History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v4.c63.t2.557

v4.c63.t2.557

The Tantravārtika of Kumārila has as usual a very long note on this discussion. He does not see eye to eye with Śabara. He says¹⁶³¹ that the Mīmāṁsā is concerned with the investigation of dharma, that śruti is the prime authority in matters of dharma, that Mīmāṁsā has concern with smṛtis only so far as their authoritativeness in matters of dharma goes, that just as agriculture and the like are not discussed in Mīmāṁsā works because they have a purely secular purpose, so all acts that men do for a visible worldly purpose have no bearing on the investigation of dharma and that therefore the bhāṣyakāra (Śabara) was not quite right in saying that such practices as rising to receive an old man or a teacher have a visible purpose and are authoritative on that ground. He further remarks that visible and invisible or spiritual purposes are often inextricably mixed up. When the Veda prescribes 'he pounds the grains of paddy' or enjoins a sacrifice like the Kārīrī for bringing down rain, there is a visible purpose therein (e.g. the rice grains have to be freed from husk before boiled rice for oblations can be prepared). So even when an act has a seen purpose it may still have Veda as the basis; so also an act such as rising to show respect to a teacher may have a seen result (such as the teacher being pleased teaches the pupils with enthusiasm) as well as an unseen result (viz. completion of Veda study without obstacles). Therefore he argues that all smṛtis¹⁶³² are authoritative according to the purpose they serve, that whatever portion of the smṛtis is concerned with *dharma* and *mokṣa* (final release from saṁsāra) has its origin in the Veda and whatever is concerned with wealth and the satisfaction of desires (*artha* and *kāma*) is based on worldly practices. In this way are to be explained the didactic portions of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas, the episodes in these being useful as *arthavādas* (eulogies of what are prescribed as religious duties), the description of the several divisions of the earth being useful for indicating what countries are suitable for the performance of dharma and the enjoyment of its rewards and being based partly on Veda and partly on direct experience. Similarly the auxiliary lores (*aṅgas*) of the Veda (such as phonetics, grammar, metrics &c.) are partly based on the Veda and partly on worldly experience. Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya (logic) are necessary for the correct interpretation and understanding of the Veda (as stated by Manu in XII. 105-106). He is even prepared to concede that systems¹⁶³³ like the Sāṅkhya (which postulates a prime cause of the world called *Pradhāna*) or Vedānta (which postulates Puruṣa as the cause of the world), the theory of atoms (propounded by Kaṇāda) serve the purpose of explaining the creation and dissolution of the world, lead one to understand how the performance of sacrifices gives rise to the subtle *apūrva* which leads on to heaven and also exemplify how human effort and fate have their own spheres of operation (i. e. without human effort the world is produced and in spite of human effort it may be dissolved). Kumārila goes a step further and states that even the Buddhist philosophies of *vijñāna* (cognitions being the only reality), of the non-existence of the soul or of eternal flux arise from the arthavāda passages of the Upaniṣads and serve the purpose of inducing men to give up extreme attachment to sensual pleasures, and therefore may be useful in their own way. He winds up by saying that in the case of all knowledge or works wherever the result (or reward) of the course laid down in them is to take place in the future and there is no possibility of experiencing its happening in the present such work may be deemed to be based on the Veda; but where, as in the science of medicine, the result can be seen taking place in other people, that knowledge is authoritative only because of the visible result.