. They declare that a king who affords no protection, (yet) receives the sixth part of the produce, takes upon himself all the foulness of his whole people"; Śāntiparvan CXLII. 31: "An impotent Kṣatriya is the king who unjustly exacts his dues without fulfilling his duty of protection and he is unskilled in the expedients of policy"; Ibid CXXXIX 100; "(The king) should spend his taxes after collecting one-sixth (of the produce as) the same: he who does not properly protect his subjects is a thief among kings (pārthivataskarah)." Similarly Yājñavalkya (I 3, 3, 5) says that the king takes half of whatever sins are committed by the unprotected subjects since he levies taxes. In this connexion wo may mention Sāntiparvan LXXI 10 where certain taxes levied by the king are called his wages (vetana)—a view involving the idea that the king is an official.
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∗ Cf. Manu VII 2 (a verse which immediately precedes the author's account of the king's creation) : “A Kṣatriya who has received according to the rule the sacrament prescribed by the Veda, must duly protect this whole (world).” S. B. E. Vol. XXV, p. 216.
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† The reference is to Chapter LXXVIII (35-44) of the Sāntiparvan. There Bhīṣma replying to a question of Yudhiṣṭhira declares that the person who becomes a raft on a raftless stream or a means of conveyance where there is no other means, should be honoured, no matter whether he is a Śūdra or a man of any other caste. For, as the speaker pointedly asks, what is the use of a bull incapable of bearing burdens, a cow that gives no milk, a wife who is barren and a king who fails to afford protection ? In picturesque language he declares that a Brāhmaṇa who does not study the Vedas, and a king who fails to protect his subjects, are like a wooden elephant, a leathern deer, a eunuch or a barren field. He who constantly protects the good, concludes Bhīṣma, and restrains the wicked, should alone be made a king ; this whole world is sustained by such a man.
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Linked texts (6)
- Mahābhārata — Vyāsa, Sanskrit
- Mānava Dharmaśāstra — Manu & Bhṛgu, Sanskrit
- Yājñavalkyasmṛti — Yājñavalkya, Sanskrit
- Śatapathabrāhmaṇa — Yājñavalkya & Śāṇḍilya (Vedic teacher), Sanskrit
- Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra — Kauṭilya, Sanskrit
- Vālmīkirāmāyaṇa — Vālmīki, Sanskrit