The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and Society c9.1

c9.1

It is obvious that the term *nāstika*, one who says "there is not," derives from the statement that is considered typical of him. Thus Manu's commentator Medhātiti (ad. 3. 150; 8. 309) characterizes the nāstika as one who, rejecting transcendence and the transcendental effectiveness of sacrifice, states: *nāsti dattam*, *nāsti hutam*, *nāsti paralokaḥ*, "There is no (value in) the gift, there is no (value) in the fire offering, there is no other world." This leads us to a further point. The term *nāstika* seems to imply also the context in which it is made, namely, the *(vi)vāda*, the disputation, where the *nāstika* confronts and competes with his opponent, the *āstika*. This is the situation known from the early expositions on *vāda*, for instance, the one preserved in the *Caraka Saṃhitā*, which exemplifies the vāda in these words: *ekasya pakṣaḥ punarbhavo 'stīti*, *nāstīty aparasya*, "One holds that there is rebirth, the other that there is none" (3. 8. 28). The point I want to stress is that in Caraka's example, there does not seem to be any question of a heterodox doctrine. In fact, the doctrinal content of the counterthesis (*pratiṣṭhāpanā*) seems to be nil. The negative statement is made simply and only for the sake of disputation, not in order to assert a particular doctrine.