Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c26: Chapter XXIV

The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c26

Language
English

Chapter XXIV

c26.1

In India the art of fortification remained in the same state as it was in Europe before the introduction of the regular systems. The Indians placed their reliance more on a strong profile than on a judicious plan; and they never realised the importance of the maxim that every work of a fortress should be flanked by some other (Lake, 11). Blacker holds that nothing proved more forcibly their ignorance of the attack and defence of fortified places than their manifest superiority when acting on the defensive. A native army scarcely ever succeeded in taking a place which attempted resistance: it was generally reduced to terms through the distress caused by the force lying around it. On the contrary, some very vigorous defences had been made, prolonged by determined defence of the breach and by bold sallies to the trenches. Mining had found its way to some but not to all parts of India; but there were few instances of its being practised with effect (Blacker, “War”, 23). In the *Mujmil-ut-tārīkh ba‘d Nādirīyah*, p. 78, line 7, it is stated that the Afghans had a practise before commencing a siege of killing a dog and throwing it in the direction of the fortress. I have never seen this mentioned elsewhere, and one does not quite see what was symbolized by the act.

c26.2

Strong places were most commonly reduced by strict investment and starving out (Fitzclarence, 245). There were few captures by a *coup de main* (*sar-i-suwārī*), the walls were not often breached, and rarely escaladed. Treachery within the walls was as frequent a cause of surrender as any other thing. In sitting down before a fortress, a Moghul army tried to surround it completely so as to prevent any ingress or egress. As Grant Duff, 165, expresses himself, “they never considered an army capable of undertaking a regular siege unless sufficiently large to surround the place invested and completely obstruct communications”. Earth works (*mūrchal*) were thrown up, in which the siege guns were placed. The system of digging approaches and laying mines (*naqb*) was known and practised, at any rate in Northern India. No doubt, Lake, 14, holds the contrary view; he says “the natives appear to be utterly ignorant of the art of conducting approaches by sap: and generally they are also unacquainted with Mining”. But this opinion must be understood as applicable to the Dakhin only.

c26.3

There was also a plan, to which recourse was sometimes had, of building high towers with the branches of trees, and when these were of a height to command the interior of the place, guns were mounted on them. These were called *sībā*. Scaling ladders (*nardubān*) were not unknown, and were occasionally brought into use. Elephants were frequently brought up to batter in the wooden gates of a fort. The *Seir* translator, iii, 182, note 45, says the gates, being always covered by some work, could not be broken in except by grenades (of which the natives knew nothing), or by pushing against them elephants, protected by iron, or by setting fire to them. It was as a protection against elephants that the gates were studded with iron spikes; to meet which it was the practice to furnish the elephant with an iron frontlet (Fitzclarence, 137). For instance, we read in the *Siyar-ul-mutākharīn* (translation, iii, 181), with reference to an assault by the Mahrattas in 1173 H. (1759), that the Khizrī gate of the Dihlī citadel “was covered with sheets of brass and set thick with iron nails jutting out twelve inches, and an inch square at the bottom”. Often the gateway was bricked up when a siege was imminent, and this device rendered it impossible to blow it in. At Cuttack in 1803, the gate was partially built up in this way, and we had considerable difficulty in entering (Lake, 211, note).

c26.4

These general remarks are borne out by a passage in Lake’s “Sieges of the Madras Army”, 14: “when one of their armies sits down before a place, the object appears rather to be to harrass the besieged and weary them out by a strict blockade, than to effect an entrance by breaching the walls: for although guns are used, they are placed at such a distance from the town, out of musket shot, and not always in battery, that their effect is uncertain, and even this desultory fire is only kept up at intervals during the day; for at night, to guard against the consequences of a sally, the guns are always withdrawn to the camp; and this ridiculous process is continued till the besieged are tired out, and a compromise is entered into”.

c26.5

Fitzclarence, “Journal”, 245, also enters at some length into the question. “The investment of an eastern fortress did not in general consist of anything beyond a blockade; and it will be seen by a reference to Indian history, that the surrender of these forts has been caused more by treachery and scarcity than by any other means, and that the length of some sieges in this country equal those of Troy, Ostend, and Mantua. The food of the Indians being almost entirely rice¹, which is the least perishable of any article of subsistence, the defence of such places may be the longer protracted. Though the natives did not understand the advantage of a glacis, still they saw the necessity of covering the foot of the wall from the enemy’s fire when exposed to it, and formed a defence similar to a fausse-braye, which they call rainee (see back, p. 265). They are very partial to loopholes to fire through, . . . . Each of these narrow and confined [entrance] lanes is generally enfiladed with guns and loopholed on every side, so that should the enemy force the outer gate, they find themselves exposed to a continuation of fresh dangers from an invisible garrison at every turn. I am not, however, a good judge of native fortresses, having only seen those of Chunar on the Ganges, of Alighur, of Agra, and Delhi. The gates at Agra, Alighur and Chunar are examples of this difficulty of entrance” ¹.

c26.6

¹ This is not true of Hindūstan, outside of Bengal. If “corn” were substituted, the argument would still hold good, and exactitude would not be sacrificed.

c26.7

¹ After this date the author also saw Daulatābād, pp. 215—221, and Aḥmadnagar, 241, 242.

c26.8

“The Indians, in the defence of their forts, behave with the greatest gallantry and courage, and in this differ from the Europeans, who often fancy that, when a practicable breach is made in their walls, surrender becomes justifiable. But here all feel desirous of fighting man to man, and look upon the contest in the breach as the fittest occasion for meeting their enemies with sword and dagger. They use large heavy wall pieces called gingalls” (see *ante*, p. 109), “which send a ball of two or more ounces to a very considerable distance. Having no shells or handgrenades, they cast bags of gunpowder into the ditch, which exploding by fire thrown on them, scorch the assailants; and at times they have recourse to thick earthen-ware pots with fuses and full of powder, the pieces of which wound dreadfully. They have been known to line the sides of the ditch with straw thatches, and by throwing other lighted thatch on their enemies, envelop them in flames. Our success against Hatras by bombardment has been a wonderful encouragement to taking all the native forts by similar means; and from their having no casements, shells are the most effective means for reducing them”; (id. 246).

