The Army of the Indian Moghuls: Its Organization and Administration c26.61

c26.61

One day ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān came out of the fort, and was attacked by one of Ṣafdar Jang's officers. Ṣafdar Jang mounted and was anxious to make an onset. Muḥammad Shāh thought this imprudent, when on the one side were the Moghuls (the wazīr's troops) and on the other the Pathāns (Qāim Jang and his men), neither of whom were to be trusted, and might act in collusion with the besieged. Several days elapsed. Then ʿAlī Muḥammad Khān fired some balls which fell in the camp of the nobles, some even coming near to the imperial enclosure "to make obeisance". Muḥammad Shāh sent for the wazīr and consulted. There was no want of men; one division by itself would have sufficed. Yet nothing was done. Once Muḥammad Shāh appealed to Rāe Hemrāj, a Saksena Kāyath, a mere clerk in the artillery office; "If I made over this business to you, how long would it take?" The kāyath replied: "Your Majesty's artillery is so powerful that I could reduce Bangarh to ashes in four ghari (about one and a half hours)". But the imperialists continued to discuss helplessly what should be done next. In this interval, Naval Rāe arrived with 20,000 horsemen and 40,000 infantry. Ṣafdar Jang went out a *kos* or two to meet him. Naval Rāe commenced the siege in earnest, and ‘Alī Muḥammad Khān began to think of flight or surrender. He sent an intimation to this effect to the wazīr, whose second son, Mu‘īn-ud-daulah (commonly called Mīr Mannū) was sent to talk the matter over. Having received a promise that his life would be spared, ‘Alī Muhammad Khān came to the Presence on the 3rd Jamadi i, 1158 H. (2nd June 1745), Khūshḥāl Chand, B.M. Or. 1844, foll. 164*a*—181*b*.