The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c26.2

c26.2

Strong places were most commonly reduced by strict investment and starving out (Fitzclarence, 245). There were few captures by a *coup de main* (*sar-i-suwārī*), the walls were not often breached, and rarely escaladed. Treachery within the walls was as frequent a cause of surrender as any other thing. In sitting down before a fortress, a Moghul army tried to surround it completely so as to prevent any ingress or egress. As Grant Duff, 165, expresses himself, “they never considered an army capable of undertaking a regular siege unless sufficiently large to surround the place invested and completely obstruct communications”. Earth works (*mūrchal*) were thrown up, in which the siege guns were placed. The system of digging approaches and laying mines (*naqb*) was known and practised, at any rate in Northern India. No doubt, Lake, 14, holds the contrary view; he says “the natives appear to be utterly ignorant of the art of conducting approaches by sap: and generally they are also unacquainted with Mining”. But this opinion must be understood as applicable to the Dakhin only.