c26.9

Approach by sap and mine. The word used for the galleries of approach seems to have been *sābāt*. This is defined by the Lucknow editor of the *Akbarnāmaḥ* (Vol. ii, p. 245, note 7) as a roof (*saqaf*) between two walls, which is also called "the path of safety" (*kūchah-i-salāmat*); *sābāt* is, he says, the name of a town in Transoxiana. Steingass, 638, explains it as a covered passage connecting two houses. The ordinary Hindi word for a mine is *surang* (Platts, 656) and *surang urānā* is to spring a mine. This mode of attack was known and practised. For instance Sher Shāh in 952 H. (1545-6) at the siege of Kālinjar advanced galleries (*sābāt*) to the foot of the wall, and then prepared *naqb*, which appears to mean here mines, and not the mere digging through of a wall (Budāonī, Text, i, 371, Ranking, 482). Again at a siege of Budāon in 963 H. (1555-6), the besiegers resorted to mining, and the commander of the garrison thwarted them by counter-mining, having detected the direction of their approach by putting his ear to the ground and listening, just as our engineers did at Lucknow in 1857, Budāonī, Text, i, 465 (Ranking, 599), and McLeod Innes' "Siege of Lucknow". And again, at the siege of Gurdāspur in 1715, ʿAbd-uṣ-ṣamad Khān made covered ways or approaches (*sābāt*), Yaḥyā Khān, 123*a*. Once more, at Allāhābād in 1719 the imperialists worked their way close to the walls of the fort "and began to mine under the walls", and Girdhar Bahādur, believing that the day was lost, made overtures through Muḥammad Khān, Bangash, (*Siwāniḥ-i-Khiẓrī*, 13). So also at the siege of Āgrah (July, August 1719) Ḥaidar Qulī Khān, who had under his command many Europeans whom he had brought from Sūrat, drove several saps towards the walls (*id.*).

c26.10

*Sābāt*. According to the dictionary this is "a covered passage connecting two houses"; and as a military term it means a trench or approach made in besieging a fortress. According to Briggs, "Firishtah", ii, 230 (siege of Chitor) the *sābāt* were constructed in the following manner. "The zigzags, commencing at gunshot distance from the fort, consist of a double wall, and by means of blinds or stuffed gabions covered with leather, the besiegers continue their approaches till they arrive near to the walls of the place to be attacked”. There is another passage to the same effect with reference to the year 1595 and the siege of Ahmadnagar.

c26.11

The text of Firishtah is even more explicit as to the siege of Chitor (Lucknow edition, Maqālah ii, p. 257, beginning at line 22). A body of five hundred carpenters, stone-cutters, blacksmiths, excavators, earthworkers, and shovelmen were set to work to construct *sābāt*, “which are peculiar to India”. These men laboured at making *sābāt* and digging mines (*naqb*). “*Sābāt* is the name for two walls which are made at the distance of a musketshot; and under the shelter of planks and baskets which are held together by skins, the said walls are carried close to the fort. Then the matchlock men and the mine-diggers (*naqqāb*) come in safety, through the wide way between those walls, to the foot of the fort, and there they dig a mine and fill it with gunpowder. When the fort has been breached (*rakhnah shud*), the rest of the army reaches the spot by way of the *sābāt*, and effects an entry into the fort”.

c26.12

We have the story of the same siege told by Nizām-ud-dīn in the *Tabaqāt-i-Akbār Shāhi*, fol. 209a, line 17, (under the 12th Ilahī year, the beginning of Ramazān 974 H., 1566 A.D.). It is practically the same as Firishtah, sometimes word for word the same. He says work was begun in two places. They prepared something like a lane (or narrow street) up to the wall of the fort. “The *sābāt* which began from the emperor’s entrenchment was so wide, that ten horsemen could ride abreast along the bottom of it; and so deep¹ that a man seated on an elephant, holding a spear in his hand, could go along it”. In spite of the shields of ox-hide, a hundred men a day were killed by shots from the garrison. The bodies were built into the walls.

c26.13

¹ The word actually used is *irtafāʿ*, “height”, which evidently means “height” from the floor of the trench to the natural surface of the ground, or to the top of the earth thrown out on each side. In other words, what we call “depth”, when speaking of an excavation.

c26.14

There was in addition a place upon which Akbar sat and picked off men appearing on the fortress walls. "His Majesty sat upon the top of a building (khānah) prepared for his reception upon the sābāt of his entrenchment (mūrchal). He sat there matchlock in hand". Budāonī, ii, 103, (Lowe 106), here copies and abridges Nizām-ud-dīn: and in describing the siege of Kālinjar in 952 H. (1545), he uses the word sābāt as if he meant by it a sap or trench, and not a tower.

c26.15

Allowing for a certain amount of obscurity and vagueness in the native historians, we may, I think, assert that, so far, the meaning of sābāt is tolerably plain. It was a trench begun at some distance from a fortress, deep and wide enough to conceal the workers, the excavated earth being thrown up on each side to increase the protection. In rocky soil it may have been necessary to form the protecting wall of material, such as planks, trees, or earth, brought from elsewhere; but in most instances the obvious and easy method was to dig a trench in the ground, and use the earth from it to heighten the sides. But a sābāt was not a tower or erection, built up from the surface of the ground. If Abul Fazl had not thrown the subject into confusion by his use of the word sābāt in the Akbarnāmah, the meaning of the word would be clear enough. But he persists in using it as the name for a temporary tower, or a battering ram, as he explicitly says in ii, 261, last line, (Lucknow edition), describing the siege of Ranthambhūr in the 14th year, 22nd Ramazān 976 H. The besiegers of Ranthambhūr came to the conclusion that the fort could not be taken without recourse to sābāt, kih sarkob-i-gardan-kashān bāshad. As to this siege Nizām-ud-dīn fol. 212a, also uses the word sābāt, but enters into no details. Budāonī, ii, 107 (Lowe, 111), follows Nizām-ud-dīn very closely.

