The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c26.5

c26.5

Fitzclarence, “Journal”, 245, also enters at some length into the question. “The investment of an eastern fortress did not in general consist of anything beyond a blockade; and it will be seen by a reference to Indian history, that the surrender of these forts has been caused more by treachery and scarcity than by any other means, and that the length of some sieges in this country equal those of Troy, Ostend, and Mantua. The food of the Indians being almost entirely rice¹, which is the least perishable of any article of subsistence, the defence of such places may be the longer protracted. Though the natives did not understand the advantage of a glacis, still they saw the necessity of covering the foot of the wall from the enemy’s fire when exposed to it, and formed a defence similar to a fausse-braye, which they call rainee (see back, p. 265). They are very partial to loopholes to fire through, . . . . Each of these narrow and confined [entrance] lanes is generally enfiladed with guns and loopholed on every side, so that should the enemy force the outer gate, they find themselves exposed to a continuation of fresh dangers from an invisible garrison at every turn. I am not, however, a good judge of native fortresses, having only seen those of Chunar on the Ganges, of Alighur, of Agra, and Delhi. The gates at Agra, Alighur and Chunar are examples of this difficulty of entrance” ¹.