History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v4.c62.26

v4.c62.26

The relation of arthaśāstra to dharmaśāstra has now to be understood. As stated above rājadharma is a very important subject of dharma-śāstra. Arthaśāstra which is principally concerned with the rights, privileges and responsibilities of the ruler is therefore properly speaking a part of dharmaśāstra. As shown above it is supposed to have like dharmaśāstra a divine source. But works on arthaśāstra enter into great details about the government of a country in all its aspects, while dharmaśāstra works generally deal only with a few salient features of rājaśāstra. Just as the Kāmasūtra (I. 2. 14) states that dharma is the highest goal and kāma is the lowest of the three puruṣārthas (vide H. Dh. vol. II part 1 p. 9), so Arthaśāstra also sets the highest value on dharma. The Kauṭilīya states (III. 1. at end)¹⁶ 'In any matter where there is a conflict between dharmaśāstra and practices or between dharmaśāstra and any secular transaction, (the king) should decide that matter by relying on dharma. If śāstra comes in conflict with any rational and equitable rule then the latter shall be the deciding factor and the (strict) letter of the text will be nowhere'. But Kauṭilya and other writers on arthaśāstra lay the greatest emphasis on artha. In the eager and relentless pursuit of worldly prosperity means may be recommended or followed which may come in conflict with the strictly ethical standpoint of the dictates of dharmaśāstra. In such cases of conflict dharmaśāstra works lay down (e. g. Āp. Dh. I.9. 24. 23, Yāj. II. 21, Nārada, vyavahāramātṛkā chap. I. 39) that dharmaśāstra rules are to be preferred to the dictates of arthaśāstra. Viśvarūpa (on Yāj. II. 21) states that according to some predecessors of his the conflict between the dictates of dharmaśāstra and arthaśāstra is illustrated as follows. Manu VIII. 351 (which is the same as Viṣṇu-dharmasūtra V. 190 and Matsyapurāṇa 227. 116-117) when dealing with vyavahāra (a subject that pre-eminently belongs to arthaśāstra) provides that in killing an *ātatāyin*, no fault attaches to the killer: while Manu XI. 89 in the chapter on prāyaścittas (which is pre-eminently a topic of dharmaśāstra) states that no penance is prescribed (i. e. there is no prāyaścitta for removing the guilt) when a person of set purpose kills a brāhmaṇa. The result is that the latter rule prevails and sin is incurred by killing a brāhmaṇa even if the latter be an ātatāyin (though there may be no punishment by the king). Viśvarūpa does not accept this illustration. The Mitākṣarā also refers to this example, disapproves of it and gives its own example. The Arthaśāstra declares that a king should endeavour to secure friends, since the acquisition of friends is superior to the acquisition of gold and land (as is laid down in Yāj. I. 352). The rule of dharmaśāstra is that a king has to dispense justice, being free from anger and avarice and in accordance with dharmaśāstra. Therefore when a suit comes before a king he must decide it according to law, even though he may lose the friendship of a person if his decision goes against the latter. The Vīramitrodaya follows the Mitākṣarā. Dharmaśāstra went by the name of smṛti (Manu II. 10), while arthaśāstra was treated as an Upaveda. The Viṣṇupurāṇa III. 6. 28, Vāyu 61. 79 and Brahmāṇḍa 35. 88-89 mention the four Upavedas¹⁷ viz. Āyurveda, Dhanurveda, Gāndharvaveda and Arthaśāstra as affiliated to the four Vedas respectively viz. Ṛgveda, Yajurveda, Sāmaveda and Atharvaveda. Kauṭilya (I. 5) states that the king should listen to the recital of *itihāsa* in the latter part of the day and includes both dharmaśāstra and arthaśāstra under itihāsa¹⁸ and requires the minister knowing arthaśāstra to advise the king (with examples and precepts derived) from itihāsa and purāṇa.