c26.16

Abul Fazl persists in using sābāt in a different sense from everybody else. To begin with the siege of Chunār, Abul Fazl (Lucknow edition), Book i, 114, line 6, says Rūmī Khān, ba kishtīhāe tartīb-i-sābāt sākhtah. The passage is translated by Mr. Beveridge, i, 331, “Rūmī Khān, . . . . . . constructed a covered way (sābāt) upon boats, and arranged such a roof (sataḥa) . . . . . .” But if we go to Jauhar, Āftābchī, my Ms. fol. 16b, or to Niẓām-ud-dīn, Ṭabaqāt, fol. 151b, we find that Rūmī Khān took three boats and built on them a battering ram (muqābil-kob). The passages are rendered to the same effect in Stewart, Tezkereh-al-Vakiāt, p. 20, lines 11—25, Erskine, “Bābar and Humāyun”, ii, 140, 141, Budāonī, Ranking, i, 456, and Elliot, “Mahomedan Historians”, v, 199. In none of them is there a word about a sābāt, nor did they ever dream of calling this high erection built on boats, a sābāt.

c26.17

It is the same with Abul Faẓl’s long account of the siege of Chitor, (Lucknow edition) ii, from line 11 of p. 245, although in one place he says they made dīwār-i-gilīn-i-ʿāriz-i-mārpech, “serpentine, wide, earthen walls”; but he writes elsewhere that Akbar sat aloft upon a sābāt, which commanded the walls, and from thence he shot. How could a serpentine wall be a tower, from which a man shot; or a battering ram, as he elsewhere defines a sābāt to be? Abul Faẓl has misled Count von Noer “Kaiser Akbar”, i, 234—240, French edition, i, 165 (Horn 121) into asserting that a sābāt should “if possible command the walls”, that from “the top of the sābāt, cannon breach the walls of the fortress”. Then he speaks of the rolling of movable shields. Dr. Horn seems here, by a reference to the tūrah (see ante p. 142) to identify it with the sābāt. But I think the text of the Akbarnāmah ii, 243—254, Lucknow edition, leads to the conclusion that three things were employed by Akbar at Chitor, 1) a long and deep trench (sābāt), 2) movable shields to protect the workmen (tūrah), and 3) a high erection commanding the walls (sībā).

c26.18

Apparently open trenches were resorted to by the Mahrattahs so far back as 1670 at the siege of Karnāla, for Grant Duff, 110, quoting the Bombay Records, says “they advanced by throwing up breastworks of earth”.

c26.19

*Sandbags*. In order to facilitate an attack, the ditch of a fort was at times filled up with sacks (*juwāl*, Steingass, 376), filled with earth. This was done at ‘Ālamgīr’s siege of Gūlkhandah in 1097 H. (1685-6), Khāfī Khān, ii, 356, line 1. We find these bags mentioned as part of the Sikh equipment when they advanced in 1710 against the town of Rāhūn in the Jālandhar *duābah*, Khāfī Khān, ii, 658, line 9, *o juwālah-hāe pur az reg, barāe mūrchāl bastan*, “and bags full of sand to make batteries”.

c26.20

*Movable shields*. In 1710 the Sikhs, when attacking the town of Jalālābād in the Ganges *Duābah*, adopted the plan of using movable wooden screens, or mantlets, mounted on ordinary cart-wheels. These they brought close to the walls, and from their shelter showered bullets and arrows on the besieged, (Khāfī Khān, ii, 656). Mantlets in general have been described, ante p. 142, under the word *Tūrah*, when dealing with Light Artillery.

c26.21

*Shātūr*, شاطور. In Budāonī, Text, i, 382, we find this word, and it would seem from the context to refer to some article made of the trunks of trees, something connected with a siege. Colonel G. Ranking, 494, note 7, not finding it in any dictionary, suggests the Turkish *sātū*, the roof of a house, meaning a shelter under which to approach the walls, something like the Roman *vinea*, a roof of planks and wicker work supported on poles eight feet long, and carried by the men as they advanced. May not the correct word be *shāhtīr*, a beam?

c26.22

*Malchār*. This is an obscure word used by ‘Abd-ul-ḥamīd twice, *Bādshāhnāmah*, i, Part 2, p. 107, l. 15, and p. 108, l. 18. Both passages belong to the year 1044 H., 1634-5, and the first refers to the siege of Urchhah, the second to that of Dhāmonī, fortresses in Bundelkhand. The wording in the second instance leads one to infer that the *malchār* was something in the nature of an approach by trenches.

c26.23

*Temporary wall.* Another device was to surround a fortress with a temporary wall, leaving a few openings at which strong guards were posted, and no one was allowed to enter or come out without a pass. This was done by ʿĀlamgīr at Gūlkhandah in 1098 H. (1686-7), *Maāsir-i-ʿĀlamgīrī*, 296. The materials employed were trunks of trees and clay. A somewhat similar plan was resorted to by ʿAbd-uṣ-ṣamad Khān, when he invested Bandah, the Sikh, in Gurdāspur.

c26.24

*Towers (Sībā).* In connection with this siege of Gurdāspur, we are told of the building of high wooden towers, on which guns were mounted, the inside of the fortified place being thereby commanded, so as to make it untenable. The following passage gives a description of these towers by a contemporary, who was present. "At a distance of two arrows' flight, batteries were erected of a size sufficient to allow of the guns being worked. They were about three cubits (4½ feet) in height and in shape like bastions. A constant fire was kept up on both sides. Whenever a gunner shewed his head above the top of the earthwork, he would be fired at by one of the Sikhs concealed behind the battlements. In the same way a head showing above the wall was immediately fired at. The Sikhs answered shot for shot, and the imperialists were unable to move out to an attack in the open. Then, at the battery of ʿĀrif Khān, ʿAbd-uṣ-ṣamad Khān prepared a tower over-topping the fort wall, and mounted his guns upon it. This device disconcerted the besieged, as the interior of the fort was now commanded and their movements thereby hampered. Similar towers were raised on two other sides of the attack, where Zakarīyah Khān and Qamr-ud-dīn Khān commanded respectively", Ghulām Muḥī-ud-dīn Khān, fol. 57*a*.

c26.25

Ījād, fol. 23*a*, with respect to the same operations, uses a word which I read *chob-sībāe*, and I suppose it applies to these towers. "The besiegers threw up *chob-sībāe*, and drove subterannean passages towards each corner of the fort”. But I am doubtful of this interpretation, as he had just spoken of “mounds of earth raised on the trunks of trees and placed from distance to distance round the fort” i. e. in other words, “towers”. Why then should he refer again to the same thing by another name (*sībā*) in the next sentence?

c26.26

*Sībā* is defined by Steingass, 714, as from the Turkish, “a place surrounded by walls”; but Horn, 103, quoting the *‘Ālamgīrnāmah*, 313, translates *sībā* “aus den Befestigungen sich erhebender Bastionen”, or in other words what was called in Europe, a cavalier. This latter meaning would apply equally to ‘Abd-uṣ-ṣamad Khān’s towers, although they were independent structures, and not part of a fortress.

c26.27

It was evidently a *sībā* that was built by Dārā Shukoh when besieging Qandahār in 1063 H. (1653). “He mounted a battery on a high and solid mound of earth” (Elphinstone, “History”, 513). We also find the word used in the *Mirāt-uṣ-ṣafā*, foll. 99*b*, when in 1169 H. (July 1756 ¹) the French under Bussy were invested in the Chahār Maḥal at Ḥaidarābād. The assailants erected *sībah*. Something of the same sort was had recourse to by the native besiegers of Arcot in 1751 (Orme “Mil. Trans.” i, 191). They filled up a house with earth, and on this as a base they raised a square mound, which commanded the gate and every part within the fort. The same kind of thing is referred to by Orme, “Hist. Frag.”, 153, on the authority of Manucci (Catrou, 4to edition of 1715, 3rd part, p. 177), as having been used at the siege of Gūlkhandah in 1687. A vast mound of earth was raised to a level with the wall and the artillery mounted on it. Wilks, ii, 360, was told by Sir Barry Close, one of the garrison, that when Tellicherry (Malabar District) was besieged in 1782, Sirdār Khān employed what was evidently a *sībā*, though the name is not used. “An immense extent of base served as the foundation for several successive stories, constructed of the trunks of trees in successive layers, crossing each other and compacted by earth rammed between the intervals; the contrivances in the rear for raising the guns were removed when the erection was complete; successive stories were raised as the besieged covered themselves from each in turn”. Lake, 221, calls these erections “cavaliers”, and compares them to the great mounds raised by the ancients in their sieges. (For “Cavalier”, see Voyle, 69).

c26.28

¹ See Malleson, “French in India”, (new edition) p. 490.

c26.29

*Storming.* With the inefficient artillery of those days, a breach was very rarely effected, and we hear of very few forts being actually stormed. Entrance was oftener secured through breaking in the gate, and for this purpose elephants, as already stated on p. 177, were employed.

c26.30

*Scaling ladders.* The name for scaling ladders was *nar-dubān*, Steingass, 1395. Bābar mentions them more than once. Their use in the reign of Humāyūn, 963 H., 1555-6 is proved by a passage in Budāonī, text, i, 465, Ranking 600. The words employed there are *zīnah-pāe*, the round of a ladder or step of a stair, and *kamand*, which Ranking translates literally “noose”, though from the context “rope-ladder” would be better. Again they were used in Shāh-jahān’s reign, (1044 H. 1634-5), at the siege of Urchhah, *Bādshāhnāmah*, i, part 2, p. 107, line 15. From time to time we hear of their being used at a much later period. For instance, at the end of 1719, when Girdhar Bahādur was besieged in Allāhābād fort by Ḥaidar Qulī Khān and other imperial officers, we read that a general attack in two directions was ordered. One of these was headed by Sher Afgan Khān, Dāūd Khān, an officer under Muḥammad Khān, Bangash, and others. They drove the besieged back to the very foot of the wall, then “Dāūd Khān, Bangash, brought up the scaling ladders, hoping to make an entry, but after much struggle and effort, he was obliged to abandon the attempt”, *Siwāniḥ-i-khiẓrī*. In 1710 the Sikhs had scaling ladders with them when they tried to take Jalālābād in the upper Ganges *Dūābah*, Khāfī Khān, ii, 657.

c26.31

*Modes of repelling assault, Burning oil, Powder Bags &c.* In a quotation already given on p. 273, from Fitzclarence, reference has been made to the throwing down from the walls of bags of gunpowder and burning thatch. I have also referred on p. 131 to the *ḥuqgah-i-ātash* used for a similar purpose. Other missiles are named by Horn, 123, quoting Von Noer i, 254 (“French trans.”, i, 161), who says that at the siege of Chitor the Rājputs brought sacks of cotton cloth and fascines steeped in oil, which they endeavoured to set fire to while the breach was being stormed. As to the throwing of skins full of gunpowder with a match attached, we read of this being done by the defenders of a fort in the Dakhin in the fourth year of Shāhjahān (1631 A.D.). Horn, 132, quotes the passage from the *Bādshāh-nāmah*, i, 376, sixth line from end, *az darūn-i-ḥiṣār bān o tufang o ḥuqgah o sang o mashk-hāe bārūt rā ātash zadah mī andakhtand*, “From inside the fort they threw rockets and bullets and grenades and stones and lighted powder-skins”. A somewhat later instance of the use of the *ḥuqgah* or hand-grenade and the *hānḍī* or firepot, was at the siege of the Ghasahrī fort (‘Alīgārh district) by Suraj Mal, Jāt, in the year 1753. In the *Sujān Charitr*, Canto v, stanza 24, we have:

c26.32

Uththan māru ghanī paḍau, saththī mukh moḍe;
Hanḍī hukke aggi de, gaḍh-wālaun chhoḍe.

c26.33

“There he fierce fighting fell, his men turned back; The defenders threw lighted *hānḍīs* and *ḥuqgahs*”.

c26.34

Quite at the end of the Moghul period, we find these means of defending a breach resorted to by George Thomas’ officers, in resisting the Mahratta assault on Hānsī (3rd Dec. 1802): “Burning choppers (i. e. thatch from the roofs of houses), powder-pots, and everything he could get hold of, were showered upon us; but our greatest loss was from the powder-pots, which greatly disheartened the men”

c26.35

("Military Memoirs of Lt. Col. James Skinner, C. B." i, 228). Again, at the siege of Bhartpur in 1805, we find in use similar means of repelling an assault. Thorn, "War", 457, says "the people on the walls continually threw down upon their heads ponderous pieces of timber and flaming packs of cotton previously dipped in oil, followed by pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles, the explosion of which had a terrible effect". See also a case, which occurred in 1781, quoted by Lake, "Sieges", 212.

c26.36

Stones. Where the fort was on an eminence and stones were available, these latter were stored, and rolled down the hill upon any besieger. (Blacker, "War", 318). In 1044 H., 1634-5, when Dhāmonī in Bundelkhand was besieged, the defenders rolled stones down on their assailants. Bādshāhnāmah, i, part 2, p. 108. This was also done at a fort in the Dakhin in 1674, when it was attacked by Shivā-jī (R. Orme, "Hist. Frag.", 47). And it is only a year or two ago that we found the same mode of defence still resorted to at Hanza in the Himalayas.

c26.37

This use of stones was the principal cause of our failure at the first storming of Chunār on the Ganges, Nov. 29th 1764, (Carraccioli, "Clive", i, 64). "Large stones, which the enemy rolled out of the breach and on each side of it, threw our men so often down and rolled them back again by twenties at a time . . . . . Our people were at last so fatigued that they were obliged to give it up". Here Captain Dow (the historian) had his skull fractured by a stone, for which he was obliged to be trepanned. Khair-ud-dīn, *Ibrat-nāmah*, 75, tells us that *sang-asiya* were thrown from the walls of Patnah when it was attacked in 1173 H. (1759); the dictionary, St. 701, says these are whetstones, possibly the stones of hand-mills are intended by the author. We were also repulsed twice, in 1789 and again in 1791, at Kistnagarhī (Salem District) "simply by (the garrison) rolling down stones and large masses of granite on the assailants", Lake, 207, note. Again, at Trimbak, in Khāndesh, our assault on the 24th April 1818 was chiefly repulsed by the garrison rolling down large stones on their assailants (Lake, 105); and great damage was done in the same way at Gopādrūg on the 13th May 1819 (id. 201).

c26.38

*Evacuation after a repulsed Assault.* Lake, 150, remarks, as among the many inconsistencies of the Indian character, that while they surrendered impregnable fortresses without a blow, they would not only defend a mere walled town, but stand an assault after a practicable breach had been made. Another curious habit connected with these defences is pointed out by Blacker, 346. It frequently happened that a garrison would repulse an assault in the most dauntless manner and with severe loss. Yet during the following night they would silently evacuate the place they had defended so well. Naturally Europeans wondered and sought for a cause. The object did not seem to be to divert the attacking force from some enterprize of greater danger to the general cause. The effort was nearly always isolated and desperate. Why not abandon the place at once, or ask for terms? It seemed that it must be a point of honour with them to try their strength, and having proved their valour, they then withdrew.

c26.39

*Reduction by Starvation.* Many instances of this cause of surrender might be adduced. This was, for example, the principal reason of the surrender of Āgrah in 1131 H. (Aug. 1719), when Nekūsīyar, after laying claim to the throne, was invested in that fort by Ḥusain ‘Alī Khān. “After a month, provisions began to be scarce. Many of those who had joined from the country round began to desert, getting over the walls at night, only to be seized by the Nawāb’s sentries. These fugitives informed Ḥusain ‘Alī Khān of the disheartened and suffering condition of the garrison. All the good grain had been used up, and nothing was left but inferior pulses, and even these had been stored over seven years and smelt so strong, that even the fourfooted beasts would not eat them with avidity. Attempts were made to bring in small supplies of flour, which were dragged up by ropes let down from the battlements. Some of the artillery of the besieging force took part in this traffic. After this was found out, the strictness of watch was redoubled, anything moving in the river at night was fired upon, and expert swimmers were kept ready to pursue and seize any one who attempted to escape by way of the river”, Mḥd Qāsim, Lāhorī, 286, 287. Negociations commenced, and the fort was surrendered on the 12th Aug. 1719, after an investment of nearly three months.

c26.40

Gurdāspūr. The reduction of Gurdāspūr and the consequent surrender of Bandah, the Sikh leader, is another instance of the starving out of a garrison. ‘Abd-uṣ-ṣamad Khān appeared before the place in April 1715, but it was not taken before the 17th Dec. of that year. Some time before this happened, the provisions had come to an end, not a grain being left in the storehouses. The garrison obtained a little food from the common soldiers outside, for which they paid at the rate of two or three shillings a pound; they also slaughtered oxen and other animals, and having no firewood, ate the flesh raw. Then they picked up and ate whatever they found on the road. They gathered the leaves from the trees; when these were gone, they stripped the bark and gathered the smaller shoots, and grinding these down, used them as a substitute for flour. The bones of animals were also ground down and used in the same way. It is said that some of the Sikhs even cut flesh from their own thighs, roasted it, and eat it.

c26.41

Thūn (First Siege). In another instance the attempt to take a place by starvation was not successful. Thūn was a fort built by the ancestors of the Jāṭ rajahs of Bhartpur, and it was their chief place of strength before they removed to Bhartpur. It was situated somewhere between Dīg and Gobardhan, to the west of Mathurā. In 1716 the cup of Churāman’s transgressions being full, it was resolved to proceed against him, and the duty was confided to Rajah Jai Singh Sawāe of Amber. Thūn having been completely invested, the siege began on the 19th Nov. 1716. The fortress was provided with lofty walls and a deep ditch filled from springs, and round it spread a thick and thorny jungle “through which a bird could hardly make its way”. Supplies were abundant; indeed (though this is probably an exaggeration) there were, it was said, grain, salt, ghī, tobacco, cloth and firewood sufficient for twenty years. When the siege was imminent, Churāman had forced all merchants and traders with their families to quit the place, leaving their goods behind them. He made himself personally responsible for compensation, if he gained the day, and as the property could not be removed, the owners gave their consent without much demur. Churāman’s son, Muḥkam Singh, and his nephew, Rūpā, issued from the fort and gave battle in the open. In his report of the 21st Dec. 1716, the Rājah claimed a victory. He next cut down the trees round the fort, and erected a large number of small guard-houses, in which he placed his men. A large cannon was sent to him from Dihlī, while three hundred mans of gunpowder, one hundred and fifty mans of lead, and five hundred rockets were supplied from the arsenal at Āgrah. The siege dragged on for twenty months, and even in the end Thūn was not taken. The rains of 1717 were very late in coming, prices rose very high, and great expense fell on the Rajah in bringing supplies from his own country of Amber. In January 1718 the Rajah reported that he had had many encounters with the Jāts, in which he had overcome them, but owing to support at Court, they were not willing to yield. Soon after this Sayyad Khān Jahān, Bārhah, a near relation of the wazīr, negotiated a peace over Jai Singh’s head, and Churāman was allowed to settle matters by offering a tribute of thirty lakhs of rupees to the government, and a present of twenty lakhs for the minister himself. Rajah Jai Singh was then recalled.

c26.42

*Thūn (Second Siege).* On a second occasion, in the year 1722, Rajah Jai Singh was more successful, and Thūn was then razed to the ground. He reached Thūn a few days before the 25th Oct. 1722; the fort was then held by the sons of Churāman, and at first there were daily fights. On the 31st a report came from the Rajah stating that he had taken three small forts from Muḥkamā (who was the son of Churāman), and he expected that Thūn would soon fall. He asked for a large cannon, one hundred *rahkalahs*, five hundred *mans* of lead and powder, and three hundred rockets. The capture of the fort was reported to the emperor on the 20th Nov. 1722. Churāman’s sons had fled. This speedy and apparently brilliant victory was, however, the result of treachery and not of hard fighting. Badan Singh, who was on bad terms with his cousin, Muḥkam Singh, had been persuaded to betray the fort, on a promise that he would be appointed to the chieftainship.

c26.43

*Communication between Besiegers and Besieged.* In Fraser, “Mil. Mem. of Lt. Col. J. Skinner”, i, 231, we read that at Hānsī the Mahrattas rolled letters upon arrows and shot them into the fort from the trenches, and received answers from George Thomas’ men in the same way, agreeing to give their leader up. In 918 H. (1512) at Gazhdawān, Bābar is said to have communicated in this way with the Uzbak garrison, (Budāonī, i, 444). Another case is at the siege of Qandahār in 1545: “The dwellers in the fort wrote daily accounts of Mīrzā ʿAskarī, and shot them down from the walls, twisted round an arrow”, *Akbarnāmah* (Beveridge) i, 466, line 4. The same mode of communicating, Manucci tells us, Philipps Ms. 1945, Part i, p. 251, was employed by the besiegers of Bhakkar in Sind (1658); one of these arrows struck Manucci on the shoulder, and he took it just as it was to the eunuch commanding the garrison.

c26.44

*Keys of Fortresses.* Horn, 133, quoting Elliot, v, 176, says that the fortresses had gold or silver keys; in this particular passage the place referred to is Ranthambhūr. An instance of this practice in Persia is found in *Mujmil-ut-Tārīkh-i-baʿd-nādirīyah* (ed. Oskar Mann) 85, line 21. We are told here that the keys of Naishapur were delivered to Aḥmad Shāh, Durrānī, when peace was made. Again, we have a somewhat earlier instance. In 1119 (1707) when Mīr Wais, Ghilzai, killed Gurgīn Khān, Gurji (Georgian), governor on behalf of Sulṭān Ḥusain Mīrzā, Ṣafawī, and took possession of Qandahār, he sent his submission to Shāh ʿĀlam Bahādur Shāh, together with a golden key (*M.-ul-u.*, iii, 702). Another Central Asian practice is to be found in *Mujmil-ut-tārīkh baʿd Nādirīyah*, p. 88, line 2, the planting of a flag on the bastion of a fort as soon as it was taken. I have found no mention of this in India. As showing the importance attached in India to the keys of a fortress, we may instance the trouble taken by Aurangzeb ʿĀlamgīr to make his father, Shāhjahān, surrender those of Āgrah, sending his eldest son, Sulṭān Muḥammad, to demand them (Bernier, 63). In 1707, Mḥd Yār Khān, the *qilaʿhdār* of Dihlī, sent his son with the keys of the fort to Bahādur Shāh in token of submission (Khāfī Khān, ii, 577). And we read in Ghulām ʿAlī Khān’s *Muqaddamah-i-Shāh ʿĀlam-nāmah*, fol. 61*b*, that during Nādir Shāh’s invasion (1738), Burhān-ul-mulk and Tahmās, Jalāir, were sent ahead from Karnāl with a note from Muḥammad Shāh addressed to Lutfullah Khān, Ṣādiq, (*ṣūbahdār* of the province), directing him to give up the keys of the fortress at Dihlī to the Shāh’s agent, which was done accordingly. Then, when Najaf Khān took Āgrah from the Jāts in 1773, the messenger conveying the news to Dihlī “carried with him the keys of the fort to be laid at His Majesty’s feet”, W. Francklin, *Shāh Aulum*, 53.

c26.45

Particular Sieges. For the period covering the end of Shāhjahān’s reign and the whole reign of ʿĀlamgīr, I add a few notes and references in respect of the more notable sieges. I then give an account, in a little more detail, of sieges belonging to the 18th century. In the second half of ʿĀlamgīr’s reign sieges, or at least attacks on forts, were very numerous.

c26.46

Qandahār. Dārā Shukoh had at the siege of Qandahār in 1063 H. (1653) four heavy guns, 30,000 iron shot, great and small, 1500 *mans* (60,000 lbs) of lead, 5000 *mans* (20,000 lbs) of gunpowder, 5000 artillerymen, 10,000 musketeers, 6000 pioneers, sappers and axemen, 500 *pakhālis* (men bringing water in large skins carried on animals), 3000 *aḥadīs*, 60 war elephants, and a great number of Brinjārīs (grain-carriers), Raverty, “Notes”, 22. There is a long account of the campaign, id., 23—28.

c26.47

Bījāpur, 1097 H., 1685-6. B.M. 1641, fol. 113a (sixteen entries), id. 138a, Khāfī Khān, ii, 322—368, *Maāsir-i-ʿĀlamgīrī*, 275.

c26.48

Gulkhandah, 1098 H., 1686-7, Abul-Ḥasan left Ḥaidarābād and took refuge in Gulkhandah in Zūl Qaʿdah 1097 H. Possession of Gulkhandah was obtained on the 24th Zūl Qaʿdah 1098, *Maāsir-i-A.*, 299. The siege lasted eight months and some days, id., 300. Description of the fort, id., 301. See also B.M. 1641, fol. 113a, (forty entries).

c26.49

Jinjī, 1105-9 H., 1693-7. Khāfī Kh. ii, 418, *Maāsir-i-ʿA.* 391.

c26.50

Khelnah, 1113 H., 1701-2. Khāfī Kh. ii, 499, *Maāsir-i-ʿA.*, 445—457.

c26.51

Kandānah, 1114 H., 1702-3. Khāfī Kh. ii, 510, *Maāsir-i-ʿA.* 469.

c26.52

Wākankherā, 1116 H., 1704-5. Khāfī Kh. ii, 527, *Maāsir-i-ʿA.* 490.

c26.53

Jaitpur. One of the best known sieges of the 18th century was that of Jaitpur in Bundelkhand, where Muḥammad Khān, Bangash, was invested by the Bundelahs aided by the Mahrattas. This siege is memorable, among other reasons, as the occasion on which the Mahrattas first took a prominent part in imperial politics north of the Narbadā. The siege lasted over three months, namely, from the 15th May to the 31st Aug. 1729. Chattarsāl, Bundelah, had submitted himself earlier in the year, and Muḥammad Khān, quite unsuspicious of danger, was out settling the country at the head of a small force. Suddenly he heard that a large Mahratta army, under Bājī Rāo and eleven other chiefs, was close at hand. From the 12th March to the 15th May, he maintained himself in his camp, but finally was forced to retreat on Jaitpur. There were no stores of food, and no time to provide any. Soon they were completely surrounded, but the Mahrattas, always poor hands at siege operations, made no impression on the place. They resolved to starve the garrison out. After a month or two there was no longer any grain for food. Recourse was then had to the slaughter of the horses and bullocks. Flour could not be procured even at one hundred rupees the seer; the only supplies were those furnished surreptitiously by the Mahrattas outside, and this flour was composed mainly of ground bones. Money was let down by a rope, and the corresponding amount of flour, at the rate of 100 rupees for a seer, was attached to the rope and drawn up. Many men died of starvation. But by Bājī Rāo’s orders, any man on giving up his arms was allowed to pass out unmolested. In the end only some thousand or twelve hundred men remained. At last Muḥammad Khān was forced to make terms and evacuate the fort (Journal A. S. B. for 1878, p. 300, and Mirāt-i-wāridāt, my copy, pp. 25, 26.

c26.54

Allahābād. This fortress was besieged twice in the 18th century, first in 1131 H. (1719) and again in 1163 H. (1750). On the first occasion the imperial forces were sent to eject the governor, Girdhar Bahādur; on the second, it was attacked by the Pathāns of Farrukhābād, when held by the officers of the then governor, Ṣafdar Jang, who was also ṣūbahdār of Audh and wazīr of the empire. The first investment lasted about nine and the second some seven months, but on neither occasion did the besiegers succeed in reducing the fort. In 1131 H. (1719) Girdhar Bahādur yielded on obtaining the government of Audh, and marched out with all the honours of war. In 1163 H. (1750) the Pathans, before they had made the least impression upon the fortress, were recalled hurriedly to defend their homes against a combined attack by Ṣafdar Jang and the Mahrattas.

c26.55

Bangarh. Almost the last expedition commanded by a Moghul emperor in person involved a siege. Between Abūl Manṣūr Khān, Ṣafdar Jang, governor of Audh, and ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān, Rohelah, a man who had recently risen to power in what we now call Rohilkhand, there had long been ill-blood from one cause and another. Now, Amīr Khān, ʿUmdat-ul-mulk, a favourite of Muḥammad Shāh, had been banished from court and sent as governor to Allāhābād, the boundary of which runs with Audh. With this noble Ṣafdar Jang struck up an intimacy. After a time, Amīr Khān was recalled to Dihlī, where he resolved to oust his enemy, the wazīr Qamr-ud-dīn Khān. For this purpose he sought the aid of Ṣafdar Jang, and caused the emperor to summon him from his government. Ṣafdar Jang was received with marked favour and appointed Mīr Ātash, or commander of the imperial artillery. Having secured influence at court, he proceeded to use it for the destruction of ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān. The latter had, however, a friend in the wazīr, with whom he had prudently formed a matrimonial connection. Meanwhile Ṣafdar Jang’s influence with the emperor was on the increase, and was crowned on the 25th June 1744 by the honour of a visit to his tents from Muḥammad Shāh in person.

c26.56

The importance of ejecting ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān was so fully impressed on the emperor, that for the first time in his reign he was persuaded to take the field in person. Amīr Khān and Ṣafdar Jang worked hard to secure this result, for without the emperor’s presence they could effect little or nothing. The wazīr, Qamr-ud-dīn Khān, was friendly to ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān, Qāim Jang, the nawāb of Farrukhābād, was in secret concert and alliance with him, and his army was efficient and well-equipped. On the 24th Muḥarram, 1158 H. (25th February 1745), making a pretext of a hunting expedition in the Lonī preserve, Muḥammad Shāh crossed the Jamnah, his real purpose being kept secret even from the wazīr.

c26.57

Omitting the intervening events, we pass on to the 21st Rabīʿ ii (May 22nd 1745), the day on which the army reached Budāon; and here Muḥammad Shāh effected a reconciliation between Qāim Jang and Ṣafdar Jang, which was ratified by an exchange of visits. All the same, Ṣafdar Jang continued actively to carry on the campaign. Then, seeing the imperial army so close to him, ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān quitted his abode at Anwalah, and took refuge in his stronghold of Bangarh, some kos to the south. To this place he was followed by the imperial army. On the one hand, the wazīr persisted that he could bring in ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān; on the other, Ṣafdar Jang urged that if he were given a free hand, he would soon overcome the rebel by force. To strengthen his position, Ṣafdar Jang also sent to Audh for reinforcements. His bakhshī, Naval Rāe, was ordered to march with this force by way of Shāhjahānpur to Bangarh.

c26.58

Bangarh was now surrounded by the imperialists. Kalyān Singh, rājah of Kumāon, who had recently suffered from an irruption of the Rohelahs, joined the army as an ally. Round the fort was a thick screen of bambus "through which the wind found its way with difficulty". Labourers and axemen were set to work to cut this hedge down, and batteries were erected. But the army and its commanders were only half-hearted in their exertions, many nobles had passed long years at court and had never seen a skirmish or heard the roar of cannon, and others again blamed the wazīr for bringing them to do a work which he did not care to do himself. The remarks just referred to caused great annoyance to Qamr-ud-dīn Khān; so much so, that Ḥaiyāt-ullah Khān, Hizbar Jang, (son of Saif-ud-Daulah Zakarīyah Khān, and son-in-law of the wazīr), begged urgently for leave to advance and end the matter.

c26.59

In spite of the overwhelming odds, ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān held his ground. Khūshḥāl Chand, although an imperial officer, cannot help admiring his courage. He also breaks forth into unstinted praise of the flourishing state of the Rohelah territory, the lands being fully cultivated, the crops good, the peasants well-off. Theft, outrage and highway-robbery were unknown within those boundaries. These results were the fruits of the ruler's strong reason and good understanding:

c26.60

"The fox carried off the morsel from the wolf,
For the former has great wits, the latter, little".

c26.61

One day ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān came out of the fort, and was attacked by one of Ṣafdar Jang's officers. Ṣafdar Jang mounted and was anxious to make an onset. Muḥammad Shāh thought this imprudent, when on the one side were the Moghuls (the wazīr's troops) and on the other the Pathāns (Qāim Jang and his men), neither of whom were to be trusted, and might act in collusion with the besieged. Several days elapsed. Then ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān fired some balls which fell in the camp of the nobles, some even coming near to the imperial enclosure "to make obeisance". Muḥammad Shāh sent for the wazīr and consulted. There was no want of men; one division by itself would have sufficed. Yet nothing was done. Once Muḥammad Shāh appealed to Rāe Hemrāj, a Saksena Kāyath, a mere clerk in the artillery office; "If I made over this business to you, how long would it take?" The kāyath replied: "Your Majesty's artillery is so powerful that I could reduce Bangarh to ashes in four ghari (about one and a half hours)". But the imperialists continued to discuss helplessly what should be done next. In this interval, Naval Rāe arrived with 20,000 horsemen and 40,000 infantry. Ṣafdar Jang went out a *kos* or two to meet him. Naval Rāe commenced the siege in earnest, and ‘Alī Muḥammad Khān began to think of flight or surrender. He sent an intimation to this effect to the wazīr, whose second son, Mu‘īn-ud-daulah (commonly called Mīr Mannū) was sent to talk the matter over. Having received a promise that his life would be spared, ‘Alī Muhammad Khān came to the Presence on the 3rd Jamadi i, 1158 H. (2nd June 1745), Khūshḥāl Chand, B.M. Or. 1844, foll. 164*a*—181*b*.

c26.62

*Agrah*. After their defeat by Aḥmad Shāh, Abdālī, in January 1761, the Mahrattas for a time quitted Northern India. Sūraj Mall of Bhartpur was then the only powerful ruler left from the gates of Dihlī to the banks of the Chambal. The only place of strength remaining to the Moghuls was the fort of Āgrah, and in 1763 Sūraj Mall determined to acquire it. Since 1754 the commander and troops had received no pay, living on the produce of what they sold from the magazines within the fort. Obviously such people would not be difficult to deal with. Sūraj Mall made a pretence of crossing to the north bank of the Jamnah, then turned suddenly and blockaded Āgrah. Still, he could never have taken the place, had it been in charge of a good commandant. At this time the command was held by a mere boy, and he was under the thumb of a subordinate, a greedy coward. From this traitor overtures were received, and the fort was given up. The blockade had lasted twenty days, but though the inhabitants of the city suffered from plundering, no damage had been done to the fort. Sūraj Mall is supposed to have carried off fifty lakhs of rupees from the town. “When Sūraj Mall took Āgrah, it had the most numerous and the best artillery in the kingdom, with powder, balls and bullets, and other goods of the Royal Wardrobe, collected during a long course of years. Everything was carried off. The best cannon were removed to Dīg and Bhartpur. Two years ago (1765?), Juwāhir Singh caused most of the houses to be demolished, imitating what had been done at Allāhābād, to allow room for the artillery to play. But the fort guns can do no harm as the bastions are so high. Nay, the *débris* of the houses could be used as ready-made entrenchments and batteries, to secure an approach to the main body of the place. The present commandant and the leaders of the Jāts know nothing of war, they are men of low extraction, owing their rise solely to their devotion to young Juwāhir Singh”, “Orme Collections”, p. 4303.

Linked texts (8)